Muhammad v. Gap Inc., No. 2:24-cv-3676 (2025)

Case details
Country
United States
Jurisdiction
Federal
Decided
2025
Disposition
Motion Granted
Majority
Douglas R. Cole (J.) (unanimous Court)
Muhammad v. Gap Inc., Slip Copy (2025) © 2025 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.12025 WL 1836657Only the Westlaw citation is currently available.United States District Court, S.D. Ohio, Eastern Division,EASTERN DIVISION.Haneef MUHAMMAD, Plaintiff,v.GAP INC., et al., Defendants.Case No. 2:24-cv-3676|Signed July 3, 2025Attorneys and Law FirmsHaneef Muhammad, Columbus, OH, Pro Se.Kevin L. Murch, Perez & Morris LLC, Columbus, OH, forDefendant Gap Inc., GPS Consumer Direct Inc.David A. Eberly, Eberly McMahon Copetas LLC, Cincinnati,OH, for Defendant Seth Vogelstein, Disability OccupationalConsultants.Samantha R. DeRoos, Barnes & Thornburg, LLP, Columbus,OH, Thomas G. Haskins Jr., Pro Hac Vice, Barnes &Thornburg LLP, Dallas, TX, for Defendant Verisk Analytics.Eric P. Mathisen, Pro Hac Vice, Eric Peter Mathisen, Ogletree,Deakins, Nash, Smoak & Stewart, P.C., Valparaiso, IN,Samuel H. Ottinger, Ogletree Deakins, Cleveland, OH, forDefendant The Hartford.OPINION AND ORDERDOUGLAS R. COLE, UNITED STATES DISTRICTJUDGE*1 Largely due to pro se Plaintiff Haneef Muhammad'slitigation tactics, what started as a relatively straightforwardcase has become a morass. This case is a year old and is still inthe motion-to-dismiss phase. Yet Muhammad has filed no lessthan thirty-seven motions, twenty-nine of which he recentlyfiled in a span of less than six weeks. Before that filing spree,most Defendants had either moved to dismiss or moved forjudgment on the pleadings on his Amended Complaint. Sincethen, though, Muhammad has moved four more times, in atwo-week span, to further amend his operative complaint.And he has also filed a flurry of other motions and motion-like filings of various names. Troublingly, the Court recentlydiscovered that at least some of these filings cite to cases—two of which Muhammad characterized as “controllingauthority”—that either do not appear to exist at all, or thatpurport to quote language that the Court cannot find in thecited decision.In short, there is a lot on the Court's plate. That said, forthe reasons discussed below, the Court GRANTS Gap'sand GPS's Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 41), GRANTS Verisk'sMotion to Dismiss (Doc. 42), and GRANTS Hartford'sMotion for Judgment on the Pleadings (Doc. 45), all of whichare directed at Muhammad's Amended Complaint (Doc. 33).The Court therefore DISMISSES that Amended ComplaintWITHOUT PREJUDICE.As to all other pending motions, including the motions forleave to file further amended complaints, the Court declines toreach them now. The Court intends to first explore its concernabout some of the case law cited in those filings. To thatend, the Court ORDERS Muhammad TO SHOW CAUSEin writing, as further described below, by July 11, 2025, whythe Court should not impose sanctions for his reliance onapparently fabricated cases. The Court specifically WARNSMuhammad that it is considering sanctions up to andincluding denial of his outstanding motions, dismissal of thisaction, designating Muhammad a vexatious litigator (therebysubjecting him to pre-filing restrictions), revocation of hisright to proceed pro se in this matter, monetary sanctions,or other sanctions, as appropriate. In addition to requiring awritten response, the Court also schedules a hearing for July16, 2025, to further address these matters.BACKGROUNDA. Procedural HistoryMuhammad initially filed this suit in the Franklin CountyCourt of Common Pleas. (See Notice of Removal, Doc. 1).But on July 8, 2024, Hartford removed the case to this Court.(Id.). Muhammad sought remand. (Doc. 9). But the DistrictJudge previously assigned to this case denied Muhammad'smotion to remand, finding that the Employment RetirementIncome Security Act (ERISA) of 1974, as amended, 29 U.S.C.§ 1001, et seq., completely preempts Muhammad's long-termdisability benefit-related claims. Those claims thus raisedfederal questions that both (1) supported removal, and (2)also provided a basis for the Court to assert supplementaljurisdiction over the remaining claims. (Doc. 62, #659–63).
Muhammad v. Gap Inc., Slip Copy (2025) © 2025 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.2*2 Once in federal court, a few Defendants named inMuhammad's original Complaint moved to dismiss. (Docs.2, 17, 18). But then, on September 11, 2024, Muhammedmoved for leave to file an Amended Complaint. (Docs. 32,33). The Magistrate Judge granted that motion, mootingthe then-pending motions to dismiss. (Order, Doc. 38). InMuhammad's Amended Complaint, he dropped a Defendant—Weeden—added a Defendant—GPS Consumer Direct, Inc.—and slightly modified some of his allegations and claims.(Compare Doc. 3, #166–69, with Doc. 33, #493–97).The Amended Complaint garnered various responses. Gapand GPS collectively moved to dismiss Count Two ofMuhammad's Amended Complaint—the only count theybelieve is directed at them. (Doc. 41). They arguethat Muhammad failed to state a plausible claim fordiscrimination, retaliation, or a hostile work environmentunder Title VII.1 (Id. at #537–39).Verisk likewise moved to dismiss. (Doc. 42). It argues thatthe Court lacks personal jurisdiction over the company. (Id. at#564–67). And beyond that, it argues that Muhammad failedto plausibly allege the sole claim he asserts against Verisk—defamation. (Id. at #567–69).Hartford, for its part, answered, (Doc. 40), and then moved forjudgment on the pleadings, (Doc. 45). In the latter, Hartfordargues that (1) ERISA preempts all of Muhammad's claimsagainst it, (2) Muhammad lacks standing to sue becausehe suffered no injury, (3) Muhammad's Australian causeof action is invalid (more on that later), and (4) even ifMuhammad properly pleaded an ERISA claim, the remedieshe seeks are unavailable. (Id. at #589–98).Dr. Vogelstein and Disability Occupational Consultants,meanwhile, answered, denying liability. (Doc. 43).Muhammad then filed a document purporting to both (1) replyto Defendants’ oppositions to the motion to remand, and (2)respond to the various Defendants’ motions to dismiss andmotion for judgment on the pleadings. (See Doc. 47). Hartfordreplied. (Doc. 49). So did Gap and GPS. (Doc. 50). Verisk didnot, but its time to do so under the local rules has long sincepassed. See S.D. Ohio Civ. R. 7.2(a)(2). So, as it stands, thosemotions are now ripe.But as it turns out, that was just the start of things.Since those motions were fully briefed, Muhammad hasgone on something of a filing spree. Nearly six monthsafter Defendants’ various motions challenging his AmendedComplaint became ripe, Muhammad filed four additionalmotions for leave to amend, and re-amend, and re-re-amendhis already-once-amended complaint. (Docs. 65, 66, 67, 68).In the first two motions, he sought leave to file a secondamended complaint containing eight counts (notwithstandingthe two separate motions, the Court could not identifyany differences between the two versions of the proposedcomplaint). (Docs. 65, 66). Then a week later, he soughtleave to file a “corrected” second amended complaint, whichincludes fourteen counts (although the last one is labeledas a second count VIII). (Doc. 67). And the passage ofanother week brought a renewed request to file yet anothercomplaint, (Doc. 68), this one labeled a third amendedcomplaint, (Doc. 68-1), which includes eighteen counts.Interestingly, among the fourteen new proposed claims areclaims he earlier had expressly said he did not intend to assert,(compare Doc. 47, #611 (“The Plaintiff is not alleging anERISA violation by the Hartford.”), with Doc. 68-1, #722(asserting an ERISA violation against the Hartford)). Thatall happened in the last few weeks of May. In the brief timesince then, Verisk, Hartford, and Gap/GPS have all opposedMuhammad's motions for leave to file based on undue delay,prejudice, and futility. (Docs. 74, 91, 93).