quotations wholly contrary to 2 actual law v. City of New York (Dec. 20, 2024)

Case details
Country
United States
Jurisdiction
Federal
Decided
Dec. 20, 2024
Panel
Warhit
Opinion
Per curiam
Landberg v City of New York2026 NY Slip Op 03935June 23, 2026Appellate Division, Second DepartmentLasallePublished by New York State Law Reporting Bureau pursuant to Judiciary Law § 431.This decision is uncorrected and subject to revision before publication in the OfficialReports.Judith Landberg, appellant,vCity of New York, et al., respondents.Supreme Court of the State of New York, Appellate Division, Second Judicial DepartmentDecided on June 23, 20262025-02380, (Index No. 509670/18)Hector D. Lasalle, P.J.Valerie Brathwaite NelsonBarry E. WarhitElena Goldberg Velazquez, JJ.Law Offices of Michael S. Lamonsoff, PLLC, New York, NY (Michael Sanders of counsel), forappellant.Steven Banks, Corporation Counsel, New York, NY (Melanie T. West and Elizabeth I. Freedman ofcounsel), for respondent City of New York.Leon R. Kowalski (Horn Appellate Group, Brooklyn, NY [Scott T. Horn and Ross S. Friscia], ofcounsel), for respondent Whitman Owner Corp.ON MOTION Appeal from an order of the Supreme Court, Kings County, dated December 20,2024, which was determined by decision and order of this Court dated June 3, 2026. On the Court'sown motion, by order to show cause dated May 20, 2026, all parties were directed to show cause whyan order should or should not be made and entered imposing such sanctions and/or costs, if any, asthis Court may deem appropriate, against counsel for the appellant, Law Offices of Michael S.Lamonsoff, PLLC, and Michael Sanders, Esq., pursuant to 22 NYCRR 130-1.1, for filing briefscontaining fabricated and/or erroneous legal authority and/or citations.24/06/2026, 08:25Landberg v City of New York - 2026 NY Slip Op 03935https://www.nycourts.gov/reporter/current/3dseries/2026/2026_03935.shtml1/8
Lasalle, P.J.[*1]DECISION AND ORDER ON MOTIONIn this case, we impose sanctions upon an attorney and a law firm for submitting a brief,prepared with the assistance of generative artificial intelligence (hereinafter GenAI), containingcitations to nonexistent cases, fictitious purported Court of Appeals quotations wholly contrary to[*2]actual law, and misrepresentations about what certain real cases actually held or decided.Factual and Procedural BackgroundThe plaintiff allegedly was injured when she tripped and fell on a loose brick in a tree well on asidewalk abutting property owned by the defendant Whitman Owner Corp. (hereinafter the owner).The plaintiff subsequently commenced this action to recover damages for personal injuries againstthe owner and the defendant City of New York. In an order dated December 20, 2024, the SupremeCourt granted the separate motions of the owner and the City for summary judgment dismissing thecomplaint insofar as asserted against each of them. The plaintiff appealed, and in a decision and orderdated June 3, 2026, this Court affirmed the order dated December 20, 2024 (see Landberg v City ofNew York, ___ AD3d ___, 2026 NY Slip Op 03433).The Plaintiff's BriefThe plaintiff's appellant's brief, submitted by Michael Sanders, Esq., on behalf of Law Offices ofMichael S. Lamonsoff, PLLC (hereinafter the law firm), cited to several nonexistent cases, misstatedthe law, and misrepresented the holdings of real cases, as follows.On two occasions, the plaintiff's brief purported to quote the nonexistent Court of Appeals caseof Xiang Fu Ji v City of New York (13 NY3d 791, 794) for the proposition that Administrative Code ofthe City of New York § 7-210, which shifted tort liability for injuries resulting from defective sidewalksfrom the City to abutting property owners, is a remedial statute that should be "construed liberally toeffectuate its remedial purpose." No case by that title exists at all, much less at the citation given bythe plaintiff's brief. There is a real Court of Appeals case entitled Xiang Fu He v Troon Mgt., Inc. (34NY3d 167), which analyzes Administrative Code § 7-210. However, Xiang Fu He does not contain thepurported quotation set forth in the plaintiff's brief, characterize Administrative Code § 7-210 asremedial, or instruct that it be construed liberally. Moreover, the Court of Appeals has never used thephrase "construed liberally to effectuate its remedial purpose." In fact, the Court of Appeals has statedthat