Pete v. Breach, No. 1:25-CV-00245-MAC (N.D. Cal. Oct. 22, 2025)

Case details
Full caption
DAVID R. PETE v. FACEBOOK DATA BREACH a/k/a/ META PLATFORMS, INC
Country
United States
Jurisdiction
Federal
Court
Northern District of California
Decided
Oct. 22, 2025
Majority
Marcia A. Crone (J.) (unanimous Court)
DAVID R. PETE, Plaintiff, v. FACEBOOK DATA BREACH a/k/a/..., Slip Copy (2025) © 2025 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.12025 WL 2979701Only the Westlaw citation is currently available.United States District Court, E.D. Texas.DAVID R. PETE, Plaintiff,v.FACEBOOK DATA BREACH a/k/a/META PLATFORMS, INC., Defendant.CIVIL ACTION NO. 1:25-CV-00245-MAC|Filed 10/22/2025MEMORANDUM AND ORDER OVERRULINGPLAINTIFF'S OBJECTION TO TRANSFERMARCIA A. CRONE UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE*1 Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636 and the Local Rules of Courtfor the Assignment of Duties to United States MagistrateJudges, the district court referred this proceeding to theHonorable Christine L. Stetson, United States MagistrateJudge, to conduct all pretrial proceedings, to enter findings offact and recommend disposition on case-dispositive matters,and to determine non-dispositive matters. See 28 U.S.C. §636(b)(1); E.D. TEX. LOC. R. CV-72.I. BackgroundOn July 14, 2025, Defendant Meta Platforms Inc. moved todismiss this action or, in the alternative, transfer it to theNorthern District of California (#17). Plaintiff David R. Pete,proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis, responded on July23, 2025 (#18); Meta replied on July 30 (#19); and Plaintifffiled a sur-reply on August 4 (#20).On September 15, 2025, Judge Stetson considered the motionand the responses thereto and issued a Memorandum Opinionon Jurisdiction (#21) finding that the court lacked personaljurisdiction over Meta. So, Judge Stetson ordered the clerk ofcourt to transfer this case to the Northern District of Californiapursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1631 (#22).The case was not immediately transferred due to this district'slocal rule instructing the clerk of court to wait 21 daysbefore transferring cases to other federal districts. E.D. TEX.LOC. R. CV-83(b). The waiting period would have passedon October 9, 2025,1 but if any party files a “motion forreconsideration of the order of transfer” within the 21-daywindow, transfer is further delayed until the court rules onsuch motion. Id. Here, a week after Judge Stetson orderedtransfer, Plaintiff filed an “Objection” (#23), which delayedtransfer. Though not required to, Meta timely responded (#24)to Plaintiff's objections on October 6, 2025.II. Legal StandardThe initial issue here is which standard of review the courtshould employ when looking at the transfer order.2 AsLocal Rule CV-83(b) states, litigants may file a “motion forreconsideration of the order of transfer.” But “the FederalRules of Civil Procedure do not provide for a motion forreconsideration.” Shepherd v. Int'l Paper Co., 372 F.3d 326,328 n.1 (5th Cir. 2004). Instead, reconsideration of non-dispositive orders is governed by Federal Rule of CivilProcedure 54(b). McClendon v. United States, 892 F.3d 775,781 (5th Cir. 2018) (referencing Austin v. Kroger Tex., L.P.,864 F.3d 326, 336–37 (5th Cir. 2017).*2 The Rule 54(b) approach is “flexible” and allowsthe “district court to afford such relief from interlocutoryjudgments as justice requires” without the “heightenedstandards for reconsideration governing final orders.” Austin,864 F.3d at 337. On the other hand, Local Rule CV-72(b)permits litigants to file objections to the non-dispositiveorders of magistrate judges for review by the district judgeunder the “clearly erroneous” standard in Federal Rule ofCivil Procedure 72(a).The court therefore must decide whether Plaintiff is entitledto a “flexible” or “clearly erroneous” standard of review. Thecourt chooses flexibility and elects to review the order oftransfer under the “clearly erroneous” standard in Rule 72(a).See E.D. TEX. LOC. R. CV-72(b); see also PersonalizedMedia Commc'ns, LLC v. Zynga, Inc., No. 12-CV-68, 2013WL 12147661, at *1 & n.2 (E.D. Tex. July 22, 2013)(Gilstrap, J.) (construing a party's incorrectly captioned“appeal” of the magistrate judge's order denying transfer as a“motion for reconsideration” but reviewing the order for clearerror under Local Rule CV-72(b)).Under this standard, the court must consider a party's“specific” objections to the magistrate judge's order and“modify or set aside any part of the order that is clearlyerroneous or contrary to law.” E.D. TEX. LOC. R. CV-72(b);FED. R. CIV. P. 72(a). To be specific, an objection must
DAVID R. PETE, Plaintiff, v. FACEBOOK DATA BREACH a/k/a/..., Slip Copy (2025) © 2025 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.2identify the specific finding or recommendation to whichobjection is made, state the basis for the objection, andspecify the place in the magistrate judge's order where thedisputed determination is found. An objection that merelyincorporates by reference or refers to the briefing beforethe magistrate judge is not specific. “Frivolous, conclusiveor general objections need not be considered by the districtcourt.” Nettles v. Wainwright, 677 F.2d 404, 410 n.8 (5th Cir.1982) (en banc), overruled on other grounds by Douglass v.United Servs. Auto. Ass'n, 79 F.3d 1412 (5th Cir. 1996) (enbanc).III. AnalysisPlaintiff's filing is confusing, but the court has distilledthree3 specific objections from him: that Judge Stetson'sorder (1) “exceed[ed] the scope of § 1631,” (2) misappliedthe “interest-of-justice” factors, and (3) failed to consider howtransfer would prejudice him. See (#23 at 2–4). The courtaddresses each in turn.A. Scope of § 1631Plaintiff objects to Judge Stetson's transfer under § 1631because it “exceeds the scope of [the statute].” (#23 at 3.)Plaintiff claims that transfer was improper because § 1631“cannot be used to create jurisdiction where it does notexist.” (Id.) Plaintiff is correct that transfer to the NorthernDistrict of California is proper “only if it can exercise personaljurisdiction” over Meta. (Id.) But as he admits, “it can.”4 (Id.)Judge Stetson did not err in finding the same.B. Application of interest-of-justice factors*3 Plaintiff also claims that Judge Stetson relied onfactors “contrary to controlling precedent” in finding thattransfer was in the interest of justice. (#23 at 3.) Plaintiffprimarily objects to Judge Stetson's consideration of his informa pauperis (ifp) status (Id.) The “controlling precedent”Plaintiff cites for support is Franco v. Mabe TruckingCompany. (Id.) In Franco, Plaintiff claims the Fifth Circuitinstructed that courts “may not consider extraneous factorssuch as the plaintiff's poverty” in considering the interests ofjustice under § 1631. (Id.) This would be cause for concernbecause Judge Stetson did consider Plaintiff's ifp status inassessing the interests of justice. (#21 at 10.) But Plaintiff'squoted language is not in Franco. The only guidance fromFranco on the interests of justice for § 1631 transfers is that“the transferor court's discretion serves as a guard against theprovision being abused to unfairly prejudice a defendant.” 3F.4th 788, 799 n.8 (5th Cir. 2021). The court does not knowfrom where Plaintiff got his quoted language.5 Nonetheless,nothing prevented Judge Stetson from considering Plaintiff'sifp status among the interest-of-justice factors.Plaintiff also claims that Judge Stetson erred by crediting asa factor the forum-selection clause contained in the Terms ofService Plaintiff agreed to when he signed up for Facebook,Meta's website. Plaintiff cites Atlantic Marine ConstructionCompany v. United States District Court for the WesternDistrict of Texas as his “controlling precedent” for this claim.