*ED. H. REID, Plff. in Err.,

v.

PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF COLORADO.

(See S. C. Reporter's ed. 137-153.)

Interstate commerce — state regulation- prior legislation by Congress — live-stock quarantine — privileges and immunities.

t. The subject of transportation of cattle from one state to another is not so far covered by the provisions of the animal industry act of May 29, 1884 (23 Stat. at L. 31, chap. 60;

U. S. Comp. Stat. 1901, p. 299), for the In¬ vestigation and suppression of diseases of cattle, or those relating to the exportation of diseased cattle to ports in foreign coun¬ tries, and the transportation between the states of live stock known to be diseased, as to preclude the enactment of Colo. Sess.

Laws 1885, p. 335, prohibiting the Importa¬ tion of cattle from south of the 36th par¬ allel of north latitude between April 1st and November 1st, unless first kept for nine¬ ty days at some place north of that parallel, or unless a certificate of freedom from con¬ tagious or Infectious disease has been ob¬ tained from the state veterinary sanitary board.

Note. — As to constitutional equality of priv¬ ileges, immunities, and protection — see Louis¬ ville Safety Vault & T. Co. v. Louisville & N.

R. Co. (Ky.) 14 L. R. A. 579, and note.

On state regulation of interstate or foreign commerce — see notes to Norfolk & W. R. Co. v. Com. (Va.) 13 L. R. A. 107 ; McCanna & P.

Co. v. Citizens’ Trust & Surety Co. 24 C. C. A.

13 ; Ratterman v. Western U. Teleg. Co. 32 L. ed. U. S. 229 ; Harmon v. Chicago, 37 L. ed.

U. S. 216 ; Cleveland, C. C. & St. L. R. Co. v. Backus, 38 L. ed. U. S. 1041 ; and Postal Teleg.

Cable Co. v. Adams, 39 L. ed. U. S. 311.

Constitutionality of state legislation regulat¬ ing the importation of infected animals.

Proper quarantine regulations restricting the Importation of cattle from another state on ac¬ count of the danger from disease do not make unconstitutional regulations of commerce.

Smith v. St. Louis & S. W. R. Co. 181 D. S. 248,

45 L. ed. 847, 21 Sup. Ct. Rep. 803.

A statute making persons having In their possession Texas cattle which have not been wintered north, liable for any damages which may accrue from permitting them to run at large and thereby spread the Texas fever, Is not unconstitutional. Kimmish v. Ball, 129 U. S.

217, 32 L. ed. 695, 2 Inters. Com. Rep. 407, 9 Sup. Ot. Rep. 277.

And the provisions of 2 Kan. Gen. Stat. 1897, chap. 139, p. 761, making any person who brings into the state cattle capable of imparting Texas, splenic, or Spanish fever, liable for damages sustained by the communication of such fever to other cattle, and providing that cattle brought from south of the 37th parallel of north latitude shall be prima facie deemed capable of communicating the disease, are not void as a regulation of commerce. Missouri, K. & T. R.

Co. v. Haber, 169 U. S. 613, 42 L. ed. 878, 18 Sup. Ct. Rep. 488.

In Grimes v. Eddy, 126 Mo. 168, 26 L. R. A.

638, 28 S. W. 756, the court upheld as a police regulation so much of Mo. Rev. Stat. 1889, |

853, as prohibited the importation into the state of Texas, Mexican, Cherokee, and Indian cattle which, though not themselves diseased, were In¬ fected with microbes or parasites by which Texas fever might be communicated to other cattle, although the court conceded that the

187 U»S.

Reid v. Colorado.

•a.. No unconstitutional burden on Interstate commerce is made by the provisions of (jolo. Sees. Laws 1885, p. 335, prohibiting the Im¬ porting of cattle from south of the 36th parallel of north latitude between April 1st and November 1st, unless first kept for nine¬ ty days at some place north of that parallel, or unless a certificate of freedom from con¬ tagious or Infectious disease has been ob¬ tained from Lhe state veterinary sanitary board.

The privileges and immunities of citizens In the several states are not denied by the provisions of Colo. Sess. Laws 1885, p. 335, for the protection of domestic cattle against the communication of disease by cattle from other states, where the statute Is equally ap¬ plicable to citizens of all states.

[No. 269.]

Argued October 2k, 1902. Decided Decem¬ ber 1, 1902.

IN ERROR to the Supreme Court of the State of Colorado to review a judgment which affirmed a conviction in the District Court of Arapahoe County for a violation of a statute of that state for the protection

of domestic cattle from the communication of disease by cattle from other states. Af¬ firmed.

See same case below, 68 Pac. 228.

The facts are stated in the opinion.

Messrs. John H. Denison and Wil¬ liam M. Springer argued the cause, and, with Messrs. Ralph Talbot and W. H. Wad- ley and Assistant Attorney General Beck, filed a brief for plaintiff in error:

The transportation of live stock by rail or by watercourse from state to state is • branch of interstate commerce.

Hannibal & St. J. R. Co. v. Husen, 95 U. S. 465, 24 L. ed. 527.

The fact that Congress has acted precludes the state of Colorado from enacting this statute, if the same be unreasonable, unnec¬ essary, or cumulative, or imposes grievous and unnecessary burdens upon the shipper engaged in interstate commerce, in excess oi congressional requirements.

Smith v. Alabama, 124 U. S. 465, 31 L. ed. 508, 1 Inters. Com. Rep. 804, 8 Sup. Ct. Rep. 564; Hinson v. Lott, 8 Wall. 148, 19 L. ed. 387.

practical effect of such provision was the abso¬ lute Inhibition of shipment Into the state of all cattle coming from the south.

