Nellum v. Credit Acceptance Corp., No. 1:25-cv-01579-TWP-CSW (2025)

Case details
Full caption
Kamia Nellum v. Credit Acceptance Corporation
Country
United States
Jurisdiction
Federal
Decided
2025
Disposition
Dismissed
KAMIA NELLUM, Plaintiff, v. CREDIT ACCEPTANCE..., Slip Copy (2025) © 2025 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.12025 WL 3222813Only the Westlaw citation is currently available.United States District Court, S.D.Indiana, Indianapolis Division.KAMIA NELLUM, Plaintiff,v.CREDIT ACCEPTANCE CORPORATION, Defendant.No. 1:25-cv-01579-TWP-CSW|11/18/2025Attorneys and Law FirmsKamia Nellum, Indianapolis, IN, Pro Se.Alan M. Ritchie, Pilgrim Christakis LLP, Chicago, IL, forDefendant.ORDER ON DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO COMPELARBITRATION AND RELATED MOTIONS*1 This matter is before the Court pursuant to an EntryReferring Motions to the Magistrate Judge. In response tothe Complaint, Defendant Credit Acceptance Corporation(“Credit Acceptance”) filed its Motion to Compel Arbitration(Dkt. 14) and supporting brief (Dkt. 15). Self-RepresentedPlaintiff Kamia Nellum (“Nellum”) filed her Motion to StrikeDefendant's Motion to Compel Arbitration (Dkt. 17) and aLimited Response in Opposition to Defendant's Motion toCompel Arbitration (Dkt. 18).Thereafter, Credit Acceptance filed its Reply in Support ofMotion (Dkt. 19), addressing Plaintiff's Limited Response(Dkt. 18). Nellum filed her Motion for Leave to FileSur-Reply (Dkt. 20) and followed it by her SupplementalSur-Reply (Dkt. 21). Credit Acceptance filed its Responsein Opposition (Dkt. 22), addressing Plaintiff's Motion toStrike (Dkt. 17). Additionally, Nellum filed her EmergencyMotion To Expedite Ruling on Defendant's Motion to CompelArbitration and Plaintiff's Related Motions (Dkt. 23).For the following reasons, the Court GRANTS CreditAcceptance's Motion to Compel Arbitration (Dkt. 14),DENIES Nellum's Motion to Strike (Dkt. 17), GRANTS inpart Nellum's Motion for Leave to File Sur-Reply (Dkt. 20)and DENIES AS MOOT Nellum's Emergency Motion (Dkt.23).I. BACKGROUNDThis case concerns a dispute between Nellum and CreditAcceptance over Nellum's purchase of a 2017 ChevroletMalibu (“the Vehicle”) on July 15, 2024, via a retailinstallment contract (“the Contract”). (Dkt 1-1). As part of thetransaction, Nellum executed a Declaration AcknowledgingElectronic Signature Process confirming that she hadpersonally affixed her electronic signature to the Contract.(Dkt. 16-1). Importantly for purposes of the pending Motion,Nellum initialed both the Notice of Arbitration and theArbitration Clause of the Contract thereby acknowledging she“read, [understood], and agree[d] to the terms and conditionsof the Arbitration Clause.” (Id.). The Arbitration Clauseprovides:Either You or We may require anyDispute to be arbitrated and may doso before or after a lawsuit has beenstarted over the Dispute. … If You orWe elect to arbitrate a Dispute, thisArbitration Clause applies. A Disputeshall be fully resolved by bindingarbitration. … If You or We elect toarbitrate a Dispute, neither You norWe will have the right to pursue thatDispute in court or have a jury resolvethat dispute.(Dkt. 16-1).“We” and “Us” are collectively defined as “Seller and/or Seller's assignee (including, without limitation, CreditAcceptance Corporation).” Additionally, the ArbitrationClause defines the types of “disputes” that the parties agreedto submit to binding arbitration:A “Dispute” is any controversy orclaim between You and Us arisingout of or in any way related to thisContract, including, but not limitedto, any default under this Contract,the collection of amounts due under
