Polinski v. USA, No. 25-cv-783 (Oct. 15, 2025)

Case details
Full caption
Claims. October v. THE UNITED STATES
Country
United States
Jurisdiction
Federal
Decided
Oct. 15, 2025
Disposition
Motion Denied
© 2025 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.PETER J. POLINSKI, Plaintiff, v. THE UNITED STATES,Defendant.United States Court of Federal Claims. | October 15, 2025 | --- Fed.Cl. ---- | 2025 WL 2935059Document Detailsstandard Citation:PETER J. POLINSKI, Plaintiff, v. THE UNITED STATES, Defendant.,No. 25-CV-783, 2025 WL 2935059 (Fed. Cl. Oct. 15, 2025)All Citations:--- Fed.Cl. ----, 2025 WL 2935059Search DetailsSearch Query:adv: (openai "artificial intelligence" chatgpt "google gemini" "westlawcocounsel" "large language model") (hallucinat! fake fictitious spuriousnonexistent "non-existent" "made up" imagined /p (gpt ai "artificialintelligence" chatgpt chaton perplexity openai copilot "google gemini""google bard" grok "mata v. avianca" claude llm llms)) (hallucinat! fakefictitious spurious nonexistent "non-existent" "made up" imagined) +3(precedent case "legal authority" "legal case") & DATE(aft 1/1/2023)Jurisdiction:Ct. of Fed. ClaimsDelivery DetailsDate:October 17, 2025 at 2:53 AMDelivered By: Client ID:NOCLIENTIDOutlineMEMORANDUMAND ORDER(p.1)All Citations (p.10)
PETER J. POLINSKI, Plaintiff, v. THE UNITED STATES, Defendant., --- Fed.Cl. ---- (2025) © 2025 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.12025 WL 2935059Only the Westlaw citation is currently available.United States Court of Federal Claims.PETER J. POLINSKI, Plaintiff,v.THE UNITED STATES, Defendant.No. 25-cv-783|Filed: October 15, 2025MEMORANDUM AND ORDERELENI M. ROUMEL Judge*1 Plaintiff Peter J. Polinski, appearing prose, filed this action against the United States(Defendant) alleging a “failure to redeem” a negotiableinstrument. ECF No. 1 (“Complaint” or “Compl.”)at 6.1 According to Plaintiff, this purported failureconstitutes a taking under the Fifth Amendment, anillegal exaction, violation of various U.S. statutes,breach of trust, misappropriation of funds, andviolation of the United States Constitution, amongvarious other claims. Compl. at 5–7, 8; ECF No. 10(“Response” or “Resp.”) at 2–3, 5–6, 8. Pending beforethe Court are Defendant's Motion to Dismiss (ECFNo. 8) (“Def. Mot.”) under Rules 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6), Plaintiff's Motion to Proceed in forma pauperis(ECF No. 2) (“IFP Motion”), and Plaintiffs 17 variousother procedural motions (ECF Nos. 11–24, 26, 30,31) (“Procedural Motions”). See infra at 17, 18 (listingmotions). As Plaintiff's claims fall outside this Court'sjurisdiction, fail to state a claim upon which reliefcan be granted, and are frivolous, Defendant's Motionto Dismiss is GRANTED and Plaintiff's Complaintis DISMISSED. Additionally, as explained furtherbelow, Plaintiff's IFP Motion is DENIED. PlaintiffsProcedural Motions are also DENIED, apart from ECFNo. 26 (“Motion for Leave to File Out of Time and toCorrect Deficiency” or “Motion to Correct”), which isGRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART.PROCEDURAL BACKGROUNDPlaintiff filed his Complaint on May 5, 2025, andmoved to proceed in forma pauperis that same day. SeeComplaint, IFP Motion. Subsequently, on July 7, 2025,Defendant filed its Motion to Dismiss, contendingthat dismissal is warranted because (i) the Courtlacks jurisdiction over Plaintiff's due process, tort,and various statutory claims, and (ii) Plaintiff failedto state a plausible claim for an illegal exaction ora Fifth Amendment Takings claim. See Def. Mot.at 6–9. Plaintiff subsequently filed an “Oppositionto Defendant's Motion to Dismiss” (ECF No. 10)(“Response” or “Resp.”) on August 11, 2025; theClerk of Court initially marked it as deficient and thisCourt granted Plaintiff leave to file the Response. ECFNos. 9, 10. In the following weeks, Plaintiff filed 17additional procedural motions (ECF Nos. 11–24, 26,30, 31) (collectively, “Procedural Motions”).The Court stayed briefing on these motions pendingresolution of Defendant's Motion to Dismiss, whichraised threshold jurisdictional issues. ECF No. 28.On August 25, Defendant filed a Reply in supportof its Motion to Dismiss. ECF No. 25 (Reply). Thenext day, Plaintiff filed a deficient Motion to FileOut of Time and Correct Deficiencies (Motion toCorrect), which included (i) a request for an in-chambers hearing (ECF No. 26-1), and (ii) a correctedversion of his Response (ECF No. 26-2) (“AmendedResponse” or “Am. Resp.”), ECF No. 26,2 despite thatthe Court had already granted Plaintiff leave to file theoriginal Response, with its deficiencies. ECF No. 9. OnSeptember 3, 2025, the Court granted Plaintiff leave tofile a Motion to File a Corrected Response. ECF No.29.FACTUAL BACKGROUND*2 Plaintiff asserts that on September 3, 2024, hemailed a “certified check” of $3 6,000,000.00 to theNew York State Treasurer. Compl. at 4, 6. Plaintiffalleges that this currency was “lawfully tendered anddeposited into the public system, including [CourtRegistry Investment System].”3 Resp. at 7. He furtherasserts that subsequently, the United States Treasury
PETER J. POLINSKI, Plaintiff, v. THE UNITED STATES, Defendant., --- Fed.Cl. ---- (2025) © 2025 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.2“failed to redeem” this “check” and instead “withheld,retained, or ignored” it— a failure which he contendsthe Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC)permitted. Compl. at 6–7; Resp. at 2.According to Plaintiff, the Defendant's purported“failure to redeem” gave rise to many claims: ataking under the Fifth Amendment, Compl. at 7, 8;an illegal exaction, id. at 5; a violation of variousprovisions of the U.S. Code, id. at 7, 8; Resp.at 2, 6; misappropriation of funds, Compl. at 8;embezzlement, id.; constructive conversion, Resp. at3; breach of trust and fiduciary duty, Compl. at 6, 8;and encroachments on the constitutional protectionsof the First, Fourth, Fifth, Ninth, and ThirteenthAmendments, as well as “due process and substantiveproperty rights,” Resp. at 5, 8. Plaintiff alleges thathe has suffered many financial, constitutional, andpsychological harms as a result. Compl. at 7.APPLICABLE LEGAL STANDARDSIt is well-established that this Court is not a forumfor all federal claims; rather it is one of limitedjurisdiction. See Marcum LLP v. United States, 753F.3d 1380, 1382 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (“The Court ofFederal Claims is a court of limited jurisdiction.”).Generally, the Tucker Act defines this Court'sjurisdiction. RadioShack Corp. v. United States, 566F.3d 1358, 1360 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (citing 28 U.S.C.