Nelson v. Navient Solutions, LLC, No. 1:24-cv-00025-SMR-SBJ (Sept. 4, 2025)

Case details
Full caption
April Ann Nelson v. Navient Solutions, LLC, et al.
Country
United States
Jurisdiction
Federal
Decided
Sept. 4, 2025
Disposition
Motion Denied
Majority
Stephanie M. Rose (C. J.) (unanimous Court)
APRIL ANN NELSON, Plaintiff, v. NAVIENT SOLUTIONS, LLC,..., Slip Copy (2025) © 2025 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.12025 WL 2633962Only the Westlaw citation is currently available.United States District Court, S.D. Iowa, Western Division.APRIL ANN NELSON, Plaintiff,v.NAVIENT SOLUTIONS, LLC, NAVIENTCREDIT FINANCE CORPORATION, andALLIED INTERSTATE, LLC, Defendants.Case No. 1:24-cv-00025-SMR-SBJ|Filed 09/04/2025Editor's Note: This decision contains citation referencesthat are incorrect or do not actually exist. These invalidcitations appeared in the original court opinion and have beenpreserved as written since they are part of the official record.Any links to these invalid citations have been removed.ORDER ON MOTION TO ALTEROR AMEND JUDGMENTSTEPHANIE M. ROSE, CHIEF JUDGE UNITED STATESDISTRICT COURT*1 Plaintiff April Ann Nelson moves to alter or amendthe Court's June 30, 2025 order under Federal Rule ofCivil Procedure 59(e). [ECF No. 56]. The order dismissedher Second Amended Complaint with prejudice. Plaintiffcontends that newly discovered evidence and manifest errorswarrant reconsideration. The motion is DENIED.I. LEGAL STANDARDRule 59(e) empowers district courts to alter or amendjudgments. The rule “was adopted ‘to make clear that thedistrict court possesses the power to rectify its own mistakesin the period immediately following the entry of judgment.’” Norman v. Ark. Dep't. of Educ., 79 F.3d 748, 750 (8thCir. 1996) (cleaned up) (citation omitted). Rule 59(e) servesa limited function. A court may grant such a motion onlyto account for an intervening change in controlling law, toconsider evidence not previously available, or to correct clearerror or prevent manifest injustice. United States v. Metro. St.Louis Sewer Dist., 440 F.3d 930, 933 (8th Cir. 2006). Suchmotions cannot introduce new evidence, tender new legaltheories, or raise arguments available before judgment. Id. at933 (citation omitted). Nor may they “relitigate old matters”or present evidence that could have been raised earlier. ExxonShipping Co. v. Baker, 554 U.S. 471, 485 n.5 (2008) (citationomitted).A party cannot establish manifest error throughdisappointment with an adverse ruling. Such error requires“wholesale disregard, misapplication, or failure to recognizecontrolling precedent.” Wakefield v. Colvin, 185 F. Supp.3d 1107, 1108 (S.D. Iowa 2016) (citation omitted). Districtcourts enjoy “broad discretion” when deciding Rule 59(e)motions and will not be reversed “absent a clear abuseof discretion.” Sparkman Learning Ctr. v. Ark. Dep't ofHum. Servs., 775 F.3d 993, 1001 (8th Cir. 2014) (quotingChristensen v. Qwest Pension Plan, 462 F.3d 913, 920 (8thCir. 2006)).II. ANALYSISPlaintiff's motion fails on all grounds. She advances threeprincipal arguments: that newly discovered evidence warrantsreconsideration, that the Court committed manifest error,and that certain deficiencies require correction. She alsoimproperly attempts to amend her complaint without leave ofcourt. Each argument fails.A. Newly Discovered EvidenceEvidence qualifies as “newly discovered” for purposesof Rule 59(e) only if it satisfies a demanding five-parttest. See Williams v. Hobbs, 658 F.3d 842, 854 (8th Cir.2011) (citation omitted). First, the evidence must have beendiscovered after entry of the court's order. Second, the movantmust have exercised diligence in attempting to obtain theevidence beforehand. Third, the evidence must not be merelycumulative nor impeaching. Fourth, the evidence must bematerial to the case. Fifth, it must be probable that theevidence would have produced a different result had it beenavailable during the original proceedings. A movant mustsatisfy all five requirements to obtain relief. Id. at 854.Plaintiff offers two pieces of allegedly newly discoveredevidence. First, she points to her successful motion to reopenher bankruptcy case, filed on July 2, 2025—two days after
APRIL ANN NELSON, Plaintiff, v. NAVIENT SOLUTIONS, LLC,..., Slip Copy (2025) © 2025 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.2this Court dismissed her complaint. [ECF No. 56-1 at 31].This evidence fails the diligence requirement from the outset.Defendants alerted Plaintiff to her standing defects on January10, 2025, yet she took no remedial action for nearly sixmonths. [ECF No. 22-1]. Such delay following an adverseruling exemplifies the lack of diligence that bars Rule 59(e)relief.