KAMIA NELLUM, Plaintiff, v. CREDIT ACCEPTANCE..., Slip Copy (2025) © 2025 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.2this Contract, the purchase, sale,delivery, set-up, quality of the Vehicle,advertising for the Vehicle or itsfinancing, or any product or serviceincluded in this Contract. “Dispute”shall have the broadest meaningpossible, and includes contract claims,and claims based on tort, violationsof laws, statutes, ordinances orregulations or any other legal orequitable theories.(Dkt. 16-1).*2 Although the Arbitration Clause permitted Nellum toreject it by written rejection within thirty (30) days of the dateof the Contract, Nellum failed to do so.Nellum's Complaint, filed in the Marion County, IndianaSuperior Court1 on July 18, 2025, alleges that CreditAcceptance “unlawfully repossessed [the Vehicle] withoutissuing proper notice or complying with statutory procedures”and attempted to repossess an “unrelated vehicle registeredto Plaintiff's mother.” (Dkt. 1-1). Additionally, her Complaintalleges that Credit Acceptance “misrepresented the vehicle'sauction status” and “failed to communicate honestly, misledPlaintiff throughout the process, and engaged in bad faith byignoring reasonable attempts to resolve the dispute.” Nellumfurther alleges that Credit Acceptance “facilitated the sale ofa defective vehicle” and “recklessly engaged in repossessionand intimidation tactics.”Nellum asserts claims against Credit Acceptance for wrongfulrepossession (Count I), retaliation and abuse of process(Count II), deceptive business practices (Count III), breach ofgood faith and fair dealing (Count IV), negligent and recklessconduct (Count V), and intentional infliction of emotionaldistress (Count VI). Credit Acceptance filed its Motion toCompel Arbitration (Dkt. 14) and supporting brief (Dkt. 15).Credit Acceptance contends that Nellum's six claims aresubject to arbitration and therefore, seeks an order compellingarbitration and staying the case.II. LEGAL STANDARDIn 1925, Congress enacted the Federal Arbitration Act(“FAA”) in response to “widespread judicial hostility toarbitration.” Am. Exp. Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 570 U.S.228, 232 (2013). Section 2 of the FAA provides:A written provision in any...contractevidencing a transaction involvingcommerce to settle by arbitration acontroversy thereafter arising out ofsuch contract or transaction . . . shallbe valid, irrevocable, and enforceable,save upon such grounds as exist at lawor in equity for the revocation of anycontract.9 U.S.C. § 2. Thus, arbitration is a matter of contract. Am.Exp., 570 U.S. at 233. Consistent with this principle, courtsmust place arbitration agreements “on an equal footing withother contracts...and enforce them according to their terms.”AT&T Mobility LLC v. Conception, 563 U.S. 333, 339 (2011).A party seeking to compel arbitration must show (1) a validagreement to arbitrate, (2) the dispute is within the scope ofarbitration, and (3) the opposing party refuses to proceed toarbitration. Kass v. PayPal Inc., 75 F.4th 693, 700 (7th Cir.2023). Arbitration can only be compelled when the court is“satisfied that the parties agreed to arbitrate that dispute.”Granite Rock Co. v. Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, 561 U.S. 287,297 (2010) (emphasis in original); United Nat. Foods, Inc.v. Teamsters Loc. 414, 58 F.4th 927, 933 (7th Cir. 2023).Whether a valid arbitration agreement exists is a matter ofstate contract law. Tinder v. Pinkerton Sec., 305 F.3d 728,733 (7th Cir. 2002). Under Indiana law2 , an arbitrationagreement—like any enforceable contract—requires an offer,acceptance, consideration. Land v. IU Credit Union, 218N.E.3d 1282, 1287 (Ind. 2023).