*3 But there's more. Starting on May 31, 2025, Muhammadpicked up the pace of his filings. He moved that day for“declaratory and equitable relief to rescind or reform asettlement agreement and general release.” (Doc. 69, #729).As far as the Court can tell, he takes issue with a settlementagreement he signed in a separate case from 2023, whichalso apparently involved the Hartford. (See id. at #729–30). Muhammad says the agreement was “entered into underconditions of fraud, misrepresentation, undue influence, andunconscionability.” (Id. at #729).Ten days after filing the declaratory judgment motion, onJune 10, 2025, Muhammad moved (twice) for what hecharacterized as “emergency” relief, asking the Court torescind the 2023 settlement agreement. (Docs. 76, 78). Andhe also moved for leave to supplement the emergencymotions. (Doc. 80). Because Muhammad had now assertedan “emergency,” the Court, on the same day that Muhammadfiled those two motions, set a telephonic status conference forroughly a week later—June 18, 2025—to discuss the issue.(6/10/25 Notice of Telephone Conference). The Court did sodespite being unable to identify any harm Muhammad hadraised in his various filings that could not be remedied by
Muhammad v. Gap Inc., Slip Copy (2025) © 2025 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.3damages if he succeeded on any of his claims. Then, perhapsemboldened by the Court's entry setting the matter for a statusconference on his request for emergency relief, Muhammadfurther supplemented those filings, (Docs. 83, 85), and alsomoved for sanctions, (Doc. 84).But before the telephonic conference could occur,Muhammad's attention shifted. He filed new motions foremergency relief but now did so based on an unsignedsettlement agreement that seems to pertain to a state-courtcase in which he's also involved with several of the sameDefendants named here. Specifically, Muhammad appears tobelieve that the yet-to-be-executed agreement in that casedeprives him of various federal rights. (See, e.g., Doc. 86-1,#1087–88). So he's filed several supplemental emergencymotions centered on that settlement agreement. (Docs. 86, 88,89).With that flurry of motions piling up over a short period, anda call already set to discuss the need for any emergency relief,the Court, on Friday, June 13, 2025, ordered Muhammad tocease filing additional documents for the five days (includinga weekend) remaining before the status conference. (6/13/25Not. Order). Suffice to say that Order did not have its intendedeffect. In response to it, Muhammad filed a “Declaration ofNon-Apperance [sic]” and refused to appear at the telephonicstatus conference based on purported concerns about his“personal safety.” (Doc. 92, #1198). He also apparently filedsomething (the Court is not entirely clear what) with boththe Sixth Circuit and the Department of Justice raising hisconcerns.2 (Id.).True to his word, Muhammad did not appear at the telephonicstatus conference. (6/18/25 Minutes & Order). So, unable todetermine what exactly Muhammad was seeking in termsof emergency relief, and still seeing no potential irreparableharm, the Court denied his various emergency motionswithout prejudice. (Id.).In the short time since, Muhammad has continued to fileabundant motions and notices. (Docs. 95, 96, 97, 98, 99, 100,101, 102, 103, 105, 106, 109, 110, 111, 112). Troublingly,the Court's initial review of those filings suggests thatMuhammad may be putting false legal citations before theCourt. The Court offers a more robust list of examples below.For now, the Court simply notes that, in his Motion forRecusal (Doc. 96), Muhammad cites two cases as “controllingauthority”: Scott v. City of Columbus Legal Department, No.2:21-cv-5543, 2022 WL 2828015 (S.D. Ohio July 20, 2022),and Humphrey v. U.S. Attorney General's Office, No. 2:15-cv-746, 2016 WL 740653 (S.D. Ohio Feb. 25, 2016). (Id. at#1237). So far as the Court can tell, neither exists.B. Factual Allegations in Muhammad's AmendedComplaint*4 Putting aside for the moment the procedural goingson, what is this case actually about? As noted, Muhammadrecently moved for leave to file a proposed third amendedcomplaint (TAC). At this point, though, Muhammad'sAmended Complaint is still the operative pleading. So inrelaying the relevant factual allegations, the Court relies onthat filing. That said, the factual allegations in the AmendedComplaint and proposed TAC largely overlap (the proposedTAC omits a few factual details and adds a few, but it mostlyadds new causes of action). (Compare Doc. 33, with Doc.68-1).Muhammad's claims are not the model of clarity. But fromwhat the Court can glean, they all seem to stem from ashoulder injury he says he incurred while working for Gap.Take his allegations against the various Defendants in turn.Start with Muhammad's claims against Dr. Vogelsteinand Disability Occupational Consultants. After Muhammadallegedly incurred the above-mentioned injury, he apparentlyfiled a Bureau of Workers’ Compensation claim. (See Ex.B, Doc. 3-2, #206–12).3 In response to that claim, Gap'sattorney, Elizabeth Weeden,4 appears to have requested anindependent medical exam of Muhammad by Dr. Vogelstein,who ostensibly either works for or contracts with DisabilityOccupational Consultants. (See id.). During that medicalexam, Dr. Vogelstein allegedly “perform[ed] movements” ofMuhammad's arm, shoulder, and back that caused pain. (Am.Compl., Doc. 33, #497). And when Muhammad objected, Dr.Vogelstein purportedly ignored Muhammad's “pleas of pain,”continuing the exam. (Id.).Apart from the exam, Muhammad is also unhappy withDr. Vogelstein's resulting medical report, which states thatMuhammad is “a rather poor historian, with his verbal historydiffering from the medical records.” (Id.; Doc. 3-2, #210).Muhammad says that comment “accus[es] [him] of lying” andevinces either prejudice or discrimination on Dr. Vogelstein'spart. (Doc. 33, #497). Muhammad also seems to press adefamation claim (again, the Complaint is not the model ofclarity) against Dr. Vogelstein based on that accusation. (Id.at #494). He says the report was “malicious” and “intended
Muhammad v. Gap Inc., Slip Copy (2025) © 2025 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.4to injure [Muhammad's] reputation by claiming [he] was ...lying about accidents and injuries though there is evidence tosupport the injuries.” (Id.).Dr. Vogelstein, however, isn't the only Defendant toallegedly defame Muhammad. So too did Verisk. Here,Muhammad points to an ISO ClaimSearch report—a reportthat summarizes an individual's worker's compensation claimhistory—which lists Muhammad's score as “999.” (Id. at#494; see also Ex. A, Doc. 3-1, #171–204). That score,according to Muhammad, “reflect[s] upon his character”because it means he has “a high risk of insurance fraud.” (Doc.33, #494). So Muhammad claims the ISO ClaimSearch report,like Dr. Vogelstein's medical report, was “malicious” and“intended to injure [his] reputation by claiming that the [he]was committing fraud.” (Id.). And he adds that Verisk refusedto submit any actual evidence of insurance fraud. (Id.).*5 Now consider Muhammad's claims against Gap andGPS.5 At the outset, he seems to be suing those entitiesfor defamation too. In connection with his ISO ClaimSearchallegations, Muhammad claims that “Weeden on behalf ofGAP/GPS” submitted both the ISO ClaimSearch report andDr. Vogelstein's report to the Industrial Commission of Ohio.