The Importation of Texas cattle Into the state between March 1st and December 1st In each year cannot be absolutely prohibited. Hannibal & St. J. R- Oo. v. Husen, 95 U. S. 46o,

24 L. ed. 527. ^ , , Oor,

Such cases as, prior to the decision in Han¬ nibal & St. J. R. Co. v. Husen, 95 U. S. 465, 24 L. ed. 527, had sustained efforts absolutely to prohibit the importation of Texas cattle (Yeazel t. Alexander, 58 Ill. 254 ; Stevens v. Brown, 58 111 289 ; Wilson v. Kansas City, St. J. & C. B. R. Co. 60 Mo. 184 ; Husen v. Hannibal & St. J. R Co. 60 Mo. 226 ; Kenney v. Hannibal & St. J. r’ Co. 62 Mo. 476) have since been overruled. Gilmore v. Hannibal & St. J. R. Co. 67 Mo. 323 ; McAlister v. Chicago, R. I. & P- R- Co- 74 Mo. 358 ; Urton v. Sherlock, 75 Mo. 247 ; Salzenstein v. Mavis, 91 Ill. 391. .

The right to carry freight and property, given to railroads by U. S. Rev. Stat. § 5258 (U. S. Comp. Stat. 1901, p. 3564), does not give them the right to carry into a state, in violation of state laws, cattle known, or which by due dili¬ gence may be known to be eapableofcom- municating disease. Missouri, K. & T. R- Co- v. Haber, 169 D. S. 613, 42 L. ed. 878, 18 Sup.

The provisions for the investigation of the diseases o< cattle, and the suppression thereof, made by the animal industry act of Congress of March 29, 1884, with the later appropriation of money to carry them out, do not preclude leg s- latton by states to protect domestic cattle against the communication of diseases by cat¬ tle from other states. Ibid.

A distinction has been drawn in Missouri be¬ tween the transportation of infected cattle through the state, and the importation of such cattle into the state. And the Missouri stat¬ ute has therefore been declared unconstitutional so far as it would impose a liability on a rail¬ road company engaged in transporting through the state cattle Infected with Texas or Spanish fever, without any intention of unloading with¬ in the state, for the injury to domestic cattle by reason of the wrecking of the train and the con¬ sequent exposure to the disease. Grimes v. Bd-

187 U. S.

dy, 126 Mo. 168, 26 L. R. A. 638, 28 S. W. 756 ; Selvege v. St. Louis & S. F. R. Co. 135 Mo. 163, 36 S. W. 652.

But in Kansas a similar statute was applied to an almost Identical state of facts, against an objection that such statute was an embargo upon interstate commerce. Missouri P. R. Co. v. Finley, 38 Kan. 550, 16 Pac. 951.

A state cannot make a carrier who shall, be¬ tween March 1st and December 1st, transport Texas cattle through the state without unload¬ ing them, liable for all contagion spread by them. Hannibal & St. J. R. Co. v. Husen, 95 D. S. 465, 24 L. ed. 527.

But where such cattle are unloaded within the state, a statute under which the carrier may be held liable for all consequent injury to do¬ mestic cattle does not violate the commerce clause of the Federal Constitution. Rouse v. Youard, 1 Kan. App. 270, 41 Pac. 426.

The Idaho sheep quarantine act of March 13, 1899, authorizing the governor, when he has reason to believe that there is an epidemic In¬ fectious disease of sheep In localities outside the state to Investigate the matter, and, if he finds the disease exists, to make a proclamation de¬ claring such localities Infected and prohibiting the introduction therefrom of sheep into the state except under such restrictions as after consultation With the state sheep inspector he may deem proper,— is Within the police power of the state. Rasmussen v. Idaho, 181 U. S. 198, 45 L. ed. 820, 21 Sup. Ot. Rep. 594.

Quarantine regulations established by the gov¬ ernor of the state on recommendation of a live¬ stock sanitary commission In pursuance of Tex. Rev Stat. 1895, art. 5043c, whereby the Im¬ portation of all cattle from the state of Louisi¬ ana from June 5th until the 15th day of the following November is prohibited because the live-stock commission had reason to believe that the anthrax had broken out, or was liable to break out, in that state, are a proper exercise of the police power of the state. Smith v. St.

& 8. W R. Oo- 181 U. S. 248, 45 L. ed.

847 21 Sup. Ct. Rep. 803.

For other cases on the validity and construc¬ tion of statutory regulations as to Infected an¬ imals, see note to Grimes v. Biddy (Mo.) 26 L. R. A. 638. 109

188, 189

Supreme Court of the United State*.

All state legislation adjudged invalid by this court either imposed a tax upon some subject of commerce, or exacted a license fee from the parties engaged in commercial pur¬ suits interstate in their nature, or created an impediment to the free navigation of pub¬ lic waters, or prescribed conditions in ac¬ cordance with which commerce in particular articles or between particular places was re¬ quired to be conducted.

Sherlock v. AUing, 93 U. S. 99, 23 L. ed.

Congress has full control over interstate commerce, and is the only authority by which that commerce can be regulated.

Missouri, K. & T. R. Co. v. Haber, 169 U. S. 613, 42 L. ed. 878, 18 Sup. Ct. Rep. 488; Grimes v. Eddy, 126 Mo. 168, 26 L. R. A. 638, 28 S. W. 766; Brown v. Houston, 114 U. S. 622, 29 L. ed. 257, 6 Sup. Ct. Rep.

1091. See also Gibbons v. Ogden, 9 Wheat.

1, 6 L. ed. 23.

The Missouri statute was held to be un¬ constitutional, solely because it went beyond the necessities of the case.

