Likewise, secondary activity could have such a limited goal and the foreseeable result of the conduct could be, while disruptive, so slight that the “cease doing business” requirement is not met.
Local 825’s goal was not so limited nor were the foreseeable Consequences of its secondary pressure slight. The operating engineers sought to force Burns to bind all the subcontractors on the project to a particular form of job assignments. The clear implication of the demands was that Burns would be required either to force a change in White’s policy or to terminate White’s contract. The strikes shut down the whole project. If Burns was unable to obtain White’s consent, Local 825 was apparently willing to continue disruptive conduct that would bring all the employers to their knees.
Certainly, the union would have preferred to have the employers capitulate to its demands; it wanted to take the job of operating the welding machines away from the Ironworkers. It was willing, however, to try to obtain this capitulation by forcing neutrals to compel White to meet union demands, To hold that this flagrant secondary conduct with these most serious disruptive effects was not prohibited by § 8 (b) (4) (B) would be largely to ignore the original congressional concern. NLRB v. Carpenters Dist. Council, 407 F. 2d 804, 806 (CA5 1969).
II
In addition to its argument that § 8 (b) (4) (B) does not cover its conduct, Local 825 argues that § 8. (b)(4)(D) provides’the exclusive remedy. Clearly, § 8 (b) (4) (D) is, as the Board and Court of Appeals held, applicable. But that section is aimed at protecting “the employer trapped between the ¡ . . claims” of rival unions. National Woodwork Mfrs. Assn. v. NLRB, 386 U. S. 612, 625 (1967). Although § 8(b)(4) (D) also