*3 If the moving party establishes that there is a validarbitration agreement, the FAA provides a strong presumptionthat arbitration “should not be denied unless it may besaid with positive assurance that the arbitration clause isnot susceptible of an interpretation that covers the asserteddispute.” AT&T Techs., Inc. v. Commc'n Workers of Am., 475U.S. 643, 650 (1986) (internal quotations omitted). Any doubtconcerning the arbitration “should be resolved in favor ofcoverage.” Id.A motion to compel arbitration is decided according to thestandard used to resolve summary judgment motions pursuant
KAMIA NELLUM, Plaintiff, v. CREDIT ACCEPTANCE..., Slip Copy (2025) © 2025 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.3to Fed. R. Civ. P. 56. Tinder, 305 F.3d at 735. “Just asin summary judgment proceedings, a party cannot avoidcompelled arbitration by generally denying the facts uponwhich the right to arbitration rests; the party must identifyspecific evidence in the record demonstrating a materialfactual dispute for trial.” Id. (citing Oppenheimer & Co., Inc.v. Neidhardt, 56 F.3d 352, 358 (2d Cir. 1995)).III. DISCUSSIONCredit Acceptance argues that this dispute falls squarelywithin the ambit of the Arbitration Clause. (Dkt. 14; Dkt.16-1). Credit Acceptance further contends Nellum is boundby the provision of the Arbitration Clause to arbitrate “anycontroversy or claim” she has with Credit Acceptance relatedto the Contract or Vehicle. (Dkt. 15).In response, Nellum contends that Credit Acceptance'sMotion to Compel does not substitute for an answer toher Complaint. (Dkt. 17). Additionally, Nellum's LimitedResponse (Dkt. 18) argues that Credit Acceptance's Motion toCompel is improper because the majority of her claims aroseafter the repossession and do not concern the performanceof the retail installment contract. As such, she contends thatCredit Acceptance's Motion to Compel should be denied infull. Alternatively, Nellum argues that if this Court determinesany claims are arbitrable, “only those contract-based claimsbe sent to arbitration and that all remaining tort and statutoryclaims proceed before this Court.” Nellum further contendsthat Credit Acceptance has waived its right to arbitrationby removing the action to federal court, engaging in motionpractice, and delaying arbitration.3*4 In response, Credit Acceptance contends Nellumconceded the validity of the Arbitration Clause by failing tosubstantively respond that the Arbitration Clause is valid andenforceable. (Dkt. 19). Credit Acceptance further contendsthat based on the language of the Arbitration Clause, theClause encompasses all of Nellum's claims related to therepossession. Finally, Credit Acceptance argues that itsconduct does not constitute a waiver of its right to arbitration.A. MOTION TO STRIKECredit Acceptance's Motion to Compel (Dkt. 14) is a properresponse to Nellum's Complaint. (Dkt. 1-1). A defendant mayfile a motion to compel arbitration in lieu of an answer.4This is because “an arbitration clause is a type of forum-selection clause.” Grasty v. Colorado Tech. Univ., 599 F.App'x 596, 597 (7th Cir. 2015). Accordingly, motions tocompel arbitration concern venue and “are brought properlyunder Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(3), not Rule12(b)(1) [subject-matter jurisdiction].” Id.As the Tenth Circuit outlined, “cases involving motionsto compel arbitration typically just note the filing of themotion in response to the complaint, without even mentioningthe presence or absence of any responsive pleading.”Lamkin v. Morinda Props. Weight Parcel, LLC, 