Robinson v. Tribe (Sept. 9, 2025)

Case details
Full caption
Shantell Robinson v. Oglala Sioux Tribe, et al.
Country
United States
Jurisdiction
Federal
Decided
Sept. 9, 2025
Disposition
Dismissed
SHANTELL ROBINSON, Plaintiff, v. OGLALA SIOUX TRIBE, et..., Slip Copy (2025) © 2025 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.12025 WL 2609573Only the Westlaw citation is currently available.United States District Court, W.D. Oklahoma.SHANTELL ROBINSON, Plaintiff,v.OGLALA SIOUX TRIBE, et al., Defendants.Case No. CIV-25-289-D|Filed 09/09/2025ORDERTIMOTHY D. DeGIUSTI Chief United States District Judge*1 Before the Court is Plaintiff Shantell Robinson's“Emergency Motion for Protective Order, Sanctions, andCourt Intervention Following Multiple Physical ProximityBreaches, Digital Manipulation, and Retaliatory SurveillanceBehavior” [Doc. No. 87].1 Defendants Wakpamni LakeCommunity Corporation (“WLCC”) and Raycen Raines(“Mr. Raines”) filed a joint response2 [Doc. Nos. 92-95].Defendant John Read (“Mr. Read”), also filed a response[Doc. No. 107]. Plaintiff filed a reply to WLCC and Mr.Raines' response [Doc. Nos. 96, 99, & 100]3 and a replyto Mr. Read's response [Doc. No. 112]. Before the Courtis also the Court's Show Cause Order [Doc. No. 89], andPlaintiff's “Response to Order to Show Cause” [Doc. No.90]. Additionally, before the Court is WLCC and Mr. Raines'“Motion for Protective Order and Injunctive Relief and forDismissal with Prejudice” [Doc. No. 101]. Plaintiff filed aresponse [Doc. No. 103], to which Defendants WLCC andMr. Raines filed a reply. [Doc. No. 113]. Plaintiff also fileda sur-reply [Doc. No. 117].4 The Motions are fully briefedand at issue.BACKGROUNDThis case is in its infancy, but has already accumulated over100 filings, with the vast majority filed by Plaintiff. TheCourt is mindful that Plaintiff is proceeding pro se, but shehas been informed and warned that she must comply withthe same rules as other litigants. [Doc. No. 59]. Moreover,the Court warned that if Plaintiff failed to adhere to therules governing litigation in federal court, then the Courtmay impose sanctions, “including dismissal of this case withprejudice.” Id. at p. 3.Despite the Court's warning, Plaintiff filed her Motion [Doc.No. 87], in which she requests the Court enter a protectiveorder against Defendants and their counsel. [Doc. No. 87].Plaintiff asserts that a protective order is necessary becauseMr. Raines was in Oklahoma harassing her in July 2025,which Defendants' counsel supported. Id.The Court ordered Plaintiff to show cause as to why herMotion did not violate Fed. R. Civ. P. 11 and the Court's May16, 2025 Order. [Doc. No. 89]. In response, Plaintiff defendedthe filing of her Motion and asserted that it “was submitted ingood faith, [and is] grounded in fact.” [Doc. No. 90, at p. 1].WLCC and Mr. Raines, as well as Mr. Read, filed responsesto Plaintiff's Motion in which they assert that Plaintiff'sallegations against them are false, and WLCC and Mr. Rainesrequest sanctions be issued against Plaintiff for misconduct.[Doc. Nos. 92 & 107]. In connection with their requestfor sanctions, WLCC and Mr. Raines filed a Motion forProtective Order and Injunctive Relief in which they elaborateon Plaintiff's misconduct—threatening correspondence, andfilings containing non-existent/misrepresented legal authorityand falsified exhibits. [Doc. No. 101], [Doc. No. 113, at p.4-7].*2 In response, Plaintiff denies that she made any threat tophysically harm any Defendant or their counsel, and objects tothe imposition of sanctions. [Doc. No. 103], [Doc. No. 117].STANDARD OF DECISION“It is well-established that a district court has broad ‘powerto manage its proceedings.’ ” Rusk v. Fidelity BrokerageServs, LLC, 2:15-cv-00853-RJS, 2019 WL 1922691, at *3(D. Utah Apr. 30, 2019) (quoting Sally Beauty Co., Inc. v.Beautyco, Inc., 372 F.3d 1186, 1191 (10th Cir. 2004)). TheCourt has inherent authority “to manage [its] own affairsso as to achieve the orderly and expeditious disposition ofcases.” Link v. Wabash R. Co., 370 U.S. 626, 630-31 (1962).Among these powers is also a court's “ability to fashion anappropriate sanction for conduct which abuses the judicialprocess.” Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S. 32, 44-45(1991). To be sure, “dismissal with prejudice is an essentialtool in the sanction toolbox.” King v. Fleming, 899 F.3d 1140,
