Across the rear of the vehicle and extending to the sides of the main body thereof is a structure, the ends of which may be “collapsed [back into the body] when the machine is conditioned for road travel.” On this structure three platforms are provided for workmen who pack produce picked or cut by other, dismounted workmen into crates, after which the crates are transported into a refrigerated storage compartment at the front of the vehicle by means of a T-shaped conveyor system running in from the platforms to the center of the vehicle.
Allen teaches the use of heat-shrinkable, “breathable,” plastic film to encase produce “for preserving the nutritious and flavorable [sic] ingredients in freshly picked produce right up to the instant of eating.” The produce is heat-sealed'in the film and the film then tightly shrunk around the produce by immersion in hot water.
Payton discloses an apparatus for shrinking film wrappers around food by passing the wrapped units through a warm-air heating chamber.
Miller discloses a wrapping device comprising a roll of heat-sealable wrapping film, a wrapping table, a hot wire for cutting the wrapping material at the desired length, and a heat sealing plate.
OPINION
The machine disclosed by McLaren differs considerably in detail from appellant’s preferred embodiment, but we agree with the solicitor that, but for the plastic wrapping, the shrinking thereof, and the location of the actual crating operation, appellant’s claims may be read on McLaren’s device. Furthermore, we agree with the Patent Office that all the other elements of appellant's claims except the location of the crating operation are disclosed in the other references and that, if adapting the plastic-wrapping technology to McLaren’s mobile produce packing plant was obvious, the latter would be such a straightforward matter of design that no reference disclosing it would be required to make it prima facie obvious. However, the fundamental question in this case, which involves a combination of various elements known in the prior art, is whether the combination of the old elements would have been obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art at the time the invention was made.
Appellant argues that the references may only be combined through hindsight, using appellant’s own disclosure as a guide. The solicitor, on the other hand, relies on In re Winslow, 365 F.2d 1017, 53 C.C.P.A. 1574 (1966), for the proposition that a combination of features shown by references is legally obvious if it would have been obvious to “the inventor working in his shop with the prior art references — which he is presumed to know — hanging on the walls around him,” id. 365 F.2d at 1020, 53 C.C.P.A. at 1578, a statement made by the writer and limited by reference to “a case like this,” which limitation it is desired to emphasize. As we have often remarked, language* from an opinion should not be divorced from the facts of the case in which the language was used.
In Winslow we said that the principal secondary reference was “in the very same art” as appellant’s invention and characterized all the references as “very pertinent art.” The language relied on by the solicitor, quoted above, therefore, does not apply in cases where the very point in issue is whether one of ordinary skill in the art would have selected, without the advantage of hindsight and knowledge of the applicant’s disclosure, the particular references which the examiner applied. As we also said in Winslow, “Section 103 requires us to presume full knowledge by the inventor of the prior art in the field of his endeavor” (emphasis, except of “prior,” added), but it does not require us to presume full knowledge by the inventor of prior art outside the field of his endeavor, i. e., of “non-analagous” art. In that respect, it only requires us to presume that the inventor would have that ability to select and utilize knowledge from other arts reasonably perti