Newell v. Law Offices of Travis R. Walker, No. 25-14017-CIV (2026)

Case details
Full caption
Lindsey Newell v. The Law Offices of Travis R. Walker, et al.
Country
United States
Jurisdiction
Federal
Decided
2026
LINDSEY NEWELL, Plaintiff, v. THE LAW OFFICES OF TRAVIS..., Slip Copy (2026) © 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.12026 WL 507533Only the Westlaw citation is currently available.United States District Court, S.D. Florida.LINDSEY NEWELL, Plaintiff,v.THE LAW OFFICES OF TRAVISR. WALKER, et al., Defendants.CASE NO. 25-14017-CIV-MIDDLEBROOKS/MAYNARD|02/13/2026Attorneys and Law FirmsThomas Martin Bonan, Seraph Legal P.A., Tampa, FL, forPlaintiff Lindsey Newell.Seth Adam Kolton, Shendell & Pollock PL, Boca Raton, FL,Travis Richard Walker, The Law Offices of Travis R. WalkerPA, Stuart, FL, for Defendants.SHANIEK MILLS MAYNARD, U.S. MAGISTRATEJUDGEREPORT & RECOMMENDATION*1 This matter is before me upon Plaintiff's Motion forAdditional Discovery Sanctions (“Motion”), DE 80, whichpresiding U.S. District Judge Donald M. Middlebrooks hasreferred to me for appropriate disposition, DE 85. Forthe following reasons, I recommend that the Motion beGRANTED IN PART AND DENIED IN PART.FACTS ALLEGED IN FIRSTAMENDED COMPLAINT [DE 27]At the end of 2022, Plaintiff Lindsey Newell hired DefendantLaw Offices of Travis R. Walker, P.A. (“Law Firm”) torepresent her in connection with divorce proceedings inwhich Ms. Newell wished to force the sale of a personalresidence she owned with her ex-spouse. DE 27 at 6 ¶¶ 35–38. By August 1, 2023, Ms. Newell had paid the Law Firm$11,959.85, but the Law Firm made no significant progress inher case. Id. at 7 ¶¶ 48–49. Most of the fees were for “routineinter-office and administrative matters.” Id. at 7 50. Afterreceiving another invoice from the Law Firm on August 1,2023, Ms. Newell hired attorney Thomas Bonan to representher in dealing with the Law Firm. Id. at 7 51.On August 3, 2023, Mr. Bonan emailed Mr. Walker. DE 27at 7 52. Mr. Bonan said he represented Ms. Newell andrequested that the Law Firm preserve specific categories ofevidence in anticipation of possible litigation. Id. The LawFirm did not respond and instead filed a motion to withdrawas counsel in the divorce case. Id. at 7 ¶¶ 53–54. The LawFirm also continued to send payment demands directly to Ms.Newell. Id.On August 15, 2023, Mr. Bonan emailed Mr. Walker again, inaddition to two other Law Firm employees, Jayda White andAttorney Hena Rodely. Id. at 8 55. The email again askedMr. Walker and the Law Firm to preserve specific categoriesof evidence. Id. at 8 ¶¶ 55–57. No one responded to the email.Id. at 8 58.On August 16, 2023, Mr. Bonan emailed again to requestMs. Newell's client file—the second such request. DE 8 at¶¶ 61–62. The Law Firm did not provide the file, and Ms.Rodely said Ms. Newell and opposing counsel in the statecase had all the documents. Id. at 8 64. Mr. Bonan emailedthe Law Firm again, noting that the requested documentswere inaccessible on the docket and specifically requestingthat the Law Firm provide “all filings, communications with[Ms. Newell], communications with opposing counsel, notes,memos, research, investigations, and reports.” Id. at 9 ¶¶ 69–70. The Law Firm did not provide the documents. Id. at 71.On September 28, 2023, Mr. Bonan requested Ms. Newell'scase file again. DE 27 at 9 72. This time, Ms. Rodelyprovided “six screenshots of texts between the formerspouses, a copy of [Ms. Newell's]...license, a two-pagescreenshot of a text between Ms. Rodely and [Ms. Newell],and a two-page screenshot of two emails trying to coordinatea mediation.” Id. at 9–10 73. No one from the Law Firmdisclosed any additional aspects of the file. Id. at 10 ¶¶ 75–76.In November 2023, the Law Firm assigned the collectionsaccount for Ms. Newell to Defendant Florida LegalCollections, P.A. (“Florida Legal Collections”), anothercompany Mr. Walker owns. DE 27 at 12 ¶¶ 94–95, 97. FloridaLegal Collections’ initial collection letter to Ms. Newelldemanded $1,574. Id. at 12 96. Ms. Newell respondedwith a letter disputing and requesting validation of the debt,identifying her legal counsel, and requesting that Florida
LINDSEY NEWELL, Plaintiff, v. THE LAW OFFICES OF TRAVIS..., Slip Copy (2026) © 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.2Legal Collections stop contacting her regarding the debt.Id. Florida Legal Collections never sent any validation andinstead continued to make direct collection communicationsto Ms. Newell throughout the first half of 2024. Id. at 13 ¶¶100, 102.