Administrative Code § 7-210, because it is "in derogation of common law, and . . . creat[es]liability where none previously existed, must be strictly construed" (Vucetovic v Epsom Downs, Inc.,10 NY3d 517, 521 [emphasis added; internal quotation marks omitted]). Thus, the plaintiff's briefcontained a fictitious quote, from a fictitious Court of Appeals case, which was directly contrary towhat the Court of Appeals has actually said.The plaintiff's brief also contained a fictitious quote from the fictitious case of Hausser v Giunta(88 AD3d 969, 970). The plaintiff's brief on two occasions quoted that fictitious case as stating thatAdministrative Code § 7-210 shifted liability for sidewalk defects from the City to abutting propertyowners, who are "in the best position to monitor and control" the condition of adjacent walkways.There is a real case by the name of Hausser v Giunta (217 AD2d 604, revd 88 NY2d 449) thatconcerned sidewalk liability, but it arose from an accident that occurred in the City of Long Beach andconcerned City of Long Beach Code § 256 instead of Administrative Code § 7-210, and the decisionand order does not contain the purported quotation set forth in the plaintiff's brief.24/06/2026, 08:25Landberg v City of New York - 2026 NY Slip Op 03935https://www.nycourts.gov/reporter/current/3dseries/2026/2026_03935.shtml2/8
The final fictitious citation in the plaintiff's brief is to the fictitious case of Lack v Lack (841NYS2d 403, 404), which the plaintiff's brief cited for the proposition that this Court reviews a grant ofsummary judgment de novo, applying the same standards as the trial court. Again, no case by thatname appears at that citation, and there appears to have never been any cases in New [*3]York withthat title.In addition to citing and/or quoting the three fictitious cases, the plaintiff's brief alsomisrepresented the holdings of real cases. The plaintiff's brief cited Campaign for Fiscal Equity vState of New York (86 NY2d 307, 318) for the proposition that exceptions to remedial statutes shouldbe strictly construed. In Campaign for Fiscal Equity, the plaintiffs sought a judgment declaring thatthe State's public school financing system was unconstitutional under the State and FederalConstitutions and unlawful under title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the United StatesDepartment of Education's regulations implementing title VI (see Campaign for Fiscal Equity v Stateof New York, 86 NY2d at 312-313). The opinion in Campaign for Fiscal Equity does not use thewords remedial or exception, or discuss how strictly statutes should be construed. The pin cite givenin the plaintiff's brief refers to a section of the opinion discussing the standard for considering thesufficiency of a pleading on a motion pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(7) (see Campaign for Fiscal Equity vState of New York, 86 NY2d at 318).Finally, in discussing whether the City established that it lacked prior written notice of thealleged defect pursuant to Administrative Code § 7-201(c), the plaintiff's brief stated that "[w]hileRodgers v. City of New York, 34 A.D.3d 555 (2d Dep't 2006), held that a two-year search can besufficient, that holding is not a blanket rule applicable in all circumstances." However, Rodgersconcerned only a motion by an adjacent landowner, and not the City, and did not address the issue ofprior written notice or how long a time frame a municipality must search its records in order toestablish the lack of prior written notice (see Rodgers v City of New York, 34 AD3d 555, 555-556). Inother words, Rodgers said nothing remotely related to whether a two-year search can be sufficient.Although the attorneys for the owner and the City, who are officers of the court, submittedrespondents' briefs, neither of them alerted this Court about the fabricated citations, fabricatedquotations, misstatements of law, and misrepresentations regarding the holdings of real casescontained in the plaintiff's brief.Oral ArgumentOn May 20, 2026, Sanders appeared before this Court and argued the appeal on behalf of theplaintiff. During the argument, members of the panel raised concerns about fictitious and erroneouscitations and quotations, and misrepresentations of law contained in the plaintiff's brief. AfterSanders indicated that he was not prepared to speak on the cases at issue, Sanders was offered