Nixon v. West, No. 1:25-cv-575 (2025)

Case details
Full caption
Nixon v. Ken Ganley Ford West
Country
United States
Jurisdiction
Federal
Decided
2025
Disposition
Motion Denied
Nixon v. Ken Ganley Ford West, --- F.Supp.3d ---- (2025) © 2025 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.12025 WL 2600359Only the Westlaw citation is currently available.United States District Court, N.D. Ohio, Eastern Division.Jermaine NIXON, Plaintiff,v.KEN GANLEY FORD WEST, et al., Defendants,Case No. 1:25-cv-575|Signed September 3, 2025Attorneys and Law FirmsJermaine Nixon, Cleveland, OH, Pro Se.Andrew R. Burton, Schulman, Roth, Canton, OH, forDefendant Ken Ganley Ford West.James W. Sandy, John P. Murray, McGlinchey Stafford,Cleveland, OH, for Defendant Americredit FinancialServices, Inc.OPINION AND ORDERJ. Philip Calabrese, United States District Judge*1 Proceeding without a lawyer, Plaintiff Jermaine Nixonbrings a variety of claims based on the financing of avehicle he purchased. Defendants move for judgment on thepleadings. For the following reasons, the Court GRANTS INPART Defendants’ motion.STATEMENT OF FACTSOn Defendants’ motion for judgment on the pleadings, thecomplaint alleges the following facts, which the Court acceptsas true and construes in the light most favorable to Plaintiff,as it must in the present procedural posture.On March 25, 2024, Plaintiff Jermaine Nixon entered intoa contract with Ken Ganley Ford West, a car dealership, topurchase a 2020 RAM pickup truck. (ECF No. 1, 8, PageID#2.) Mr. Nixon financed the purchase through GM Financial,a financial institution “that finances vehicle purchasers.” (Id.,¶¶ 7–9, PageID #2.) Apart from attaching various documentsfrom the vehicle purchase (ECF No. 1-1), the complaint doesnot allege any other facts about the transaction.STATEMENT OF THE CASEOn March 24, 2025, Plaintiff brought four claims againstDefendants Ken Ganley Ford West and Americredit FinancialServices, Inc., doing business as GM Financial. First, Plaintiffalleges a violation of the Truth in Lending Act based onDefendants’ alleged failure to “provide clear disclosuresrequired under TILA and Regulation Z.” (Id., ¶¶ 11–13,PageID #3.) Plaintiff claims that the violation entitles himto statutory damages under 15 U.S.C. § 1640(a). Second,Plaintiff alleges a violation of the Equal Credit OpportunityAct based on Defendants’ alleged “discriminatory lendingpractices” and “charging Plaintiff a higher interest rate basedon race and color.” (Id., ¶¶ 14–16, PageID #3.) Plaintiffclaims that Defendants’ discriminatory pricing constitutesdiscrimination on theories of both disparate treatment anddisparate impact, entitling him to actual and punitivedamages. (Id., ¶¶ 17–18, PageID #4.) Third, Plaintiff claimsthat Defendants violated State usury laws by charging himan “unlawful and excessive” interest rate of 24.40%, “nearOhio's maximum legal limit of 25%.” (Id., ¶¶ 19–21, PageID#4.) Fourth, Plaintiff claims that Defendant Ken Ganley FordWest “knowingly included a $5,000 vehicle service contract”without Plaintiff's consent, constituting a “deceptive act under[the Ohio Consumer Sales Practices Act.” (Id., ¶¶ 22–23,PageID #4.).Plaintiff attaches a copy of the vehicle contract, the servicecontract, and other related documents. (ECF No. 1-1, PageID#6–15.) The vehicle contract contains a vehicle informationsection, a “Federal Truth-In-Lending Disclosures” section,payment information, and Mr. Nixon's signature. (Id., PageID#6.) The other documents include information on vehicledelivery, arbitration, financing, and Plaintiff's credit score.(Id., PageID #7–15.) Every document attached to thecomplaint bears Plaintiff's signature. (Id., PageID #6–15.)Defendant Americredit Financial Services moved forjudgment on the pleadings. (ECF No. 7.) Defendant KenGanley Ford West moves to join the motion (ECF No.14.) Plaintiff did not oppose the motion. Instead, he filed aflurry of motions titled a “motion for relief” (ECF No. 8),a “motion to rescind contract” (ECF No. 9), a “motion toenforce the Federal Trade Commission Holder Rule” (ECFNo. 10), an “amended motion to rescind contract and