(Id.). In doing so, Weeden allegedly “attempt[ed] to convincethe [Industrial Commission] hearing officer” that Muhammadwas trying to commit insurance fraud, which brought him“ridicule, hatred, and contempt.” (Id.).The thrust of Muhammad's remaining allegations against Gapand GPS, center on his termination from Gap. According toMuhammad, Gap terminated him on October 22, 2023, andclaimed it was because he did “not return[ ] to work in a timelyfashion.” (Doc. 33, #495 (purporting to quote Ex. D, Doc. 3-4,#217)). But Muhammad takes issue with that justification. Healleges that the termination was somehow illegal because Gapknew he had a torn rotator cuff.6 (Doc. 33, #495). Beyondthat, Muhammad believes Gap and GPS unlawfully billedhim $2,462 in unpaid health insurance premiums. (Id.). Andhe says that bill was meant to force him to take an “unfairsettlement offer” (an offer the Court understands to relate toa pending state-court case, (see Doc. 93, #1217 n.2)). (Doc.33, #495). All told, Muhammad asserts that Gap and GPSengaged in discrimination and retaliation based on his race,sex, and religion when it terminated him and billed him forinsurance premiums. (Id. at #495–96).Apparently, though, Gap reinstated Muhammad as anemployee. (Resp., Doc. 47, #613). In light of that, Muhammadalso seems to raise a hostile work environment claim againstGap and GPS, claiming that their treatment of him duringthe termination ordeal has made him “afraid to return towork.” (Doc. 33, #496).That leaves the allegations against Hartford. As a result ofMuhammad's employment at Gap, he was covered by theGroup Policy (the Policy) that Hartford issued to Gap tofund long-term disability benefits. (Hartford Answer, Doc.40, #521–22). In October 2023, Muhammad submitted aclaim under the Policy for long-term disability benefits.(Doc. 33, #496). Hartford initially denied that claim, findingthat Muhammad wasn't an “active employee” as the Policydefined the term. (Id.). So Muhammad appealed. (Id.). Inresponse, Hartford partially approved Muhammad's disabilitybenefits claim for certain of his cited medical conditions. (Seeid.; see also Doc. 40, #522).Based on that approval, Hartford provided Muhammada calculation of his benefits. (Doc. 40, #522). In thatcalculation, Hartford explained that it would, under thePolicy, deduct from Muhammad's monthly long-termdisability benefit payment the worker's compensation benefitsit believed he was receiving. (Id.; see also Doc. 33, #496(claiming that “Hartford did deny [Muhammad's] claimagain in bad faith by claiming [he] was receiving workerscompensation benefits”)). Unhappy with that, Muhammadagain challenged Hartford's determination. (Doc. 33, #496).And eventually, Hartford overturned its decision to deduct theworker's compensation amount from Muhammad's long-termdisability benefit payment. (Id.; see also Doc. 40, #523).*6 Muhammad alleges that during the process of obtaininghis long-term disability benefits, Hartford instructed itsemployees to hang up on him and not communicate with him.(Doc. 33, #496). And he says Hartford refused to provide himan independent medical peer review report that Dr. Annie R.Layno-Moses had authored in connection with his benefitsappeals. (Id.; see also Doc. 40, #524). Muhammad complainsthat Hartford's actions were taken in bad faith, resulting in adelay in his benefits decision and causing him mental anguish.(Doc. 33, #496). And he believes that Hartford, in taking theseactions, intended to discriminate against him based on hisrace, sex, and religion. (Id. at #496–97).All told, the Court understands Muhammad's AmendedComplaint to raise the following claims: (1) a state-law defamation against Verisk, Dr. Vogelstein, DisabilityOccupational Consultants, Gap, and GPS (Count One);
Muhammad v. Gap Inc., Slip Copy (2025) © 2025 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.5(2) Title VII discrimination, retaliation, and hostile workenvironment claims against Gap and GPS (Count Two); (3)state-law claims for wrongful denial of long-term disabilitybenefits, bad faith, and emotional distress, and a federaldiscrimination claim against Hartford (Count Three); and(4) a state and/or federal discrimination claim against Dr.Vogelstein (Count Four).Muhammad's proposed TAC, which includes the most recentrendition of his allegations, but which is not yet the operativecomplaint, includes largely the same factual allegations,though he adds a few facts (e.g., that he's a “Black, Muslim,male”), (Doc. 68-1, #718), and drops a few facts (e.g.,that Hartford reinstated his disability benefits and that Dr.Vogelstein allegedly harmed him during the medical exam).Perhaps most notably, the proposed TAC alleges a host of newcauses of action, adding fourteen new counts for a total ofeighteen claims: Title VII Discrimination against Gap, GPS,and Hartford (Count I); Title VII Retaliation against Gapand GPS (Count II); defamation against Gap, Verisk, and Dr.Vogelstein (Count III); wrongful termination in violation ofpublic policy against Gap (Count IV); intentional infliction ofemotional distress against GAP, Dr. Vogelstein, and Hartford(Count V); breach of contract and bad faith denial ofbenefits against Hartford (Count VI); 42 U.S.C. § 1981race discrimination against GAP, GPS, and Hartford (CountVII); state and federal civil conspiracy against GAP, Dr.Vogelstein, and Hartford (Count VIII); obstruction of justiceand retaliatory litigation tactics against all Defendants (CountIX); fraudulent misrepresentation against Hartford and Gap(Count X); violation of ERISA against Hartford (Count XI);tortious interference with prospective economic advantageagainst all Defendants (Count XII); negligence againstVerisk, ISO,7 Vogelstein, and Gap (Count XIII); negligentinfliction of emotional distress against all Defendants (CountXIV); fraudulent inducement against Gap (Count XV); civilconspiracy against Gap and Hartford (Count XVI); bad faithsettlement practices against Gap (Count XVII); and attemptedinvoluntary waiver of civil rights against Gap (Count XVIII).(Id. at #718–24).LEGAL STANDARDThe currently operative Amended Complaint has three typesof motions pending against it—a motion to dismiss on themerits, a motion for judgment on the pleadings, and amotion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction. The Courtdiscusses the standards for each (although the Court addressesthe first two jointly), and then adds a word about generalconsiderations that apply to pro se litigants.A. Rule 12(b)(6) and Rule 12(c) Standard.*7 A motion for judgment on the pleadings under FederalRule of Civil Procedure 12(c) “is appropriately granted whenno material issue of fact exists and the party making themotion is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Tucker v.Middleburg-Legacy Place, LLC, 539 F.3d 545, 549 (6th Cir.2008) (cleaned up). To make that determination, the Courtapplies the same standards applicable to resolving motions todismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). Id.To survive a motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of CivilProcedure 12(b)(6), a “complaint must present sufficient factsto ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’ ”Robbins v. New Cingular Wireless PCS, LLC, 854 F.3d 315,319 (6th Cir. 2017) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). “A claim has facial plausibility whenthe plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court todraw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable forthe misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662,678 (2009). In assessing plausibility, the Court “construe[s]the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.”Bassett v. Nat'l Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, 528 F.3d 426, 430(6th Cir. 2008) (cleaned up). That is so, however, only as towell-pleaded factual allegations. The Court need not acceptas true any legal conclusions alleged in a complaint; “labelsand conclusions” or a “formulaic recitation of the elementsof a cause of action” will not suffice. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678(cleaned up). And while well-pleaded allegations are acceptedas true, they are just that—allegations.A court analyzing a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6)generally must confine its review to the pleadings. Armengauv. Cline, 7 F. App'x 336, 343 (6th Cir. 2001). That said, if “acourt may consider exhibits attached to the complaint, publicrecords, items appearing in the record of the case, and exhibitsattached to defendant's motion to dismiss, so long as theyare referred to in the complaint and are central to the claimscontained therein, without converting the motion to one forsummary judgment.” Gavitt v. Born, 835 F.3d 623, 640 (6thCir. 2016).B. Rule 12(b)(2) Standard.Motions to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(2) for want of personaljurisdiction are governed by a slightly different standard.For challenges to personal jurisdiction, “[t]he plaintiff bears