SHANTELL ROBINSON, Plaintiff, v. OGLALA SIOUX TRIBE, et..., Slip Copy (2025) © 2025 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.21150 (10th Cir. 2018). “[B]ecause dismissal is such a harshsanction, it is appropriate only in cases of willfulness, badfaith, or some fault.” Xyngular v. Schenkel, 890 F.3d 868,873 (10th Cir. 2018) (quotation omitted). The party seekingdismissal must demonstrate sanctionable conduct by clear andconvincing evidence. Id. at 873-74.I. WLCC and Mr. Raines' Motion for Sanctions.WLCC and Mr. Raines assert that Plaintiff's conduct has beenso outrageous and in bad faith that the Court should sanctionPlaintiff by dismissing her claims with prejudice pursuant tothe Court's inherent authority. [Doc. No. 113].A. Defendants have Shown by Clear and ConvincingEvidence that Plaintiff's Willful Misconduct isSanctionable Conduct.i. Plaintiff's Threatening Correspondence.It is undisputed that Plaintiff and her purported agent,“consultant” Ryan Ferrari, sent the correspondence thatWLCC and Mr. Raines assert constitute threats of violence.However, Plaintiff argues that the correspondence are notthreats of violence. [Doc. No. 117]. The Court disagrees.The Court finds that Defendants have proven by clear andconvincing evidence that Plaintiff and her agent sent threatsof physical harm to Mr. Raines and Defendants' counselin connection with this case. Indeed, the Court finds thefollowing correspondence constitute threats of physical harm:July 20, 2025• 10:09 p.m.-Plaintiff's agent to Mr. Raines: “Does yourwhole world have to BURN. Think about all youhave built. Do you really want to through (sic) it allway (sic). I NEED AND (sic) ANSWER or OperationCROSSOVER ... Code name WATCHER TICK TOCKTICK TOCK.” [Doc. No. 93-1, at p.1].July 21, 2025• 11:08 a.m.-Plaintiff's agent to Counsel: “This will neverbe undone and all parties and their attorneys will notrecover.... Your clock is Ticking, I can hear it can you.Tick TOCK Tick TOCK.” [Doc. No. 95-4, at p. 16].July 22, 2025• 2:40 a.m.-Plaintiff's agent to Counsel: “P.S. if one of youfall you all get buried.” [Doc. No. 95-2].• 6:02 a.m.-Plaintiff's agent to Counsel: “Not only will youloose (sic) your license, you will be put in jail. Ms. Frostis the only one that can save you all.... Because of yourlack of trust you will burn.” [Doc. No. 95-1].*3 • 6:17 a.m.-Plaintiff's agent to Counsel: “Your (sic)safe for know (sic) provided you do the right thingtoday.” [Doc. No. 94-3, at p.1].July 23, 2025• 3:42 a.m.-Plaintiff to Counsel: “[Mr. Raines] does notscare me at all. If anything I am prepared to end his life ifhe invades my space or he will have to end mine becauseI will not back down EVER! ... You now HOLD all oftheir fate.” [Doc. No. 94-5, at p. 1].• 10:10 p.m.-Plaintiff to Counsel: “You guys are trackingme I'm tracking you.” [Doc. No. 94-8, at p. 1].Plaintiff attempts to justify these threats by couching themas part of a settlement negotiation tactic. [Doc. No. 99, atp. 1]. Taken as true, attempting to achieve a resolution of acase through threats of harm is also unacceptable sanctionableconduct.Accordingly, the Court finds that Plaintiff and her agents'threatening correspondence constitute sanctionable conduct.ii. Plaintiff's Submissions ofFabricated Evidence to the Court.Moreover, the Court finds that Defendants have provenby clear and convincing evidence that Plaintiff willfullysubmitted fabricated evidence to the Court. Indeed, to showthe Court that Mr. Raines was harassing Plaintiff in July2025, Plaintiff submitted a photo purportedly captured by anOklahoma surveillance camera depicting Mr. Raines drivinga vehicle. [Doc. No. 99-1, at p. 1], [Doc. No. 100-1, at p. 1]. Itwas not until after Defendants challenged the authenticity ofthe photo, that Plaintiff admitted it was not authentic. [Doc.No. 112]. Plaintiff also submitted to the Court documentscontaining Defendants' and their counsel's quoted statementsthat she allegedly digitally intercepted. [Doc. No. 87-1]. TheCourt ordered Plaintiff to show cause as to why her Motiondid not violate Rule 11. [Doc. No. 89]. In response, Plaintiff