Hannibal d St. J. R. Co. v. Husen, 95 U. S. 465, 21 L. ed. 527.

Transportation is essential to commerce, or, rather, it is commerce itself; and every obstacle to it, or burden laid upon it by leg¬ islative authority, is regulation.

Ibid.

The state may not, under cover of exert¬ ing its police powers, substantially prohibit or burden either foreign or interstate com¬ merce.

Ibid.; Leisy v. Hardin, 135 U. S. 100, 34 L. ed. 128, 3 Inters. Com. Rep. 36, 10 Sup. Ct. Rep. 681.

The power conferred by the Constitution upon Congress to regulate commerce is ex¬ clusive, and permits no action or interfer¬ ence by the states in any case where the subject of the power is national or admits one uniform system of regulation.

Cooley v. Philadelphia Port Wardens, 12 How. 299, 13 L. ed. 996; Gibbons v. Ogden, 9 Wheat. 16, 6 L. ed. 27 ; Henderson v. New 1 ork, 92 U. S. 259, sub nom. Henderson v. Wickham, 23 L. ed. 543 ; Gulf, C. d S. F. R. Co. v. Hefley, 158 U. S. 99, 39 L. ed. 910, 16 Sup. Ct. Rep. 802.

The state requirement is hostile both to the letter and the spirit of the constitution¬ al provision.

Gulf, C. d S. F. R. Co. v. Hefley, 158 U. S. 99, 39 L. ed. 910, 15 Sup. Ct. Rep. 802.

A state cannot regulate commerce under the guise of an inspection law.

Minnesota v. Barber, 136 U. S. 313, 34 L. ed. 455, 3 Inters. Com. Rep. 185, 10 Sup. Ct. Rep. 862 : Brimmer v. Rebman, 138 U. S. 78, 34 L. ed. 862, 3 Inters. Com. Rep. 485, 11 Sup. Ct. Rep. 213.

Mr. Frederic D. McKenney argued the cause for defendant in error. Mr. Charles G. Post filed a brief for defendant in error:

The Colorado act was intended as supple¬ mentary to and along the line of the Federal act.

Missouri, K. d T. R. Co. v. Haber, 169 U. S. 613, 42 L. ed. 878, 18 Sup. Ct. Rep. 488.

Oct. Term,

I( is a matter of general information or knowledge that Texas cattle are not, in fact, diseased themselves, so as to render them unhealthy for food, but that all Texas cattle are infected in their systems with a para¬ site or germ which is harmless to them, but which when taken into the stomach by na¬ tive cattle produces what is known as Texas fever.

Grimes v. Eddy, 126 Mo. 168, 26 L. R. A. 638, 28 S. W. 756.

The regulations prescribed by the Agricul¬ tural Department as incidental to carrying the act into effect could not relieve even from civil liability.

Missouri, K. d T. R. Co. v. Haber, 169 U. S. 624, 42 L. ed. 882, 18 Sup. Ct. Rep. 488.

Neither corporations nor individuals are entitled, by force alone of the Constitution of the United States, and without liability for injuries resulting therefrom to others, to bring into one state from another state, cattle liable to impart or ..capable of com¬ municating disease to domestic cattle.

Missouri, K. d T. R. Co. v. Haber, 169 U. S. 628, 42 L. ed. 883, 18 Sup. Ct. Rep. 488.

The fee of 1.5 cents per head is not un¬ reasonable.

Patapsco Guano Co. v. North Carolina Bd. of Agri. 171 U. S. 345, 43 L. ed. 191, 18 Sup. Ct. Rep. 862.

*Mr. Justice Harlan delivered the opin-[138J ion of the court:

The plaintiff in error was convicted in the district court of Arapahoe county, Colo¬ rado, and sentenced to confinement for six months in the county jail for a violation of the 2d section of a statute enacted March 21st, 1885, to prevent the introduction of infectious or contagious diseases among the cattle and horses of that state. Colo. Seas.

Laws 1885, p. 335.

The judgment was affirmed by the su¬ preme court of the state, and, the case hav¬ ing been brought here, it is insisted that by the final judgment the accused has been de¬ nied a right specially claimed by him under the Constitution of the United States.

This position depends upon the inquiry whether a certain act of Congress, to be presently, referred to, has the scope and ef¬ fect attributed to it by the accused, and, that contention failing, whether the statute under which he was convicted is repugnant to that instrument.

After reciting that certain infectious and contagious diseases, known as the Texas or splenetic fever, Spanish itch, and other dis¬ eases of a dangerous and contagious nature, were prevalent among cattle and horse stock in the states and territories south of the 36th parallel of north latitude, and that it was essential for the protection of the cat¬ tle and horses of Colorado to prevent the introduction and spread of all such diseases within that state, the above statute provid¬ ed:

8 1. It shall be unlawful for any person, association, or corporation to bring or drive, or cause to be brought or driven, into this state any cattle or horBes having an infec¬ tious or ‘contagious disease, or which have[lM]

187 V. 8.

Reid v. Colorado.

189-141

been herded, or brought into contact, with *ay other cattle or horses laboring under such disease, at any time within ninety days prior to their importation into this

Ҥ 2. It shall be unlawful for any person, association, or corporation to bring or drive, or cause to oe brought or driven, into this state, between the first day of April and the first day of November, any cattle or horses from a state, territory, or county, south of the 36th parallel of north latitude, unless said cattle or horses have been held at some place north of the said parallel of latitude for a period of at least ninety days prior to their importation into this state, or unless the person, association, or corpora tion owning or having charge of such cattle or horses shall procure from the state veteri nary sanitary board & certificate, or bill of health, to the effect that said cattle or horses are free from all infectious or con tagious diseases, and have not been exposed, at any time within ninety days prior there to, to any of said diseases. The expense of any inspection connected herewith to be paid by the owner or owners of such cattle or horses.