*2 On January 24, 2024, the state court entered an agreedorder allowing the Law Firm to withdraw from the divorcecase and requiring the Law Firm “to transmit any remaining,non-privileged documentation in the applicable client casefile to Mr. Bonan by January 29, 2024.” DE 27 at 10 78.Neither Mr. Walker nor the Law Firm complied. Id. at 10 79.Instead, Defendants attempted to collect additional paymentfrom Ms. Newell, including through telephone calls, texts,and emails. Id. at 10–11 ¶¶ 80–87. Some of the collectionattempts occurred between 9:00 PM and 8:00 AM. Id. at 11 88.PROCEDURAL HISTORYOn January 15, 2025, Ms. Newell filed a five-countComplaint against Mr. Walker, the Law Firm, and FloridaLegal Collections, alleging violations of the FloridaConsumer Collection Practices Act (“FCCPA”) and theFair Debt Collection Practices Act (“FDCPA”). DE 1. TheComplaint alleges Mr. Walker and his companies violatedthese statutes by contacting Ms. Newell to collect a debt afterknowing she was represented by counsel, contacting her withsuch frequency and at such times as to constitute harassment,attempting to collect an amount in excess of what she owed,and overbilling in the underlying divorce case. Id.On May 21, 2025, Ms. Newell filed a First AmendedComplaint. DE 27. On June 4, 2025, I entered a PretrialScheduling Order setting a discovery deadline of September29, 2025. DE 37. On September 5, 2025, Ms. Newell's counselmoved for a Clerk's default against all Defendants basedon their failure to adhere to Court-ordered deadlines forresponding to the Amended Complaint. DE 43. A Clerk'sdefault—the second in the case—was entered on September8, 2025. DE 48. On September 10, 2025, Defendants movedto set aside the Clerk's default. DE 51.After recounting Defendants’ missed deadlines, JudgeMiddlebrooks granted the motion to set aside the Clerk'sdefault based on the strong preference that lawsuits beresolved on the merits rather than by default posture butnoted that the “case has a troubling history of delay by theDefendants.” DE 55 at 1, 4. The Court also noted Ms. Newell's“valid concerns about the upcoming discovery deadline givenDefendants’ failure to participate in discovery.” Id. at 4.Considering those concerns, which were laid out in detailin Ms. Newell's unopposed motion to amend the PretrialScheduling Order, DE 56, on October 1, 2025, the Courtextended the discovery deadline to December 28, 2025. DE57. Also on October 1, 2025, Ms. Newell filed a motion todismiss Defendants’ counterclaims, DE 58, and Attorney SethAdam Kolton entered a notice of appearance on behalf of allthree Defendants. DE 59.Defendants failed to respond to the pending motion to dismissthe counterclaims by the deadline of October 15, 2025. TheCourt entered an Order requiring Defendants to show causewhy the motion should not be granted based on Defendants’failure to timely respond. DE 63. On October 31, 2025,Defendants responded through their counsel, Mr. Kolton,stating that an administrative error had prevented Mr. Koltonfrom receiving filings in the case, but the error was resolved.DE 64, DE 65. The Court accepted this explanation andpermitted Defendants to file their response to Ms. Newell'smotion to dismiss. DE 70.DISCOVERY HISTORYOn November 4, 2025, Ms. Newell moved to compeldisclosures, discovery responses, and depositions. DE 66.That discovery motion was referred to me, DE 67, and Iordered expedited briefing. DE 68.In the motion to compel, Ms. Newell asserted that evenfive months after the scheduling conference, Defendants hadnever served initial disclosures. DE 66 at 2. Further, Ms.Newell noticed depositions of “collection managers” for theLaw Firm and Florida Legal Collections, and Defendantsinformed Ms. Newell immediately before the start of thedepositions that no witnesses would appear. Id. at 3–4. Duringconferral, Defendants confirmed that they would not beproducing witnesses in response to the deposition notices.Id. at 4. Finally, Defendants had failed to serve responses towritten discovery or produce responsive documents even afterMs. Newell agreed to extensions of the response deadlines. Id.at 9. Ms. Newell sought an order (1) compelling the missingdisclosures; (2) deeming objections to written discoveryrequests waived and requiring responses within 10 days;(3) deeming requests for admissions admitted; (4) requiringthe Law Firm and FLC to produce collection managers for
LINDSEY NEWELL, Plaintiff, v. THE LAW OFFICES OF TRAVIS..., Slip Copy (2026) © 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.3depositions within 15 days; and (5) awarding fees and costsunder Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 37. Id. at 12–13.*3 On November 12, 2025, Defendants filed a responsein which they did “not dispute that discovery responses[we]re overdue.” DE 69 at 1. Instead, Defendants said thesanctions requested were excessive, particularly consideringDefendants’ recent retention of Mr. Kolton as counsel. Id.at 1, 7. Defendants promised they would “promptly” servedisclosures and discovery responses. Id. at 2, 4.On November 18, 2025, I granted in part and denied inpart Ms. Newell's motion to compel. DE 73. I noted thatthe case had been pending for ten months, the previouslyextended discovery period was nearing its end, expiringon December 28, 2025,1 and Defendants had undisputedlydelayed discovery without justification. Id. at 1–2. I explainedthat Defendants’ failure to comply with discovery obligationswas particularly egregious considering that two Defendantswere