Nixon v. Ken Ganley Ford West, --- F.Supp.3d ---- (2025) © 2025 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.2motion for declaratory and monetary relief based on newlydiscovered APR violations” (ECF No. 11), and a “motion forrelief” (ECF No. 12). Then, he filed a “motion to suspendloan payments.” (ECF No. 20.) Because these filings allegeadditional facts and are structured similarly to complaints,Defendants construed the motions as attempts to amend thecomplaint.*2 In the interest of judicial economy, the Court GRANTSDefendant Ken Ganley Ford West's motion to join the motionfor judgment on the pleadings (ECF No. 14).ANALYSISPlaintiff did not oppose Defendants’ motion for judgment onthe pleadings. Nor did he request any extensions of time to doso. That alone suffices to grant the motion, but the Court willtake up the merits of the motion in any event. Then, the Courtturns to additional procedural matters.I. Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings“The only difference between Rule 12(c) and Rule 12(b)(6)”is timing. Hunter v. Ohio Veterans Home, 272 F. Supp. 2d692, 694 (N.D. Ohio 2003). Rule 12(c) provides that, once“the pleadings are closed” a party may “move for judgment onthe pleadings.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(c). “A motion for judgmenton the pleadings ... generally follows the same rules as amotion to dismiss the complaint under Rule 12(b)(6).” Batesv. Green Farms Condo. Assoc., 958 F.3d 470, 480 (6th Cir.2020) (citing D'Ambrosio v. Marino, 747 F.3d 378, 383 (6thCir. 2014)).Therefore, on a motion under Rule 12(c), courts “must followthe Supreme Court's changes to the pleading standards inAshcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d868 (2009), and Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544,127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007).” Bates, 958 F.3dat 480 (citing Engler v. Arnold, 862 F.3d 571, 575 (6thCir. 2017)). While “the court's decision rests primarily uponthe allegations of the complaint[,]” “exhibits attached tothe complaint may also be taken into account.” JTO, Inc.v. Travelers Indem. Co. of Am., 242 F. Supp. 3d 599, 602(N.D. Ohio 2017) (cleaned up). Only “well-pleaded factualallegations” that “plausibly give rise to an entitlement ofrelief” and “allow the court to draw the reasonable inferencethat the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged”will survive. Bates, 958 F.3d at 480 (quotation and citationomitted). Conversely, “[m]ere labels and conclusions are notenough[.]” Engler, 862 F.3d at 575. Nor are facts that are“merely consistent with” liability. Bates, 958 F.3d at 480(quotation omitted).To overcome the motion, a complaint “must contain sufficientfactual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief thatis plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678,129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009). To be plausible onits face, the complaint must plead “factual content that allowsthe court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendantis liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. (citing Bell Atl. Corp.v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 556, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d929 (2007)). A complaint must “raise a right to relief abovethe speculative level” into the “realm of plausible liability.”Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555, 557, 127 S.Ct. 1955.The Court construes factual allegations in the light mostfavorable to the non-moving party. Wilburn v. United States,616 F. App'x 848, 852 (6th Cir. 2015); see, e.g., Directv,Inc. v. Treesh, 487 F.3d 471, 476 (6th Cir. 2007). Thefactual allegations need not contain meticulous details, but“threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action,supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.”Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937 (citing Twombly, 550U.S. at 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955); see, e.g., Directv, 487 F.3dat 476. A motion for judgment on the pleadings should begranted where there are no material issues of fact, and themoving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Tuckerv. Middleburg-Legacy Place, LLC, 539 F.3d 545, 549 (6th Cir.2008).