“5 3. Any person violating the provision of this act shall be deemed guilty of a mis¬ demeanor, and shall, on conviction, be pun¬ ished by a fine of not less than five hundred (500) dollars, nor more than five thousand (5,000) dollars, or by imprisonment in the eounty jail for a term of not less than six months, and not exceeding three years, or by both such fine and imprisonment.

“§ 4. If any person, association, or cor¬ poration shall bring, or cause to be brought, into this state, any cattle or horses, in vio¬ lation of the provisions of sections 1 or 2 of this act, or shall, by false representation, procure a certificate of health, as provided for in section 2 of this act, he or they shall be liable, in all cases, for all damages sus¬ tained on account of disease communicated by or from said cattle or horses; judgment for damages in any such case, together with the costs of action, shall be a lien upon all such cattle and horses, and a writ of at¬ tachment may issue in the first instance without the giving of a bond, and the corn t rendering such judgment may order the sale of said cattle or horses, or so many thereof 1401 as *may be necessary to satisfy said judg¬ ments and costs. Such sale shall be con¬ ducted as other sales under execution.” Colo. Sess. Laws 1885, p. 335.

There was no proof in the case that the particular cattle in question had any dan¬ gerous, infectious, or contagious disease. But it did appear that after being kept a long while in Lubbock and Cochian coun¬ ties Texas, south of the 36th parallel of north latitude, these cattle were shipped on the 20th day of June, 1901, to Denver, Colo¬ rado, on their way to their ultimate desti¬ nation in Wyoming, without being first in¬ spected as required by the statute of the former state. The provisions of the Colo¬ rado statute were ignored altogether as in¬ valid legislation. Being asked by one of the witnesses whether he had or not allowed the 187 U. S.

state board of sanitary inspection to inspect the cattle or whether or not he had procured from the state veterinary sanitary board a certificate or bill of health to the ef¬ fect that the cattle were free from all in¬ fectious or contagious diseases, the defend¬ ant said “that the state board of sanitary inspection, through one of their inspectors, had inspected the cattle against hi3 will and desire, but that he had not obtained from the board any certificate or bill of health whatsoever. But he said that he immedi¬ ately theretofore had had the cattle in¬ spected by a duly authorized inspector of the Bureau of Animal Industry of the United States, at Hereford, in the state of Texas, and had obtained a certificate from him to the effect that the same were free from any infectidus or contagious disease; that the reason he could not get a certifi¬ cate or bill of health from the state board of Colorado was because he would not pay the expense of such inspection, and because he had opposed such inspection as unneces¬ sary and without any warrant in law.”

When refusing his assent to the state in¬ spection, Reid showed to the state author¬ ities what he called a “United States cer¬ tificate.”

The certificate was signed by “Arthur C.

Hart, Ass’t Inspector, Bureau of Animal Industry.” That officer certified that he had carefully inspected the cattle in ques¬ tion at Hereford, Texas, and found them “free from Texas or splenetic fever infec¬ tion ( *boophilus bovis), or any other infec-

tious or contagious disease,” and that “no Texas fever infection is known to exist where they have been kept or on the trail over which they have passed.” Below the signature of the assistant inspector was the following unsigned printed memorandum: “Animals which have been inspected and certified by an inspector of the U. S. Bureau of Animal Industry, and are free from dis¬ ease, have the right to go into any state and be sold for any purpose, without further in¬ spection or the exaction of fees.”

The above, together with certain pub¬ lished regulations prepared and issued by the Bureau of Animal Industry, was all the evidence in the case.

The defendant asked the court to instruct

the jury: , , .

That it was unnecessary for the delena- ant to procure from the Colorado veterinary sanitarv board a certificate or bill of health to the effect that his cattle were free from infectious or contagious diseases, and had not been exposed at any time within ninety davs prior thereto, to any of said diseases, for the reason that the cattle had previous¬ ly been inspected, “according to the statute of the United States in such case made and provided, and according to the rules and regulations pursuant to said statute, pro¬ mulgated by the Department of Agricul¬ ture, by a duly authorized inspector of the Bureau of Animal Industry of the United States, stationed at Hereford, in the state of Texas, and had been duly certified by such United States inspector to be free from any infectious or contagious disease; and

141-144

Supreme Court or the United States.

Oct. Term.

for the further reason that he, the said de¬ fendant, then and there exhibited and showed to the said state inspector of Colo¬ rado the said inspection certificate of the United States to said cattle;” and,

That the Colorado statute, approved March 21st, 1885, and under which defend¬ ant was prosecuted, was repugnant to the provision of the Constitution of the United States giving Congress power to regulate commerce among the states, as well as to the provision declaring that the citizens of each state shall be entitled to all the privi¬ leges and immunities of citizens in the sev¬ eral states, and was null and void, as im¬ posing unnecessary and unlawful burdens and restrictions upon interstate commerce.