(Id.) While Plaintiff again misquotes his cited case, he doescorrectly rely on Atlantic Marine to say that forum-selectionclauses should be “given controlling weight” except, forinstance, if the transferee court were an improper venue.See (id.); 571 U.S. 49, 60 (2013). But the Northern Districtof California is a proper venue for this case. Further, the“enforcement of valid forum-selection clauses” serves “vitalinterests of the justice system.” Atl. Marine, 571 U.S. at 63.Judge Stetson's choice of interest-of-justice factors was notcontrary to law.C. Prejudicial effect of transferLast, Plaintiff objects to how Judge Stetson “ignored” thepersonal hardships he claims that he will suffer if the case istransferred to the Northern District of California. (#23 at 4.)Plaintiff's troubles with litigating in California are irrelevant.The Supreme Court makes clear that “[w]hen parties agreeto a forum-selection clause, they waive the right to challengethe preselected forum” no matter the “inconvenience [they]would suffer.” Atl. Marine, 571 U.S. at 64. Whatever trials andtribulations transfer treats Plaintiff to, he can always consultthe Northern District of California's guide to “RepresentingYourself,” https://cand.uscourts.gov/ representing-yourself.IV. OrderPlaintiff's objections are overruled. The clerk of court isdirected to immediately transfer this action to the NorthernDistrict of California pursuant to Judge Stetson's order (#22).E.D. TEX. LOC. R. CV-83(b).Signed this date Oct 22, 2025
DAVID R. PETE, Plaintiff, v. FACEBOOK DATA BREACH a/k/a/..., Slip Copy (2025) © 2025 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.3All CitationsSlip Copy, 2025 WL 2979701Footnotes1Plaintiff is entitled to an additional three days for his deadlines because he receives court filings by mail.FED. R. CIV. P. 6(d).2There is no jurisdictional problem here because of Local Rule CV-83(b), reflecting how the Eastern Districtof Texas has adopted “the better practice” of “stay[ing] the effect of transfer orders for a sufficient period toenable ... review to be sought” in order to avoid jurisdictional fiascos. 15 Charles A. Wright, Arthur R. Miller,& Richard D. Freer (Wright & Miller), Federal Practice and Procedure § 3846 (4th ed. 2023). See In re SpaceExpl. Techs. Corp., 99 F.4th 233, 236 n.5 (5th Cir. 2024) (Jones, J., dissenting) (noting how “in the wakeof [that case's] controversy [over jurisdiction and transfer], the Southern District of Texas adopted a localrule that requires a 21-day waiting period for transfers to another district to allow an opportunity for stay orappellate review”).3A potential fourth objection is Plaintiff's claim that the transfer order “violat[ed] Rule 83(b)” (#23 at 3). Plaintiffspecifies that he believes the order violated Local Rule CV-83(b) because it transferred the case in violationof “the procedural safeguard embodied in” the rule. (Id.) Plaintiff must mean to reference the 21-day waitingperiod to avoid jurisdiction snafus, as the language he purports to quote from the rule is nonexistent. JudgeStetson's order did not violate Local Rule CV-83(b), however. The only reason why this court can evenconsider Plaintiff's objections is because of the rule. Plaintiff is very much enjoying its procedural safeguard.His objection is baseless, and the court does not consider frivolous objections. Nettles, 677 F.2d at 410 n.8.4The Northern District of California has general personal-jurisdiction over Meta. A corporation like Meta issubject to general personal-jurisdiction wherever it is “at home,” which is wherever “it is incorporated or has itsprincipal place of business.” Daimler AG v. Bauman, 571 U.S. 117, 137 (2014). Here, both parties agree, andJudge Stetson found, that Meta's principal place of business is in California. (#s1 at 1, ¶5; 21 at 5; 24 at 4.)5If it was from artificial intelligence, the court would remind Plaintiff that its errors could subject him to sanctionsunder Local Rule CV-11(g), as he should know by now.End of Document© 2025 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.
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