Muhammad v. Gap Inc., Slip Copy (2025) © 2025 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.6the burden of establishing that [such] jurisdiction exists.”Theunissen v. Matthews, 935 F.2d 1454, 1458 (6th Cir. 1991).The nature of the burden turns on how the Court chooses, inits discretion, to handle the motion. Malone v. Stanley Black& Decker, Inc., 965 F.3d 499, 505 (6th Cir. 2020). Beforetrial, a court may decide to resolve the question on the writtensubmissions, to permit additional discovery, or to hold anevidentiary hearing. Id. If an evidentiary hearing is held, “theplaintiff may not stand on his pleadings but must, by affidavitor otherwise, set forth specific facts showing that the court hasjurisdiction” by a preponderance-of-the-evidence standard.Theunissen, 935 F.2d at 1458, 1465. But if the Court “ruleson written submissions alone, the burden consists of a primafacie showing that personal jurisdiction exists.” Schneider v.Hardesty, 669 F.3d 693, 697 (6th Cir. 2012) (cleaned up).And a plaintiff may rely on just his allegations to meet thatprima facie burden. Malone, 965 F.3d at 505. In other words,when the Court opts not to hold a hearing, it rules on aRule 12(b)(2) motion based on the factual allegations in theoperative complaint without consideration of any affidavit ordeclaration contradicting those jurisdictional allegations. Id.C. Pro Se Litigant Standard.*8 Finally, a word on the standards that apply to pro selitigants. Ordinarily, a pro se litigant's pleadings should beconstrued liberally and are subject to less stringent standardsthan formal pleadings filed by attorneys. Haines v. Kerner,404 U.S. 519, 520–21 (1972); Franklin v. Rose, 765 F.2d 82,84–85 (6th Cir. 1985). But Muhammad is no ordinary prose litigant. As this case alone demonstrates, he's capable ofmanufacturing lengthy and multitudinous filings. And this isnot his first rodeo. He's had his share of experience in statecourt, (see Doc. 91, #1181 (listing Muhammad's various statecases)), and in federal court, see, e.g., Muhammad v. Gibson,No. 2:21-cv-4165 (S.D. Ohio Oct. 18, 2022); Muhammadv. PNC Fin. Servs., No. 2:24-cv-3934 (S.D. Ohio May 6,2025). And in any event, even pro se litigants still mustcomply with the procedural rules that govern civil cases.McNeil v. United States, 508 U.S. 106, 113 (1993). That is,“[t]he liberal treatment of pro se pleadings does not requirelenient treatment of substantive law.” Johnson v. Stewart, No.08-1521, 2010 WL 8738105, at *3 (6th Cir. May 5, 2010). Nordoes Muhammad's pro se status relieve him of his obligationsof candor and truthfulness to the Court. See, e.g., Kendrick v.Sec'y, Fla. Dep't of Corr., No. 21-12686, 2022 WL 2388425,at *3 (11th Cir. July 1, 2022) (“[Pro se litigants] owe the sameduty of candor to the court as imposed on any other litigant.”).LAW AND ANALYSISAs the above recounting suggests, there are many pendingmotions and motion-like filings in this case.8 That said, thecurrently operative complaint is the Amended Complaint,which Defendants have moved to dismiss on various grounds.So the Court starts there. As to that version of the complaint,the Court agrees that it fails, for one reason or another, asagainst any Defendant. So the Court dismisses it. But thatis not the end of the story. Among other things, Muhammadhas since moved twice (or arguably three times, dependingon how one counts the proposed “corrected” second amendedcomplaint, which adds new claims beyond those in theoriginal proposed second amended complaint) to furtheramend his already Amended Complaint. He has presented ahost of other filings, as well. But rather than address the meritsof these filings, the Court elects to hold them in abeyance fornow, pending further exploration of some apparent errors andomissions in Muhammad's filings.A. Muhammad's Amended Complaint Falls ShortAgainst All Defendants.1. Muhammad Failed to Plausibly Allege His ClaimsAgainst Gap and GPS.Up first are Muhammad's claims against Gap and GPS. TheCourt understands Muhammad to press four claims againstthem in his Amended Complaint: a state-law defamationclaim, and Title VII discrimination, retaliation, and hostilework environment claims.Start with the Title VII claims. To survive a motion todismiss, Muhammad need not prove a prima facie caseof discrimination, retaliation, or hostile work environment.Ogbonna-McGruder v. Austin Peay State Univ., 91 F.4th833, 839, 842 (6th Cir. 2024), cert. denied, 144 S. Ct. 2689(2024); Demers v. Ohio C.R. Comm'n, No. 2:23-cv-940,2023 WL 7222842, at *3 (S.D. Ohio Nov. 1, 2023). But fordiscrimination or retaliation, he must at least allege facts fromwhich the Court can reasonably infer that such discriminationor retaliation occurred. See Keys v. Humana, Inc., 684F.3d 605, 610 (6th Cir. 2012). And for the hostile workenvironment claim, Muhammad must plausibly allege that his“workplace is permeated with discriminatory intimidation,ridicule, and insult that is sufficiently severe or pervasive toalter the conditions of [his] employment and create an abusive
Muhammad v. Gap Inc., Slip Copy (2025) © 2025 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.7working environment.” Ogbonna-McGruder, 91 F.4th at 839(quotation omitted).*9 Muhammad did not meet those standards. Consider firstthe discrimination claim. Other than alleging Gap's statedreason for terminating him—not returning to work in a timelyfashion—was false, (Doc. 33, #494–95), Muhammad offersno facts to support a discrimination claim. He merely says thathe is “of a protected class,” and despite being “overqualifiedfor his position,” Gap terminated him unjustly. (Id. at #495).Those conclusory allegations don't provide the Court with anyfacts from which it can infer that discrimination occurred.Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. What's more, Muhammad neglected toallege his race or religion.9 And he admitted that he does notknow who filled his position at Gap, (Doc. 33, #495), whichmeans the Court cannot reasonably infer that Gap treated non-protected individuals more favorably—the very essence of adiscrimination claim.The retaliation claim suffers from similar defects.Muhammad complains that Gap billed him for unpaid healthinsurance premiums and tried to force him to accept anunfair settlement offer. (Id.). But without more, the Courtcannot reasonably infer that this conduct (if it occurred)represented retaliation. To start, Muhammad did not allegewhat protected activity he undertook that supposedly led Gapto retaliate against him.10 And even if the Court liberallyreads the Amended Complaint as pointing to his filing ofa worker's compensation claim or his filing of this lawsuitas the allegedly protected activities, that still doesn't cutit. Muhammad offered nothing from which the Court canreasonably infer that either of those activities caused Gap toretaliate. Indeed, even reading the Amended Complaint inthe light most favorable to Muhammad, it seems that Gapterminated him because he did not return to work after amedical leave of absence in accordance with Gap's policy,and that Gap billed him because he failed to pay insurancepremiums related to that medical