440 F.App'x 604, 608 n.1. (10th Cir. 2011). The Lamkin courtemphasized that “requiring a party to file an answer denyingmaterial allegations in the complaint and asserting potentialaffirmative defenses— in short, formally and substantivelyengaging in the merits of the litigation—in order to enforceits right not to litigate is a non-sequitur.” Id. (emphasis inoriginal).Here, Nellum's Motion to Strike (Dkt. 17) contends that CreditAcceptance's Motion to Compel does not substitute for ananswer to her Complaint. This argument is contrary to law.Because a defendant may file a motion to compel arbitrationin lieu of an answer, Nellum's Motion to Strike (Dkt. 17) isDENIED.B. WAIVER OF THE RIGHT TO ARBITRATIONCredit Acceptance has not waived its right to arbitration.There is a “strong federal policy” favoring arbitration. St.Mary's Med. Ctr. of Evansville, Inc. v. Disco AluminumProd. Co., 969 F.2d 585, 590 (7th Cir. 1992). As such,parties asserting waiver of a right to arbitrate “bear a ‘heavyburden’ and courts should not ‘lightly infer’ waiver.” Id. Toestablish waiver, a party must show that the party seekingarbitration “acted inconsistently with the right to arbitrate.”Kawasaki Heavy Indus., Ltd. v. Bombardier RecreationalProd., Inc., 660 F.3d 988, 994 (7th Cir. 2011). Several factorsare considered in the waiver analysis, including “whetherthe allegedly defaulting party participated in litigation,substantially delayed its request for arbitration, or participatedin discovery.” Id. Additionally, the Court affords more weightto the “diligence or the lack thereof of the party seekingarbitration,” and asks whether the party did “all it couldreasonably have been expected to do to make the earliestfeasible determination of whether to proceed judicially orby arbitration.” Cabinetree of Wisconsin, Inc. v. KraftmaidCabinetry, Inc., 50 F.3d 388, 391 (7th Cir. 1995).*5 Nellum contends Credit Acceptance waived its right toarbitration by removing the action to federal court, engaging
KAMIA NELLUM, Plaintiff, v. CREDIT ACCEPTANCE..., Slip Copy (2025) © 2025 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.4in motion practice, and delaying arbitration. (Dkt. 18). CreditAcceptance argues that removal of a case to federal courtalone is insufficient to establish waiver. (Dkt. 19). Further,Credit Acceptance argues its “participation in this litigationhas been minimal,” and notes it “announced its intention toarbitrate at every turn, refrained from engaging in discoveryor dispositive motion practice (other than to oppose Plaintiff'sunsuccessful motion for remand), and filed its Motion toCompel Arbitration just two months after removing the case.”Courts have found waiver where a defendant seeking tocompel arbitration not only removed the case to federal courtbut also participated in discovery. Cabinetree of Wisconsin,Inc., 50 F.3d at 391. In Cabinetree, the Court found a partywaived arbitration when only nine months after filing alawsuit and issuing discovery requests requiring the otherparty to produce nearly two-thousand documents did it seekarbitration. Id. at 389. The instant case is distinguishable.While Credit Acceptance removed this case to federal court,it has not filed an answer to Nellum's Complaint andhas not participated in discovery. Credit Acceptance timelyand properly sought arbitration two months after removal.Accordingly, because Nellum has not shown that CreditAcceptance has acted inconsistently with its right to arbitrate,this Court finds that Credit Acceptance has not waived itsright to seek arbitration.C. VALIDITY OF THE ARBITRATION AGREEMENTThe Arbitration Clause is a valid agreement to