Mullins v. Duquesne Univ. of the Holy Spirit (July 15, 2026)

Case details
Full caption
Mullins v. Duquesne University of the Holy Spirit
Country
United States
Jurisdiction
Federal
Decided
July 15, 2026
Disposition
Motion Denied
DAVID MULLINS, Plaintiff, v. DUQUESNE UNIVERSITY OF THE HOLY SPIRIT, ALICIA SIMPSON, ADAM..., SlipCopy (2026) WESTLAW   © 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.12026 WL 2042802Only the Westlaw citation is currently available.United States District Court, W.D. Pennsylvania.DAVID MULLINS, Plaintiff,v.DUQUESNE UNIVERSITY OF THEHOLY SPIRIT, ALICIA SIMPSON,ADAM WASILKO, ANNE MULLARKEYSAWA, and DANIEL SELCER, Defendants.Civil No. 25-1366|Filed 07/15/2026Attorneys and Law FirmsDavid Michael Mullins, Pittsburgh, PA, Pro Se.Beverly A. Block, George Charles Thompson, JulianneC. Beil, Block & Associates, LLC, Pittsburgh, PA, forDefendants.Opinion and Order on Motion to StrikeMarilyn J. Horan United States District Court Judge*1 The Court previously denied Plaintiff David Mullins’Motion to File a Second Amended Complaint. Op. and Order,May 8, 2026, ECF No. 45. Plaintiff then filed a Motionfor Reconsideration of that decision, with Brief in Support.ECF No. 47 & 48. Presently before the Court is Defendants’Motion to Strike Plaintiff's Motion for Reconsideration andBrief in Support. ECF No. 50. Plaintiff filed a Response inOpposition to Defendants’ Motion, to which Defendants havefiled a Reply. ECF No. 53, 54. For the reasons stated below,Defendants’ Motion to Strike will be denied.I. Authority for Imposing SanctionsDefendants seek, at a minimum, to strike Plaintiff's Motionand Brief as violative of this Court's Order regarding the useof Artificial Intelligence Tools. See Op. and Order, December5, 2025, ECF No. 42, at 5. Courts have the inherent power toenforce their own Orders. Chambers v. NASCO, 501 U.S. 32(1991) (“It has long been understood that ‘[c]ertain impliedpowers must necessarily result to our Courts of justice fromthe nature of their institution,’ powers ‘which cannot bedispensed with in a Court, because they are necessary to theexercise of all others.’ ”) (quoting United States v. Hudson, 7Cranch 32, 34, 3 L.Ed. 259 (1812)). Thus, this Court retainsinherent power to enforce its own Orders as it sees fit.Defendants also request sanctions against Plaintiff underFederal Rules of Civil Procedure 11 and 37. Rule 37 appliesonly to issues regarding discovery, which is inapplicablehere. Fed. R. Civ. P. 37 (“Failure to Make Disclosures orto Cooperate in Discovery; Sanctions”). Plaintiff objects tothe Court imposing sanctions pursuant to Rule 11, becauseDefendants have not complied with Rule 11(c)(2)’s “safeharbor” requirement. Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(c)(2) (permitting aparty time to withdraw or correct the allegedly sanctionablefiling). Accordingly, Rule 11 sanctions cannot be imposed atthis time based upon Defendants’ Motion alone. However,if a Court finds, at any time, that a litigant has engaged insanctionable conduct under Rule 11, “the court may orderan attorney, law firm, or party to show cause why conductspecifically described in the order has not violated Rule11(b).” Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(c)(3). After notice is providedin the form of a show cause order, and the litigant hasbeen afforded a reasonable opportunity to respond, thecourt may impose sanctions. Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(c)(1). Here,if the Court found sanctionable conduct in violation ofRule 11, a show cause order would be entered beforeimposition of potential sanctions. See Jakes v. Youngblood,No. 2:24-CV-1608, 2025 WL 2371007 (W.D. Pa. June 26,2025) (Stickman, J.) (issuing show cause order after findingfabricated quotations from caselaw, non-existent quotations,and repeated misrepresentation of case law in lawyer's briefs).Finally, Defendants invoke Rule 12(f) as authority for strikingthe Motion and Brief Plaintiff objects to the Court relyingon Rule 12(f), because that Rule specifically applies to“pleadings,” not motions and briefs. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(f)(stating that a court may strike “a pleading”); compareFed. R. Civ. P. 7(a) (defining “pleadings” allowed and7(b) separately addressing the form of “Motions and OtherPapers”). Nonetheless, the Court has the power to strike amotion or brief pursuant to its inherent authority and/or aviolation of a court order. See, e.g., Jakes, No. 2:24-CV-1608,2025 WL 2371007 (striking lawyer's error-ridden Motion andReply Brief).II. The Court's AI Use Order*2 On December 5, 2025, in this case, the Court issuedan Order with respect to the use of generative artificial