(142] *The court refused to so instruct the jury, but instructed them that if they believed from the evidence, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the defendant did, on or about the 20th day of June, 1901, that is, between the 1st day of April and the 1st day of No¬ vember of that year, “unlawfully bring or drive, or cause to be brought or driven, into the state of Colorado, and into the county of Arapahoe, the cattle as mentioned in the in¬ formation or any part thereof, from certain counties south of the 36th parallel, north latitude; and that said cattle had not been held theretofore at some place north of said parallel of latitude for a period of at least ninety days prior to the importation of said cattle into said state of Colorado; and that the said defendant had not procured from the state veterinary sanitary board of Colo¬ rado a certificate or bill of health, to the effect that said cattle were free from infec¬ tious or contagious diseases, and to the ef¬ fect that the same had not been exposed at any time within ninety days prior thereto to any of said diseases; and that then and there the said defendant did refuse and de¬ cline to procure, or permit anyone for him to procure, such certificate or bill of health, and did refuse and decline to pay or allow, or suffer or permit anyone for him to pay, the expense of any inspection so as by the act prescribed, — then and in that event it is your duty to find the defendant guilty as charged in this information.”

The contention here of the defendant is substantially that the subject of the trans¬ portation of cattle from one state to an- oher has been so far covered by the act of Congress known as the animal industry act of May 29th, 1884 (23 Stat. at L. 31, chap. 60, U. S. Comp. Stat. 1901, p. 299), that, after its passage, no enactment by the state upon the same subject was permissible; and that, even in the absence of legislation by Congress, the Colorado statute is invalid, in that, by its natural or necessary opera¬ tion, it unreasonably obstructs that free¬ dom of commerce among the states which the Constitution established. l*,ese ques¬ tions are recognized by the court as of great importance, and have received its most care¬ ful consideration.

Taking up the first branch of the defend¬ ant’s contention, let us look at the control¬ ling provisions of the above act of Congress, 112

•and ascertain whether that statute has the[143) scope and effect claimed for it.

The statute is entitled “An Act for the Establishment of a Bureau of Animal In¬ dustry, to Prevent the Exportation of Dis¬ eased Cattle, and to Provide Means for the Suppression and Extirpation of Pleuro¬ pneumonia and Other Contagious Diseases among Domestic Animals.”

By the 1st section the Commissioner of Agriculture is directed to organize in his de¬ partment a Bureau of Animal Industry, to appoint a chief thereof, who shall be a com¬ petent veterinary surgeon, and whose duty it shall be “to investigate and report upon the condition of the domestic animals of the United States, their protection and use, and also inquire into and report the causes of contagious, infectious, and communicable diseases among them, and the means for the prevention and cure of the same, and to col¬ lect such information on these subjects as shall be valuable to the agricultural and commercial interests of the country.” $ 1 (U. S. Comp. Stat. 1901, p. 299].

By the 2d section the Commissioner is au¬ thorized to appoint two competent agents, practical stock raisers or experienced busi¬ ness men familiar with questions pertaining to commercial transactions in live stock, whose duty it shall be, under the instruc¬ tions of the Commissioner, “to examine and report upon the best methods of treating, transporting, and caring for animals, and the means to be adopted for the suppression and extirpation of contagious pleuro-pneu- monia, and to provide against the spread of other dangerous contagious, infectious, and communicable diseases. ” § 2 [U. S. Comp.

Stat. 1901, p. 300].

The 3d section makes it “the duty of the Commissioner of Agriculture to prepare such rules and regulations as he may deem necessary for the speedy and effectual sup¬ pression and extirpation of said diseases, and to certify such rules and regulations to the executive authority of each state and territory, and invite said authorities to co¬ operate in the execution and enforcement of this act.” And “whenever the plans and methods of the Commissioner of Agriculture shall be accepted by any state or territory in which pleuro-pneumonia or other conta¬ gious, infectious, or communicable disease is declared to exist, *or such state or territory

shall have adopted plans and methods for the suppression and extirpation of said dis¬ eases, and such plans and methods shall be accepted by the Commissioner of Agricul¬ ture, and whenever the governor of a state or other properly constituted authorities signify their readiness to co-operate for the extinction of any contagious, infectious, or communicable disease in conformity with the provisions of this act, the Commissioner of Agriculture is hereby authorized to expend so much of the money appropriated by this act as may be necessary in such investiga¬ tions, and in such disinfection and quaran¬ tine measures as may be necessary to pre¬ vent the spread of the disease from one state or territory into another.” § 3 [U. S.

Comp. Stat. 1901, p. 300].

187 TJ. s.

Reid ▼. Colorado.

144-14©

In order “to promote the exportation of live stock from the United States,” the Commissioner was directed to “make spe¬ cial investigation as to the existence of pleuro-pneumonia, or any contagious, infec¬ tious, or communicable disease, along the dividing lines between the United States and foreign countries, and along the lines of transportation from all parts of the United States to ports from which live stock are exported, and make report of the re¬ sults of such investigation to the Secretary of the Treasury, who shall, from time to time, establish such regulations concerning the exportation and transportation of live stock as the results of said investigations may require” (§ 4 [U. S. Comp. Stat. 1901, p. 3183]); and that “to prevent the expor¬ tation from any port of the United States to any port in a foreign country of live stock affected with any contagious, infec¬ tious, or communicable disease, and espe¬ cially pleuro-pneumonia,” the Secretary of the Treasury was authorized to take such steps and adopt such measures, not incon¬ sistent with the provisions of the act, as he might deem necessary. § 5 [U. S. Comp. Stat. 1901, p. 3183],

By another section of the act all railroad companies within the United States, or the owners or masters of any steam or sailing vessel or other vessel or boat, were forbid¬ den to receive for transportation or trans¬ port from one state or territory to another, or from any state into the District of Co¬ lumbia, or from the District into any state, “any live stock affected with any conta¬ gious, infectious, or communicable disease, and especially the disease known as pleuro- [ 145] pneumonia ; nor shall *any person, company, or corporation deliver for such transporta¬ tion to any railroad company, or master or owner of any boat or vessel, any live stock, knowing them to be affected with any con¬ tagious, infectious, or communicable dis¬ ease; nor shall any person, company, or cor¬ poration drive on foot or transport in pri¬ vate conveyance from one state or territory to another, or from any state into the Dis¬ trict of Columbia, or from the District into any state, any live stock, knowing them to be affected with any contagious, infectious, or communicable disease, and especially the disease known as pleuro-pneumonia: Pro¬ vided, That the so-called splenetic or Texas fever shall not be considered a contagious, infectious, or communicable disease within the meaning of sections 4, 5, 6, and 7 of this act, as to cattle being transported by rail to market for slaughter, when the same are un¬ loaded only to be fed and watered in lots on the way thereto.” $ 6 [U. S. Comp. Stat. 1901, p. 3184].