an attorney admitted to practice in this jurisdictionand his law firm. Id. at 2–3. I ordered Defendants to (1)serve complete initial disclosures by November 21, 2025;(2) serve complete responses (with objections as appropriate)to all outstanding written discovery requests by November28, 2025; (3) confer with Ms. Newell's counsel and scheduledepositions to occur by December 12, 2025; and (4) conferand file a joint status report confirming compliance withthe Order by December 2, 2025. DE 73 at 4. I warned theparties that I would “not hesitate to award fees or otherappropriate sanctions upon a showing that any party iswillfully obstructing the discovery process.” Id. at 3-4, 5.On December 23, 2025, Ms. Newell filed the pending Motionfor Additional Discovery Sanctions (“Motion for Sanctions”).DE 80. The Motion for Sanctions is fully briefed, DE 87,DE 90, DE 85.2 I held an evidentiary hearing on Monday,February 9, 2026. DE 98. The matter is now ripe for review.EVIDENTIARY HEARINGAt the evidentiary hearing, Defendants called two witnesses:Mr. Walker and Robert Woodbury, a Law Firm paralegal. DE103.Mr. Walker testified that the Law Firm keeps client files aspaper copies and in cloud storage, but Ms. Newell's file ismissing from both places. Mr. Walker said he had Law Firmstaff search thousands of hard-copy files and had the LawFirm's IT vendor, Capstone, search the cloud server, both tono avail. Though Mr. Walker said he first tried to find Ms.Newell's client file shortly after receiving a litigation holdnotice from Mr. Bonan, the only documentary evidence hehad of any instruction to anyone to search for Ms. Newell's filewas an email to Capstone sent in November 2025. Accordingto Mr. Walker, the Capstone searches in November 2025 wereoverinclusive and originally located over 100 gigabytes ofdata, which he turned over to his lawyer for review. Mr.Walker also spoke of another third-party company, Interpose,that was holding Florida Legal Collections’ records anddemanding that Florida Legal Collections pay $20,000 ininvoices before it would release the files. Mr. Walker testifiedthat when the Law Firm receives a litigation hold, the practiceis for designated employees to “handle the process,” but Mr.Walker does not know if that happened in this case when heand his Law Firm received the litigation hold notice fromMr. Bonan. Mr. Walker acknowledged that Mr. Bonan sent anevidence preservation request, DE 90-2, to Mr. Walker's emailaddress on August 3, 2023.*4 The other witness, paralegal Robert Woodbury, joinedthe Law Firm's staff in September 2025, while this casewas already pending. He testified that on the Friday beforetheevidentiary hearing, he spent the day running searchesin the Law Firm's emails for documents and informationresponsive to the discovery requests in this case. He alsotalked to Capstone. His search ultimately produced 29potentially responsive emails.LEGAL STANDARDA district court has broad authority to impose sanctionsunder Rule 37 when a party fails to obey a discovery order.Malautea v. Suzuki Motor Co., Ltd., 987 F.2d 1536, 1542(11th Cir. 1993). Rule 37(b)(2) provides for, on the one hand,dispositive sanctions such as the entry of an involuntarydismissal or default judgment and, on the other hand, lessersanctions such as striking pleadings, staying proceedings,designating facts or elements as undisputed, and precludingthe introduction of certain evidence. Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(b)(2)(A)(i)–(vii).The party moving for sanctions bears the burden of makinga prima facie showing that a court order has been violated.U.S. v. One 1999 Forty-Seven Foot Fountain Motor Vessel,240 F.R.D. 695, 698 (S.D. Fla. 2007) (citing In re Chase &Sanborn Corp., 872 F.2d 397, 400 (11th Cir. 1989)). Once
LINDSEY NEWELL, Plaintiff, v. THE LAW OFFICES OF TRAVIS..., Slip Copy (2026) © 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.4the moving party satisfies its burden, the non-moving partymust defend its failure to follow the order in question byshowing that it was unable to comply with the court orderafter “all reasonable efforts.” In re Chase & Sanborn Corp.,872 F.2d at 400 (quoting U.S. v. Rizzo, 539 F.2d 458, 465(5th Cir. 1976)); One 1999 Forty-Seven Foot Fountain MotorVessel, 240 F.R.D. at 698. The non-moving party “ ‘must gobeyond a mere assertion of inability and satisfy [its] burdenof production on the point by introducing evidence in supportof [its] claim.’ ” In re Chase & Sanborn Corp., 872 F.2d at400 (quoting United States v. Hayes, 722 F.2d 723, 725 (11thCir. 1984)).The moving party does not need to show an opposingparty's willfulness or bad faith for the Court to impose lessersanctions. See Coquina Invs. v. TD Bank, N.A., 760 F.3d 1300,1319 (11th Cir. 2014) (“ ‘Our caselaw is clear that only ina case where the court imposes the most severe sanction—default or dismissal—is a finding of willfulness or badfaith failure to comply necessary.’ ” (quoting BankAtlantic v.Blythe Eastman Paine Webber, Inc., 12 F.3d 1045, 1049 (11thCir. 