SHANTELL ROBINSON, Plaintiff, v. OGLALA SIOUX TRIBE, et..., Slip Copy (2025) © 2025 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.3defended the filing of her Motion and asserted that it “wassubmitted in good faith, [and is] grounded in fact.” [Doc. No.90, at p. 1]. However, Mr. Read's counsel swears under oaththat the statements attributable to him never occurred. [Doc.No. 107-2, at p. 2]. Plaintiff provided no evidence rebuttingMr. Read's counsel's affidavit, and no evidence to support theveracity of the purported intercepted statements. Rather, sheattempts to recharacterize these submissions as demonstrativesimulations that she had “clearly distinguish[ed] betweenillustrative materials and sworn testimony.” [Doc. No. 117].As an initial matter, Plaintiff does not indicate anywhere in thefilings in which the exhibits were initially submitted that theywere strictly demonstrative or illustrative. Regardless, like aregular exhibit, a party submitting a demonstrative exhibitto the Court is certifying that it is based on truthfulness, notfalsehoods. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(b)(3) (A party to litigationcertifies with each filing that “the factual contentions haveevidentiary support or, if specifically so identified, will likelyhave evidentiary support after a reasonable opportunity forfurther investigation or discovery; ....”). Accordingly, thesubmissions of fabricated evidence are violations of Rule 11.The evidence clearly and convincingly shows that Plaintiffknew the photo and purportedly intercepted statements sheprovided to the Court were fabricated. Accordingly, theCourt finds Plaintiff's submissions of the fabricated evidenceconstitute sanctionable conduct.iii. Plaintiff's Submissions of Non-Existentand Misrepresented Legal Authority.*4 Many of Plaintiff's filings contain non-existent andmisrepresented legal authority. [Doc. No. 68, at p. 7 & 14-15],[Doc. No. 79, at p. 4-6], [Doc. No. 80, at p. 2], [Doc. No.103, at p. 2]. Plaintiff does not directly address the issue ofher filings containing non-existent and misrepresented legalauthority. Instead, Plaintiff attempts to reframe the issue byarguing that her use of artificial intelligence (“A.I.”) to assisther with this litigation is not prohibited. [Doc. No. 103, atp. 2].5 However, this is not the issue. The issue is whetherPlaintiff's submission of non-existent and misrepresentedlegal authority constitutes sanctionable conduct. The Courtfinds it does.A party's obligations under Rule 11 are not altered by thetechnology a party uses in preparing a filing submitted to theCourt. See Coomer v. Lindell, No. 22-CV-01129-NYW-SBP,2025 WL 1865282, at *3 (D. Colo. July 7, 2025) (“Courtsacross the county—both within the United States Court ofAppeals for the Tenth Circuit ... and outside of it—recognizethat Rule 11 applies to the use of artificial intelligence.”)(citing Wadsworth v. Walmart, Inc., 348 F.R.D. 489, 495 (D.Wyo. 2025); Mata v. Avianca, Inc., 678 F. Supp. 3d 443,461 (S.D.N.Y. 2023); Ferris v. Amazon.com Servs., LLC,No. 3:24-cv-00304-MPM-JMV, 2025 WL 1122235, at *2(N.D. Miss. Apr. 16, 2025) (quotations omitted)). A party'ssubmission to the Court constitutes a certification that “theclaims, defenses, or other legal contentions are warranted byexisting law or by a nonfrivolous argument for extending,modifying, or reversing existing law or for establishing newlaw.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(B)(2). “While courts afford pro selitigants considerable leeway, that leeway does not relievepro se litigants of their obligation under Rule 11 to confirmthe validity of any cited legal authority.” Sanders v. UnitedStates, 176 Fed. Cl. 163, 169 (2025).6 “ ‘A fake opinion is not‘existing law’ and citation to a fake opinion does not provide anon-frivolous ground for extending, modifying, or reversingexisting law, or for establishing new law.’ ” Coomer, 2025WL 1865282, at * 3 (quoting Mata, 678 F. Supp. 3d at 461).Accordingly, Plaintiff's submissions of non-existent andmisrepresented legal authority to the Court constitutesanctionable conduct.iv. Plaintiff's Submission of Excessiveand Frivolous Filings to the Court.The Court finds that Plaintiff's excessive and frivolous (andoften unhinged) filings also constitute sanctionable conduct.Indeed, despite the Court's prior warning [Doc. No. 59],Plaintiff has filed at least twenty-three ill-conceived motions,notices, and supplements. [Doc. Nos. 43-45, 47-48, 50-51,54-57, 72-73, 75-76, 80, 84, 86-87, 91, 97-98, 115]. Forexample, as evidence that Mr. Raines was harassing Plaintiff,Plaintiff proffered that she experienced:• Piercing pain through right hand palm and wrist (timedwith Slack transmission windows)[;]*5 • Burning, itching, and pressure in ears, ribs, and backof scalp—matching DOJ's “coded digital harassment”symptom matrix[; and]• High-anxiety mirror reactions from street-level lightchanges observed in real time.
