JAMES C. HILL, Circuit Judge:
Plaintiffs commenced this shareholders’ derivative action on February 2,1977, alleging numerous acts of corporate misconduct by defendants in connection with the management of Skyway Development Corporation [hereinafter Skyway], Plaintiffs have appealed from an order of the district court granting full summary judgment to certain defendants and partial summary judgment to others. Because we determine that we are without jurisdiction to consider the merits of this appeal, we dismiss.
I.
Plaintiffs’ amended complaint, grounded jurisdictionally upon diversity of citizenship, 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a) (1976), alleges eight causes of action essentially charging defendants with fraud, conspiracy, and violations of fiduciary duties. The relief plaintiffs requested includes, inter alia, an accounting, appointment of a receiver, rescission, specific performance, some $67 million in actual damages, and an unspecified amount of punitive damages. Skyway, a nominal defendant, has counterclaimed to the tune of $100 million alleging, inter alia, that plaintiffs’ action is a “spurious lawsuit” filed “for the purpose of destroying [the] corporation.”
The United States District Court, Middle District of Florida, on October 4, 1979 granted summary judgment, see Fed.R. Civ.P. 56(d), as to certain issues and parties in the case. The grant of summary judgment focused in large measure upon a release agreement entered into in 1974 between various members of Skyway’s board and plaintiffs. The scope of the grant was clear: three defendants were granted partial summary judgment and five others were granted full summary judgment. This action by the district court, then, clearly had the effect of disposing of “one or more but fewer than all of the claims or parties,” Fed.R.Civ.P. 54(b), involved. From the order of the district court granting partial and full summary judgments, plaintiffs have attempted to appeal. They neither moved the district court to enter final judgment as to issues or parties they seek to bring before this Court, see Fed.R. Civ.P. 54(b), nor have they requested district court certification for interlocutory appeal, see 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) (1976).
II.
A federal court’s inquiry into its own jurisdiction to consider the merits of a case before it has been aptly characterized by commentators as “the first principle of federal jurisdiction.” P. Bator, P. Mishkin, D. Shapiro & H. Wechsler, Hart and Wechsler’s The Federal Courts and the Federal System 835 (2d ed. 1973). So critical is this “first principle” to our constitutional government that federal jurisdiction is said to be an “open” question at all stages, trial and appellate, of an action. In fact, “[t]his question the court is bound to ask and answer for itself, even when not otherwise suggested ...,”
Mansfield, Coldwater & Lake Michigan Ry. v. Swan, 111 U.S. 379, 382, 4 S.Ct. 510, 511, 28 L.Ed. 462 (1884), and we have done precisely that.
See also City of Kenosha v. Bruno, 412 U.S. 507, 511, 93 S.Ct. 2222, 2225, 37 L.Ed.2d 109 (1973);
Louisville & Nashville Railroad Company v. Mottley, 211 U.S. 149, 152, 29 S.Ct. 42, 43, 53 L.Ed.2d 126 (1908);
Cameron v. Hodges, 127 U.S. 322, 325-26, 8 S.Ct. 1154, 1155-1156, 32 L.Ed. 132 (1888);
Mansfield, supra, 111 U.S. at 382, 4 S.Ct. at 511;
Capron v. Van Noorden, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 126, 126, 2 L.Ed. 229 (1804);
Oswalt v. Scripto, Inc., 616 F.2d 191, 192 (5th Cir. 1980);
State of Alabama ex rel. Baxley v. Woody, 473 F.2d 10, 12-13 (5th Cir. 1973). In advance of