1994)). Thus, a finding of willfulness is not necessaryto direct that designated facts be taken as established forpurposes of an action. Coquina Investments, 760 F.3d at1319–20.“Rule 37 sanctions are imposed not only to prevent unfairprejudice to the litigants but also to ensure the integrity ofthe discovery process.” Aztec Steel Co. v. Fla. Steel Corp.,691 F.2d 480, 482 (11th Cir. 1982). A district court has“substantial discretion in deciding whether and how to imposesanctions under Rule 37.” Chudasama v. Mazda Motor Corp.,123 F.3d 1353, 1366 (11th Cir. 1997).Additionally, “[i]nstead of or in addition to [other sanctions],the court must order the disobedient party, the attorneyadvising that party, or both to pay the reasonable expenses,including attorney's fees, caused by the failure, unless thefailure was substantially justified or other circumstancesmake an award of expenses unjust.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(c).DISCUSSIONApplying these standards, I consider Ms. Newell'scontentions regarding Defendants’ discovery failures in thiscase. Ms. Newell asserts that Defendants have failed tocomply with my prior discovery order as follows.A. Failure to Produce Documents ShowingDefendants’ Debt Collection Attempts*5 Ms. Newell complains that Defendants failed to produceany records or documentation reflecting their efforts to collecta debt from the Ms. Newell, information going to the heartof this collections dispute case. Despite specific discoveryrequests, Defendants failed to produce communicationsto or from Ms. Newell or her counsel concerning hercollections account; records reflecting the dates or times ofany phone calls, texts, or written correspondence attemptingto collecting on the debt; documents identifying the originalcreditor; records regarding attempts to validate the debt; ormaterials reflecting Defendants’ supervision of employeeswho contacted Ms. Newell regarding the debt. DE 80-1, Resp.to RFP Nos. 2, 3, 24, 26, 35; DE 80-2 Resp. to RFP Nos. 1,7, 8, 14, 21, 30, 33; DE 80-9, Resp. to RFP Nos. 1-5, 7-10,15-19, 23, 24, 26, 27, 29, 31, 32, 34, 37, 39.Ten months into this case—and only one month before theclose of the discovery period— Defendants Travis Walkerand the Law Firm represented that they were “currentlyworking with their tech support team” to obtain the requestedmaterials. DE 80-2, Resp. to RFP Nos. 1, 7, 8, 27, 30, 33, 34.Defendant Florida Legal Collections further claimed that itcould not obtain the documents because a former employee,Jason Lichter, had “deleted special programming” whenhe was fired in August 2024, and the software developer,Interpose, refused to provide access to the documents unlessFlorida Legal Collections paid $20,000. DE 80-5, Resp. toInterrogatories 3–16, 18–25; DE 80-9, Resp. to RFP Nos. 1–13, 15–21, 23–24, 26–27, 29, 31–39; DE 80-10, Response toRFA Nos. 3–25.Discovery closed on December 28, 2025. Defendantsnever supplemented their responses to these requests andproduced no responsive documents. They likewise submittedno affidavits, declarations, or other competent evidencedemonstrating that the materials were unavailable prior tothe close of discovery. They also never provided Ms. Newellwith contact information for Interpose or Jason Lichter, whoDefendants claimed was “solely responsible for all collectionactivities during the period of time in question.” DE 80-9 at 1.At the evidentiary hearing, Travis Walker testified that Lichterdestroyed Defendants’ access to the relevant software beforehis departure, preventing retrieval of the requested records.He further asserted that Interpose demanded payment of
LINDSEY NEWELL, Plaintiff, v. THE LAW OFFICES OF TRAVIS..., Slip Copy (2026) © 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.5$20,000 in outstanding invoices before restoring access. Mr.Walker, however, produced no documentation supporting thisclaim and acknowledged under oath that he had not contactedInterpose about the issue since early 2025.The record reflects no meaningful effort by Mr. Walker toobtain the documents during the discovery period. Nor did heprovide contact information for Interpose so that Ms. Newellcould subpoena the records directly. A party may not avoidits discovery obligations by relying on unsupported assertionsthat responsive information is inaccessible, particularly wherethe party has made no diligent attempt to secure it. See,e.g., Trinos v. Quality Staffing Servs. Corp., 250 F.R.D. 696,698 (S.D. Fla. 2008) (“[C]ourts should only limit discoverybased on evidence of the burden involved, not on a mererecitation that the discovery request is unduly burdensome.’”) (emphasis in original) (citation omitted).I find that Defendants’ failure to produce the requestedmaterials was not substantially justified and no othercircumstances render an award of sanctions unjust. Theprolonged delay, unsupported explanations, and completefailure to pursue reasonable avenues for obtaining the recordsdemonstrate, at a minimum, willful noncompliance withDefendants’ discovery