§ 1491(a)(1)). The Tucker Act vests this Courtwith jurisdiction over any suit against the UnitedStates for money damages “founded either upon theConstitution, or any Act of Congress or any regulationof an executive department, or upon any express orimplied contract with the United States ... in cases notsounding in tort.” 28 U.S.C. § 1491(a)(1). The TuckerAct does not create any enforceable right against theUnited States on its own, nor does it grant jurisdictionfor “every claim invoking the Constitution, a federalstatute, or a regulation.” United States v. Mitchell, 463U.S. 206, 216 (1983); United States v. Testan, 424U.S. 392, 398 (1987). To invoke jurisdiction under theTucker Act, a plaintiff must “identify a separate sourceof substantive law that creates the right to moneydamages.” Fisher v. United States, 402 F.3d 1167, 1172(Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc).“[T]he court must address jurisdictional issues, evensua sponte, . . . whether raised by a party ornot.” St. Bernard Par. Gov't v. United States, 916F.3d 987, 992-93 (Fed. Cir. 2019); see Rule 12(h)(3) (“If the [Court of Federal Claims] determinesat any time that it lacks subject matter jurisdiction,the court must dismiss the action.”); Kissi v. UnitedStates, 493 F. App'x 57, 58 (Fed. Cir. 2012). Whendetermining jurisdiction, this Court “accepts as trueall uncontroverted factual allegations in the complaint,and construes them in the light most favorable to theplaintiff.” Estes Express Lines v. United States, 739F.3d 689, 692 (Fed. Cir. 2014).*3 To withstand a motion to dismiss pursuant to12(b)(6), “a complaint must contain sufficient factualmatter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim for reliefthat is plausible on its face.’ ” Ashcroft v. Iqbal,556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp v.Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). At the motionto dismiss stage, this Court must “accept as true thecomplaint's well-pled factual allegations” but need not“accept the asserted legal conclusions.” Am. BankersAss'n v. United States, 932 F.3d 1375, 1380 (Fed.Cir. 2019). Dismissal for failure to state a claim uponwhich relief can be granted under Rule 12(b)(6) “isappropriate when the facts asserted by the claimantdo not entitle him to a legal remedy.” Lindsay v.United States, 295 F.3d 1252, 1257 (Fed. Cir. 2002)(interpreting predecessor to Rule 12(b)(6)). The Court“must consider the complaint in its entirety” as wellas “documents incorporated into the complaint byreference, and matters of which a court may takejudicial notice.” Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights,Ltd., 551 U.S. 308, 322 (2007).Further, this Court liberally construes filings submittedby pro se plaintiffs. Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89,94 (2007). Although held to a less stringent standardfor procedural deficiencies, pro se plaintiffs must stillprove by a preponderance of the evidence that thisCourt has subject matter jurisdiction. See Roman v.United States, 61 F.4th 1366, 1370 (Fed. Cir. 2023);see also Colbert v. United States, 617 F. App'x 981,983 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (“No plaintiff, pro se or otherwise,may be excused from the burden of meeting the court'sjurisdictional requirements.”). Additionally, while thisCourt permits ambiguities in pro se filings, it “does
PETER J. POLINSKI, Plaintiff, v. THE UNITED STATES, Defendant., --- Fed.Cl. ---- (2025) © 2025 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.3not excuse ... failures” on the merits. Henke v. UnitedStates, 60 F.3d 795, 799 (Fed. Cir. 1995).Finally, Section 1915 of Title 28 of the United StatesCode, which permits individuals who cannot afforda federal court's filing fees to pursue their claims informa pauperis without pre- payment, mandates thatthe Court dismiss all frivolous claims and those thatfail to state a claim upon which relief can be granted:(2) Notwithstanding any filing fee, or any portionthereof, that may have been paid, the court shalldismiss the case at any time if the court determinesthat... (B) the action or appeal... (i) is frivolous ormalicious; (ii) fails to state a claim on which reliefmay be granted; or (iii) seeks monetary relief againsta defendant who is immune from such relief.28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) (emphasis added).Dismissal of claims as frivolous “is appropriate whenthe facts alleged rise to the level of the irrational or thewholly incredible,” or “if the facts alleged are ‘clearlybaseless,’ a category encompassing allegations thatare ‘fanciful,’ ‘fantastic,’ and ‘delusional.’ ” Dentonv. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 32-33 (1992) (quotingNeitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 327-28 (1989)(citations omitted)); Dozier-Carter v. United States,No. 10-5141, 2010 WL 4569990, at *2 (Fed. Cir. Nov.5, 2010). Accordingly, the Court may “pierce the veilof the complaint's factual allegations and dismiss thoseclaims whose factual contentions are clearly baseless.”Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 327.DISCUSSIONAs this Court lacks jurisdiction under even the mostliberal construction of Plaintiff's complaint, it mustdismiss Plaintiff's claims without considering theirmerits. Even if it did have jurisdiction, the Court findsthat Plaintiff's filings fail to state a claim upon whichrelief may be granted. Finally, the Court is obligated todismiss this case because it is frivolous.I. This Court Lacks Jurisdiction Over PlaintiffsTort, Equitable, Constitutional, and StatutoryClaimsPlaintiff alleges a multitude of claims, including tortand constitutional claims, over which the Court lacksjurisdiction. For the reasons discussed further below,the Court must dismiss these claims. Rule 12(h)(3) (“Ifthe [Court of Federal Claims] determines at any timethat it lacks subject matter jurisdiction, the court mustdismiss the action.”).A. The Court Lacks Jurisdiction over Plaintiff'sClaims Sounding in Tort*4 Plaintiff's pleadings assert numerous tort-basedclaims, including “misappropriation of funds,” “grossnegligence of trust,” “estate embezzlement,” “unjustenrichment,” Compl. at 8, “breach of fiduciary duty,”causing “[p]sychological harm” including “pain andsuffering due to defamation,” id. at 7, “breach of trust,”Resp. at 7, and “constructive conversion,” id. at 3.In his Response, Plaintiff maintains that he “does notassert tort-based damages,” id. at 6, while continuingto allege a “breach of trust” and other claims soundingin tort. Id.; see Procedural Motions (alleging variousbreaches of trust); see also Brown v. United States,105 F.3d 621, 623 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (fraud and similarclaims are torts); Woods v. United States, 122 F.App'x 989, 991 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (defamation is atort); Demodulation, Inc. v. United States, 118 Fed. Cl.69, 73 (2014) (misappropriation is a tort); Naskar v.United States, 82 Fed. Cl. 319, 321 (2008) (negligenceis a tort); Block v. United States, 66 Fed. Cl. 68,72 (2005) (conversion is a tort). The Court mustlook to the true nature of Plaintiff's claims, whichclearly sound in tort, as opposed to statements tothe contrary. Pines Residential Treatment Ctr., Inc. v.United States, 444 F.3d 1379, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 2006)(citing Katz v. Cisneros, 16 F.3d 1204, 1207 (Fed.Cir. 1994) (“Regardless of a party's characterizationof its claim, ‘we look to the true nature of the actionin determining ...jurisdiction.’ ”); Livingston v. UnitedStates, 167 Fed. Cl. 604, 618-19 (2023) (collectingcases stating the same, from both the Federal Circuitand the Court of Federal Claims.). It is axiomatic thatthe “Court of Federal Claims’ limited jurisdiction doesnot include tort claims.” Chisum v. United States, No.2025-1562, 2025 WL 2836408 at *2 (Fed. Cir. Oct.7, 2025); 28 U.S.C. § 1491(a)(1) (“The United StatesCourt of Federal Claims shall have jurisdiction ... incases not sounding in tort”); Keene Corp. v. UnitedStates, 508 U.S. 200, 214 (1993). Accordingly, suchclaims are dismissed for want of jurisdiction.
PETER J. POLINSKI, Plaintiff, v. THE UNITED STATES, Defendant., --- Fed.Cl. ---- (2025) © 2025 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.4B. The Court Lacks Jurisdiction Over Plaintiff'sConstitutional ClaimsIn addition to tort claims, Plaintiff has raised variousconstitutional claims over which this Court lacksjurisdiction. While this Court adjudicates certain casesarising under the Constitution, its jurisdiction islimited to money-mandating claims. Chisum, 2025WL 2836408 at *2 (“[T]he Court of Federal Claims’limited jurisdiction does not include ... non-money-mandating constitutional provisions.”); see Fisher, 402F.3d at 1173 (requiring this Court to determine whethera constitutional provision is money-mandating todetermine whether it has jurisdiction over a claim).From what the Court can discern, Plaintiff first assertsthat his “due process” of law was violated by theTreasury's failure to redeem his check. Compl. at 2,7; Resp. at 2. Furthermore, the Complaint allegesthat the Government caused Plaintiff's “involuntaryservitude,” Compl. at 6, and “peonage,” id. at 8, “inviolation of the Thirteenth Amendment's prohibitionagainst slavery.” Resp. at 5. In his Response,Plaintiff includes a further litany of purported “directconstitutional injuries,” including alleged violations ofthe First, Fourth, and Ninth Amendments. Id. at 5.The Court lacks authority to hear these claims. Insofaras Plaintiff's due process claim is separate from histakings claim,4 “[t]he law is well settled that theDue Process clauses of both the Fifth and FourteenthAmendments do not mandate the payment of moneyand thus do not provide a cause of action under theTucker Act.” Smith v. United States, 709 F.3d 1114,1116 (Fed. Cir. 2013). The Court similarly has nojurisdiction over First Amendment Claims. Cabral v.United States, 317 F. App'x 979, 981 (Fed. Cir. 2008)(“The law is well-settled that ... the First Amendment...[is] not money-mandating in these circumstances.”).Nor does it have jurisdiction over Fourth Amendmentclaims. Brown v. United States, 105 F.3d 621, 623(Fed. Cir. 1997) (“Because monetary damages arenot available for a Fourth Amendment violation, theCourt of Federal Claims does not have jurisdiction.”).Claims made under the Ninth Amendment, likewise,do not fall under this Court's jurisdiction. Brashear v.United States, 776 F. App'x 679, 682 (Fed. Cir. 2019)(none of Fourth, Seventh, Ninth, Tenth, or ThirteenthAmendments “are money-mandating.”). Finally, it iswell-established that this Court lacks jurisdiction overclaims asserted under the Thirteenth Amendment. Id.C. The Court Lacks Jurisdiction over Plaintiff'sStatutory Claims*5 Finally, Plaintiff lists a variety of statutes that hecontends “create a money-mandating framework thatsupports the jurisdiction of this Court.” Resp. at 2;see Compl. at 4, 6, 8. To the contrary, the statutesPlaintiff cites are not money-mandating and cannotsupport this Court's jurisdiction under the Tucker Act,either individually or in tandem. A statute is money-mandating not just because it imposes duties on thegovernment, but instead only “if it can fairly beinterpreted as mandating compensation for damagessustained as a result of the breach of the duties itimposes.” Ferreiro v. United States, 501 F.3d 1349,1352 