SHANTELL ROBINSON, Plaintiff, v. OGLALA SIOUX TRIBE, et..., Slip Copy (2025) © 2025 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.4[Doc. No. 87, at p. 3]. Plaintiff elaborated thatthese symptoms meant there was a “deliberate physicalpresence, weaponized through shadow technology, spiritualmimicry, and surveillance synchronization, designed toforce psychological collapse or silent withdrawal.” Id.Consequently, the Court has stricken multiple of her filings.[Doc. Nos. 39, 72, 73, 75, 76, & 98].B. Dismissal with Prejudice is the AppropriateSanction for Plaintiff's Willful Misconduct.To determine whether dismissal or some lesser sanctionis appropriate, the Court must consider the following fivefactors:(1) the degree of actual prejudice to the defendant causedby the misconduct;(2) the amount of interference with the judicial process;(3) the culpability of the litigant;(4) whether the court warned the litigant in advance thatdismissal of the action would be a likely sanction fornoncompliance; and(5) the efficacy of lesser sanctions.King, 899 F.3d at 1150 (quotation and alteration omitted).i. Degree of Prejudice to Defendants“The more the misconduct prejudiced the opposing party,the more appropriate dismissal becomes as a sanction.” Id.at 1151. “[A] litigant who threatens to cause physical harmto another party or attorney has ‘defiled the very temple ofjustice’ and acted in bad faith.” Petito v. Brewster, No. 3-08-cv-0006-L, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18134, at *6-7 (N.D. Tex.Mar. 10, 2008). In litigation, a threat to physically harm theother party or their counsel is never acceptable.There is no question that Plaintiff's threateningcorrespondence caused great prejudice to Defendants. Herthreatening correspondence caused Defendants' counsel tofear for their safety, and Mr. Raines to fear for his life. [Doc.No. 101, at p. 9]. A party and their counsel should never haveto consider if the benefit of litigating a case outweighs the riskof the opposing party harming them. Plaintiff's conduct in thisregard was outrageous.Additionally, Plaintiff's excessive frivolous filings havecaused great prejudice to Defendants, causing them to incurunnecessary fees. Further, Plaintiff's misrepresentations andfabricated evidence have unnecessarily added to Defendants'fees and costs, as they have had to dedicate parts of severalfilings to address them.Accordingly, the Court finds that the significant prejudicePlaintiff's threatening correspondence, frivolous filings, andmisrepresentations have caused Defendants, weighs in favorof imposing sanctions against Plaintiff.ii. Plaintiff's Interference with the Judicial ProcessIt is hard to imagine how threatening to physicallyharm opposing parties and counsel would not interferewith the judicial process. Indeed, Plaintiff's threateningcorrespondence caused Defendants and their counsel to fearfor their safety in defending this action. [Doc. No. 101, at p.9].Moreover, Plaintiff's litigation conduct has unduly taxedthe Court's limited resources. The Court has expendedan inordinate amount of time reviewing her numerousfilings. Furthermore, by presenting the Court with fabricatedevidence and frivolous filings, which are riddled withmisrepresentations, Plaintiff has undermined the Court'sability to effectively manage its docket. See Park v. Kim, 91F.4th 610, 615 (2nd Cir. 2024) (“An attempt to persuade acourt or oppose an adversary by relying on fake opinions is anabuse of the adversary system.”) (quoting Mata, 678 F. Supp.3d at 461).*6 Based on these disruptions attributable to Plaintiff, theCourt finds that the second factor also weighs in favor ofimposing sanctions.iii. Plaintiff's CulpabilityAs to Plaintiff's threats of physical harm, Plaintiff is clearlyculpable. A pro se party “is not entitled to any latitudewhen it comes to threatening and inappropriate conduct.”Cameron v. Lambert, No. 07 CIV.9258 (DC), 2008 WL4823596, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 7, 2008). Indeed, a pro separty's “unfamiliarity with the legal process is no excuse forthreatening physical force ....” Id. In litigation there is nojustifiable reason to threaten to physically harm an opposingparty or their counsel.