*3 Although the Court construes pro se documents andpleadings liberally, parties who do not have a lawyer are notexempt from following the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.Martin v. Overton, 391 F.3d 710, 712 (6th Cir. 2004); Wells v.Brown, 891 F.2d 591, 594 (6th Cir. 1989). A pro se complaintmust still “contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true,to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’ ” Iqbal,556 U.S. at 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S.at 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955).I.A. The Truth in Lending ActCongress enacted the Truth in Lending Act with the intentionof “promoting the informed use of credit by assuringmeaningful disclosure of credit terms to consumers.” Baker v.Sunny Chevrolet, Inc., 349 F.3d 862, 864 (6th Cir. 2003). TheAct allows consumers “to compare more readily the variouscredit terms available to [them] and avoid the uninformed use
Nixon v. Ken Ganley Ford West, --- F.Supp.3d ---- (2025) © 2025 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.3of credit.” 15 U.S.C. § 1601(a). Further, Congress intendedthe Act to be a remedial statute, establishing “a broad, liberalconstruction in favor of the consumer.” Marais v. Chase HomeFin. LLC, 736 F.3d 711, 714 (6th Cir. 2013) (quoting Clemmerv. Key Bank N.A., 539 F.3d 349, 353 (6th Cir. 2008)).For the purposes of the Act, a “creditor” is “only ... a personwho both (1) regularly extends ... consumer credit ..., and (2)is the person to whom the debt arising from the consumercredit transaction is initially payable.” 15 U.S.C. § 1602(g).Any creditor who “fails to comply with any requirementimposed” by the Act, including disclosures, is liable “in anamount equal to the sum of ... any actual damage sustained.”15 U.S.C. § 1640(a)(1). Additionally, the assignee of acontract can assume liability for a disclosure violation if theviolation is found “on the face of the disclosure statement”or in “other documents assigned.” 15 U.S.C. § 1641(a); seeHughes v. Deutsche Bank Nat'l Tr. Co., No. 5:16-cv-2245,2017 WL 770147, at *4, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 27920, at *7(N.D. Ohio Feb. 28, 2017) (dismissing a complaint under 15U.S.C. § 1641 because the violation did not appear on the faceof the disclosure).Here, Plaintiff's complaint alleges that Defendants failedto “provide clear disclosures required under TILA andRegulation Z.” (Id., ¶¶ 11–13, PageID #3.) Additionally,Plaintiff claims damages based on the alleged violations.Plaintiff's complaint does not survive a Rule 12(c) motionbecause it does not rise “above the speculative level.”Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955. The complaintdoes not even include a “threadbare recital of the elementsof a cause of action”—it does not identify which ofthe hundreds of provisions of the Act or the dozens ofdisclosure requirements under Regulation Z apply here, orhow Defendants might have violated them. See Iqbal, 556U.S. at 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at555, 127 S.Ct. 1955). Instead, it makes only “mere conclusorystatements” that the Defendants violated the Act and theRegulation. See id.Moreover, the contract clearly provides disclosures pursuantto the Act on its face. (ECF No. 1-1, PageID #6.) Thesedisclosures include information on the annual percentage rate,finance charges, the total sale price, and the total of payments.(Id.) The complaint does not mention these disclosures orexplain why they are inadequate. Therefore, Plaintiff's claimfor violation of the Truth in Lending Act fails to meet thebasic pleading standard of Rule 8, and the Court GRANTSjudgment in favor of Defendants on this count.I.B. The Equal Credit Opportunity Act*4 The Equal Credit Opportunity Act prohibits creditorsfrom discriminating against any applicant “with respect to anyaspect of a credit transaction ... on the basis of race, color,religion, national origin, sex or marital status, or age.” 15U.S.C. § 1691(a)(1). For purposes of this Act, a creditor isanyone who “regularly extends, renews, or continues credit”or “who regularly arranges for such transactions.” 