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (citations and internal quotationmarks omitted).Specifically, Plaintiff points to: 31 U.S.C. Section3123; 12 U.S.C. Sections 411 and 412; 31 U.S.C.Section 9303(c)(2); 15 U.S.C. Sections 1 and 2;Public Law 73-10; and the Uniform Commercial CodeSections 3-603 and 8-505 through 8-508. Compl. at8; Resp. at 4, 7. These statutes are insufficient toestablish jurisdiction in this Court. First, 31 U.S.C.Section 3123 simply requires that the Government payits obligations under Chapter 31, without specifyingthe obligation or directing compensation. Therefore,it is not money-mandating. Harris v. United States,No. 24-859, 2025 WL 432922, at *3 (Fed. Cl.Feb. 7, 2025) (holding that various provisions ofChapter 31, including Section 3123, are not money-mandating). Nor are 12 U.S.C. Sections 411 and412 money-mandating in nature. Kennedy v. UnitedStates, 748 F. App'x 335, 336 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (“Weagree ... that [plaintiffs] argument that [12 U.S.C.] §411 entitles him to money on demand from entitieslike the Federal Reserve Bank of New York andother defendants is frivolous.”); Robinson v. UnitedStates, No. 24-CV-166, 2024 WL 4524743, at *8(Fed. Cl. Sept. 17, 2024), reconsideration denied,No. 24-CV-166, 2024 WL 4719093 (Fed. Cl. Nov.7, 2024) (holding that none of plaintiffs relied-upon provisions, including Sections 411 and 412,are money-mandating); Richardson v. United States,170 Fed. Cl. 598, 600–01 (2024) (same). Public Law73-10, in which Congress suspended the gold standard,
PETER J. POLINSKI, Plaintiff, v. THE UNITED STATES, Defendant., --- Fed.Cl. ---- (2025) © 2025 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.5merely “ensure[s] valuation of currency” and is notmoney-mandating. Johnson v. United States, 79 Fed.Cl. 769, 774-75 (2007). Similarly, the Court lacksjurisdiction over claims arising from the UniformCommercial Code. Clark v. United States, 116 F. App'x278, 279 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (affirming the dismissal of aclaim under the UCC for lack of jurisdiction); Harrisv. United States, No. 24-859, 2025 WL 432922, at *3(Fed. Cl. Feb. 7, 2025) (“Claims under the UCC ...are not within this court's jurisdiction.”); Mikolajczykv. United States, 172 Fed. Cl. 15, 18 (same), motion forrelief from judgment denied, 172 Fed. Cl. 539 (2024).Regarding sections 1 and 2 of Title 15 of the U.S.Code, part of the Sherman Antitrust Act, the Court alsolacks jurisdiction. The Sherman Antitrust Act grantsjurisdiction over its enforcement only to “the severaldistrict courts of the United States” — and “[w]hereCongress has granted exclusive jurisdiction in certaincourts, these statutory provisions govern.” 15 U.S.C. §4; Cherbanaeff v. United States, 77 Fed.Cl. 490, 502(2007), aff'd, 300 Fed.Appx. 933 (Fed. Cir. 2008); seealso Everett v. United States, No. 2024-2245, 2024 WL4750068, at *1 (Fed. Cir. Nov. 12, 2024) (per curiam).Finally, 31 U.S.C. Section 9303(c)(2) is not money-mandating in nature. Section 9303(c)(2) merely statesthat using an “eligible obligation” as security isthe same as using a “certified check.” An “eligibleobligation” is “any security designated as acceptable inlieu of a surety bond by the Secretary of the Treasury.”31 U.S.C. § 9301(2). Section 9303(c)(2) does notmention a “right of recovery in damages,” let alone“mandate[ ] compensation” if the government doesnot accept an eligible obligation in lieu of a check—and therefore cannot be fairly interpreted as money-mandating. See Fisher v. United States, 402 F.3d 1167,1172 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (describing the standard for astatute to be money-mandating); Doe v. United States,463 F.3d 1314, 1324 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (same). Even ifthis statute were money-mandating, the Court must askwhether it mandates compensation as to the particularclass of plaintiffs to which Plaintiff belongs. GreenleeCnty., Ariz. v. United States, 487 F.3d 871, 876 n.2(Fed. Cir. 2007). Section 9303(c)(2) establishes thatvarious forms of currency are acceptable as security“[i]f a person is required under a law of the UnitedStates to give a surety bond.” 31 U.S.C. § 9303(a).Any right to compensation would not apply to Plaintiff,who has not alleged that he has been required to givea surety bond.5*6 In sum, none of the statutes Plaintiff cites aremoney-mandating or invoke this Court's jurisdiction.Even strung together, the statutes do not create amoney-mandating framework, as they indicate no“substantive right” to “compensation by the FederalGovernment for the damage sustained.” In re UnitedStates, 463 F.3d 1328, 1333–34 (Fed. Cir. 2006)(first citing Hamlet v. United States, 63 F.3d 1097,1101 (Fed. Cir. 1995), and then United States v.Mitchell, 463 U.S. 206, 217, 103 S.Ct. 2961, 77L.Ed.2d 580 (1983)); see Gravatt v. United States, 100Fed. Cl. 279, 287 (2011) (holding that a statute wasnot money mandating when it did “not impose anyspecific monetary obligations on the government”).Accordingly, these claims must be dismissed. Rule12(h)(3).II. Plaintiff Fails to State a Claim Upon WhichRelief Can Be GrantedAfter removing extra-jurisdictional claims, Plaintiff isleft with claims under the Fifth Amendment TakingsClause and for illegal exaction. Plaintiff fails to statea claim upon which relief can be granted for either, asthe allegations in the Complaint are implausible and donot plead the elements of either claim.A. Plaintiff's Fifth Amendment Takings Claim isImplausible and Insufficiently PledPlaintiff raises a takings claim under the FifthAmendment. See Compl. at 8. A plaintiff maystate a claim for a Fifth Amendment taking by (i)“identif[ying] a cognizable Fifth Amendment propertyinterest,” and (ii) showing that “the government'saction amounted to a compensable taking of thatinterest.” Casitas Mun. Water Dist. v. United States,708 F.3d 1340, 1348 (Fed. Cir. 2013).According to Plaintiff, he mailed a “$36,000,000.00negotiable instrument (Exhibit A)” to a stategovernment official and the federal government's“failure to redeem” said check constituted an unjusttaking and requires compensation. Compl. at 4–5.Defendant contends that there are two problems withPlaintiff's takings claim as asserted in the Complaint:first, the claim is implausible; and second, the