Other provisions of the act are as fol¬ lows: ,

Ҥ 7. That it shall be the duty of the Commissioner of Agriculture to notify, in writing, the proper officials or agents of any railroad, steamboat, or other transportation company doing business in or through any infected locality, and by publication in such newspapers as he may select, of the exist ence of said contagion; and any person or 187 U. S. U. S. Book, 47.

persons operating any such railroad, or master or owner of any boat or vessel, or owner or custodian of or person having con¬ trol over such cattle or other live stock within such infected district, who shall knowingly violate the provisions of section 6 of this act, shall be guilty of a misde¬ meanor, and, upon conviction, shall be pun¬ ished by a fine of not less than one hundred nor more than five thousand dollars, or by imprisonment for not more than one year, or by both such fine and imprisonment.

[U. S. Comp. Stat. 1901, p. 3184.]

“§ 8. That whenever any contagious, in¬ fectious, or communicable disease affecting domestic animals, and especially the disease known as pleuro-pneumonia, shall be brought into or shall break out in the Dis¬ trict of Columbia, it shall be the duty of the commissioners of said District to take measures to suppress the same promptly and to prevent the same from spreading; and for this purpose the said commission¬ ers are ‘hereby empowered to order and re-

quire that any premises, farm, or farms where such disease exists or has existed, be put in quarantine; to order all or any ani¬ mals coming into the District to be detained at any place or places for the purpose of in¬ spection and examination; to prescribe reg¬ ulations for and to require the destruction of animals affected with contagious, infec¬ tious, or communicable disease, and for the proper disposition of their hides and car¬ casses; to prescribe regulations for disin¬ fection, and such other regulations as they may deem necessary to prevent infection or contagion being communicated, and shall re¬ port to the Commissioner of Agriculture whatever they may do in pursuance of the provisions of this section. [U. S. Comp.

Stat. 1901, p. 3184.]

“§ 9. That it shall be the duty of the sev¬ eral United States district attorneys to prosecute all violations of this act which shall be brought to their notice or knowl¬ edge by any person making the complaint under oath ; and the same shall be heard be¬ fore any district or circuit court of the United States or territorial court holden within the district in which the violation of this act has been committed.” [U. S. Comp.

Stat. 1901, p. 3185.] 23 Stat. at L. 31,

chap. 60 ( U. S. Comp. Stat. 1901, p. 299).

It may be here stated that by the act of February 9th, 1889, the Department of Ag¬ riculture was made one of the Executive Departments of the government, and placed under the supervision and control of a Sec- retarv of Agriculture (25 Stat. at L. 659, chap.* 122, U. S. Comp. Stat. 1901, p. 285), and that by the act of July 14th, 1890, the Secretary was vested with all the authority which by the above act of May 29th, 1884, was conferred upon the Commissioner of Agriculture. 26 Stat. at L. 282, chap. 707.

It is quite true, as urged on behalf of the defendant, that the transportation of live stock from state to state is a branch of in¬ terstate commerce, and that any specified rule or regulation in respect of such trans¬ portation, which Congress may lawfully prescribe or authorize, and which may prop- h Z1S

149-14S

Supreme Court of the United States.

Got. Term,

•rij bn deemed a regulation of such com¬ merce, is paramount throughout the Union. So that when the entire subject of the transportation of live stock from one state to another is taken under direct national supervision, and a system devised by which diseased stock may be excluded from inter- {147]state commerce, all 'local or state regula¬ tions in respect of such matters and cover¬ ing the same ground will cease to have any force, whether formally abrogated or not; and such rules and regulations as Congress may lawfully prescribe or authorize will alone control. Gibbons v. Ogden, 9 Wheat. 1, 210, 6 L. ed. 23, 73; Morgan’s L. d T. R. d 8. 8. Co. v. Louisiana Bd. of Health, 118 U. S. 455, 464, 30 L. ed. 237, 241, 6 Sup. Ct. Rep. 1114; Hennington v. Georgia, 163 U. S. 299, 317, 41 L. ed. 166, 173, 16 Sup. Ct. Rep. 1086; New York, N. H. d H. R. Go. v. New York, 165 U. S. 628, 631, 41 L. ed. 853, 854, 17 Sup. Ct. Rep. 418; Missouri, E. d T. R. Go. v. Haber, 169 U. S. 613, 626, 42 L. ed. 878, 882, 18 Sup. Ct Rep. 488; Rasmussen v. Idaho, 181 U. S. 198, 200, 45 L. ed. 820, 821, 21 Sup. Ct. Rep. 594. The power which the states might thus exercise may in this way be suspended until na¬ tional control is abandoned and the subject be thereby left under the police power of the states.

But the difficulty with the defendant’s case is that Congress has not by any statute covered the whole subject of the transporta¬ tion of live stock among the several states, and, except in certain particulars not in¬ volving the present issue, has left a wide field for the exercise by the states of their power, by appropriate regulations, to pro¬ tect their domestic animals against conta¬ gious, infectious, and communicable dis¬ eases.