15 U.S.C.§ 1691a(e). Under the statute's implementing regulations, aperson is not a creditor for the purposes of an alleged violationof the statute unless the person “knew or had reasonablenotice of the act, policy, or practice that constituted theviolation before becoming involved in the credit transaction.”12 C.F.R. § 202.2(l).Any assignee who “participates in the decision to extend,renew, or continue credit” is also a creditor under thestatute. 15 U.S.C. § 1691a(e). Accordingly, an assigneeassumes liability only where the assignee “influences thecredit decision by, for example, participating in the decisionto extend credit or by negotiating the terms of the credit.”Simmerman v. Ocwen Fin. & Mortg. Servs., 463 B.R. 47,63 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 2011) (citing Wright v. Castle PointMortgage, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 32761, 2006 WL 1468678,at *4–5 (D.N.J. May 22, 2006)).To establish a prima facie case for credit discriminationunder the Equal Credit Opportunity Act, a plaintiff mustshow: “(1) Plaintiff was a member of a protected class; (2)Plaintiff applied for credit from Defendants; (3) Plaintiffwas qualified for the credit; and (4) despite Plaintiff'squalification, Defendants denied her credit application.”Mays v. Buckeye Rural Elec. Co-op., 277 F.3d 873, 877 (6thCir. 2002); see, e.g., Matthiesen v. Banc One Mortgage Corp.,173 F.3d 1242, 1246 (10th Cir. 1999). If the plaintiff satisfiesthese elements, a creditor may be liable for actual damages,punitive damages, costs of the action, or attorney's fees. 15U.S.C. § 1691e(a)–(d).Here, Plaintiff cannot establish a prima facie case forcredit discrimination under the Equal Credit OpportunityAct. In the complaint, Plaintiff alleges that by charging ahigher rate based on race and color, Defendants engagedin “discriminatory lending practices ... [and] disparatetreatment.” (ECF No. 1, ¶¶ 14–18, PageID #3–4.) However,Plaintiff makes no allegation suggesting that he receivedtreatment different from customers of other races. Indeed,he scarcely makes factual allegations at all. Further, Plaintiff
Nixon v. Ken Ganley Ford West, --- F.Supp.3d ---- (2025) © 2025 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.4fails to offer any information suggesting that the interestrate he received related to his race rather than to his creditscore. Again, the complaint offers, at best, “mere conclusorystatements.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937 (citingTwombly, 550 U.S. at 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955). Therefore,Plaintiff's claim for violation of the Equal Credit OpportunityAct fails to satisfy the basic pleading standard of Rule 8, andthe Court GRANTS Defendants’ motion as to Count Two.I.C. State-Law ClaimsPlaintiff asserts two claims under State law. The Courthas discretion to exercise supplemental jurisdiction overthese State-law claims under 28 U.S.C. § 1367. The Court“may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over aclaim ... if ... [it] has dismissed all claims over which ithas original jurisdiction.” 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3). In lightof comity interests, the Court “applies a strong presumptionagainst the exercise of supplemental jurisdiction once federalclaims have been dismissed.” Packard v. Farmers Ins. Co. ofColumbus, 423 F. App'x 580, 584 (6th Cir. 2011). The Courtshould maintain jurisdiction “only in cases where the interestsof judicial economy and the avoidance of multiplicity oflitigation outweigh our concern over needlessly deciding statelaw issues.” Id. (quoting Moon v. Harrison Piping Supply, 465F.3d 719, 728 (6th Cir. 2006)).