DAVID MULLINS, Plaintiff, v. DUQUESNE UNIVERSITY OF THE HOLY SPIRIT, ALICIA SIMPSON, ADAM..., SlipCopy (2026) WESTLAW   © 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.2intelligence tools, directing that all parties shall comply withthe following:The use of Artificial Intelligenceor Generative Artificial Intelligence,raises a number of practicalconcerns for the Court, includingthe risk that the generative ArtificialIntelligence tools produce legallyor factually incorrect information,produce incorrect quotations, produceincorrect case citations, or createunsupported or nonexistent legalcitations. Any party, whetherrepresenting themselves pro se orthrough counsel, who uses anygenerative artificial intelligence toolsin the preparation of any pleadingto be filed in this matter, mustinclude with the pleading a Certificatestating that Artificial Intelligence and/or Generative Artificial Intelligencetools were used in the preparationof the pleading. The party must alsodirect opposing counsel and the courtto the specific portions of the filinggenerated by the Artificial Intelligencetools, and certify that counsel or theself-represented party has checked theaccuracy of the pleading, including allcitations and all legal authorities.ECF No. 42, at 5. The Court's Order is aimed at preventing“legally or factually incorrect information, [ ] incorrectquotations, [ ] incorrect case citations, or [ ] unsupportedor nonexistent legal citations.” ECF No. 42, at 5. Thefinal sentence of this Order directs an AI-using litigant tocertify that they have “checked the accuracy of the pleading,including all citations and all legal authorities.” Id.The Order also directs AI-using litigants to point out the“specific portions of the filing generated by the ArtificialIntelligence tools.” Id. In context, it is expected that thelitigant point out any AI-generated portion of the pleading thatcontains (or contained, until corrected) legally or factuallyincorrect information, quotations, or “hallucinated” casecitations, or unsupported or nonexistent legal citations. Thus,the Order is aimed at preventing substantive mistakes andfalsities related to a person's AI-generated legal research.Plaintiff included the required certificate of use of artificialintelligence. He states that he used an AI Tool, Anthropic's“Claude,” to assist with drafting, wording, organization,and editing; for suggested phrasing for legal argumentsor formulations of legal propositions; and for phrasingassistance, structural editing, and stylistic refinement. He alsoexplains that any “AI influence” is embedded within phrasingthroughout the pleading. Plaintiff specifically states that hedid not use AI tools to generate citations, quotations, legalauthorities, or factual assertions.III. Pro Se PleadingsWhen reviewing pro se filings, “however inartfully pleaded,”pro se plaintiffs must be held to “less stringent standardsthan formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.” Haines v. Kerner,404 U.S. 519, 520-521 (1972). “A document filed pro se is‘to be liberally construed.’ ” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S.89, 94 (2007) (quoting Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106(1976)). If the court can reasonably read and understand a prose filing, it should accept it despite its failure to cite properlegal authority, confusion of legal theories, poor syntax andsentence construction, and/or a litigant's unfamiliarity withpleading requirements. Garrett v. Wexford Health, 938 F.3d69, 94 (3d Cir. 2019); Boag v. MacDougall, 454 U.S. 364(1982). Nonetheless, a court need not credit bald assertions,unwarranted inferences, or legal conclusions cast in the formof factual averments. Morse v. Lower Merion School District,132 F.3d 902, 906, n. 8 (3d Cir. 1997).IV. Discussion*3 Generally, Defendants argue that Plaintiff violated theCourt's AI use Order by including a “multitude of inaccurateinformation, improper case citations, and unsupported legaltheories, which strongly suggest Plaintiff's reliance on AITools.” Mot. Strike at 4. Defendants also argue that Plaintiff'sBrief contains unintelligible phrases and arguments. In theirReply Brief, Defendants argue that Plaintiff's pleadingsshould be stricken for “ ‘pervasive’ use of AI tools to draftthe Motion for Reconsideration.” Deft. Reply Br. 1. TheDefendants further point to Plaintiff's “use of unsupportedcitations and improper reliance on case law, all very likelycaused by overreliance on generative AI.” Id. at 2. Defendantsspecifically argue that Plaintiff's inappropriate reliance uponAI is revealed by his errors in citing and relying upon Phillipsv. County of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 234 (3d Cir. 2008)1,