An examination of the animal industry act will make this entirely clear. Three distinct subjects are embraced by that act. One is the ascertainment through the Agri¬ cultural Department of the condition of the domestic animals of the United States, the causes of contagious, infectious, or com¬ municable diseases affecting them, the best methods for treating, transporting, and car¬ ing for animals, the means to be adopted for the suppression and extirpation of such diseases, particularly that of contagious pleuro-pneumonia, and to collect such infor¬ mation on those subjects as will be valu¬ able to the agricultural and commercial in¬ terests of the country. Congress did not assume to declare that “the rules and regu¬ lations” which that Department might adopt as necessary “for the speedy and effec¬ tual suppression and extirpation of said dis¬ eases” should have in themselves, or apart from the action of a state, any binding force upon the states. They were to be cer¬ tified to the executive authority of each state, and the co-operation of such authori¬ ties in executing the act of Congress in¬ vited. If the authorities of any state 1 148] 'adopted the plans and methods devised by the Department, or if the state authorities adopted measures of their own which the Department approved, then the money ap¬

propriated by Congress could be used is conducting the required investigations, and in such disinfection and quarantine meas¬ ures as might be necessary to prevent the spread of the diseased in question from one state or territory into another. Congress did not intend to override the power of the states to care for the Bafety of the property of their peoples by such legislation as they deemed appropriate. It did not undertake to invest any officer or agent of the Depart¬ ment with authority to go into a state and without its assent take charge of the work of suppressing or extirpating contagious, infectious, or communicable diseases there prevailing, and which endangered the health of domestic animals. Nor did Congress give the Department authority by its offi¬ cers or agents to inspect cattle within the limits of a state, and give a certificate that should be of superior authority in that or other states, or which should entitle the owner to carry his cattle into or through another state without reference to the rea¬ sonable and valid regulations which the lat¬ ter state may have adopted for the protec¬ tion of its own domestic animals. It should never be held that Congress intends to su¬ persede, or by its legislation suspend, the exercise of the police powers of the states, even when it may do so, unless its purpose to effect that result is clearly manifested.

This court has said — and the principle has been often reaffirmed — that “in the applica¬ tion of this principle of supremacy of an act of Congress in a case where the state law is but the exercise of a reserved power, the repugnance or conflict should be direct and positive, so that the two acts could not be reconciled or consistently stand togeth¬ er.” Sinnott v. Davenport, 22 How. 227,

243, 16 L. ed. 243, 247. The certificate given to the defendant by Assistant Inspect¬ or Hart of the Bureau of Animal Industry was in itself without legal weight in Colo¬ rado. As said in Missouri, K. d T. R. Go. v. Haber, above cited: “While the states were invited to co-operate with the general government in the execution and enforcement of the act, whatever power they had to pro¬ tect their domestic cattle against such dis¬ eases was left untouched and unimpaired *by[149) the act of Congress.” Hence, it was decided in that case that the animal industry act did not stand in the way of the state of Kansas enacting a statute declaring that any person driving, shipping, or transport¬ ing, or causing to be shipped, driven, or transported into or through that state, any cattle liable or capable of communicating Texas or splenetic fever to domestic cattle should be liable to the person injured there¬ by for all damages sustained by reason of the communication of said disease or fever, to be recovered in a civil action. We there held that the Kansas statute did nothing more than establish a rule of civil liability^ in that state, affected no regulation of in¬ terstate commerce that Congress had pre¬ scribed or authorized, and impaired no right secured by the national Constitution.

Another subject embraced by the act of Congress related to the exportation from

187 U. S.

Reid v. Colorado.

149-151

ports of the United States to ports in for¬ eign countries of live stock affected with contagious, infectious, or communicable dis¬ eases, especially pleuro-pneumonia; and in relation to that matter the Secretary of the Treasury was authorized to take such steps and adopt such measures, not inconsistent with the act of Congress, as he deemed nec¬ essary. As the present case is not one of the exportation of live stock to a foreign country, it is unnecessary to consider what power, if any, remained with the states, after the passage of the animal industry act, to suppress or extirpate diseases that in fact affected live stock, which it was thp purpose of the owners to export.

Still another subject covered by the act is the driving on foot or transporting from one state or territory into another state or territory, or from any state into the Dis¬ trict of Columbia, or from the District into any state, of any live stock known to be af¬ fected with any contagious, infectious, or communicable disease. But this provision does not cover the entire subject of the transporting or shipping of diseased live stock from one state to another. The owner of such stock, when bringing them into an¬ other state, may not know them to be dis¬ eased; but they may, in fact, be diseased, or the circumstances may be such as fairly to flBOjauthorize the state into which *they are about to be brought to take such precau¬ tionary measures as will reasonably guard its own domestic animals against danger from contagious, infectious, or communica¬ ble diseases. The act of Congress left the state free to cover that field by such regu¬ lations as it deemed appropriate, and which only incidentally affected the freedom of interstate commerce. Congress went no farther than to make it an offense against the United States for any one knowingly to take or send from one state or territory to another state or territory, or into the Dis¬ trict of Columbia, or from the District into any state, live stock affected with infectious or communicable disease. The animal in¬ dustry act did not make it an offense against the United States to send from one state into another live stock which the ship¬ per did not know were diseased. The of¬ fense charged upon the defendant in the state court was not the introduction into Colorado of cattle that he knew to be dis¬ eased. He was charged with having brought his cattle into Colorado from cer¬ tain counties in Texas, south of the 36th parallel of north latitude, without said cat¬ tle having been held at some place north of said parallel of latitude for at least the time required prior to their being brought into Colorado, and without having procured from the state veterinary sanitary board a certificate or bill of health to the effect that his cattle, in fact, were free from all in¬ fectious or contagious diseases, and had not been exposed at any time within ninety davs prior thereto to any such diseases, but had declined to procure such certificate or have the inspection required by the statute. 187 U. 8.