leave. (See id. at #495; seealso Doc. 3-4, #217). Muhammad has offered no facts fromwhich the Court can reasonably conclude otherwise.The hostile work environment claim likewise fails becauseMuhammad alleged no facts whatsoever concerning hisworkplace. He merely says that Gap's treatment of him—i.e., terminating him and billing him for unpaid insurancepremiums—“has made the work environment hostile” andthat he's “afraid to return to work.” (Doc. 33, #496).Those conclusory allegations say nothing about whether hisworkplace is “permeated with discriminatory intimidation,ridicule, and insult” or about the severity of the perceivedhostility. Ogbonna-McGruder, 91 F.4th at 839. In short,Muhammad has not plausibly alleged any of his Title VIIclaims.Turn to the defamation claim. Gap and GPS did not addressthat claim in their motion to dismiss, which is perhapsunderstandable given the Amended Complaint's generallack of clarity about which claims it asserts against whichDefendants. That said, Muhammad alleges that Weeden,“on behalf of GAP/GPS did submit the ISO Claim searchand Dr. Vogelstein's report to the Industrial Commission ofOhio,” which allegedly caused him “ridicule, hatred, andcontempt.” (Doc. 33, #494). Giving Muhammad the benefitof the doubt, it seems he is raising a defamation claim againstGap and GPS. But even assuming that is so, that claimlikewise fails.Under Ohio law, a court decides “as a matter of law whethercertain statements alleged to be defamatory are actionable ornot.” Am. Chem. Soc'y v. Leadscope, Inc., 978 N.E.2d 832,853 (Ohio 2012) (quotation omitted). A false (i.e., actionable)statement is one “that sets forth matters which are not trueor statements without grounds in truth or fact.” Carr v.Educ. Theatre Ass'n, 215 N.E.3d 584, 589 (Ohio Ct. App.2023) (cleaned up). A statement is not “false” even if “it ismisleading and fails to disclose all relevant facts,” so long asthe statement “has some truth in it.” Id. (cleaned up).*10 Here, the ISO ClaimSearch report that gave Muhammada ClaimDirector Score of “999” isn't an actionable defamatorystatement. Muhammad says that the report, in essence,was saying he has a “high risk of insurance fraud.” (Doc.33, #494). But the report (which Muhammad attached tohis original Complaint and references in his AmendedComplaint) nowhere uses the phrase “high risk of insurancefraud.” (See Doc. 3-1). Rather, the report identifies up totwenty-five of Muhammad's previous worker's compensationclaims that are “similar” to his present claim and calculatesa score accordingly. (See Doc. 3-1, #171). It's therefore hardto see how the report is “malicious,” as Muhammad puts it,(Doc. 33, #494), or how it is “without grounds in truth or fact,”as Ohio case law puts it, Carr, 215 N.E.3d at 589. In otherwords, the ClaimDirector Score isn't defamatory.The Court therefore GRANTS Gap's and GPS's Motionto Dismiss (Doc. 41), and DISMISSES WITHOUTPREJUDICE Muhammad's Amended Complaint againstthose Defendants.
Muhammad v. Gap Inc., Slip Copy (2025) © 2025 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.82. Muhammad's Complaint Does Not Make a PrimaFacie Showing of Personal Jurisdiction Over Verisk.Turn to Verisk, which challenges Muhammad's AmendedComplaint in two ways. First, Verisk argues that Muhammadfailed to establish that Verisk is subject to personaljurisdiction in this Court. (Doc. 42, #564–67). Second, Verisksays the Amended Complaint did not allege facts sufficient tostate a defamation claim (which the Court agrees is the onlyclaim asserted against Verisk). (Id. at #567–69). Because theCourt agrees with Verisk on the first ground, it need not reachthe second.Personal jurisdiction comes in two flavors: general andspecific. Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown,564 U.S. 915, 919 (2011). Muhammad's allegations donot make a prima facie showing of either. Starting withthe former, the Court lacks general personal jurisdictionover Verisk since it is not “at home” in Ohio. Id. at 924.Indeed, neither Muhammad's Amended Complaint nor hisopposition mention anything about Verisk's domicile at all.(See generally Docs. 33, 47). In other words, Muhammadhas not made a prima facie showing of general personaljurisdiction.Turn to specific personal jurisdiction. Here, Verisk arguesthat Muhammad's Amended Complaint did not allege anyfacts showing that Verisk purposefully availed itself of thebenefits and consequences of acting in Ohio. (Doc. 42,#566). And as Verisk correctly notes, without “purposefulavailment,” specific personal jurisdiction is lacking. AirProds. & Controls, Inc. v. Safetech Int'l, Inc., 503 F.3d 544,550 (6th Cir. 2007) (outlining the three-part test to determinewhether a court can exercise specific personal jurisdiction).The Court agrees with Verisk that Muhammad's allegationsfall short of establishing specific personal jurisdiction.Muhammad bases his defamation claim on Verisk publishingan allegedly defamatory ISO ClaimSearch report. (Doc.33, #494). Problematically, though, the Complaint nowheredescribes any affiliation between Ohio and that underlyingcontroversy. Goodyear, 564 U.S. at 919. The closestMuhammad comes is alleging that Verisk published the ISOClaimSearch report, which other Defendants then accessedand disseminated. (Doc. 33, #494). But that raises twoproblems. First, the unilateral activities of other partiescannot establish that Verisk purposely availed itself of Ohio'sprivileges and consequences. Air Prods. & Controls, 503 F.3dat 551. Second, Verisk publishing a report that professionalswho handle insurance claims can access is akin to operatinga passive website, and does not, by itself, show that Veriskpurposefully availed itself of the forum. See Concord MusicGrp., Inc. v. Anthropic PBC, 738 F. Supp. 3d 973, 986 (M.D.Tenn. 2024); see also Carbone v. Kaal, __ F.4th __, 2025WL 1720375, at *5 (6th Cir. 2025) (finding that web servers’location in Ohio was insufficient to establish a “substantialconnection” with the forum state (quotation omitted)). Alltold, none of Muhammad's allegations link Verisk to Ohio atall. And that means he hasn't met his burden in making a primafacie showing of specific personal jurisdiction. Theunissen,935 F.2d at 1458; Schneider, 669 F.3d at 697.*11 So the Court GRANTS Verisk's Motion to Dismiss(Doc. 42), and DISMISSES WITHOUT PREJUDICEMuhammad's Amended Complaint against it.3. ERISA Preempts Muhammad's State-Law ClaimsAgainst Hartford, and He Also Failed to State aFederal Discrimination Claim.That leaves Hartford's motion for judgment on the pleadings,which mounts four arguments: (1) ERISA expressly preemptsall Muhammad's claims against Hartford, (2) Muhammadlacks standing to sue because he suffered no injury, (3)the Australian anti-discrimination law Muhammad cited isan invalid cause of action, and (4) even if Muhammadproperly pleaded an ERISA claim, the remedies he seeks areunavailable. (Doc. 45, #589–98). Ultimately, the Court agreesthat Hartford is entitled to judgment as a matter of law onMuhammad's preempted state-law claims: wrongful denialof long-term disability benefits, bad faith, and emotionaldistress. And while the Court isn't convinced ERISA preemptsMuhammad's federal discrimination claim, he failed toplausibly allege that claim.Start with ERISA's preemption scheme. Two types of ERISApreemption exist: “complete preemption under 29 U.S.C. §1132(a) and express preemption under 29 U.S.C. § 1144.”Loffredo v. Daimler AG, 500 F. App'x 491, 500 (6th Cir.2012) (Moore, J., concurring in the judgment). Completepreemption permits removal of state-law claims to federalcourt because completely preempted state-law claims “are,in fact, federal claims.” Id. Express preemption, by contrast,allows for dismissal of claims (but not removal) because it isa type of defense. Id. Ultimately, which type of preemptionapplies “affects how the federal court should treat that claim.”Id.