theopportunity to take a 15-minute recess, which Sanders declined. Sanders stated that he personallywrote the plaintiff's brief. While Sanders initially confirmed that the authorities within the brief camefrom Lexis, Westlaw, or a book, or were "cited from a previous case," he later hypothesized that theerroneous citations may have possibly been the product of him "over-relying" on "other briefs" orstring cites.This Court's Order to Show Cause and the Responding AffirmationsOn the Court's own motion, by order to show cause dated May 20, 2026, all parties weredirected to show cause why an order should or should not be made and entered imposing sanctionsand/or costs, if any, against Sanders and the law firm, "for filing briefs containing fabricated and/orerroneous legal authority and/or citations."24/06/2026, 08:25Landberg v City of New York - 2026 NY Slip Op 03935https://www.nycourts.gov/reporter/current/3dseries/2026/2026_03935.shtml3/8
In response, Sanders submitted an affirmation in which he stated that he took "fullresponsibility for the deficiencies identified by the Court," and acknowledged submitting "a brief[*4]to this Court unknowingly with three fabricated citations." Although he stated that he "carefullyreviewed [his] brief" after oral argument, Sanders did not identify or acknowledge the brief'smisstatements of the law or misrepresentations about the holdings of certain real cases cited.Sanders's affirmation did not mention anything about Rodgers v City of New York (34 AD3d 555),even though a member of the panel had identified that case during oral argument as a case aboutwhich the plaintiff's brief contained a misrepresentation of the law.Sanders stated that in connection with his research, he recalled "utilizing traditional legalresearch resources, including Westlaw, appellate briefs, publicly available sources, and othersecondary materials. However, [he] also recall[ed] utilizing artificial intelligence-assisted researchtools but [did] not recall which exact tool [he] used, it was one of the free ones available to the public."Sanders stated that after carefully reviewing the brief, it was his "belief that the non-existent citationsidentified by the Court originated during the AI-assisted portion of [his] supplemental research which[he] negligently failed to verify before filing [the plaintiff's] brief with this Court." Sanders stated thatthis was a violation of the policy of the law firm, which "had made known its policy that all AIgenerated citations to facts and the law required personal review and confirmation by the lawyersusing artificial intelligence tools."Sanders further stated in his affirmation that when he appeared for oral argument and the Courtasked him where the fabricated cases came from, he "should have stated that they were hallucinatedby artificial intelligence. [He] was genuinely scared at the time. It felt like [his] career was on the line,and [he] was afraid to even use the words 'AI.'" Sanders went on to "expla[in], not justif[y]" that hewas"confused and stunned at the questioning because [he] was prepared to address the nuance of thecases [he] cited for the central legal issue as to whether the location of the accident qualified as a 'treewell' within the meaning of Administrative Code § 7-210. The cases with the wrong citations werecited for the more simple, and [he] believed to be non-questionable basic principles of AdministrativeCode § 7-210."Sanders stated that he was "deeply embarrassed" for his error and that he "can assure this Court withevery fiber in [his] body that going forward, [he] will be extremely rigorous, to verify every citation inany paper [he] ever file[s] going forward."The law firm also submitted an affirmation of its general counsel, Stacey Haskel, who stated thatprior to this unfortunate incident, Sanders, who had been employed at the law firm since 2024,"maintained an unblemished record, and [she had] never received a single complaint regarding hiswork product, his ethics, or his diligence." Haskel stated that she was "shocked to learn that,completely contrary to [the law] firm['s] policy, Mr. Sanders utilized generative artificial intelligencetools in a manner that exceeded the scope of technology approved for use by the [law firm]." Haskelstated that while recognizing the severity of the error, the law firm had "accepted Mr. Sanders'ssincere apology and his solemn