Poole v. Walmart, Inc. (2025)

Case details
Country
United States
Jurisdiction
Federal
Decided
2025
Disposition
Motion Granted
Poole v. Walmart, Inc., Slip Copy (2025) © 2025 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.12025 WL 2577025Only the Westlaw citation is currently available.United States District Court, N.D. Illinois, Eastern Division.James POOLE, Plaintiff,v.WALMART, INC., Defendant.No. 25 CV 603|Signed September 5, 2025Attorneys and Law FirmsJames Poole, Chicago, IL, Pro Se.Lori Ann Vanderlaan, Best, Vanderlaan & Harrington,Chicago, IL, Richard Joseph Vadasy, Chicago, IL, forDefendant.MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDERLindsay C. Jenkins, Judge*1 James Poole filed this action against Walmart Inc.,originally alleging state law claims for malicious prosecution,false imprisonment, false arrest, and battery. [Dkt. 1-1 at 4,8.]1 Walmart removed the case from the Circuit Court ofCook County pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a), based ondiversity of citizenship and Poole's claimed damages, whichhe alleges exceed $75,000. [Dkt. 1 at 2.] The court grantedWalmart's motion to dismiss Poole's claims, see dkt. 30, andprovided Poole leave to amend his complaint.In his amended complaint, Poole re-alleges his claims formalicious prosecution, battery, and false arrest, while addingrespondeat superior and spoliation claims. [Dkt. 31.] Walmartagain moves to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim. [Dkt. 42.] For the reasonsexplained below, the motion is granted in part and denied inpart.I. Legal StandardA Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss tests the legal sufficiencyof the plaintiff's claims. The Court takes well-pleaded factualallegations as true and draws reasonable inferences in favorof the plaintiff. Reardon v. Danley, 74 F.4th 825, 827 (7th Cir.2023). “To survive a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6),plaintiff's complaint must allege facts which, when taken astrue, plausibly suggest that the plaintiff has a right to relief,raising that possibility above a speculative level.” Cochranv. Ill. State Toll Highway Auth., 828 F.3d 597, 599 (7th Cir.2016) (cleaned up). A plaintiff's claim must be “plausible,rather than merely speculative,” which requires a plaintiff toallege “just enough details about the subject matter of the caseto present a story that holds together.” Russell v. Zimmer, Inc.,82 F.4th 564, 570–71 (7th Cir. 2023) (cleaned up). Althoughpro se filings are construed liberally, procedural rules stillapply. See Johnson v. Prentice, 29 F.4th 895, 903 (7th Cir.2021).II. Background2On August 30, 2024, James Poole went to a Walmart store inLansing, Illinois. [Dkt. 31 at 2.] Upon arriving, he noticed “alack of available shopping carts” and “politely complained”about this to Lamont Isaac, the store manager. [Id.] Poolefound a cart and began shopping. [Id.] As Poole shopped inthe toy aisle, Issac and Walmart's “off-duty security officer”approached Poole and falsely accused Poole of assaultingstore employees and impersonating a police officer. [Id., at2, 7.] Poole alleges that Isaac called 911 and that Isaacinformed Poole that Poole “was being detained and escorted”to the front of the store. [Id. at 7.] Isaac “detained” Poolewithout consent. Once a Lansing police officer arrived, Issacfalsely relayed that Poole was impersonating a police officer“through intimidation and assault.” [Id. at 2.] Poole wasarrested and transported to the Lansing police station, wherehe was fingerprinted and held for seven hours “without anyindependent investigation or probable cause.” [Id. at 2, 7.]*2 Poole was released and the Cook County State'sAttorney's Office declined to bring charges. [Id.]II. AnalysisPoole's amended complaint raises state law and § 1983 claimsfor (1) malicious prosecution; (2) battery; (3) false arrest; and(4) spoliation of evidence. [Dkt. 31.] The court considers eachin turn.A. Malicious ProsecutionThe court previously dismissed this claim with prejudice, soPoole's attempt to re-plead it is improper.