DAVID MULLINS, Plaintiff, v. DUQUESNE UNIVERSITY OF THE HOLY SPIRIT, ALICIA SIMPSON, ADAM..., SlipCopy (2026) WESTLAW   © 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.3Max's Seafood Café v. Quinteros, 176 F.3d 669, 677 (3d Cir.1999)2, and (together) Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S.544, 570 (2007) and Pension Benefit Guar. Corp. v. WhiteConsol. Indus., Inc., 998 F.2d 1192, 1196 (3d Cir.1993).3A. Relevant Law RegardingSanctionable AI-Use Conduct“Every lawyer knows that citing fake cases in a court filing isa terrible decision.” Johnson v. Dunn, 792 F. Supp. 3d 1241,1256 (N.D. Ala. 2025). There are a multitude of resourcesand tools a lawyer may rely upon in preparing a pleading.“In researching and drafting court submissions, good lawyersappropriately obtain assistance from junior lawyers, lawstudents, contract lawyers, legal encyclopedias and databasessuch as Westlaw and LexisNexis.” Mata v. Avianca, Inc.,678 F. Supp. 3d 443, 448 (S.D.N.Y. 2023). AI is anothersuch resource. Just like Westlaw and LexisNexis, “there isnothing inherently improper about using a reliable artificialintelligence tool for assistance.” Id.If a document is filed containing fake case citations, inventedquotations, or similar egregious errors, the lawyer may facesanctions. Whether a litigant uses AI Tools or one of theother resources identified above to prepare a motion orbrief, the responsibility of reviewing the final product foraccuracy remains the same. Thus, it is not the use of AIitself that is sanctionable, but rather the failure to sufficientlyreview an AI-generated filing. A review of cases addressingsanctionable AI use informs the Court that the potentiallysanctionable conduct almost always results from a lawyer'sfailure to properly review and correct a document priorto submission. As explained above, this Court's AI Orderis similarly aimed at eliminating the central problem: AI-generated falsehoods in legal documents. See Lifetime WellLLC v. IBSpot.com Inc., 819 F. Supp. 3d 373, 378 (E.D.Pa. 2026) (addressing “misuse of artificial intelligence inbriefing,” which “contained at least eight false case citationhallucinations generated by artificial intelligence”), id. at384 (citing seven “exemplar” cases where sanctions wereimposed for AI use resulting in non-existent authorities orhallucinations); Johnson, 792 F. Supp. 3d at 1256 (addressing“false statements of law generated in the first instanceby AI”), id. at 1266 (collecting cases); and Mata, 678 F.Supp. 3d at 448 (describing how law firm “abandoned theirresponsibilities when they submitted non-existent judicialopinions with fake quotes and citations created by theartificial intelligence tool ChatGPT”). The Court did not findany recent cases imposing sanctions for using AI tools onlyto assist with drafting, editing, and other composition issues.B. Whether Sanctions for AIUse in this Case are Appropriate*4 As explained, the Court's Order governing the use ofAI Tools in this case is aimed at ensuring that litigants whouse artificial intelligence tools in preparing their pleadingsdo not consequently produce legally or factually incorrectinformation, incorrect case citations, or unsupported ornonexistent legal citations. Defendants’ arguments in supportof striking Plaintiff's pleading do not sufficiently allegethis serious and sanctionable variety of AI use. Plaintiff'sBrief presents neither inaccurate, false, or non-existent casecitations, nor accompanying legal propositions that wouldotherwise be unsupported because the AI generated casecitations were false or incomplete. Plaintiff's certificationconfirms that he did not use any AI Tool to generatecitations, quotations, legal authorities, or factual assertions.Therefore, Plaintiff's pleading should not contain the kinds ofsanctionable AI use conduct as identified in the cases citedabove (generating or including false citations, false quotes,and the like). Accordingly, sanctions against Plaintiff forusing AI to generate false or fictious citations or quotationsare not appropriate.C. Plaintiff's Use of AI in Preparing his BriefDefendants primarily challenge the substance and structureof Plaintiff's legal arguments, how he chooses to use cases tosupport his arguments, his legal analysis as to what the casesmean, and his alleged failure to support his legal theories.Defendants