abusive language, gender-related jokes, and occasional teasing” obtain no remedy. See Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 788, 118 S.Ct. 2275, 141 L.Ed.2d 662 (1998) (internal quotation omitted). “[A] sexually objectionable environment must be both objectively and subjectively offensive, one that a reasonable person would find hostile or abusive, and one that the victim in fact did perceive to be so.” Id. at 787, 118 S.Ct. 2275 (citation omitted). To be actionable, the conduct complained of must be extreme in nature and not merely rude or unpleasant. LeGrand, 394 F.3d at 1101 (citation omitted). Allegations of a few isolated or sporadic incidents will not suffice; rather, the plaintiff must demonstrate the alleged harassment was “so intimidating, offensive, or hostile that it poisoned the work environment.” Tuggle v. Mangan, 348 F.3d 714, 720 (8th Cir.2003) (quoting Scusa v. Nestle U.S.A. Co., 181 F.3d 958, 967 (8th Cir.1999)). Such standards are demanding, for “Title VII does not prohibit all verbal or physical harassment” and is not “a general civility code for the American workplace.” Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 80, 118 S.Ct. 998, 140 L.Ed.2d 201 (1998). In determining whether a work environment was sufficiently hostile or abusive, we examine the totality of the circumstances, including whether the discriminatory conduct was frequent and severe; whether it was physically threatening or humiliating, as opposed to merely an offensive utterance; and whether it unreasonably interfered with the employee’s work performance. Harris, 510 U.S. at 23,114 S.Ct. 367.
Supreme Court and Eighth Circuit precedent persuades us Hanson’s conduct did not create an actionable hostile work environment. Given this court’s rejection of claims premised on equally or more egregious facts than those set forth here, see LeGrand, 394 F.3d at 1102 (collecting cases), and Duncan v. Gen. Motors Corp., 300 F.3d 928, 935 (8th Cir.2002), we conclude Nitsche fails to demonstrate the harassment he encountered was sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of his employment and create a hostile work environment. Viewing the evidence, both objectively and subjectively, in the light most favorable to Nitsche, Hanson’s behavior, albeit crude and immature, occurred sporadically over the course of approximately twenty years, was not physically violent or threatening, and did not unreasonably interfere with Nitsche’s work performance. Although sexual content was abundant in Hanson’s repertoire of ribaldry, “the Supreme Court has never held that ‘workplace harassment ... is automatically discrimination because of sex merely because the words used have sexual content or connotations.’ ” Scusa, 181 F.3d at 967 (quoting Oncale, 523 U.S. at 80, 118 S.Ct. 998). We also note Hanson’s caricature incident occurring in October 2001 did not relate to Nitsche, the snakes and mice in Nitsche’s lunch box and the molasses poem did not involve any sexual conduct or connotation, and Hanson’s display of a pornographic video following a poker game occurred at Hanson’s home, not the Osage Valley workplace. Further, Hanson’s other comments were not so frequent, intimidating, offensive, or hostile to have poisoned the work environment. Keeping in mind “Title VII is ‘not designed to purge the workplace of vulgarity,’ ” Duncan, 300 F.3d at 934 (quoting Baskerville v. Culligan Int’l Co., 50 F.3d 428, 430 (7th Cir.1995)), we conclude Nitsche fails to demonstrate an actionable hostile work environment sexual harass