PETER J. POLINSKI, Plaintiff, v. THE UNITED STATES, Defendant., --- Fed.Cl. ---- (2025) © 2025 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.6Complaint does not allege that Plaintiff had a propertyinterest in $36 million. Def. Mot. at 7.Defendant is correct. The pleadings contain no factsplausibly suggesting that Plaintiff had an instrumentworth $36 million in the first place. While Plaintiffattaches an image of a check to his Complaint, thecheck is marked VOID and has no financial institutionlisted on it except the United States Treasury, whichis also marked as the intended recipient. ECF No. 1–2 at 4. The Court finds no evidence from the face ofthe Complaint that this check is valid or validly worth$36 million. See Ibrahim v. United States, No. 19–760, 2019 WL 3384849, at *4 (Fed. Cl. July 26, 2019)(finding it implausible that contract signed only byplaintiff and based on “bizarre circumstances” actuallyentitled plaintiff to millions of dollars); Maat El v.United States, No. 24-1563, 2024 WL 4851311, at*4 (Fed. Cl. Nov. 21, 2024) (finding that a demandfor $100 million without basis for any damages fromalleged injury was frivolous); see also Jefferson v.United States, No. 25-cv-302, 2025 WL 666186, at*2 (Fed. Cl. Feb. 28, 2025) (finding that the “fancifulsum of money requested” without any supporting factsdemonstrated frivolousness). While Plaintiff remarksrepeatedly that this was “certified,” “eligible,” and“lawfully tendered” currency, Compl. at 7–8, suchassertions cannot stand in the place of sufficientand specific facts. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S.662, 678 (2009) (“Nor does a complaint suffice if ittenders ‘naked assertion[s]’ devoid of ‘further factualenhancement.’ ”) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570(2007)).*7 Even if the purported “certified check” waslegitimate, there is no explanation in the pleadings for(i) how Plaintiff has a property interest in a tenderedcheck when he is not the recipient listed on the check,and (ii) why a “failure to redeem”6 any check would bea taking of a property interest. How Defendant couldhave taken a property interest in this purported check,which appears both void and addressed “to the orderof” the Government, is not plausibly explained. Def.Mot. At 7; ECF No. 1–2 at 4. Accordingly, Plaintiff hasfailed to state a cognizable takings claim. Rule 12(b)(6).B. Plaintiff's Illegal Exaction Claim isImplausible and Insufficiently PledAdditionally, Plaintiff makes a claim of illegalexaction, which falls under the Court's jurisdiction.Compl. at 5; Aerolineas Argentinas v. United States,77 F.3d 1564, 1573 (Fed. Cir. 1996); Ontario PowerGeneration, Inc. v. United States, 369 F.3d 1298, 1301(Fed. Cir. 2004). This claim, too, fails to withstandDefendant's 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss.An illegal exaction claim is established when acomplaint alleges that a (i) “plaintiff has paid moneyover to the Government, directly or in effect, andseeks return of all or part of that sum,” and (ii) thatsum was “improperly paid, exacted, or taken from theclaimant in contravention of the Constitution, a statute,or a regulation.” Kalos v. United States, 87 Fed. Cl.230, 238 (2009), aff'd, 368 F. App'x 127 (Fed. Cir.2010); see also Perry v. United States, 149 Fed. Cl.1 (2020), aff'd, No. 2020-2084, 2021 WL 2935075(Fed. Cir. July 13, 2021) (quoting Piszel v. UnitedStates, 833 F.3d 1366, 1382 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (“[A]plaintiff cannot allege merely that he or she paid moneyto the government; rather, a plaintiff also must assertsufficient facts to demonstrate that such payment wasmade pursuant to a requirement that is ‘contrary tolaw[.]’ ”)). To be an exaction, the payment must be“a direct result of the application of a statute or aregulation,” e.g., “compulsion or direction pursuant toa statute or regulation.” Casa de Cambio Comdiv S.A.de C. V. v. United States, 48 Fed. Cl. 137, 145 (2000),aff'd, 291 F.3d 1356 (Fed. Cir. 2002).Plaintiff's claim of illegal exaction fails for tworeasons. First, as discussed, the allegation thatPlaintiff's check was valuable currency paid over to thegovernment is implausible. See supra Section ILA. Ifit is implausible that Plaintiff paid over money, thenit is implausible that his money was illegally exacted.Second, while Plaintiff alleges that he tendered anegotiable instrument to the Defendant, he nowherealleges that he improperly paid it over, nor that theDefendant asked, mandated, or caused such payment“contrary to law.” Piszel, 833 F.3d at 1382. Instead, thefacts as alleged indicate that Plaintiff's alleged depositwas unrelated to statute, regulation, or governmentinducement—in other words, not an illegal exaction.See Compl. at 6-7. Plaintiff's allegation of illegal
PETER J. POLINSKI, Plaintiff, v. THE UNITED STATES, Defendant., --- Fed.Cl. ---- (2025) © 2025 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.7exaction thus fails to state a claim upon which reliefcan be granted under Rule 12(b)(6).III. Plaintiff's Complaint Must be Dismissed asFrivolous*8 At heart, Plaintiff's Complaint and successivefilings seek to establish that his allegedly tenderedcurrency—which he calls an “International Bill ofExchange,” Resp. at 1, “certified check,” Compl. at 6,“negotiable instrument,” id., and “eligible obligation,”id.