argue that such alleged pleading deficiencies arethe result of a “pervasive” use of AI to draft his pleadings andwhich “strongly suggest” a reliance on AI Tools. As explainedabove, the Court Order is broadly intended to eliminate AI-generated falsities in court pleadings. It appears that whatDefendants are primarily concerned with are the substantivecontent and organization of Plaintiff's brief insofar as AI wasused, and that Plaintiff allegedly did not thoroughly review hisBrief before submission. A cursory review of Plaintiff's Briefshows, as Plaintiff certified, that he used AI to assist withdrafting, wording, phrasing assistance, stylistic refinement,organization, editing, structural editing, suggested phrasingfor legal arguments, and suggested phrasing for formulationsof legal propositions. However, the Court declines to strike
DAVID MULLINS, Plaintiff, v. DUQUESNE UNIVERSITY OF THE HOLY SPIRIT, ALICIA SIMPSON, ADAM..., SlipCopy (2026) WESTLAW   © 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.4Plaintiff's Brief based upon the use of AI in assisting withpreparing his Brief.With respect to Defendants’ allegations regarding the use ofspecific case citations, only a few, but not all, of the examplespointed out by Defendants are unsupported by Plaintiff's casecitation. For example, on page 3, Plaintiff states that theCourt's Order “conflates Rule 9(b) particularity with proof,contrary to Phillips v. County of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 233(3d Cir.2008).” Defendants correctly contend that Phillipsdoes not address fraud or Rule 9(b). Neither the term “fraud,”nor “Rule 9(b)” appear in the Phillips decision, but it isclear from context that Plaintiff believes the Court imposed ahigher standard in analyzing his proposed fraud claims than ispermitted under a futility or motion to dismiss standard. Thisdoes not appear to the Court to amount to sanctionable AI use,as Plaintiff's meaning is clear.Similarly, on page 6, Plaintiff states: “Where a documentadmitted under the [integral-documents] doctrine isambiguous on its face, or where two reasonable readings ofthe document are available, the Rule 12 inference rule appliesto the document itself: the contested reading goes to thenon-movant.” ECF No. 48, at 6. Plaintiff cites Phillips, 515F.3d at 233, to support this proposition, but Phillips does notaddress the handling of documents by a court. Nonetheless,the argument Plaintiff makes is, at least, relatively clear:when conducting a futility analysis, if the court considers anoutside document that is ambiguous, or presents two opposingreasonable readings, the court is required to err in favor ofPlaintiff and not rely on the ambiguous document as authorityfor a finding of futility.There are other similar examples of Plaintiff including acitation that does not appear to directly support its adjacentproposition. In each instance, however, Plaintiff's legalargument is decipherable, which may reasonably support aconclusion that Plaintiff included such citations in a goodfaith belief that they were appropriate. It is also possible,based upon his certified use of AI, that Plaintiff's use ofAI provided recommendations for case citations.4 This mayespecially be true given the multitude of string citations, withat least one lengthy four-case string citation appearing in themiddle of a sentence. Specifically, the examples pointed outby Defendants, and those discovered by the Court, containsupporting authority falling under two categories: (i) citationsthat are generally supportive of Plaintiff's overall argument,but not indicative of negligent failure to review his Brief;and (ii) citations that appear to merely be reinforcementof case law in support of the futility standard, the motionto dismiss standard, or the reconsideration standard. Suchcitations, while unconventional and, at times confusing,do not appear to be intentional, but an example of apro se plaintiff, using AI, and referencing often-cited caselaw for relevant standards of law, all argued in favorof granting reconsideration. Defendants’ arguments, andPlaintiff's Reply to said arguments, appear to the Court tobe in favor of and against the substance of Plaintiff's Motionfor Reconsideration. The examples cited by Defendants,however, do not amount to sanctionable AI use conduct.D. Plaintiff's Brief in Supportof Motion for Reconsideration*5 Defendants’ final argument is that Plaintiff's Briefin Support of his Motion for Reconsideration should bestricken because it is replete with “a multitude of legallyinaccurate information, [ ] unsupported legal