assurances that this will never happen again. We believe he isgenuinely remorseful and understands the gravity of his oversight." Haskel stated that the law firm"recognizes that a stern reminder of our professional responsibilities to all staff is required" and thatit "scheduled multiple comprehensive ethics sessions for the entirety of the [law firm's] legal andsupport staff, focusing explicitly on technology and generative AI in legal practice." Finally, Haskelstated that the law firm "has made it unequivocally clear that any future deviation from thesestandards will be met with [*5]immediate disciplinary action."24/06/2026, 08:25Landberg v City of New York - 2026 NY Slip Op 03935https://www.nycourts.gov/reporter/current/3dseries/2026/2026_03935.shtml4/8
DiscussionA court "in its discretion, may award to any party or attorney in any civil action or proceedingbefore the court, except where prohibited by law, costs in the form of reimbursement for actualexpenses reasonably incurred and reasonable attorney's fees, resulting from frivolous conduct" (22NYCRR 130-1.1[a]). "In addition to or in lieu of awarding costs, the court, in its discretion may imposefinancial sanctions upon any party or attorney in a civil action or proceeding who engages in frivolousconduct" (id.). Conduct is frivolous if: "(1) it is completely without merit in law and cannot besupported by a reasonable argument for an extension, modification or reversal of existing law; (2) it isundertaken primarily to delay or prolong the resolution of the litigation, or to harass or maliciouslyinjure another; or (3) it asserts material factual statements that are false" (id. § 130-1.1[c]). "Indetermining whether the conduct undertaken was frivolous, the court shall consider, among otherissues the circumstances under which the conduct took place, including the time available forinvestigating the legal or factual basis of the conduct, and whether or not the conduct was continuedwhen its lack of legal or factual basis was apparent, should have been apparent, or was brought to theattention of counsel or the party" (id.). In determining an appropriate sanction, "courts must considerthat sanctions are both retributive, in that they punish past conduct, but are also goal oriented, in thatthey are useful in deterring future frivolous conduct not only by the particular parties, but also by the[b]ar at large" (Deutsche Bank Natl. Trust Co. v LeTennier, ___ AD3d ___, ___, 2026 NY Slip Op00040, *5-6 [internal quotation marks omitted]).As this Court discussed recently in Matter of Julien v Arthur (___ AD3d ___, 2026 NY Slip Op03308, *1-2), "[c]ourts across the country have recognized the pitfalls posed by the use of GenAI indrafting briefs and other memoranda without verifying the accuracy of the information generated.""In particular, courts have noted the risk of GenAI hallucinations, which may take the form ofcitations to nonexistent cases, fabricated quotations from actual cases, or misstatements of law thatare not representative of what a case actually decided" (Matter of Julien v Arthur, ___ AD3d at ___,2026 NY Slip Op 03308, *2 [internal quotation marks omitted]). "The danger posed by GenAIhallucinations lies not merely in their inaccuracy, but also in their tendency to masquerade as agenuine citation or statement of law, resulting in a waste of time and money to the opposing party inexposing the deception and an unnecessary burden on the court's resources" (Matter of Julien vArthur, ___ AD3d at ___, 2026 NY Slip Op 03308, *2 [citation and internal quotation marksomitted])."Many harms flow from the submission of fake opinions. The opposing party wastes time and moneyin exposing the deception. The Court's time is taken from other important endeavors. The client maybe deprived of arguments based on authentic judicial precedents. There is potential harm to thereputation of judges and courts whose names are falsely invoked as authors of the bogus opinions andto the reputation of a party attributed with fictional conduct. It promotes cynicism about the legalprofession and the American judicial system" (Mata v Avianca, Inc., 678 F Supp 3d 443, 448 [SD NY][footnote omitted]).As stated by the Appellate Division, Third Department,"[t]o be clear, attorneys and litigants are not prohibited from using GenAI to assist with the[*6]preparation of court submissions. The issue arises when attorneys and staff are not sufficientlytrained on the dangers of such technology, and instead erroneously rely on it without humanoversight. As with the work from a paralegal, intern or another attorney, the use of GenAI in no wayabrogates an attorney's or litigant's obligation to fact check and cite check every document filed with acourt. To do otherwise may be sanctionable, depending on the facts and particular circumstances of24/06/2026, 08:25Landberg v City of New York - 2026 NY Slip Op 03935https://www.nycourts.gov/reporter/current/3dseries/2026/2026_03935.shtml5/8