—merits “redemption” by the government in theamount of $36 million. The claim is frivolous. It isdubious that such an instrument, with zero indicationof legitimacy or connection with a financial institution,written out to the U.S. Treasury, would obligate theGovernment; such facts rise “to the level of theirrational or the wholly incredible.” See Denton, 504U.S. at 33.Plaintiff's theory, as the Court understands it, isreminiscent of other sovereign citizen theories. Onesuch theory is that, to use people as collateral forthe national debt, the United States Government hascreated individual trusts for each citizen, into whichthe Treasury deposits profits made from the citizen'sproperty. See Gravatt, 100 Fed. Cl. 279, 283 (2011)(citing Bryant v. Wash. Mut. Bank, 524 F.Supp.2d 753,758–59 (W.D. Va. 2007)) (explaining the “redemption”theory associated with sovereign citizens); Rivera v.United States, 105 Fed. Cl. 644, 650 (2012) (rejectinga similar theory). According to this theory, HouseResolution 192—also known as Public Law 73–10—and the Uniform Commercial Code provide the legalmeans for individuals regain this wealth. Gravatt, 100Fed. Cl. at 283. A “beneficiary” of an individual trustmay resort to “redemption,” whereby he obtains thiswithheld wealth by filing financing statements naminghimself both as debtor and secured party. Id.Plaintiff's filings spell out a similar story. Plaintiffidentifies himself as both “executor and livingbeneficiary,” of his estate, Compl. at 5, and attachestax forms listing himself as “lender,” “payer,” and“creditor,” ECF No. 1–2 at 6–8. According to Plaintiff,the Government is a “federal custodian[ ],” whichhas engaged in a breach of fiduciary duty by not“redeeming” his $36 million deposited in federalcustody. Am. Resp. at 22; Id. at 21–22; Compl.at 6. This has “converted Plaintiff's private creditinto government-held debt.” Resp. at 5. Plaintiff'sinvocation of the UCC and Public Law 73-10 are alsotypical of a sovereign citizen claim. Plaintiff's furthermotions for an in-chambers hearing, to recognize andenforce his “express trust,” and to compel discoveryand production of Trust/CRIS accounting, appear toarise from this alleged individual trust. See ECF Nos.11, 13, 17.Courts have universally rejected such theories asimplausible and frivolous. Miles v. United States, No.24-CV-1932, 2025 WL 28368, at *3 n.5 (Fed. Cl.Jan. 3, 2025) (listing cases and stating that “TheFederal Circuit, this Court, and other Judges of theCourt of Federal Claims have uniformly found thatthe Court of Federal Claims lacks jurisdiction overclaims based on the sovereign citizen theory as it isinvalid and frivolous.”); Hollowell v. United States,No. 24-711, 2025 WL 1564761, at *4 n.4 (Fed. Cl. June3, 2025) (“Judges have uniformly found sovereigncitizen theories to be invalid and frivolous.”); Potterv. United States, 161 Fed. Cl. 24, 29 (2022) (findinga lack of jurisdiction because “[i]n short, the legalfiction presented by plaintiff in the complaint is notbased in law but in the fantasies of the sovereigncitizen movement.”); Davenport v. United States, No.17-1122C, 2017 WL 5988354, at *2 (Fed. Cl. Dec. 4,2017) (“The Tucker Act precludes sovereign citizenclaims... [and] this Court has held that claims involvingthe sovereign citizen theory are ‘nonsensical’ andshould be dismissed as frivolous.”) (citing Gravatt,100 Fed. Cl. at 288 (2011)).*9 Plaintiff has filed in this Court before.7 Indeed,Plaintiff asserts that he has taken on the “extraordinaryworkload of maintaining twelve (12) active mattersacross this Court, the Federal Circuit, and the UnitedStates Supreme Court”—“extensive drafting, mailing,and preparation duties that would overwhelm a staffedlaw firm.” Am. Resp. at 3. In a separate case beforeanother judge of the Court of Federal Claims, Plaintifffiled twelve (12) “increasingly frivolous emergencymotions” and was ordered to show cause as towhy he should not be subjected to an anti-filinginjunction, given his “onslaught of frivolous filings”which have become a “concerning pattern.” Polinskiv. United States, 177 Fed. Cl. 782, 787 (2025). Thatjudge further admonished Plaintiff, informing him that“[t]his guerrilla tactic of flooding the docket with
PETER J. POLINSKI, Plaintiff, v. THE UNITED STATES, Defendant., --- Fed.Cl. ---- (2025) © 2025 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.8meritless entries is an abuse of the procedures designedto maintain fairness and efficiency.”8 September3, 2025, Order and Notice at 1, id. Even morerecently, the Federal Circuit has affirmed a dismissalof one of Plaintiff's claims alleging a “failure toredeem,” explaining that his “sweeping assertions” areinsufficient to state a takings claim. Polinski v. UnitedStates, No. 2025-1561, 2025 WL 2536876 at*l (Fed.Cir. Sept. 4, 2025).The rapidity and repetitiveness of Plaintiff s filings, hisinsistence on recycling the same meritless arguments,his specious legal and financial theories, and hisimplausible claim that a questionable “check” writtenout to the U.S. Treasury constitutes an unlawful orcompensable taking or exaction for which he deserves$36 million, all lead the Court to conclude thatPlaintiff's claims are frivolous and, pursuant to 28U.S.C. § 1915, must be swiftly dismissed.IV. Plaintiff's IFP Motion“Proceeding in forma pauperis is a privilege, ... nota right,” and courts have a “duty to deny in formapauperis status to those individuals who have abusedthe system,” Bryant v. United States, 618 Fed. App'x683, 685 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (quoting White v. Colorado,157 F.3d 1226, 1233 (10th Cir. 1998)); In re Sindram,498 U.S. 177, 180 (1991). For this reason, a “courtshall dismiss the case at any time” if the action to befiled in forma pauperis “is frivolous or malicious.”28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i). As noted, this action isfrivolous and Plaintiff has abused the Court systembefore.9 Accordingly, the Court denies Plaintiff's IFPMotion pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e). Maat Elv. United States, No. 24-1563, 2024 WL 4851311,at *2 (Fed. Cl. Nov. 21, 2024) (“[W]here plaintiffshave exhibited a history of frivolous or abusive filings,courts have an obligation to deny IFP status on thebasis of vexatious litigation.”) (cleaned up) (citingStraw v. United States, Nos. 2021-1600, 2021-1602,2021 WL 3440773 at *5 (Fed. Cir. Aug. 6, 2021)(collecting cases)); Double Lion Uchet Express Tr. v.United States, 149 Fed. Cl. 415, 423 (2020) (firstciting Manning v. United States, 123 Fed. Cl. 679, 683(2015), and then citing Floyd v. United States, 125Fed. Cl. 183, 192 (2016) (“[Section 1915] requires thatthe court deny an in forma pauperis application if, inconnection with or prior to ruling on the application,the court finds the case is frivolous.”) (alterations inoriginal).V. Plaintiff's Procedural Motions*10 Pending before the Court are Plaintiff's 17Procedural Motions:• Emergency MOTION for In Chambers Hearingand In Camera Review. ECF No. 11.