arbitrate.Whether a valid arbitration agreement exists is a matter ofstate contract law. Tinder, 305 F.3d at 733. In Indiana, “anagreement to arbitrate must be in writing and evince anintention to resolve some controversy through arbitration.”Novotny v. Renewal by Andersen Corp., 861 N.E.2d 15, 22(Ind. Ct. App. 2007). As with all contract interpretation,Courts give the language of the arbitration agreement “itsplain and ordinary meaning.” Green Tree Servicing, LLC v.Brough, 930 N.E.2d 1238, 1241-42 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010). To“determine the intent of the parties at the time the contractwas made,” a Court should examine “the language usedto express their rights and duties.” Id. When construing anarbitration agreement, “every doubt is to be resolved in favorof arbitration.” Id.As Credit Acceptance notes, Nellum conceded to thevalidity of the Arbitration Clause by failing to respond toCredit Acceptance's claim in its Motion to Compel thatthe Arbitration Clause is valid and enforceable. See Bontev. U.S. Bank, N.A., 624 F.3d 461, 466 (7th Cir. 2010)(“Failure to respond to an argument... results in waiver,” and aparty's “silence leaves [the court] to conclude” a concession).Additionally, Credit Acceptance has presented evidence in theform of a sworn declaration and exhibits that both the Noticeof Arbitration and the Arbitration Clause were in writing andinitialed by Nellum. (Dkt. 16-1). Credit Acceptance has alsoprovided evidence of Nellum's execution of a DeclarationAcknowledging Electronic Signature Process, confirmingthat she had personally affixed her electronic signature to theContract (Dkt. 16-2) and a sworn declaration that Nellum hadthe opportunity to reject the Arbitration Clause within 30 daysof the date of the Contract and failed to do so (Dkt. 16).Nellum does not raise any arguments related to the validityof the arbitration clause and does not dispute that she failedto reject her assent to the Contract or to the ArbitrationClause within. (Dkt. 18). Instead, Nellum concedes that a“small fraction” of her claims “could arguably fall within”the Arbitration Clause. (Id. at 1). The Arbitration Clauseis written broadly to encompass all disputes and explicitlycontains the parties’ agreement to submit all disputes relatedto the Contract to arbitration; therefore, the Arbitration Clauseis valid.D. WHETHER THE DISPUTE IS WITHIN THESCOPE OF THE ARBITRATION CLAUSE*6 Nellum's claims fall within the scope of the ArbitrationClause. In addition to showing a valid agreement to arbitrate,a party seeking arbitration must also show that the dispute iswithin the scope of arbitration. Kass, 75 F.4th at 700. ThisCourt has held “[i]f an ‘arbitration clause is broad enough,by its own terms, to encompass disputes,’ then arbitration ofthose disputes is required. Edmondson v. German Am. Bank,748 F. Supp. 3d 621, 628 (S.D. Ind. 2024); quoting Rosenblumv. Travelbyus.com Ltd., 299 F.3d 657, 662 (7th Cir. 2002).Moreover, “any doubt concerning the scope of the arbitrationclause is resolved in favor of arbitration.” Id. at 629.While Nellum concedes that “roughly 15%” of her claimscould arguably fall within the Arbitration Clause, shecontends that “approximately 85%” of her claims are notcovered by the Arbitration Clause. (Dkt. 18). As such,she requests that if this Court determines that any of herclaims are arbitrable, “only those contract-based claims besent to arbitration and that all remaining tort and statutoryclaims proceed before this Court.” (Id.). In response, CreditAcceptance contends that the Arbitration Clause encompassesNellum's repossession-related tort and statutory claims. (Dkt.19).