each case" (Deutsche Bank Natl. Trust Co. v LeTennier, ___ AD3d at ___, 2026 NY Slip Op 00040,*6-7)."The misuse of AI technology also implicates [a] lawyer's ethical duty to provide independentprofessional judgment in rendering legal services. Undoubtedly, lawyers are selected and hired by thepublic for their judgment and counsel" (Grymes Dev. Co. v Fodera, 88 Misc 3d 767, 772 [Sup Ct,Richmond County]).In Matter of Julien, this Court held that by filing an appellate brief citing to a nonexistent caseas the sole support for his claim of judicial bias, the pro se father in a child custody proceedingengaged in conduct that was "completely without merit in law and cannot be supported by areasonable argument for an extension, modification or reversal of existing law" (22 NYCRR 130-1.1[c][1]) and that involved the assertion of "material factual statements that are false" (id. § 130-1.1[c][3];see Matter of Julien v Arthur, ___ AD3d at ___, 2026 NY Slip Op 03308, *2). Under thecircumstances presented, including the father's pro se status, the fact that he cited only onenonexistent case, and that he readily acknowledged his misplaced reliance on GenAI once he wasalerted to the issue without further reoccurrence, this Court deemed it appropriate to impose amonetary sanction in the sum of $250 (see Matter of Julien v Arthur, ___ AD3d at ___, 2026 NYSlip Op 03308, *2).This case is obviously much more egregious in that the person who filed the subject brief is atrained attorney with access to legal research materials, including Westlaw, and who is bound by theRules of Professional Conduct (see Rules of Prof Conduct [22 NYCRR 1200.0] rules 1.1[a]; 3.3[a][1];8.4[d], [h]; Matter of Zareh, ___ AD3d ___, ___, 2026 NY Slip Op 00619 [determining, in thecontext of an attorney discipline proceeding, that a public censure was an appropriate sanction for anattorney who submitted a brief containing citation errors and misrepresentations of law, which wasdetermined to have been drafted using GenAI]). Further, stories about the unreliability of GenAI inperforming legal work, leading to fictitious citations, misrepresentations of the law, and sanctions,have been widespread in the media for years, putting all attorneys on notice of this (see e.g. BenjaminWeiser, Lawyer Who Used ChatGPT Faces Penalty for Made Up Citations, NY Times, June 8, 2023,available at https://www.nytimes.com/2023/06/08/nyregion/lawyer-chatgpt-sanctions.html [lastaccessed June 22, 2026]).Moreover, when confronted about the fabricated cases cited in his brief at oral argument,Sanders declined the opportunity to take a 15-minute recess to discern where he had found the cases,and maintained that he had found them either on Westlaw or Lexis or in a book, a previous case, oranother brief. As Sanders later admitted in his affirmation, he was not being candid at the time of oralargument, as he should have said that the cases were hallucinated by artificial intelligence. Sanders"expla[ined]" that his decision to be dishonest with the Court was due to being "scared." This may betrue. However, Sanders's decision not to be honest with the Court during oral argument alsodemonstrated his professional immaturity, arrogance, and profound [*7]lack of respect for thejudicial system.Even after being given the opportunity to respond to the Court's concerns in writing, it appearsthat Sanders was still not completely candid. In his affirmation, Sanders recalled using artificialintelligence research tools in connection with his supplemental legal research, which he blamed forthe three fictitious cases that were cited for what he believed to be "non-questionable basic principles"of law. However, as outlined above, the brief that Sanders submitted did not merely contain fictitiouscase citations for non-questionable principles of law. The brief also contained fabricated quotationsfrom the Court of Appeals, which said the opposite of what the Court of Appeals has actually said24/06/2026, 08:25Landberg v City of New York - 2026 NY Slip Op 03935https://www.nycourts.gov/reporter/current/3dseries/2026/2026_03935.shtml6/8