• Emergency MOTION for Declaratory Judgment.ECF No. 12.• Emergency Motion to Recognize & EnforceExpress Trust. ECF No. 13.• Motion to Seal Case. ECF No. 14.• MOTION for Writ of Replevin and Return ofInstruments. ECF No. 15.• Emergency Motion for Summary Judgment. ECFNo. 16.• Emergency MOTION to Compel Discovery andProduction of Trust/CRIS Accounting. ECF No.17.• Emergency Motion for Constructive Trust andEquitable Lien. ECF No. 18.• Emergency Motion for Leave to Proceed Sui JurisIn Original Equity. ECF No. 19.• Emergency Motion for Order to Show Cause. ECFNo. 20.• Emergency Motion for Accounting andSettlement. ECF No. 21.• Plaintiff's Motion for Judicial Notice of FederalObligations (GSA Bonds) In CRIS Registry. ECFNo. 22.• Emergency Motion for Immediate Restitution, Set-Off and Discharge of Public Debt. ECF No. 23.• MOTION for Final Settlement Discharge, andClosure of Case. ECF No. 24.• MOTION for Leave to File Out of Time and toCorrect Deficiency. ECF No. 26.
PETER J. POLINSKI, Plaintiff, v. THE UNITED STATES, Defendant., --- Fed.Cl. ---- (2025) © 2025 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.9• MOTION for Leave to File Attached Objection toDefendant's Motion to Dismiss Out of Time. ECFNo. 30.• Plaintiffs Motion for Leave to File Sur-Reply. ECFNo. 31.The Court begins with Plaintiff's motion “to sealthe case record in its entirety.” ECF No. 14 at 1.There is a strong presumption of public access tojudicial records. In re Violation of Rule 28(D), 635F.3d 1352, 1356–57 (Fed. Cir. 2011). Here, Plaintiffsuggests sealing purported “sensitive financial, trust,and proprietary records ... as well as informationsubject to fiduciary confidentiality.” ECF No. 14at 1. He points to the “proprietary nature of trustinstruments, CUSIP identifiers, Treasury accounts, andCRIS fund details.” Id. at 2. Even assuming theseidentifiers and documents are real, Plaintiff does notprovide a “specific explanation of the sensitivity ofthe information and the harm the disclosure of theinformation could cause beyond [ ] unsupported andunexplained assertions.” Monbo v. United States, No.24-890C, 2024 WL 44043 87, at *2 (Fed. Cl. Oct.4, 2024). Instead, he vaguely refers to “irreparableharm” and “expos[ing] sensitive trust property tounauthorized third parties.” ECF No. 14 at 2. The Courttherefore denies Plaintiff's request to seal the entirerecord.Second, Plaintiff's Motion for Leave to File out ofTime and Correct Deficiency (ECF No. 26) is deniedin part and granted in part. As reflected above, theCourt has considered any new supplemental argumentscontained in the Amended Response (ECF No. 26–2).See supra at n. 2. (considering both the amended andoriginal Response as supplements to the Complaint).Accordingly, the Court sees no reason to allow theMotion to be filed nunc pro tunc and denies theremainder of the motion as moot.Finally, Plaintiff's remaining Procedural Motions areeach denied for mootness. Plaintiff's Motion to filean Objection to the Motion to Dismiss (ECF No.30) unnecessarily attempts to file a duplicate of theAmended Response. See supra n.2. Other ProceduralMotions (ECF Nos. 11-24) demand a variety of actionsfrom the court such as declaratory relief (ECF No.12), a writ of replevin (ECF No. 15), and summaryjudgment (ECF No. 16). See ECF Nos. 11–13, 15–24. These motions replicate Plaintiff's frivolous legaltheories; more to the point, none of them will revivethis Court's jurisdiction. The Court also sees no needto grant Plaintiff leave to file a Sur-Reply as requestedin ECF No. 31, as Defendant did not raise anynew arguments or issues in its Reply.10 The Courtaccordingly denies these procedural motions as moot.VI. Plaintiff's Use of Artificial Intelligence*11 Plaintiff's filings appear to have been draftedwith the assistance of artificial intelligence (AI), andreference cases that do not exist, such as: (i) ShearsonLehman Bros., Inc. v. Wasatch Bank, 788 P.2d 514(Utah 1990),11 Emergency Motion for DeclaratoryJudgment (ECF No. 12) at 4, (ii) Ivey v. United States,2019 WL 2080027 (Fed. Cl. 2019),12 EmergencyMotion to Recognize and Enforce Express Trust (ECFNo. 13 at 8), and (iii) Self v. Ray, 61 F.R.D. 666 (E.D.Ark. 1974)13 (id.).While Plaintiff's use of AI, by itself, does not violatethis Court's Rules, his citation to fake cases does.See Willis v. U.S. Bank Nat'l Ass'n, 783 F. Supp. 3d959, 960-62 (N.D. Tex. 2025) (surveying positives andnegatives of AI use in litigation throughout standingorder regarding AI). The citation of fake, AI-createdcases in briefing is “an ‘abuse of the adversary system’and unacceptable.” Sanders v. United States, 176 Fed.Cl. 163, 169 (quoting Park v. Kim, 91 F.4th 610, 615(2d Cir. 2024)). It violates Rule 11, which obligatesany party appearing before this Court—including prose litigants—to, at a minimum, “confirm the existenceand validity of[ ] the legal authorities on which theyrely.” Id. (quoting Park, 91 F.4th at 615); Rule 11(b)(2).Other judges have imposed sanctions on pro separties and attorneys alike, including “fines, requiringpayment of the opposing party's fees, striking filings,dismissal of the action, and initiating disciplinaryactions.” Id. at 170. In Sanders, this Court opted towarn rather than sanction the plaintiff because the“[p]laintiff may not have been aware of the risk thatAI programs can generate fake case citations and otherlegal misstatements.” Id. Here, too, a warning willsuffice, as the Court lacks jurisdiction over Plaintiff'sclaims and Defendant has not requested sanctions.