His knowledge ias to the actual condition of the cattle was of no consequence under the state enactment, or under the charge made.

Our conclusion is that the statute of Colorado as here involved does not cover the same ground as the act of Congress, and therefore is not inconsistent with that act; and its constitutionality is not to be ques¬ tioned unless it be in violation of the Con¬ stitution of the United States, independent¬ ly of any legislation by Congress. The lat¬ ter question we now proceed to examine.

Certain principles are well settled by tha former decisions of this court. One is that the purpose of a statute, in whatever lan¬ guage it may be framed, must be determined by its natural #and reasonable effect. He»-[151) derson v. New York, 92 U. S. 259, 268, sub nom: Henderson v. Wickham,, 23 L. ed. 543,

its police regulations, whatever their ob¬ ject, unnecessarily burden foreign or inter¬ state commerce. Hannibal <£ St. J. R. Go. v. Husen, 95 U. S. 465, 472, 24 I*, ed. 527,

ers of a state cannot legitimately be exerted so as to defeat or impair a right secured by the national Constitution, any more than to defeat or impair a statute passed by Con¬ gress in pursuance of the powers granted to it. Gibbons v. Ogden, 9 Wheat. 1, 210, 6 L. ed. 23, 73; Missouri, K. & T. R. Co. v. Haber,

169 U. S. 613, 625, 626, 42 L. ed. 878, 882,

18 Sup. Ct. Rep. 488, and authorities cited.

Now, it is said that the defendant has a right under the Constitution of the United States to ship live stock from one state to another state. This will be conceded on all hands. But the defendant is not given by that instrument the right to introduce into a state, against its will, live stock affected by a contagious, infectious, or communica¬ ble disease, and whose presence in the state will or may be injurious to its domestic animals. The state — Congress not having assumed charge of the matter as involved in interstate commerce — may protect its peo¬ ple and their property against such dangers, taking care always that the means employed to that end do not go beyond the necessities of the case or unreasonably burden the exer¬ cise of privileges secured by the Constitu¬ tion of the United States.

Is the statute of Colorado liable to the objection just stated? Can the courts hold that upon its face it unreasonably obstructs the exercise of the general right secured by the Constitution to ship or send recognized articles of commerce from one state to an¬ other without interference by local author¬ ity? Those questions must be answered in the negative. The Colorado statute, in ef¬ fect, declares that live stock coming between the dates and from the territory specified are ordinarily in such condition that their presence in the state may be dangerous to its domestic animals; and hence the re¬ quirement that before being brought or sent into the state they shall either be kept at some place north of the 36th parallel of north latitude for at least ninety days prior to their importation into the state, or the

115

151-154

Supreme Coubt of the United States.

owner must procure from the state veteri- {152]nary sanitary board *a certificate or bill of health that the cattle are free from all in¬ fectious or contagious diseases, and have not been exposed to any of said diseases at any time within ninety days prior thereto. As there is no evidence in the case as to the practical operation of this regulation upon shippers of cattle, as it does not appear otherwise than that the statute can be obeyed without serious embarrassment or unreasonable cost, the court cannot assume arbitrarily that the state acted wholly without authority or that it unduly bur¬ dened the exercise of the privilege of en¬ gaging in interstate commerce. The ac¬ cused seems to have been content to rest his defense upon such grounds as arose upon the face of the local statute, without refer¬ ence to any evidence bearing upon the rea¬ sonableness or unreasonableness of the par¬ ticular methods adopted by the state to pro¬ tect its domestic animals. He seems to have been willing to risk the case upon the simple proposition — based upon the words of the state enactment and upon the act of Congress, reinforced by certain regulations made by the Agricultural Department — that the local statute was inconsistent with that act, and with the general power of Con¬ gress to regulate interstate commerce.

As, therefore, the statute does not forbid the introduction into the state of all live stock coming from the defined territory, — that diseased as well as that not diseased, — but only prescribes certain methods to pro¬ tect the domestic animals of Colorado from contact with live stock coming from that territory between certain dates, and as those methods have been devised by the state un¬ der the power to protect the property of its people from injury, and do not appear upon their face to be unreasonable, we must, in the absence of evidence showing the con¬ trary, assume that they are appropriate to the object which the state is entitled to ac¬ complish.

One other objection to the Colorado stat¬ ute must be noticed, namely, that it is in¬ consistent with the clause of the Constitu¬ tion declaring that the citizens of each state shall be entitled to all privileges and immu¬ nities of citizens in the several states. This position is untenable. The statute is equal¬ ly applicable to citizens of all the states. No discrimination is shown. No privileges are granted to citizens of Colorado that are {153]danied *to citizens of other states. Kim- mitih v. Ball, 129 U. S. 217, 222, 32 L. ed. 695, 697, 2 Inters. Com. Rep. 407, 9 Sup Ct. Rep. 277.

The principle is universal that legisla¬ tion, whether by Congress or by a state, must be taken to be valid, unless the con¬ trary is made clearly to appear; and as the contrary does not so appear, the statute of Colorado is to be taken as a constitutional exercise of the power of the state.

Perceiving no error in the judgment to the prejudice of the plaintiff under the Con-

Oot. Teem,

stitution of the United States, the judgment is affirmed.

Mr. Justice Brewer dissented from th*- opinion and judgment of the court.