about whether Administrative Code § 7-210 is to be construed liberally or strictly. In addition, thebrief completely misrepresented what was decided or discussed in two real cases cited therein. Since"fabricated quotations from actual cases" and "misstatements of law that are not representative ofwhat a case actually decided" are well-recognized "pitfalls posed by the use of GenAI in draftingbriefs" (Matter of Julien v Arthur, ___ AD3d at ___, 2026 NY Slip Op 03308, *1-2), it appears thatGenAI was used to do more than simply conduct supplemental research, as suggested by Sanders inhis affirmation. Sanders wholly failed to fulfill his obligation to review the work of GenAI to preventthe submission to this Court of a brief containing significant misrepresentations of the law.Under all of the circumstances presented, including Sanders's lack of candor and submission ofa brief with fabricated quotations that significantly misstated the law and with other misstatementsthat wholly misrepresented what certain real cases actually decided, we deem it appropriate to imposea monetary sanction on Sanders in the sum of $8,000 (see Deutsche Bank Natl. Trust Co. vLeTennier, ___ AD3d at ___, 2026 NY Slip Op 00040, *6; Grymes Dev. Co. v Fodera, 88 Misc 3d at773; Idehen v Stoute-Philip, 86 Misc 3d 1244[A], 2025 NY Slip Op 51211[U] [Civ Ct, Queens County];Fletcher v Experian Info. Solutions, Inc., 168 F4th 231, 240 [5th Cir]; Mata v Avianca, Inc., 678 FSupp 3d at 461-466).As for the law firm, we credit Haskel's statements in her affirmation that Sanders's actions werecontrary to the law firm's policy, and that the law firm had no reason to believe that Sanders wasusing GenAI in a manner that exceeded the scope of technology approved for use by the law firm.Nevertheless, as the law firm's name appeared on a brief that contained significantmisrepresentations, and in light of the deterrent purpose of sanctions, we deem it appropriate toimpose a monetary sanction on the law firm in the sum of $2,500.In their affirmations in response to this Court's order to show cause, neither of the defendant'sattorneys requests the imposition of costs, and neither of the defendants has submitted billingstatements. Accordingly, this Court will not award costs pursuant to 22 NYCRR 130-1.1(a).We note that the issue before this Court now is limited to whether the conduct of the attorneyand the law firm warrants sanctions. Whether disciplinary action is also warranted may be a matterfor the Attorney Grievance Committee.BRATHWAITE NELSON, WARHIT and GOLDBERG VELAZQUEZ, JJ., concur.Upon the order to show cause dated May 20, 2026, and the papers filed in response thereto, it isORDERED that within 20 days of service upon him of a copy of this opinion and order [*8]onmotion, Michael Sanders, Esq., is directed to pay a sanction in the sum of $8,000 to the Lawyers'Fund for Client Protection of the State of New York; and it is further,ORDERED that within 20 days of service upon it of a copy of this opinion and order on motion,Law Offices of Michael S. Lamonsoff, PLLC, is directed to pay a sanction in the sum of $2,500 to theLawyers' Fund for Client Protection of the State of New York; and it is further,ORDERED within 10 days after payment of the sanctions, Michael Sanders, Esq., and LawOffices of Michael S. Lamonsoff, PLLC, shall file proof of payment with the Clerk of this Court; and itis further,ORDERED that the motion is otherwise denied; and it is further,ORDERED that the Clerk of this Court, or his designee, is directed to serve counsel for theparties with a copy of this opinion and order on motion at the email address provided to this Court.24/06/2026, 08:25Landberg v City of New York - 2026 NY Slip Op 03935https://www.nycourts.gov/reporter/current/3dseries/2026/2026_03935.shtml7/8
ENTER:Darrell M. JosephClerk of the CourtLinks to or from other sites do not signify endorsement or relationship with them.24/06/2026, 08:25Landberg v City of New York - 2026 NY Slip Op 03935https://www.nycourts.gov/reporter/current/3dseries/2026/2026_03935.shtml8/8
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