ment can reasonably foresee that customers will cross state lines for the purpose of patronizing the illegal operation or whenever the operator actively seeks to attract business from another State. The first half of this proposed interpretation — reasonable foreseeability of interstate patronage — does not merit acceptance. Whenever individuals actually cross state fines for the purpose of patronizing a criminal establishment, it will almost always be reasonable to say that the operators of the establishment could have foreseen that some of their customers would come from out of State. So, for practical purposes, this alternative construction is almost as expansive as interpretations that we have already rejected. In addition, there is little, if any, evidence that Congress intended that foreseeability should govern criminal liability under § 1952.
There may, however, be greater support for the second half of the Government’s proposed interpretation — that active encouragement of interstate patronage violates the Act. Of course, the conduct deemed to constitute active encouragement must be more than merely conducting the illegal operation; otherwise, this interpretation would only restate other constructions which we have rejected. Still, there are cases in which federal courts have correctly applied § 1952 to those individuals whose agents or employees cross state fines in furtherance of illegal activity, see, e. g., United States v. Chambers, 382 F. 2d 910, 913-914 (CA6 1967); United States v. Barrow, 363 F. 2d 62, 64-65 (CA3 1966), cert. denied, 385 U. S. 1001 (1967); United States v. Zizzo, 338 F. 2d 577, 580 (CA7 1964), cert. denied, 381 U. S. 915 (1965), and the Government argues that the principles of those decisions should be extended to cover persons who actively seek interstate patronage. Although we are cited to no cases that have gone so far and although much of what we have said casts substantial doubt on the Government’s