Poole v. Walmart, Inc., Slip Copy (2025) © 2025 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.2To reiterate, succeeding on a claim of malicious prosecutionunder Illinois law requires a plaintiff to demonstrate: “(1)the commencement or continuance of an original criminal orcivil judicial proceeding by the defendant; (2) the terminationof the proceeding in favor of the plaintiff; (3) the absenceof probable cause for such proceeding; (4) the presence ofmalice; and (5) damages resulting to the plaintiff.” Beaman v.Freesmeyer, 131 N.E.3d 488, 495 (Ill. 2019) (quoting Swickv. Liautaud, 662 N.E.2d 1238, 1242 (Ill. 1996)).Some state action is required for a malicious prosecutionclaim; but importantly, “ ‘a citizen does not commence aprosecution when he merely gives false information’ to theauthorities.” Crockett v. WKM Auto., Inc., 2025 WL 886171,at *12 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 21, 2025) (quoting Randall v. Lemke,726 N.E.2d 183, 185 (Ill. App. Ct. 2000)). As previouslyexplained, Poole's malicious prosecution claim cannot standbecause “no criminal proceeding ever commenced, so amalicious prosecution claim fails as a matter of law.” [Dkt.30 at 4.] In his original complaint, and indeed in his amendedcomplaint, Isaac alleges that after his arrest, Lansing policespoke with the State's Attorney's Office, who declined to bringcharges against Poole and Poole was released. [Dkt. 31 at2.] Even taking as true that Isaac provided false informationto the Lansing police, this claim cannot proceed because nocriminal proceeding was commenced. Crockett, 2025 WL886171, at *12 (“Only if the false information is given withknowledge of the falsity and then the authorities commencejudicial proceedings based on that information is a citizenpotentially liable.”) (emphasis added). This claim remainsdismissed with prejudice.B. BatteryNext, Poole brings a state law battery claim. In Illinois, “[t]heelements of a claim for civil battery are: (1) an intentionalact on the part of the defendant, (2) resulting in offensivecontact with the plaintiff's person, and (3) lack of consent tothe defendant's conduct.” Obermeier v. Nw. Mem'l Hosp., 134N.E.3d 316, 333–34 (Ill. App. Ct. 2019). “[B]attery requiresmore than an intent to contact, in that a defendant must intendto cause a harmful or offensive contact.” Censke v. UnitedStates, 27 F. Supp. 3d 920, 931–32 (N.D. Ill. 2014).Walmart argues Poole's claims should be dismissed withprejudice because he fails to allege that any Walmartemployee made physical contact with him. [Dkt. 43 at 6.]It's true that Poole's amended complaint does not allegeanyone, let alone a Walmart employee, ever touched him.In fact, Poole's response brief reiterates that he “does notallege in his First Amended Complaint that anyone evermade any physical contact with him other than the Lansingpolice officer who placed him under arrest.” [Dkt. 47 at1.] “[O]ffensive contact with the plaintiff's person” is anexplicit requirement of battery. Obermeier, 134 N.E.3d at333. Because Poole alleges that no one made physical contactwith him, his battery claim is dismissed with prejudice.C. False Arrest*3 Poole also brings a false arrest claim against Walmart.[Dkt. 31 at 1, 3.] Under Illinois law, success on a falsearrest claim requires an (1) “arrest or restraint against hiswill;” (2) “caused or procured by the defendant[ ];” and(3) “made without probable cause or reasonable grounds tobelieve he committed the offense.” Gaddis v. DeMattei, 30F.4th 625, 633 (7th Cir. 2022). The essence of such a causeof action is that the plaintiff was “restrained or arrested bythe defendant, and that the defendant acted without havingreasonable grounds to believe that an offense was committedby the plaintiff.” Meerbrey v. Marshall Field & Co., 564N.E.2d 1222, 1231 (Ill. 1990).Private individuals may be liable for false arrest if they“caused or procured” the plaintiff's arrest. Schroeder v.Lufthansa German Airlines, 875 F.2d 613, 618 (7th Cir.1989) (“Under Illinois law, an ‘arrest by an officer causedor procured by a private person is the same as an arrest bythe private person.’ ” (quoting Dutton v. Roo-Mac, Inc., 426N.E.2d 604, 607 (Ill. App. Ct. 1981))) To cause or procure anarrest, an individual must have “personally participated [in thearrest] by direct act or by indirect procurement.” Id. (quotingCampbell v. Kaczmarek, 350 N.E.2d 97, 101 (Ill. App. Ct.1976)). In Illinois, this generally requires a showing that aprivate citizen “commanded or mounted a campaign againstthe police in order to procure the plaintiff's arrest.” Gaddis,30 F.4th at 633 (citing Odorizzi v. A.O. Smith Corp., 452 F.2d229 (7th Cir. 1971)).Construing Poole's pleading liberally, he has stated a claim forfalse arrest. He alleges that he was restrained unreasonablyor without probable cause in that Isaac detained and escortedPoole to the front of the store where he was turned overto a Lansing police officer. [Dkt. 31 at 2, 7.] Poole allegesthat Isaac falsely told the Lansing police officer that Poole“assault[ed] store employees and impersonat[ed] a policeofficer,” which caused the officer to arrest Poole. [Id. at 2.]Viewed liberally, that is enough to plausibly suggest thata Walmart employee, Isaac, “directed or procured” Poole's