obligations. Accordingly, sanctionsare warranted for this discovery failure.In determining the appropriate sanction, I note thatinformation regarding Defendants’ attempts to collect fromMs. Newell goes directly to the core factual disputes in thiscase, which arise under the FDCPA and FCCPA. “To prevailon a claim under the FDCPA, a plaintiff must prove that‘(1) the plaintiff has been the object of a collection activityarising from a consumer debt, (2) the defendant is a debtcollector as defined by the FDCPA, and (3) the defendant hasengaged in an act or omission prohibited by the FDCPA.’” Quinn-Davis v. TrueAccord Corp., 2024 WL 4851344, *3(S.D. Fla. Nov. 20, 2024). Here, Ms. Newell alleges thatDefendants engaged in several acts prohibited by the FDCPAincluding: continuing collection efforts after failing to provideverification of the debt in violation of 15 U.S.C. § 1692g(b);continuing collection efforts after being notified in writingthat Ms. Newell disputed the debt in violation 15 U.S.C.§ 1692g(b); repeatedly calling or texting so frequently andat such times as to constitute harassment in violation of 15U.S.C. § 1692d; falsely representing the amount of the debt inviolation of 15 U.S.C. § 1692e(2)(a); and attempting to collecton an amount not expressly authorized by the agreementcreating the debt in violation of 15 U.S.C. § 1692f.*6 “Florida's FCCPA requires substantially the sameelements to state a claim for relief as the federal FDCPA.”Quinn-Davis, 2024 WL 4851344, at *3. However, the secondprong is different in that the FCCPA prohibits acts ofpersons, not just debt collectors. Ali v. LH All. Inc., No. 19-CV-61387, 2019 WL 3997124, *3 (S.D. Fla. Aug. 23, 2019).Ms. Newell alleges that Defendants violated the FCCPA bycommunicating with her directly to collect the debt afterbeing told she was represented by a lawyer in violation ofFlorida Statute § 559.72(18); repeatedly calling or texting sofrequently and at such times as to constitute harassment orabuse in violation of Florida Statute § 559.72(7); attemptingto collect on a debt knowing the debt is not legitimate(because it resulted from overbilling) in violation of FloridaStatute § 559.72(9); and attempting to collect on the debtby sending communications between 9:00 P.M. and 8:00A.M. without prior consent in violation of Florida Statute §559.72(17).Records reflecting Defendants’ communications with Ms.Newell—including the dates, times, frequency, and substanceof those communications—would ordinarily constitute theprimary evidence bearing on these issues. Defendants’ failureto preserve and produce such records therefore substantiallyprejudices Ms. Newell's ability to prove her claims and to testDefendants’ version of events.Rule 37(b)(2)(A)(i) authorizes courts to direct that designatedfacts be taken as established when a party's discoveryviolations deprive the opposing party of evidence necessaryto litigate the case. I find such a sanction warranted here.Accordingly, for purposes of this action, I recommend that thefollowing facts be taken as established:1. Defendants do not possess reliable business recordsdocumenting the dates, times, frequency, or manner of theircommunications with Ms. Newell regarding the allegeddebt.2. Defendants cannot establish through contemporaneousrecords that their collection communications compliedwith the requirements of the FDCPA or the FCCPA.B. Failure to Produce Policies, Procedures, and TrainingMaterials Concerning Compliance with the FDCPA andFCCPA
LINDSEY NEWELL, Plaintiff, v. THE LAW OFFICES OF TRAVIS..., Slip Copy (2026) © 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.6Next, Ms. Newell asserts that Defendants failed to produceany policies, procedures, or training materials concerningcompliance with 15 U.S.C. § 1692 and Fla. Stat. § 559.72.Travis Walker and the Law Firm deny possessing anysuch policies or procedures. See DE 80-1, Resp. to RFPNo. 6; DE 80-2, Resp. to RFP Nos. 6, 29. Florida LegalCollections responded with an unsupported, boilerplateobjection, asserting that production of policies, procedures,or training would be unduly burdensome because Lichterdestroyed access to the information and Interpose required$20,000 to restore that access. See DE 80-9, Resp. toRFP Nos. 6, 20, 36. As discussed above, Defendants haveprovided no documentation substantiating these assertionsand no evidence demonstrating a diligent effort to obtain thematerials.As a result, Defendants should not be permitted to rely on thebona fide error defense, as asserted in their First AffirmativeDefense. See DE 77 at 13. To invoke that defense, a debtcollector must demonstrate that it “actually employed orimplement[ed] … procedures to avoid errors” and that thoseprocedures were “reasonably adapted to avoid the specificerror at issue.” Kottler v. Gulf Coast Collections Bureau, Inc.,847 F. App'x 542, 544 (11th Cir. 2021) (quoting Owen v. I.C.Sys., Inc., 629 F.3d 1263, 1274 (11th Cir. 2011)). Defendantshave produced no policies, procedures, or training materials,nor any secondary evidence establishing their existence orimplementation. A party may not withhold discovery centralto an affirmative defense and then rely on that same defenseto avoid liability. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(c)(1). Defendantshave failed to support the factual predicate necessary toassert a bona fide error defense by producing documentationestablishing that they had procedures or policies in placeto avoid violations. Accordingly, pursuant to Rule 37(c)(1), Defendants should be precluded from relying on thataffirmative defense in this action.C. Failure to Produce Ms. Newell's Client File*7 Ms. Newell further contends that Defendants failed toproduce the complete client file from her state court case. Shespecifically requested “the complete client file...includingall pleadings, communications, notes, memos, research,investigations, reports, drafts, and exhibits,” as well as “alldocuments reflecting efforts to transfer the client file,” “anycalendars, task lists, or docketing entries relating to Plaintiff'sfile,” and “any correspondence with court personnel oropposing counsel in the underlying matter relevant to billedwork.” See DE 80-1, Request Nos. 1, 5, 21, 33. These requestsshould come as no surprise to Defendants since Mr. Bonanrequested preservation of the case file as early as August2023, DE 90-2, and, according to the Complaint, the statecourt ordered the Law Firm to transmit the case file to Mr.Bonan by January 29, 2024, DE 27 at 78.In response, the Law Firm stated either that no responsivefiles existed or that it was “currently working with its techsupport team” to collect responsive documents. DE 80-1,Resp. to Req. Nos. 1, 5, 21, 33. These responses were notsupplemented or substantiated in any meaningful way priorto the close of discovery.At the evidentiary hearing, Mr. Walker acknowledged thatthe client file should have been maintained in both hardcopy and electronic form. He offered no explanation for thedisappearance of these materials.In November 2025—more than ten months after thefederal litigation began—Mr. Walker emailed his IT vendor,Capstone, directing it to search for responsive documents.Limited materials were located and eventually produced. Ms.Newell's counsel acknowledges receipt of certain documents,including publicly available state court filings, the retaineragreement, some internal account notes, and one draft motion.However, no communications between the Law Firm andopposing counsel in the divorce case were produced, nor werecalendars, docketing entries, transfer documentation, or othercore components of a complete client file.The record establishes that the client file should haveexisted, that Defendants were on notice of their dutyto preserve it, and that significant portions are nowunavailable without explanation. Defendants have offered noevidence demonstrating that the loss was inadvertent despitereasonable preservation efforts, nor have they shown thatthe failure to produce was substantially justified. I thereforefind that Defendants’ failure to preserve and produce Ms.Newell's complete client file reflects, at a minimum, willfuldisregard of their preservation and discovery obligations. Thedelay in initiating any meaningful search, the disappearanceof both hard copy and electronic records after a preservationrequest was received, and the absence of competent evidenceexplaining the loss demonstrate conduct beyond merenegligence.Ms. Newell has been prejudiced by the unavailability ofthe file, which goes directly to her claims that Defendantswere attempting to collect unjustified amounts. See, e.g.,
LINDSEY NEWELL, Plaintiff, v. THE LAW OFFICES OF TRAVIS..., Slip Copy (2026) © 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.7DE 27 at 15–16 118, 17 127. Accordingly, I concludethat sanctions are warranted. Pursuant to Rule 37(b)(2)(A)and Rule 37(c)(1), Defendants should be precluded fromintroducing any evidence concerning the contents of themissing client file beyond the documents already produced.Defendants should not be permitted to rely on unproducedcommunications, internal notes, or other materials allegedlycontained within the file. Further, because Defendants havefailed to produce transfer documentation from the file asrequested, Defendants should be precluded from claimingthat they complied with all court orders and professionalobligations regarding the transfer of the client file as theyassert in their Fifth Affirmative Defense.D. Failure to Produce Person in Charge of Collectionsfor Deposition and to Disclose Certain Key Witnesses inInitial Disclosures*8 Ms. Newell next argues that Defendants failed to producefor deposition the individual most knowledgeable aboutcollections at the Law Firm and Florida Legal Collections. DE65 at 3; DE 73 at 4; DE 90-1. Instead, Defendants producedTravis Walker, who testified under oath that he was not theperson in charge of collections for Florida Legal Collectionsand does not make collection phone calls for the Law Firm.DE 80-8 at 5; DE 80-7 at 9. As a