SHANTELL ROBINSON, Plaintiff, v. OGLALA SIOUX TRIBE, et..., Slip Copy (2025) © 2025 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.5Furthermore, Plaintiff ignored the Court's warning aboutadhering to Rule 11. [Doc. No. 59]. Thus, her culpability forthe barrage of filings, submission of falsified evidence, andmisrepresentations of legal authority also favor the impositionof severe sanctions.Based on these disruptions attributable to Plaintiff, the Courtfinds that the third factor also weighs in favor of imposingsanctions.iv. Prior Warnings to PlaintiffThe Court finds that it need not warn a party that threateningto physically harm another party or their counsel may resultin sanctions, because such conduct is so outrageous and farbeyond the decorum expected of a litigant before the Court.Furthermore, the Court has previously warned Plaintiff thatfailure to abide by Rule 11 and her continuation of excessivefilings may result in sanctions, including dismissal withprejudice of her claims. [Doc. No. 59].7 Thus, the fourthfactor weighs in favor of granting sanctions as to Plaintiff'sthreats and frivolous filings, and her misrepresentations oflegal authority and submission of falsified exhibits.v. Efficacy of Lesser SanctionsAlthough “dismissal with prejudice is an essential tool inthe sanction toolbox,” the Court recognizes that “dismissalis a severe sanction and is not ordinarily warranted if lessersanctions would be effective.” King, 899 F.3d at 1150, 1153(quotation omitted). Although dismissal is among the harshestremedies, it has been found warranted in cases where partieshave threatened opposing parties or counsel with violence.See Beasley v. Hicks, No. 21-2317, 2022 WL 2828268, at *3(7th Cir. July 20, 2022) (affirming district court's dismissalwith prejudice of the plaintiff's lawsuit as a sanction under thedistrict court's inherent authority when the plaintiff threatenedto harm the opposing counsel at a deposition); Cameron, 2008WL 4823596, at *5 (dismissing the pro se plaintiff's complaintwith prejudice as a sanction under its inherent authoritywhen the plaintiff threatened to harm opposing counsel at adeposition). Indeed, “[d]eath threats directed at an opposingparty and a witness are sufficiently serious to warrant thesanction of dismissal.” Czajkowski v. Richardson, No. 23-CV-02240-SPB, 2024 WL 760095, at *2 (D. Colo. Feb. 5,2024), appeal dismissed, No. 24-1064, 2024 WL 4579388(10th Cir. Oct. 25, 2024) (citation omitted).*7 Furthermore, dismissal with prejudice is an appropriatesanction when the “evidence support[s] the need for anunforgiving sanction to deter future misconduct ... and to issuea clear statement to potential imitators.” King, 899 F.3d at1153-54. Indeed, “[d]ismissing a case with prejudice servesat least two purposes. It penalizes the party whose conductwarrants the sanction and discourages ‘those who might betempted to such conduct in the absence of such a deterrent.’” Jones v. Thompson, 996 F.2d 261, 266 (10th Cir. 1993)(quoting Nat'l Hockey League v. Metro. Hockey Club, Inc.,427 U.S. 639, 643 (1976)).Plaintiff has demonstrated no real intent to take heed ofand abide by the Court's warnings. The threats she andher agent have made to opposing parties and counselare outrageous, warranting the imposition of a terminatingsanction. Moreover, her otherwise abusive litigation tacticsand frivolous, unhinged filings compound the need forthe most severe sanction of dismissal with prejudice. Anysanction short of dismissal might incentivize future litigantsto similarly threaten violence against opposing parties andcounsel, or submit excessive frivolous filings that containfabricated legal authority and evidence. Moreover, becausePlaintiff is proceeding in forma pauperis, the Court findsthat a monetary sanction would be ineffective. Accordingly,dismissal with prejudice is the most appropriate sanction thatwould effectively cure the prejudice to Defendants, deterfuture misconduct, and punish Plaintiff for her wrongdoing.II. WLCC and Mr. Raines' Motion for ProtectiveOrder and InjunctionBecause the Court finds that Plaintiff's willful misconductwarrants the imposition of a sanction dismissing her claimswith prejudice, WLCC and