Poole v. Walmart, Inc., Slip Copy (2025) © 2025 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.3arrest, while falsely relaying that Poole was impersonating apolice officer.To be sure, ultimately, Poole will not succeed on this claimmerely by showing that a Walmart employee provided falseor inaccurate information to the police. Randall v. Lemke,726 N.E.2d 183, 186 (Ill. App. Ct. 2000) (providing falseinformation to the police does not support a claim offalse arrest “[u]nless the information is the sole basis forthe arrest....”); Dugar v. U.S. Bank Nat'l Assn., 2022 WL2105894, at *4 (N.D. Ill. June 10, 2022) (“The rule in Illinois,then, is that even when a private defendant was the solesource of information for arresting officers, the plaintiff muststill show that the defendant encouraged or ‘affirmativelyinstigated the arrest in some way.’ ”) (quoting Carey v. K-Way,Inc., 728 N.E.2d 743, 747 (Ill. App. Ct. 2000)). He will haveto show that false information was the sole basis for the arrest.At the pleadings stage, Poole has alleged enough to make itplausible that a Walmart employee personally participated inthe arrest by direct act or by indirect procurement. Poole'sfalse arrest claim against Walmart may proceed under Illinoisstate law.It may not proceed under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 or Monell, whichPoole references in his amended complaint. [Dkt. 31 at 3.]A Monell claim challenges the “execution of a government'spolicy or custom, whether made by its lawmakers or bythose whose edicts or acts may fairly be said to representofficial policy.” Monell v. Dep't of Social Services of Cityof New York, 436 U.S. 658, 694 (2018). “For a Monellclaim to survive a motion to dismiss, a plaintiff must pleadfacts that plausibly suggest” four factors are met. Thomas v.Neenah Joint Sch. Dist., 74 F.4th 521, 524 (7th Cir. 2023).First, that he was deprived of a constitutional right; second,that the deprivation can be traced to some municipal action(i.e. a policy or custom); third, that the policy or customdemonstrates municipal fault (i.e. deliberate indifference);and fourth, that the municipal action was the moving forcebehind the federal-rights violation. Id.*4 Poole's amended complaint alleges none of these things.He states only that “Walmart is liable under § 1983 throughrespondeat superior for Isaac's role in the arrest” underMonell. [Dkt. 31 at 3.] This is incorrect. There is no generalrespondeat superior liability under § 1983, so Walmart cannotbe held liable for constitutional violations solely because itemployed Isaac or even an off duty security guard. J.K.J.v. Polk Cnty., 960 F.3d 367, 377 (7th Cir. 2020); Taylor v.Ways, 999 F.3d 478, 493 (7th Cir. 2021). A private companyperforming a public function can be sued for constitutionalviolations under Monell, but it “cannot be held liable forthe unconstitutional acts of their employees unless those actswere carried out pursuant to an official custom or policy.”Grieveson v. Anderson, 538 F.3d 763, 771 (7th Cir. 2008).No such official custom or policy is alleged in this case.Finally, as noted above, a Monell claim requires that Poolebe deprived of some constitutional right. Here, there is noviable constitutional claim—Poole has alleged a state lawfalse arrest claim only. Petty v. City of Chicago, 754 F.3d416, 424–25 (7th Cir. 2014) (“To establish municipal liabilityand prevail on his Monell claim, it is not enough for Petty toallege that CPD's alleged policy injured him. Rather, he mustestablish: (1) that he suffered a constitutional injury, and (2)that the City authorized or maintained a custom of approvingthe unconstitutional conduct ... But if no constitutionalviolation occurred in the first place, a Monell claim cannot besupported.” (internal citation omitted)). Poole's claims againstWalmart under § 1983 and respondeat superior are dismissedwith prejudice.D. Spoliation of EvidenceFinally, Poole brings a claim for spoliation of evidence. [Dkt.31 at 1, 6.] Under Illinois state law, “spoliation of evidence isa form of negligence; proof of spoliation requires a showingthat the defendant owed the plaintiff a duty to preserveevidence, breached that duty, and thereby proximately causedthe plaintiff to be unable to prove the underlying cause ofaction.” Brian J. Wanca, J.D., P.C. v. Oppenheim, 226 N.E.3d732, 745 (Ill. App. Ct. 2023) (quoting Brobbey v. EnterpriseLeasing Co. of Chicago, 935 N.E.2d 1084, 1096 (Ill. App. Ct.2010)).Poole bases his spoliation claim on “Walmart's failure toprepare an incident report and preserve CCTV footage.” [Dkt.31 at 6.] Poole claims that “[p]rior to or immediately after”his arrest, he “gave Walmart's asset-protection team notice topreserve all CCTV footage” related to the incident. [Id., at 2.]He also claims internal policy at Walmart requires draftingincident reports and preserving store surveillance video forup to two years “whenever an arrest or 911 call occurs.” [Id.]Separately, Poole alleges that “Walmart had actual notice ofpotential litigation and failed to preserve the footage.” [Id. at4.]To establish duty, a plaintiff must allege that “a reasonableperson in the defendant's position should have known theevidence would be material to potential civil litigation.” Jonesv. O'Brien Tire & Battery Service Center, Inc., 871 N.E.2d 98,