Muhammad v. Gap Inc., Slip Copy (2025) © 2025 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.9Here, Hartford argues that ERISA expressly preemptsMuhammad's state-law claims under § 1144, and that theCourt should therefore dismiss those claims. (Doc. 45, #591–95). The problem, though, is that Harford has already argued,and the Court has already agreed, that ERISA completelypreempts Muhammad's state-law claims here under § 1132(a).Indeed, in denying Muhammad's motion for remand, theDistrict Judge then assigned to this case determined thatcomplete preemption is what allowed Hartford to removethe case in the first instance. (Doc. 62, #659–62). Thatmeans Muhammad's completely preempted state-law claimsare actually federal claims, and that the Court must “treatthem as such, evaluating them as ERISA claims.” Loffredo,500 F. App'x at 500. Hartford's express-preemption argument,in other words, doesn't work at this juncture since expresspreemption acts as a defense to state-law claims, not federalones.The problem for Muhammad is that, once his wrongful denialof long-term disability benefits, bad faith, and emotionaldistress claims are properly analyzed as federal ERISAclaims, they still fail. For one, Muhammad has adamantlydeclared that he “is not alleging an ERISA violation by [ ]Hartford.” (Doc. 47, #611). That declaration, to be clear,does not impact the complete-preemption analysis, whichturns on the nature of the asserted claims; but the statementdoes suggest that it would be “futile” to grant Muhammadleave to amend his Complaint to “re-plead those claims toconform with ERISA.” Loffredo, 500 F. App'x at 500. Foranother, even if Muhammad did attempt to re-plead thoseclaims to assert an ERISA claim, the remedies he seeks areunavailable. Muhammad admits that his long-term disabilitybenefits claim “was reinstated,” meaning that he's receivingall the benefits to which he's entitled. (Doc. 33, #496).The compensatory and punitive damages he seeks, then,seem to pertain only to the bad faith, delay, and emotionaldistress he incurred while obtaining those benefits. (See id.at #496–97). But ERISA does not provide for those typesof remedies. Lewandowski v. Occidental Chem. Corp., 986F.2d 1006, 1010 (6th Cir. 1993) (“ERISA does not remedyprocedural violations with a damage award.”); Haviland v.Metro. Life Ins. Co., 876 F. Supp. 2d 946, 963 (E.D. Mich.2012) (collecting cases) (explaining that “compensatory andconsequential damages ... are not available under ERISA”),aff'd, 730 F.3d 563 (6th Cir. 2013). The Court thus agreeswith Hartford that it is entitled to judgment as a matter oflaw on Muhammad's wrongful denial of long-term disabilitybenefits, bad faith, and emotional distress claims.*12 But that still leaves Muhammad's discrimination claim,which the Court is not convinced that ERISA preempts.To see why, start with the claim Muhammad asserts.The Complaint alleges that Hartford discriminated againstMuhammad based on his race, sex, and religion. (Doc. 33,#497). But Muhammad brings that discrimination claim underAustralia's Anti-Discrimination Act 1977. (Id. at #496). AsHartford correctly argues, Australian law does not applydomestically and is thus an invalid cause of action that fallsoutside the Court's jurisdiction. (Doc. 45, #596–97 (citing,among other cases, Lockett v. Quest Diagnostics, No. 1:24-cv-592, 2024 WL 2801357, at *2 (N.D. Ga. Mar. 11, 2024),report and recommendation adopted, No. 1:24-cv-592, 2024WL 2801356 (N.D. Ga. Apr. 24, 2024)).That said, courts are to liberally construe pro se pleadings.Franklin, 765 F.2d at 84–85. And here, the Court is inclined toconstrue Muhammad's discrimination claim as instead arisingunder 42 U.S.C. § 1981, which prohibits racial discriminationin the making and enforcement of contracts. Cf. Marks OneCar Rental, Inc. v. Auto Club Grp. Ins. Co., 55 F. Supp. 3d977, 989–90 (E.D. Mich. 2014) (allowing a § 1981 claimagainst a private insurer based on racial discrimination duringthe billing relationship to proceed).So construed, the Court is not persuaded that ERISAeither completely or expressly preempts Muhammad'sdiscrimination claim.11 As for complete preemption,asserting a federal cause of action to rectify discriminatoryconduct is an “attempt to remedy [a] violation of a legal dutyindependent of ERISA.” See Aetna Health Inc. v. Davila,542 U.S. 200, 214 (2004). That means the claim does not“fall within the scope of” § 1132(a)(1), and is not completelypreempted. See id. at 221. Nor does ERISA expressly preempta § 1981 claim, which arises under federal, not state, law.29 U.S.C. § 1144(d) (“Nothing in this subchapter shall beconstrued to alter, amend, modify, invalidate, impair, orsupersede any law of the United States.”); see also Loffredo,500 F. App'x at 498.But that is something of a Pyrrhic victory for Muhammad,as he fails to plausibly allege a § 1981 claim. To do so,he must plead facts supporting “that (1) he belongs to anidentifiable class of persons who are subject to discriminationbased on their race; (2) the defendant intended to discriminateagainst him on the basis of race; and (3) the defendant'sdiscriminatory conduct abridged a right enumerated in section1981(a).” Amini v. Oberlin Coll., 440 F.3d 350, 358 (6th Cir.2006). But as noted before, Muhammad did not allege his race
Muhammad v. Gap Inc., Slip Copy (2025) © 2025 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.10in his Amended Complaint.12 And other than conclusoryallegations, (Doc. 33, #496–97), Muhammad offers nothingfrom which the Court can reasonably infer that Hartforddenied or delayed his benefits on account of his race.The Court therefore GRANTS Hartford's Motionfor Judgment on the Pleadings (Doc. 45), andDISMISSES WITHOUT PREJUDICE Muhammad'sAmended Complaint against the entity.4. Muhammad's Defamation Claim Against Dr.Vogelstein and Disability Occupational ConsultantsAlso Fails.*13 In his Amended Complaint, Muhammad seems to asserta defamation claim against Dr. Vogelstein and DisabilityOccupational Consultants based on Dr. Vogelstein writingthat Muhammad is a “rather poor historian” in a medicalexam report. (Doc. 33, #494; Doc. 3-2, #210). But thatisn't an actionable defamatory statement. In writing the poorhistorian comment, Dr. Vogelstein noted that Muhammad's“verbal history differ[ed] from the medical records” at issue.