Mr. Raines' Motion for ProtectiveOrder and Injunction requesting the Court impose restrictionson Plaintiff's correspondence regarding this litigation withDefendants and their counsel is rendered moot.III. Plaintiff's Motion for Protective OrderThe Court finds Plaintiff's request for a protective orderunsubstantiated. Plaintiff provided no credible evidence thatMr. Raines was in Oklahoma harassing Plaintiff in July2025. [Doc. Nos. 87, 96, 99, 100, 112, & 117]. The exhibitsPlaintiff proffered in support of her Motion are the sameaforementioned exhibits. [Doc. No. 87-1, at p. 1], [Doc. No.99-1, at p.1], [Doc. No. 100-1, at p. 1]. Accordingly, forthe same reasons that Plaintiff's submission of the exhibits
SHANTELL ROBINSON, Plaintiff, v. OGLALA SIOUX TRIBE, et..., Slip Copy (2025) © 2025 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.6support the imposition of sanctions against Plaintiff, they alsosupport denying her request for a protective order.CONCLUSIONIT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that DefendantsWakpamni Lake Community Corporation and Raycen Raines'“Motion for Protective and Injunctive Relief and forDismissal with Prejudice” [Doc. No. 101] is GRANTED INPART and DENIED IN PART as MOOT. Plaintiff's claimsare dismissed with prejudice and judgment shall be entered infavor of Defendants.IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff's “EmergencyMotion for Protective Order, Sanctions, and CourtIntervention Following Multiple Physical ProximityBreaches, Digital Manipulation, and Retaliatory SurveillanceBehavior” [Doc. No. 87] is DENIED.IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that because Plaintiff's claimsare dismissed with prejudice, the remaining pending Motionsin this case are DENIED as MOOT.IT IS SO ORDERED this 9th day of September, 2025.All CitationsSlip Copy, 2025 WL 2609573Footnotes1Citations to the parties' filings reference the CM/ECF pagination at the top of each page.2Defendants WLCC and Mr. Raines filed three separate declarations in support of their Response. [Doc. Nos.93-95]. The Court construes the declarations as exhibits to WLCC and Mr. Raines' Response [Doc. No. 92].3Plaintiff filed two declarations in support of her reply. [Doc. Nos. 99 & 100]. The Court construes thedeclarations as exhibits to her reply. [Doc. No. 96].4Although the Court did not strike Plaintiff's sur-reply, Plaintiff is reminded that pursuant to local rule 7.1(h)“[s]upplemental briefs may be filed only upon motion and leave of court.”5Notably, Plaintiff provides the Court with a non-existent quote from Henlsey v. Alcon Labs, 277 F.3d 535 (4thCir. 2002) to support her assertion that her use of A.I. in this lawsuit is acceptable. [Doc. No. 103, at p. 2].6Although Plaintiff is pro se, Plaintiff clearly understands her Rule 11 obligations and duty of candor to theCourt, as she has moved for sanctions against Defendants for allegedly violating Rule 11 by purportedlysubmitting false statements and “making representations to the court that are not grounded in fact orlaw.” [Doc. No. 119, at p. 3]; see also [Doc. No. 49-1 at p. 3] (Plaintiff citing Rule 11(b) in support of her claimthat Defendants made “[f]alse representations to the Court.”); [Doc. No. 80, at p. 2-3] (Plaintiff noting thatparties have a duty of candor and must not mislead the court).7Although the Court has not previously expressly warned Plaintiff of the range of sanctions possible forincluding non-existent and misrepresented legal authority in her filings, or attaching falsified exhibits, suchconduct as noted above violates Rule 11, about which Plaintiff has been previously warned. Moreover, a lackof prior warning does not prevent a court from imposing a terminating sanction. See Xyngular, 890 F.3d at874-75 (citing Rogers v. Andrus Transp. Servs., 502 F.3d 1147, 1152 (10th Cir. 2007) (noting that a warningunder the fourth Ehrenhaus factor “is not a sine qua non for dismissal.”)).End of Document© 2025 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.
ProvenanceKnow exactly where this document came from.Members see the sourcing behind every authority on DocPost — so you can check the record yourself and cite with confidence.Request access