theories,”“unintelligible phrases and arguments,” and “indecipherablephrases” ECF No. 51, 4, 8, & 9. Defendants are largelycorrect in their characterization of Plaintiff's Brief. It is,sesquipedalian in places, convoluted, obtuse, repetitive,and difficult to follow. Plaintiff's Brief includes unusualphrasings, compound words, and references, which at times,are unique to Plaintiff. The substantive arguments areparticularly byzantine. They are unnecessarily confusing,convoluted, dense, repetitious, and over-argued. Argumentsmade in one section appear again, in part, in other sections,serving only to confuse the reader. Plaintiff's unique headings,phrasings, and nomenclature do not make it any easier for thereader of the Brief. However, the Court cannot say that the“true substance” of the Brief, though “confused, ambiguous,vague, or otherwise unintelligible,” is “well disguised.”Garrett, 938 F.3d at 94 (quoting Salahuddin v. Cuomo, 861F.2d 40, 42 (2d Cir. 1988)). The Court is at least capable ofreviewing the Brief pursuant to the applicable standard andaddressing Plaintiff's arguments. The Court further deducesthat Defendants are also able to meaningfully respond to thecore of Plaintiff's arguments. Garrett, 938 F.3d at 94 (it is notuncommon for a pro se litigant to file a pleading that “containsrepetitious and irrelevant matter, so long as that disposablehusk [surrounds] ... a core of proper pleading”) (citation andquotations omitted). To the extent that Plaintiff's structure,phrasing, and arguments prove to be difficult to interpret,that is a consequence Plaintiff must face as the author of theMotion and Brief. Such deficiencies, if any, in this case, donot amount to sanctionable AI use conduct.
DAVID MULLINS, Plaintiff, v. DUQUESNE UNIVERSITY OF THE HOLY SPIRIT, ALICIA SIMPSON, ADAM..., SlipCopy (2026) WESTLAW   © 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.5V. ConclusionStriking Plaintiff's Motion for Reconsideration and Briefis a drastic remedy. Here, it would serve only to causeadditional delay for a case that is already eight months oldand yet to generate a response to the Amended Complaint.The Court notes, however, that Defendants’ Motion to Strikehas served the function of clarifying certain portions withinPlaintiff's Motion and Brief. Similarly, Plaintiff's Responseto the Motion to Strike imparts a better understanding ofhis utilization of AI tools and the representations in his AIcertification. As to Defendants’ challenges to the substanceof Plaintiff's Motion for Reconsideration contained withinthe Motion to Strike, as well as Plaintiffs’ Reply thereto,such arguments are better addressed through briefing uponthe Motion for Reconsideration itself. As such, at the parties’discretion, they may include any of their relevant argumentscontained in their briefing on the Motion to Strike, in theirResponse or Reply related to the Motion for Reconsideration.The motion to strike will therefore be denied.AND NOW, this 15th day of July 2026, Defendants’ Motionto Strike Plaintiff's Motion for Reconsideration and Brief inSupport, ECF No. 51, is DENIED.Defendants shall file a Response to Plaintiff's Motion forReconsideration and accompanying Brief by July 22, 2026.Plaintiff may file a Reply to Defendants’ Response by July29, 2026.David Michael Mullins430 S. Fairmount St. Unit 1Pittsburgh, PA 15232All CitationsSlip Copy, 2026 WL 2042802Footnotes1Regarding Phillips, Defendants argue that Plaintiff's use reveals inappropriate reliance on AI Tools becausehe failed to account for Iqbal, a post-Phillips case; erroneously cited Phillips for pleading requirements forfraud; and cited Phillips for a doctrine regarding consideration of documents, which was not discussed inthat case.2Regarding Max's Seafood, Defendants argue Plaintiff cited the case as support for various phrases andconcepts not appearing therein; and he cited it as support for challenging the Court's application of Iqbal,which was decided ten years after Max's Seafood.3Regarding Twombly and Pension Benefit Guaranty, Defendants argue that Plaintiff erroneously cites thesecases in support of the standard to apply on a motion to amend, but neither case addressed that standard.4Plaintiff certified, in part, that he used AI to assist with drafting, wording, phrasing assistance, stylisticrefinement, organization, editing, structural editing, suggested phrasing for legal arguments, and suggestedphrasing for formulations of legal propositions.End of Document© 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.
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