result, Ms. Newell was unableto obtain significant information concerning Defendants’collection processes, policies, procedures, and compliancepractices because Travis Walker could not provide any of thatinformation. See, e.g., 80-7 at 9 (Mr. Walker testifying thathe does not know if the Law Firm sends texts messages, thenumber from which collection calls may come, or the fullgroup of people who makes collection phone calls); DE 80-8at 8 (Mr. Walker testifying that he does not remember whetherFLC had authority to collect the debts at issue).During his deposition and at the evidentiary hearing, Mr.Walker identified Angel Morales as the employee responsiblefor overseeing collections. DE 80-8 at 5; DE 80-7 at 9. Despitethis testimony, Defendants neither produced Mr. Morales fordeposition nor disclosed him as an individual likely to havediscoverable information in their Rule 26 initial disclosuresor interrogatory responses. Defendants likewise failed todisclose Luke Carpentier, a former employee whose nameappears on a collection letter sent to Ms. Newell, DE 80-4 at2-3, and who therefore plainly possesses relevant knowledgeregarding the collection activity at issue.The duty to supplement disclosures under Rule 26(e) requiresparties to timely identify individuals with discoverableinformation. Defendants’ failure to disclose these witnessesdeprived Ms. Newell of the opportunity to depose theindividuals most knowledgeable about the very practicescentral to her claims. Because discovery has now closed,that opportunity cannot be restored without reopening thediscovery period and disrupting the orderly progression ofthis case. I therefore find that Defendants violated theirdisclosure obligations, and that the violation was neithersubstantially justified nor harmless. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(c)(1).3When a party fails to identify a witness as required by Rule26, Rule 37(c)(1) provides that the party is not permittedto use that witness to supply evidence unless the failurewas substantially justified or harmless. The rule “is a ‘self-executing sanction for failure to make a disclosure,’ ”making it an “ ‘effective enforcement’ mechanism of thedisclosure requirement when ‘the party required to makethe disclosure would need the material to support its owncontentions.” Barron v. Fed. Rsrv. Bank of Atlanta, 129 F.App'x 512, 520 (11th Cir. 2005) (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 37,advisory committee's note (1993)). Given the importance oftestimony from the individual responsible for collections—and Defendants’ failure to disclose that individual despitepossessing that knowledge—I conclude that exclusion isthe appropriate remedy. Accordingly, I recommend thatDefendants be precluded from calling Angel Morales orLuke Carpentier as witnesses, whether at summary judgment,evidentiary hearing, or trial, except upon a showing ofextraordinary circumstances.4*9 Ms. Newell also asserts that Defendants providedinaccurate contact information for certain disclosed witnessesby identifying Defendants’ office as their location when thoseindividuals were, in fact, former employees. The presentrecord, however, does not demonstrate that Ms. Newellattempted to contact or depose these witnesses and was unableto do so because of the inaccurate information. Nor doesthe record show that Ms. Newell sought updated contactinformation during discovery. Absent a showing of resultingprejudice, sanctions are not warranted. See Fed. R. Civ. P.37(c)(1). I therefore decline to recommend sanctions on thisbasis.E. Fees and CostsLastly, an award of fees and costs to Ms. Newell iswarranted. Under Rule 37(b)(2)(C), when a party has failedto comply with a discovery order, “the court must order the
LINDSEY NEWELL, Plaintiff, v. THE LAW OFFICES OF TRAVIS..., Slip Copy (2026) © 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.8disobedient party...to pay the reasonable expenses, includingattorney's fees, caused by the failure, unless the failure wassubstantially justified or other circumstances make an awardof expenses unjust.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(b)(2)(C). As discussedabove, I reject Defendants’ arguments that their discoverymisconduct was substantially justified. I also do not find anyother circumstances that would make an award of expensesunjust. Therefore, Rule 37 requires me to order Defendantsto pay the reasonable expenses caused by their discoveryfailures. In this case, those expenses should include theattorneys’ fees Ms. Newell has incurred in its attempts toobtain the discovery it is due and in litigating this Motion.Upon consideration, drawing upon my own knowledge andexperience, I conclude that the amount of $5,000.00 servesas a fair amount to reimburse Ms. Newell for expensesreasonably incurred in pursuit of sanctions and the productionof relevant information in discovery.RECOMMENDATIONDefendants have failed to comply with their discoveryobligations and my prior Order, and sanctions are warranted.Accordingly, I recommend