(Doc. 3-2, #210; see also id. at #206 (“I have reviewedall of [Muhammad's] available medical records.”)). It wouldappear, then, that the statement, at the very least, “has sometruth in it,” Carr, 215 N.E.3d at 589 (quotation omitted),meaning it's not false in the sense required to state adefamation claim.Further, from what the Court can tell, Muhammadalso appears to assert a discrimination claim againstthese Defendants based on both the allegedly defamatorystatement and Dr. Vogelstein “perform[ing] movements”of Muhammad's arm, shoulder, and back that caused paineven after Muhammad objected. (Doc. 33, #497). But thisdiscrimination claim fails for the same reasons the other onesdo. Muhammad hasn't alleged any facts from which the Courtcan infer that discrimination occurred.For those reasons, the Court DIMISSES WITHOUTPREJUDICE Muhammad's Amended Complaint as againstDr. Vogelstein and Disability Occupational Consultants. Andthat in turn means that the Amended Complaint fails to statea viable claim against any Defendant.B. The Court Defers Ruling on Muhammad's OtherPending Motions in Light of the Upcoming Hearing onthe Order to Show Cause.With Muhammad's substantive claims addressed, the Courtturns to a couple of concerns it has about Muhammad'slitigation tactics in this case. To begin, as described above,Muhammad has filed a plethora of motions and notices ofvarious sorts in this case. While litigants have every rightto file appropriate motions, inappropriately over-indulging inthat activity creates at least two problems. First, as Defendantshave observed, over-litigating hikes up the time and costsDefendants must expend defending this action. (See Docs.74, 91, 93 (explaining that responding to numerous motionsfor leave to amend and subsequent amended complaintsincreases defense costs)). Second, addressing a litigant'smultitudinous filings saps the Court's limited resources.Indeed, compounding that latter problem here, when theCourt attempted to provide itself time to review Muhammad'svarious filings seeking emergency relief before a telephonicstatus conference that the Court set to discuss those requests,Muhammad responded to the Court's order preventing himfrom making further filings by refusing to appear at theconference and by filing eleven additional motions andnotices. That aptly illustrates the problem.Beyond that, though, it appears Muhammad has taken toputting false information before the Court. In at least two ofhis recent filings, he seems to cite to non-existent cases and/or purports to reference quotes that the Court cannot find inthe cases he cites as including them. Examples include:• In his Supplemental Evidentiaty [sic] Submission inSupport of the Plaintiff's Third Amended Complaint[sic] (Doc. 111), Muhammad purports to include quotesfrom six cases, (id. at #1612). So far as the Court can tell,none of the cases he cites in fact contain the languagehe quotes.• In Muhammad's Motion for Recusal (Doc. 96), he assertsthat the Court relied on McDonald's Corp. v. FranklinCounty, 2021 WL 1570922 (S.D. Ohio Apr. 21, 2021), tojustify “gagging” him. (Doc. 96, #1237–38). To start, thecase the Court actually cited was In re McDonald, 489U.S. 180, 184 (1989). But more to the point, the case hesubstituted does not appear to exist, or at least the Courtcannot find it.*14 • In that same motion, Muhammad claims to include aquote from Obama for America v. Husted, 697 F.3d 423,436 (6th Cir. 2012). (Doc. 96, #1226). While the caseadmittedly supports the purported quote substantively,so far as the Court can tell, the “quoted” material is notin the case.
Muhammad v. Gap Inc., Slip Copy (2025) © 2025 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.11• Muhammad also cites Friendship Materials, Inc. v.Michigan Brick, Inc., 679 F.2d 100, 105 (6th Cir. 1982),for the proposition that he need not prove harm thatis “uncompensable by money,” a phrase he quotes, incases involving civil rights violations. (Doc. 96, #1227).But the “uncompensable by money” language appearsnowhere in the cited case, and the case does not involveor discuss an alleged civil rights violation, but ratherinvolves an alleged Sherman Act violation. FriendshipMaterials, 679 F.2d at 101–02.• Muhammad further provides a purported quote fromHumphrey v. U.S. Attorney General's Office, 279 F.App'x 328, 331 (6th Cir. 2008), which does not appearin that case. (Doc. 96, #1232).• Finally, and perhaps most troubling of all, Muhammadcites two cases in that motion as “controlling authority”:Scott v. City of Columbus Legal Department, No. 2:21-cv-5543, 2022 WL 2828015 (S.D. Ohio July 20, 2022),and Humphrey v. U.S. Attorney General's Office, No.2:15-cv-746, 2016 WL 740653 (S.D. Ohio Feb. 25,2016). (Doc. 96, #1237). Neither exists.To be clear, this is not meant to serve as an exhaustive list.Rather, it merely illustrates the basis for the Court's concerns.If Muhammad is in fact citing non-existent case law, ormaking up quotations, that sort of conduct would “directlyviolate[ ] [Muhammad's] duty of candor to the Court,” which,in turn, provides a basis for the Court to impose sanctions.Buckner v. Hilton Glob., No. 3:24-cv-375, 2025 WL 1725426,at *6–7 (W.D. Ky. June 20, 2025). After all, “many harmsflow from such deception—including wasting the opposingparty's time and money, the Court's time and resources, andreputational harms to the legal system.” Id. at *7 (quotingMorgan v. Cmty. Against Violence, No. 23-cv-353, 2023 WL6976510, at *8 (D.N.M. Oct. 23, 2023)).And the Court further suspects that these inaccuracies maybe the result of Muhammad's use of generative artificialintelligence (AI) technology. If so, that's also a problem.Generative AI, at least in its current iterations, will sometimessimply “make stuff up” or “hallucinat[e]” quotations and/orcase law. Id. at *6 (quotation omitted). Compounding theproblem, what generative AI lacks in precision, it more thanmakes up for in speed. Litigants who simply file the materialthat AI tools generate, without carefully reviewing it firstfor accuracy, have the potential to swamp courts with whatappear at first glance to be legal arguments built on law andprecedent, but which are in fact nothing of the sort. Andnot only are these problems in their own right, but they alsoheighten the two concerns the Court highlighted above—thatdefendants will be forced to spend more time and incur morecosts parsing through copious baseless filings to defend anaction, and that Courts will waste precious time doing thesame in ruling on motions and moving matters along.Given the Court's concerns that Muhammad mayhave provided erroneous citations, the Court ORDERSMuhammad TO SHOW CAUSE in writing, by July 11,2025, why the Court should not impose sanctions. In hisresponse to this Show Cause Order, which the Court furtherORDERS him to sign under penalty of perjury, Muhammadmust provide a complete list of all cases he cited in theSupplemental Evidentiaty [sic] Submission in Support of thePlaintiff's Third Amended Cpmplaint [sic] (Doc. 111), andthe Motion for Recusal (Doc. 96), with a reference to thedocument and PageID number in which each such citationoccurred. As to each such citation, Muhammad shall (1)confirm to the Court in writing whether the case he cited infact exists (along with explaining how he confirmed that fact(e.g., reviewing the cited case reporter, using Westlaw, Lexis,or some other similar legal database, etc.)), (2) confirm to theCourt in writing whether the language, if any, that he purportsto quote from any such case actually appears in that case(again, along with describing how he confirmed that fact),and (3) as to any case that he now concedes does not exist,or as to any “quoted” language that he now admits does notin fact appear in the case to which he attributes it, explainwhat steps (if any) he had taken to confirm the existenceof the case and/or the accuracy of the alleged quote, beforeinitially filing the document that included that material withthe Court.13 To be clear, this task is not meant as punishment.Rather, it is designed (1) to confirm whether the Court canrely on the materials Muhammad cited in those two filings,and (2) to ensure that Muhammad is acquainted with the stepsthat an attorney (or a pro se litigant) must undertake beforeciting case law or other legal materials to the Court in orderto discharge their duty of candor to the tribunal.*15 The Court further sets an in-person hearing on thismatter at 1:00 p.m. on July 16, 2025. At that hearing, the Courtintends to discuss Muhammad's response to the Court's ShowCause Order and to set a path for moving this matter forward.Pending the outcome of that hearing, the Court will deferruling on Muhammad's other pending motions. And due tothe Court's concerns about the apparent inaccuracies present