Poole v. Walmart, Inc., Slip Copy (2025) © 2025 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.4105 (Ill. App. Ct. 2007). Taking Poole's factual allegationsas true, which the court must at the motion to dismiss stage,Poole adequately alleges that his arrest and the notice hegave Walmart about his potential litigation created a dutyto preserve the CCTV footage. As to causation, a plaintiffmust show that “ ‘but for the destruction of these records,[he] would have had a reasonable probability of succeeding”in his case. Oliva v. Menard, 2024 WL 3984174, at *5(N.D. Ill. Aug. 29, 2024). If a plaintiff cannot prevail in theunderlying action even with the lost or destroyed evidence,then the defendant's conduct is not the cause of harm. “Thisrequirement prevents a plaintiff from recovering where it canbe shown that the underlying action was meritless.” Boyd v.Travelers Ins. Co., 652 N.E.2d 267, 271 n.2 (Ill. 1995).Poole states that “destruction or loss of the video evidenceprejudiced Plaintiff's ability to prove his innocence and thefalsity of Isaac's claims.” [Dkt. 31 at 4.] Because it isplausible that CCTV footage might depict the relevant events,including the circumstances leading up to the Lansing police'sarrival, the amended complaint—when liberally construed—sufficiently states a spoliation claim.* * * **5 The court would be remiss if it did not address a glaringissue that presents itself in nearly every one of Poole's filings.Poole asks the “court to take notice” of several cases that donot actually exist, for example, Phipps v. Sears, Roebuck &Co, 570 N.E 2d 405, 412 (1st Dist. 1991), Carberry v. ChicagoTransit Authority, 512 N.E.2d 96, 99 (1st Dist. 1987), andCain v. Chicago Transit Authority, 529 N.E.2d 640, 643 (1stDist. 1988). [Dkt. 47 at 7.] Walmart could not find the threecases. [Dkt. 48 at 2.] The court could not find them either.In Poole's most recent filings, he cites two cases from the“Eastern District of Illinois.” [Dkt. 54 at 4. (citing “Miller v.United States, 532 F. Supp. 2d 1365 (E.D. Ill. 2008))” and“United States v. Miller Law Group, 2021 WL ______ (E.D.Ill. 2021.”)] The Eastern District of Illinois no longer existsand hasn't existed since 1978.3While generative AI platforms, such as ChatGPT, canbe useful tools for attorneys and pro se litigants alike,they have their shortcomings. These platforms sometimes“hallucinate,” meaning they provide inaccurate responses. Inthe legal research context, these hallucinations can include thegeneration of fictitious case cites and misrepresentations ofcase summaries or holdings, like the citations noted above.The court reminds Poole that the requirements of faithfulrepresentations to the court under Rule 11 applies to pro seplaintiffs. Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(b). Rule 11(c) allows districtcourts to sanction parties when they act in bad faith andengage in deliberate misconduct in an effort to deceive thecourt. If Poole relies on AI or other technology to draft afiling, he remains responsible for ensuring his filings areaccurate and do not contain fabricated caselaw, citations orquotations. Failure to comply with Rule 11 obligations in thefuture will result in sanctions, up to and including dismissalof the case with prejudice.IV. ConclusionDefendant's motion to dismiss is granted in part and denied inpart. Poole's malicious prosecution, battery, and § 1983 claimsare dismissed with prejudice. It is denied with respect to hisfalse arrest and spoliation claims.All CitationsSlip Copy, 2025 WL 2577025Footnotes1Citations to docket filings generally refer to the electronic pagination provided by CM/ECF, which may not beconsistent with page numbers in the underlying documents.2The following factual allegations are taken from Poole's Amended Complaint and are accepted as true forthe purposes of the motion. Smith v. First Hosp. Lab'ys, Inc., 77 F.4th 603, 607 (7th Cir. 2023). The courtdoes not vouch for the accuracy of facts set forth at the pleading stage. See Goldberg v. United States, 881F.3d 529, 531 (7th Cir. 2018). Any additional facts alleged in subsequent filings have not been considered,
Poole v. Walmart, Inc., Slip Copy (2025) © 2025 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.5consistent with the court's earlier instructions to Poole to only file one document titled “amended complaint”with the relevant factual information. [Dkt. 29; Dkt. 30 at 8.]3https://www.fjc.gov/history/courts/u.s.-district-courts-districts-illinoisEnd of Document© 2025 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.
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