KAMIA NELLUM, Plaintiff, v. CREDIT ACCEPTANCE..., Slip Copy (2025) © 2025 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.5Additionally, Nellum argues that the Clause “expresslyexcludes” repossession-related tort and statutory claims.(Dkt. 18). Nellum cites to a cherry-picked portion of theArbitration Clause's repossession carve-out provision tosupport her contention. (Id.). However, the full text ofthe Arbitration Clause's repossession carve-out provisionprovides:“Dispute” does not include any repossession of the Vehicleupon Your default or any exercise of the power of sale ofthe Vehicle under this Contract or any individual action byYou to prevent Us from using such remedy, so long as suchindividual action does not involve a request for monetaryrelief of any kind.(Dkt. No. 16-1 at 5).Credit Acceptance notes that the repossession carve-outprovision is inapplicable because Nellum is not seeking toprevent Credit Acceptance from repossessing or selling theVehicle. (Dkt. 19). Indeed, this Court notes that based on theclaims in Nellum's Complaint regarding Credit Acceptance'salleged “unlawful repossession of Plaintiff's vehicle,” (Dkt.1-1) the repossession has already occurred. Credit Acceptancefurther highlights that Nellum's Complaint includes a requestfor monetary relief, which expressly removes it from thecarve-out. (Id.; Dkt. 19).The express language of the Arbitration Clause is writtenbroadly and provides the buyer agrees to arbitrate a “dispute,”defined as “any controversy or claim”—including “claimsbased on tort, violations of laws, statutes, ordinances orregulations or any other legal or equitable theories”—“arisingout of or in any way related to [the] Contract,” including“any default” or “collection of amounts due under [the]Contract.” (Dkt. No. 16-1 at 5).Other district courts have examined Credit Acceptance'sArbitration Clause and found it broad enough to encompassa plaintiff's repossession-related claims. See LaRue v.Collateral Recovery Team LLC, 2019 WL 5538423, at *3(S.D. Tex. Oct. 25, 2019) (finding that definition of “dispute”in Credit Acceptance's Arbitration Clause that included“contract claims, claims based on tort, violations of laws,statutes, ordinances or regulations or any other legal orequitable theories” encompassed the plaintiff's repossession-related claims); Credit Acceptance Corp. v. Vansteenburgh,2017 WL 4560173, at *4 (N.D. Miss. Oct. 12, 2017) (same);Gillette v. Serv. Intel. LLC, 2019 WL 5268570, at *3 (E.D.Wis. Oct. 17, 2019) (same, and noting that “[w]hen reviewingthe scope of an arbitration contract, the court will not veerfrom the plain text to rewrite operative provisions that clearlyindicate arbitrable issues”).*7 Therefore, based on a plain reading of the Clause,this Court finds that the Arbitration Clause encompasses allclaims, including any tort and statutory claims. Accordingly,Nellum's claims, as pled in her Complaint, are within thescope of the Arbitration Clause and must be arbitrated.IV. CONCLUSIONFor the foregoing reasons, Credit Acceptance's Motion toCompel Arbitration (Dkt. 14) is GRANTED. If Nellumintends to pursue her claims, she must proceed as set forth inthe Arbitration Agreement.Credit Acceptance has requested a stay of the action pendingarbitration. Section 3 of the FAA provides that “upon beingsatisfied that the issue involved in such suit or proceeding isreferable to arbitration,” the Court “shall on application of oneof the parties stay the trial of the action until such arbitrationhas been had in accordance with the terms of the agreement.”9 U.S.C. § 3; see also Halim v. Great Gatsby's AuctionGallery, Inc., 516 F.3d 557, 561 (7th Cir. 2008) (“[T]he propercourse of action when a party seeks to invoke an arbitrationclause is to stay the proceedings rather to dismiss outright.”).Pending further order of the Court, all proceedings in thisaction are hereby STAYED.Credit Acceptance is ORDERED to file a status report onor before January 17, 2026, indicating whether Plaintiff hasinitiated arbitration. If arbitration is not pursued by January17, 2026, this action will be dismissed with prejudice. Ifarbitration is pursued, Credit Acceptance is ordered to filereports on the status of the arbitration every 60 days,beginning January 17, 2026.Additionally, Plaintiff's Motion to Strike Defendant'sMotion to Compel Arbitration (Dkt. 17) is DENIED.Plaintiff's Motion for Leave to File Sur-Reply (Dkt. 20)is GRANTED IN PART, in that the Court reviewedand considered Plaintiff's arguments within the sur-reply.Plaintiff's Emergency Motion (Dkt. 23) is hereby DENIED asmoot.SO ORDERED.