Muhammad v. Gap Inc., Slip Copy (2025) © 2025 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.12in Muhammad's recent filings, the Court further ORDERSthat Muhammad shall not present any filings, other than hisresponse to the Show Cause Order, between now and the dateof the hearing.CONCLUSIONFor the reasons discussed above, the Court GRANTS Gap'sand GPS's Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 41), GRANTS Verisk'sMotion to Dismiss (Doc. 42), and GRANTS Hartford'sMotion for Judgment on the Pleadings (Doc. 45), as toMuhammad's Amended Complaint (Doc. 33), which theCourt DISMISSES WITHOUT PREJUDICE. The Courtfurther sets an in-person hearing on this matter for July16, 2025, at 1:00 p.m. in Courtroom 148, at which theCourt intends to discuss Muhammad's response to the Court'sShow Cause Order and to set a path for moving this matterforward. The Court HOLDS all other pending motions INABEYANCE pending the outcome of that hearing. Relatedly,the Court's previously entered STAY (6/24/25 Not. Order)will extend through the date of that hearing. Finally, the Courtspecifically WARNS Muhammad that failing to timely andappropriately respond to the Show Cause Order as directed,failing to appear at the hearing, or attempting to file anymotions in this case in the interim (other than the responseto the Show Cause Order as described above), may resultin sanctions, up to and including denial of his pendingmotions, dismissal of this action, designation of Muhammadas a vexatious litigator (thereby subjecting him to prefilingrestrictions), revocation of his right to proceed pro se in thisaction, monetary sanctions, or other potential sanctions, asappropriate.SO ORDERED.All CitationsSlip Copy, 2025 WL 1836657Footnotes1Gap's and GPS's motion also argues for dismissal based on Muhammad's failure to exhaust his administrativeremedies. (Doc. 41, #535–37). Specifically, they argue that he did not receive a right-to-sue notice beforefiling his Amended Complaint. (Id. at #537). But since filing their motion, it appears that the Ohio CivilRights Commission and the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission have issued Muhammad right-to-sue notices. (Gap Mot. for Leave, Doc. 63, #669). In connection with that development, Gap and GPS movedfor leave to file a supplemental memorandum detailing that fact. (Id. at #664). The Court thus GRANTS Gapand GPS's Motion for Leave (Doc. 63), and will consequently not consider the failure to exhaust argumentwhen analyzing their motion to dismiss.2To be clear, Muhammad has every right to file whatever he wishes in other forums, subject to the rules ofthose forums.3Muhammad attached Exhibits A, B, C, and D to only his original Complaint, not his Amended Complaint.(Compare Docs. 3, 3-1, 3-2, 3-3, 3-4, with Doc. 33). That said, he references all four exhibits in his AmendedComplaint and states that they are “attached” to the filing. (Doc. 33, #494–95). So it seems that Muhammadsimply forgot to attach the exhibits when he filed his Amended Complaint, and that the Court, therefore, mayproperly consider them in this Opinion and Order. Gavitt v. Born, 835 F.3d 623, 640 (6th Cir. 2016).4Muhammad's original Complaint named Weeden as a Defendant. (Doc. 3, #166). But his Amended Complaintdoes not. (Doc. 33, #493). And while the Amended Complaint mentions Weeden while laying out theallegations, it does so by referencing Weeden “on behalf of GAP/GPS”—a linguistic change from the originalComplaint. (Compare Doc. 3, #167, with Doc. 33, #494). Based on those changes, the Court concludes thatWeeden is no longer a Defendant to the case.
Muhammad v. Gap Inc., Slip Copy (2025) © 2025 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.135In his Amended Complaint, Muhammad added GPS as a Defendant because GPS is apparently “a subsidiaryof GAP Inc and is directly involved in the case.” (Doc. 32, #489).6Although Muhammad cited Ohio's worker's compensation statute in his original Complaint, (Doc. 3, #168),he omitted that reference in his Amended Complaint, (see generally Doc. 33). So even though Muhammad,in his opposition to Gap's and GPS's motion to dismiss, clarifies that he meant to press state-law wrongfultermination claims, (Doc. 47, #612–13), he may not do so. Ault v. Medina Med. Invs., LLC, No. 1:06-cv-1113,2007 WL 81853, at *3 (N.D. Ohio Jan. 8, 2007) (“It is axiomatic that a plaintiff cannot add new claims to [his]complaint in an opposition to a motion to dismiss.”).7While Muhammad names ISO Claims Services, Inc. as a Defendant in his proposed third amended complaint,(Doc. 68-1, #716), he did not name that entity as a Defendant in his currently operative pleading, (see Doc.33).8The Court acknowledges that the phrase “motion-like filings” is inartful. But the Court does not know exactlyhow to characterize filings such as Muhammad's “Notice of Constitutional Conflict Regarding PACER AccessRevocation and Procedural Retaliation” (Doc. 109). While not labeled a motion, the filing nonetheless seemsto request relief from the Court. (Id. at #1605).9The Court acknowledges that in his proposed TAC, Muhammad does allege those attributes.10The Court likewise acknowledges that in his proposed TAC, Muhammad does allege specific protectedactivities he allegedly undertook.11One thing bears noting. The District Judge previously assigned to this case did not address Muhammad'sdiscrimination claim in the Opinion and Order denying his motion to remand, and thus did not say one way orthe other whether ERISA preempts that claim. (See Doc. 62). As a result, the Court's determination here thatERISA does not preempt the discrimination claim in no way conflicts with or calls into question that Judge'sdetermination.12As also noted before, his proposed TAC remedies at least that defect.13If the only “confirmation” that Muhammad can provide in connection with a given case citation or quotationis that he referenced generative AI, Muhammad shall indicate the generative AI tool on which he relied toprovide the case name and/or quotation.End of Document© 2025 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.
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