PETER J. POLINSKI, Plaintiff, v. THE UNITED STATES, Defendant., --- Fed.Cl. ---- (2025) © 2025 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.10Further, Plaintiff is neither an attorney, nor a memberof this Court's bar. However, Plaintiff is now on noticeof the risks associated with using AI. Accordingly,Plaintiff is advised that he may be subject to sanctionsin the future should he file additional pleadings inthis or other courts referencing fictional, AI-generatedlegal authority.CONCLUSIONFor the foregoing reasons, the Court GRANTSDefendant's Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 8) andDISMISSES Plaintiff's Complaint (ECF No. 1) forlack of subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to Rule12(b)(1) and 12(h)(3), for failure to state a claim uponwhich relief can be granted pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), and for frivolousness pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §1915(e)(2)(B)(i). Additionally, Plaintiff's Motion toProceed in Forma Pauperis (ECF No. 2) is DENIEDfor frivolousness pursuant to U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i). Accordingly, Plaintiff is ORDERED to pay the$405.00 filing fee. Plaintiff's Motion to file a CorrectedResponse (ECF No. 26) is GRANTED IN PART andDENIED IN PART. Plaintiff's Motion to Seal (ECFNo. 14) is DENIED. Plaintiff's remaining ProceduralMotions (ECF No. 11-13, 15-24, 30-31) are DENIEDas MOOT. The Clerk of Court is DIRECTED to enterJudgment accordingly and mark this case as closed.*12 IT IS SO ORDERED.All Citations--- Fed.Cl. ----, 2025 WL 2935059Footnotes1Citations throughout this Order reference the ECF-assigned page numbers, which do not always correspondto the pagination within the document.2Both versions of Plaintiff's Response are nearly identical, but ECF No. 26 contains an additional section ontrust law, equity, and the Constitution. Am. Resp. at 12-14. Because this Court construes pro se complaintsliberally, both the amended and original Response will be considered as supplements to the Complaint.Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972). As Plaintiff moved to file the exact same amended response inECF No. 30, the Court denies the motion (ECF No. 30) as moot. See infra at V.3Defendant protests that Plaintiff has not explained how his claim based on submitting currency to theNew York State Treasurer is a claim against the Treasury. Def. Mot. at 7. This Court, construing Plaintiff'sComplaint liberally, interprets his Complaint as alleging that the check was ultimately deposited into thefederal system, C.R.I.S., alluded to in the exhibits to Plaintiff's Complaint and in subsequent filings, and thuswas tendered to the United States. See ECF No. 1-2 at 3; Resp. at 7.4See infra, Section II.A.5Plaintiff explains that he tendered the check in “lawful settlement of Case No. 18120127”; a number alsoused as the account number in certain tax filings attached to the Complaint. See ECF No. 1-2 at 6–9; Amend.Resp. at 18. This Court is not aware of any legal case to which this number refers.6Plaintiff also frames his claim as the government having “ignored” the check, Resp. at 2. If so, the claim stillfails. The government's decision to “ignore” Plaintiff's preferred currency is not by itself a taking of Plaintiffs property. Given Plaintiff's other filings, it appears that Plaintiff may believe that the government has fundsfor him in trust, and his “check” was an attempted withdrawal of his funds which the government has notfacilitated. The existence of such a trust relationship is implausible, unsupported, and frivolous. See infraSection III.7See Polinski v. United States, No. 25-760, 2025 WL 2315463, at *2 (Fed. Cl. Aug. 12, 2025) (dismissed forfailure to state a claim and lack of subject matter jurisdiction); Polinski v. United States, 177 Fed. Cl. 782,783 n.1 (2025) (collecting ten (10) additional cases involving Plaintiff in the Court of Federal Claims).
PETER J. POLINSKI, Plaintiff, v. THE UNITED STATES, Defendant., --- Fed.Cl. ---- (2025) © 2025 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.118It has been observed that advancement of the “redemption” theory “appears to be a variation of the sovereigncitizen tactic referred to as ‘paper terrorism’—the filing of fraudulent UCC financing statements and defaultjudgments against government agencies and officials, such as the United States Department of Justice, theInternal Revenue Service (“IRS”), judges, prosecutors, and clerks of court.” Gravatt, 100 Fed. Cl. at 283 n.2(2011) (citing, e.g., Monroe v. Beard, 536 F.3d 198, 202-203 (3d Cir. 2008); United States v. Belt, Civ. No.PJM 10-2921, 2011 WL 3236065, at *4 (D. Md. July 26, 2011)).9See supra Section III.10Plaintiff's Motion to File a Sur-Reply accuses Defendant of citing “new authorities” in its Reply. ECF No. 31at 2. However, Defendant's Reply did not raise new substantive arguments.11This citation instead references the actual case of City of Monticello v. Christensen, 788 P.2d 513 (Utah1990), which addresses criminal law questions wholly irrelevant to the present action.12This citation does not lead to any actual document.13This citation references the actual case of Young v. Trailwood Lakes, Inc., 61 F.R.D. 666 (E.D. Ky. 1974),which addresses class action certification questions wholly irrelevant to the present action.End of Document© 2025 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S.Government Works.
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