*2 Second, Plaintiff relies on a July 2, 2025 letter fromher bankruptcy attorney claiming the adversary action wasnot “settled” but instead resolved through Navient SolutionsLLC's (“NSL”) review of a school misconduct dischargeapplication. This letter suffers the same fundamental lackof timeliness. The attorney represented Plaintiff throughoutthe adversary proceeding, making any clarification readilyavailable during the original proceedings. That Plaintiffobtained this letter days before filing her motion—six monthsafter learning of her standing deficiencies—reveals its posthoc character. The letter represents an attempt to manufactureevidence after dismissal rather than genuine newly discoveredmaterial.Even assuming the bankruptcy trustee ultimately abandonsthese claims, Plaintiff cannot demonstrate that it is probable adifferent result would have ensued. The Court's original orderidentified multiple independent grounds for dismissing eachclaim on the merits. [ECF No. 54]. Curing the standing defectcannot revive claims that suffer from fundamental substantivedeficiencies. Hobbs, 658 F.3d at 854.B. Manifest ErrorPlaintiff's arguments largely reiterate positions the Courtpreviously considered and rejected. Her dissatisfaction withthe Court's reasoning does not constitute manifest error. SeeWakefield, 185 F. Supp. 3d at 1108.Plaintiff cannot overcome the fundamental deficienciesin her FTC Holder Rule claim. She continues offeringvague allegations about school misconduct without requisitespecificity. Her attempt to characterize NSL's loan dischargeas an “admission of wrongdoing” runs afoul of Federal Ruleof Evidence 408, which prohibits using settlement offers toprove liability. Bertroche v. Mercy Physician Assocs., Inc.,No. 18-CV-59 CJW-KEM, 2019 WL 7761809, at *4 (N.D.Iowa Oct. 28, 2019). The claim also remains time-barred, asthe alleged misconduct occurred nearly two decades ago.Plaintiff's semantic dispute over whether the adversary actionwas “settled” lacks merit. The undisputed facts establish thatNSL agreed to discharge the loan balance and Plaintiff agreedto dismiss the adversary action. This constitutes settlementunder any reasonable understanding. Plaintiff's July 2, 2025letter from her bankruptcy counsel—obtained days beforefiling this motion—represents a transparent post hoc attemptto manufacture a claim.The analysis of Plaintiff's statutory claims contained nomanifest error. Under the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act,Plaintiff has not established that either NSL or Navient CreditFinance Corporation qualifies as a “debt collector” under thestatute. As for Allied, the Court correctly found that Plaintifffailed to allege specific false statements or deceptive conduct,and that settlement discussions during pending litigation donot constitute prohibited debt collection practices withoutmore. The Court reached the same conclusion regardingPlaintiff's Iowa Code Chapter 714H claim. Attempting tosettle disputed claims while represented by counsel cannotreasonably be characterized as a deceptive or unfair practice,particularly when those efforts resulted in over $52,000 indebt discharge for Plaintiff.C. Improper Amendment AttemptsMuch of Plaintiff's motion improperly attempts to injectnew theories and allegations previously available to her. Herbreach of contract argument based on loan terms, allegationsof a “system error” dating back twenty years, and variousother contentions were absent from the Second AmendedComplaint yet feature prominently in her post-judgmentmotion. Such efforts violate the fundamental principle thatRule 59(e) motions cannot introduce new legal theories orraise arguments available before judgment. Innovative HomeHealth Care, Inc. v. P.T.-O.T. Assocs. of the Black Hills, 141F.3d 1284, 1286 (8th Cir. 1998).1D. Citation of Nonexistent Authorities*3 The motion contains multiple citations to nonexistentcases. Examples of these fictitious authorities includeHaglund v. Philip Morris Inc., 332 F.3d 252 (1st Cir. 2003);In re Jackson, 593 B.R. 844 (Bankr. D. Idaho 2018); andHarris v. City of St. Paul, 2018 WL 4620747 (8th Cir. 2018).This is at least the third brief in which Plaintiff has submittednonexistent case citations, suggesting continued improper use
APRIL ANN NELSON, Plaintiff, v. NAVIENT SOLUTIONS, LLC,..., Slip Copy (2025) © 2025 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.3of generative artificial intelligence in legal briefing. Suchconduct wastes judicial resources and misleads the Court.III. CONCLUSIONRule 59(e) provides a narrow avenue for correcting manifesterrors or addressing newly discovered evidence. It doesnot afford disappointed litigants an opportunity to relitigatedecided questions. Plaintiff has identified no change incontrolling law, no previously unavailable evidence, andno manifest errors warranting reconsideration. Her motioninstead seeks to advance arguments and theories availableduring the original proceedings but not timely raised.The Court's order correctly identified multiple independentgrounds for dismissing each claim. Plaintiff's motion failsto demonstrate that reconsideration would alter any of thesedeterminations. Rule 59(e) relief remedies clear legal error, itdoes not provide a second opportunity to present argumentsthat could have been made initially. Accordingly, Plaintiff'sRule 59(e) Motion to Alter or Amend Judgment is DENIED.[ECF No. 56].IT IS SO ORDERED.Dated this 4th day of September, 2025.All CitationsSlip Copy, 2025 WL 2633962Footnotes1Plaintiff filed a reply brief that exceeds the page limit established by Local Rule 7(g) by more than double.[ECF No. 58]. Although parties may seek leave to file overlength briefs, Plaintiff made no such request.The Court therefore declines to consider the reply brief. Even a cursory review reveals that the brief raisesadditional arguments not previously advanced in this litigation, compounding the procedural deficienciesalready identified. Moreover, Plaintiff fails to address her pattern of citing nonexistent legal authorities, atroubling practice that has persisted throughout these proceedings.End of Document© 2025 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.
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