that the Motion for Sanctions, DE80, be GRANTED IN PART AND DENIED IN PART.Specifically, I recommend that:1. The following facts be taken as established:a. Defendants do not possess reliable business recordsdocumenting the dates, times, frequency, or manner of theircommunications with Ms. Newell regarding the allegeddebt.b. Defendants cannot establish through contemporaneousrecords that their collection communications compliedwith the requirements of the FDCPA or the FCCPA.2. Defendants be precluded from relying on the bona fideerror defense as set forth in their First Affirmative Defensesince they have not turned over any policies, procedures,or training manuals.3. Defendants be precluded from introducing any evidenceconcerning the contents of the missing client file beyondthe documents already produced.4. Defendants be precluded from claiming that theytransferred the client file in compliance with all courtorders and professional obligations as set forth in theirFifth Affirmative Defense since they have not produced theentire client file or any transfer documentation.5. Defendants be precluded from calling Angel Moralesor Luke Carpentier as witnesses, whether at summaryjudgment, evidentiary hearing, or trial, except upon ashowing of extraordinary circumstances.6. Defendants be jointly and severally required to pay$5,000.00 to Ms. Newell.NOTICE OF RIGHT TO OBJECT ANDSHORTENED OBJECTIONS PERIODSince summary judgment briefing is already underway in thiscase, I find it necessary and appropriate to shorten the timefor any objections pursuant to Southern District of FloridaMagistrate Judge Rule 4(a). The parties shall have sevencalendar (7) days from the date of being served with a copyof this Report and Recommendation within which to filewritten objections, if any, with U.S. District Judge Donald M.Middlebrooks. Failure to file objections timely shall bar theparties from a de novo determination by the District Judgeof an issue covered in the Report and Recommendation andshall bar the parties from attacking on appeal unobjected-tofactual and legal conclusions contained in this Report andRecommendation. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Thomas v. Arn,474 U.S. 140, 149 (1985); Henley v. Johnson, 885 F.2d 790,794 (11th Cir. 1989); 11th Cir. R. 3-1 (2016). Conversely,if a party does not intend to object to this Report andRecommendation, then that party shall file a Notice ofsuch within three (3) days of the date of this Report andRecommendation.*10 DONE AND ORDERED in Chambers at Fort Pierce,Florida, this 13th day of February, 2026.SHANIEK MILLS MAYNARDU.S. MAGISTRATE JUDGEAll CitationsSlip Copy, 2026 WL 507533
LINDSEY NEWELL, Plaintiff, v. THE LAW OFFICES OF TRAVIS..., Slip Copy (2026) © 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.9Footnotes1Defendants filed an opposed motion for another extension of the discovery deadline. DE 81. JudgeMiddlebrooks denied the Motion, finding Defendants had “not shown they ha[d] acted with diligence” and hadnot established why the broad discovery they sought was needed. DE 84. Therefore, the discovery periodexpired on December 28, 2025.2After I notified Defendants of an apparent artificial intelligence hallucination in their response, DE 87, theywithdrew their original response, DE 99, and an amended response. DE 100. These filings acknowledgedthat there were additional hallucinations in the original response. DE 99 at 1; DE 100 at 1 n.1. While theamended response contained replacements for many incorrect case citations, its substance did not materiallydiffer from that of the original response.3Defendants also argue it was improper for Ms. Newell to notice depositions for the "person in charge ofcollections" instead of noticing 30(b)(6) depositions for corporate representatives of the Law Firm and FLC,specifying topics for questioning. DE 87 at 3. The case Defendants cite, Meraki Solar, LLC v. Rosenbalm,contradicts this conclusion. The Meraki court explained that a party is not required to take a 30(b)(6)deposition, nor does the availability of 30(b)(6) depositions prohibit parties from deposing agents of acorporate entity to investigate their personal knowledge. 2021 WL 12286635, at *2 (N.D. Fla. Oct. 29, 2021).Further, by the text of Rule 30, Ms. Newell was permitted to notice a witness by role rather than by name.See Fed. R. Civ. P. 30(b)(1) “If the name is unknown, the notice must provide a general description sufficientto identify the person or the particular class or group to which the person belongs.”).4I do not recommend re-opening discovery for the limited purpose of deposing these witnesses given theadvanced posture of the case, which is now in the summary judgment phase, and Defendants’ complete lackof justification for failing to disclose these witnesses. At this juncture, I believe exclusion of these witnessesbetter serves the interests of efficiency and fairness.End of Document© 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.
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