KAMIA NELLUM, Plaintiff, v. CREDIT ACCEPTANCE..., Slip Copy (2025) © 2025 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.6Date: November 18, 2025Editor's Note: Tabular or graphical material not displayableat this time.Distribution:Kamia Nellum8776 Bald Eagle CourtIndianapolis, IN 46234Alan M. RitchiePilgrim Christakis LLParitchie@pilgrimchristakis.comAll CitationsSlip Copy, 2025 WL 3222813Footnotes1Credit Acceptance removed the case to federal court on August 8, 2025 (Dkt 1). This Court denied Nellum'sMotion to Remand to State Court on October 7, 2025 (Dkt. 13).2The parties generally agree that Indiana law applies, (Dkt. 15 at 5) and (Dkt. 18 at 2).3Nellum cites to Messina v. N. Cent. Distrib., Inc., 821 N.E.2d 236 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005) for the proposition thatthat “[u]nder federal and Indiana precedent, such litigation conduct constitutes waiver.” A Westlaw searchfor the Messina case shows that the proper citation for the case is Messina v. N. Cent. Distrib., Inc., 821F.3d 1047, 1050 (8th Cir. 2016) and that no such case was addressed by the Indiana Court of Appeals.Additionally, Nellum cites to “Miller v. Credit Acceptance Corp., 2019 WL 2450930 (S.D. Ind. 2019)” asauthority for the proposition that “[t]his very court has already held that post-repossession and credit-reportingconduct by Credit Acceptance falls outside its arbitration clause.” However, this case citation does not exist.A Westlaw search using “2019 WL 2450930” yields a 2019 habeas corpus decision from the District of Utah.See Honie v. Crowther, 2019 WL 2450930, (D. Utah June 12, 2019). A Westlaw search using “Miller v. CreditAcceptance Corp.” yields two opinions from the same case addressing a motion for remand. See Miller v.Credit Acceptance Corp., 2012 WL 1621268, at *1 (N.D. Ohio May 9, 2012) (granting motion for remand);Miller v. Credit Acceptance Corp., 2012 WL 2463912, at *1 (N.D. Ohio June 27, 2012) (denying plaintiff'smotion for attorney's fees).Although Nellum's sur-reply affirmatively represents that she did not fabricate citations, she concedes that“[s]ome references may be imperfect due to limited access and the complexity of legal databases. (Dkt. 20-1).Nellum is not excused from compliance with the procedural rules and is hereby cautioned that submittinghallucinated citations to the Court is unacceptable. Such conduct can result in sanctions. See Pearle Vision,Inc. v. Room, 541 F.3d 751, 758 (7th Cir. 2008) (noting that “pro se litigants are not excused from compliancewith the procedural rules”); see also Tsupko v. Kinetic Advantage, LLC, No. 1:24-CV-01210-TWP-KMB, 2025WL 2677157, at *5 (S.D. Ind. Sept. 17, 2025) (cautioning a pro se litigant for his citations to non-existent caselaw). See also Mid Cent. Operating Eng'rs Health & Welfare Fund v. HoosierVac LLC, No. 2:24-CV-00326-JPH-MJD, 2025 WL 574234, at *5 (S.D. Ind. Feb. 21, 2025), report and recommendation adopted as modified,No. 2:24-CV-00326- JPH-MJD, 2025 WL 1511211 (S.D. Ind. May 28, 2025).4See Hembd v. BR Assocs., Inc., No. 3:08-CV-187-RLY-WGH, 2009 WL 10713131, at *1 (S.D. Ind. Feb.27, 2009) (“In lieu of filing an answer to Plaintiff's complaint, Defendant filed the instant motion to compelarbitration and stay these proceedings.”); see also Kiefer Specialty Flooring, Inc. v. Tarkett, Inc., 174 F.3d907, 909 (7th Cir. 1999) (“In response to the litigation initiated by Kiefer, Tarkett filed a motion to compel
KAMIA NELLUM, Plaintiff, v. CREDIT ACCEPTANCE..., Slip Copy (2025) © 2025 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.7arbitration pursuant to the arbitration provision in the parties’ distributorship agreements and to stay the suitpending arbitration.”).End of Document© 2025 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.
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