*5 Here, after the dismissal of federal claims and inthe interest of comity, these considerations lead the Courtto decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction. Exercisingjurisdiction over Plaintiff's two State-law claims wouldnot promote judicial economy and declining to exercisejurisdiction will not result in a multiplicity of litigation. Forthese reasons, the Court declines to exercise supplementaljurisdiction over the State-law claims and, therefore,DISMISSES them WITHOUT PREJUDICE.II. Other Procedural MattersII.A. Plaintiffs’ MotionsAfter Defendants moved for judgment on the pleadings,Plaintiff had thirty days—until May 21, 2025—to respond.See Local Rule 7.1(d). Forty-two days after the filing of themotion, Plaintiff filed five motions. (ECF No. 8; ECF No. 9;ECF No. 10; ECF No. 11; ECF No. 12.) The first four copyof the style of complaint: each contains a short statement offacts, legal claims, and prayers for relief. The fifth purports tobe an exhibit in support of Plaintiff's allegations. It containsa “financial summary” comprised only of a number ofcalculations unsupported by any explanations or documents.(ECF No. 12.)If Plaintiff intended these motions to constitute a briefopposing Defendants’ motion, they come well after thedeadline to respond. And if Plaintiff intends to use them to addadditional facts to his complaint, they do not comply with therules governing amendment of pleadings set forth in Rule 15or Section 3 of the Court's Civil Standing Order. See also PulteHomes, Inc. v. Laborers’ Int'l Union of N. Am., 648 F.3d 295,305 (6th Cir. 2011); Begala v. PNC Bank, 214 F.3d 776, 784(6th Cir. 2000). Nor does Plaintiff purport to file his motionsunder any other procedural rule. Accordingly, the CourtSTRIKES Plaintiff's motions as procedurally improper.II.B. Artificial Intelligence HallucinationsIn their responses to Plaintiff's motions, Defendants claim thatthey are unable to locate numerous cases using the citationsPlaintiff provided in his papers. (ECF No. 16, PageID #113;ECF No. 17, PageID #119–20.) Nor is the Court. Based onits review, the Court is confident that Plaintiff used generativeartificial intelligence in drafting at least two motions that citenonexistent cases.Artificial intelligence has the potential to help litigants likePlaintiff who do not have access to a lawyer. In this respect,this nascent tool may prove helpful in promoting access tojustice. However, anyone who appears in Court, representedby counsel or not, is subject to Rule 11. Under Rule 11,“[b]y presenting to the court a pleading, written motion,or other paper,” the signatory to that filing makes certainrepresentations to the Court. For instance, the “unrepresentedparty certifies that to the best of the person's knowledge,information, and belief,” formed after a reasonable inquiry,that his “legal contentions are warranted by existing law.” Fed.R. Civ. P. 11(b)(2) (emphasis added).Plaintiff has not discharged this duty. Ordinarily, this behaviorwould subject him to sanctions. Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(c). Indeed,the Court has not hesitated to impose sanctions for Rule 11violations in the past. See, e.g., Metron Nutraceuticals, LLCv. Cook, 550 F. Supp. 3d 484 (N.D. Ohio 2021). However, theCourt exercises its discretion not to impose sanctions in thisinstance. In doing so, the Court provides notice to Plaintiff—and to others, lawyer or not, who might make this samemistake. Relying on generative AI or citing authorities that donot, in fact, exist subjects a person to sanctions under Rule 11.
Nixon v. Ken Ganley Ford West, --- F.Supp.3d ---- (2025) © 2025 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.5CONCLUSION*6 For the foregoing reasons, the Court GRANTS IN PARTDefendants’ motion for judgment on the pleadings (ECF No.7). Specifically, in the interest of judicial economy, the CourtGRANTS Defendant Ken Ganley Ford West's motion to jointhe motion for judgment on the pleadings (ECF No. 14)and GRANTS the motion for judgment on the pleadings onPlaintiff's federal claims asserted in Count I and Count II. TheCourt declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over theState-law claims in Count III and Count IV and, therefore,DISMISSES them WITHOUT PREJUDICE. Additionally,the Court STRIKES Plaintiff's various improper motions(ECF No. 8; ECF No. 9; ECF No. 10; ECF No. 11; ECF No.12). Finally, the Court DENIES AS MOOT Plaintiff's motion“to suspend loan payments pending litigation.” (ECF No. 20.)SO ORDERED.All Citations--- F.Supp.3d ----, 2025 WL 2600359End of Document© 2025 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.
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