shows that the court considered the factors “called into question by the case at hand and necessary to support the reasonableness of the fee award.” Id. at 500 n.1 (citing Stanford Daily v. Zurcher, 64 F.R.D. 680, 682 (N.D.Cal.1974), aff'd, 550 F.2d 464 (9th Cir.), rev’d on other grounds, 436 U.S. 547, 98 S.Ct. 1970, 56 L.Ed.2d 525 (1978)). See also Manhart v. City of Los Angeles, 652 F.2d 904, 907 (9th Cir. 1981).
The record here indicates that the court considered, applied, and discussed the Kerr factors necessary to support the award.5 Having reviewed the record, we are satisfied that the district court did not abuse its discretion in awarding the attorney’s fees requested.
Appellants urge this court to reduce the amount awarded because appellees “succeeded” on fewer than all of the original claims against fewer than all of the original thirty-two defendants, Sethy v. Alameda County Water District, 602 F.2d 894 (9th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1046, 100 S.Ct. 734, 62 L.Ed.2d 731 (1980), and because the attorney’s fees were disproportionately larger than the jury verdict. Schaeffer v. San Diego Yellow Cabs, Inc., 462 F.2d 1002 (9th Cir. 1972).
In Manhart, we construed Sethy and concluded that no attorney’s fees “may be paid for the time spent to prepare unrelated claims on which plaintiffs did not prevail.” 652 F.2d at 909, citing Sethy, 602 F.2d at 898 (emphasis added). We distinguished Sethy by pointing out that “plaintiffs [in Manhart] pursued several claims to remedy the same injury, gender discrimination.” 652 F.2d at 909. In Manhart, we concluded that if all claims are related to the same injury, then the amount of attorney’s fees should not be reduced for time spent on unsuccessful claims if plaintiff prevails in the ultimate goal of the lawsuit.
Like Manhart, the present case involves related claims brought to remedy the same injury — here, the violation of civil rights. The district court, therefore, properly awarded attorney’s fees for hours expended on unsuccessful but related claims. See also Seattle School District No. 1 v. Washington, 633 F.2d 1338, 1349-50 (9th Cir. 1980); Northcross v. Board of Education of the Memphis City Schools, 611 F.2d 624, 636 (6th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 447 U.S. 911, 100 S.Ct. 2999, 64 L.Ed.2d 862 (1980). This result is in line with Congress’ unequivocal viewpoint that civil rights attorneys should be compensated “as is traditional with attorneys compensated by a fee-paying client for all time reasonably expended on a matter.” S.Rep.No.94-1011, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 6 (1976), U.S.Code Cong. & Admin.News 1976, p. 5908, 5913. Traditional methods of attorney compensation based on fee-paying clients do not differentiate between successful and unsuccessful claims. See Northcross, 611 F.2d at 636.
In passing section 1988, Congress intended to provide access to the judicial system for those who wish to vindicate civil rights violations. Reducing attorney’s fees awards for unsuccessful related claims brought in good faith would militate against that policy and “would hardly further our mandate to use the ‘broadest and most flexible remedies available’ to us to enforce the civil rights laws if we were so directly to discourage innovative and vigorous lawyering in a changing area of the law.”6 Northcross, 611 F.2d at 636.
This decision is not affected by Bartholomew v. Watson, 665 F.2d 910 (9th Cir. 1982), which does not refer to our earlier
5
The district court carefully determined that:
6
This is especially true in the present case. Appellees brought suit in 1975, years before the Supreme Court declared that municipalities could be sued under section 1983. Monell v. Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658, 98 S.Ct. 2018, 56 L.Ed.2d 611 (1978).