S.A. v. RGR Global Logistics, LLC (June 23, 2026)

Case details
Full caption
Compania General de Combustibles S.A., et al. v. RGR Global Logistics, LLC, et al.
Country
United States
Jurisdiction
Federal
Decided
June 23, 2026
Disposition
Motion Denied
Majority
Nicholas J. Ganjei (J.) (unanimous Court)
Compania General de Combustibles S.A., et al., Plaintiffs, v. RGR Global Logistics, LLC, et al., Defendants.,Slip Copy (2026) WESTLAW   © 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.12026 WL 1799690Only the Westlaw citation is currently available.United States District Court, S.D. Texas, Houston Division.Compania General deCombustibles S.A., et al., Plaintiffs,v.RGR Global Logistics, LLC, et al., Defendants.Civil No. 4:25-cv-6020|Filed 06/23/2026Editor's Note: This document contains discussion ofunverified citations, likely generated by AI tools used by aparty or counsel. These citations are not attributable to theCourt. The unverified citations have been preserved as part ofthe official record, but links are unavailable.Attorneys and Law FirmsMichael Joseph Cummins, Gibson Robb & Lindh LLP,Emeryville, CA, William Sean O'Neil, W. Sean O'NeilAttorney at Law, Houston, TX, for Plaintiffs.Mark Joseph Dyer, Aileen Diaz Meador, Martin, Disiere,Jefferson & Wisdom, LLP, Dallas, TX, for Defendant RGRGlobal Logistics, LLC.Konor Andrew Cormier, Mehaffy Weber, Houston, TX, forDefendant Triton Transport, LLC.Kenneth Howard Tribuch, Chaffe McCall LLP, Houston, TX,for Defendant Cole International, Inc.Daniel John Gibson, Spring, TX, for Defendant Union PacificRailroad Co.ORDER DENYING MOTION TO DISMISS AND TOSHOW CAUSENicholas J. Ganjei United States District Judge*1 Before the Court is Defendant Union Pacific RailroadCompany's Motion to Dismiss. For the reasons set forthbelow, the motion is DENIED. Additionally, the CourtORDERS Union Pacific to provide to this Court by June29, 2026 a copy of the opinion in Missouri Pac. R.R. Co. v.Shiflet, 425 S.W.2d 662 (Tex. 1968), which Defendant citesin its Motion to Dismiss, along with an explanation as to howDefendant came to locate the case.I. BACKGROUNDThis case arises from a collision between a rail locomotiveowned and operated by Union Pacific and a tractor-trailer carrying Plaintiffs Compania General de CombustiblesS.A., Allianz Argentina Compania de Seguros S.A., andSudamericana Seguros Galicia SA's cargo, resulting in thedestruction of the cargo and its non-delivery. Doc. 1 at 5–6.Plaintiff sued Union Pacific for negligence. Id. at 6–7. UnionPacific now moves to dismiss for failure to state a claim uponwhich relief can be granted, arguing that Plaintiff's recovery ispreempted by the Carmack Amendment, that Plaintiff failedto plead sufficient facts to state a claim for negligence, andthat the economic loss doctrine bars Plaintiff's recovery. Doc.9 at 3–5.II. LEGAL STANDARDRule 8(a)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requires aplaintiff's complaint to provide “a short and plain statement ofthe claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Rule12(b)(6) allows the defendant to seek dismissal if the plaintifffails “to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.”Read together, the Supreme Court holds that Rule 8 “doesnot require ‘detailed factual allegations,’ but it demandsmore than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)(quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544,555 (2007)). To survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss,the complaint “must provide the plaintiff's grounds forentitlement to relief—including factual allegations that whenassumed to be true ‘raise a right to relief above the speculativelevel.’ ” Cuvillier v. Taylor, 503 F.3d 397, 401 (5th Cir. 2007)(quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555).A complaint must therefore contain “enough facts to statea claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Twombly,550 U.S. at 570. “A claim has facial plausibility when theplaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to drawthe reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for themisconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (citing Twombly,
Compania General de Combustibles S.A., et al., Plaintiffs, v. RGR Global Logistics, LLC, et al., Defendants.,Slip Copy (2026) WESTLAW   © 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.2550 U.S. at 556). This standard on plausibility is “not akin toa ‘probability requirement,’ but it asks for more than a sheerpossibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” Id. at 678(quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556).Review on motions to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) is narrow.The reviewing court must accept the well-pleaded facts astrue and view them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.Walker v. Beaumont Indep. Sch. Dist., 938 F.3d 724, 735 (5thCir. 2019) (citation omitted). However, courts do not acceptas true what are simply conclusory allegations, unwarrantedfactual inferences, or legal conclusions. See Gentilello v.Rege, 627 F.3d 540, 544 (5th Cir. 2010). The court mustalso generally limit itself to the contents of the pleadings andits attachments. Brand Coupon Network, L.L.C. v. CatalinaMktg. Corp., 748 F.3d 631, 635 (5th Cir. 2014).III. ANALYSIS*2 Plaintiff's claim is not preempted by the CarmackAmendment and therefore has stated a valid claim againstUnion Pacific. Where a carrier is responsible for damage tocargo, the Carmack Amendment provides the cargo ownerwith its exclusive remedy. However, when the damage iscaused by someone other than the carrier, as Union Pacificis alleged to have done here, the owner is free to pursuea state law claim against that tortfeasor. Furthermore, theComplaint contains sufficient facts necessary to plausiblyplead negligence under Texas law. Finally, the economic lossdoctrine does not bar Plaintiffs' recovery because they pleaddamage to their property in addition to economic losses.A. Carmack AmendmentUnion Pacific argues that the Carmack Amendment to theInterstate Commerce Act, 49 U.S.C. § 14706, preemptsPlaintiffs' recovery against them. Union Pacific is incorrectbecause the Carmack Amendment's preemption of state-lawnegligence claims does not apply to damage caused by a non-contracting rail carrier who is not liable under a shippingreceipt or bill of lading.The Carmack Amendment, which covers rail carriers andother motor carriers, requires such a carrier to issue a receiptbill of lading for property it receives for transportation. 49U.S.C. § 11706(a). Under the Amendment, a rail carrier orfreight forwarder is “liable to the person entitled to recoverunder the receipt or bill of lading” for actual loss or injury totransported property caused by either the receiver rail carrier,the delivering rail carrier, or another rail carrier over whoseline or route the property is transported. Id. The CarmackAmendment provides “the exclusive cause of action for lossor damage to goods arising from the interstate transportationof those goods by a common carrier,” preempting anystate law negligence claims against those same carriers. SeeHoskins v. Bekins Van Lines¸ 343 F.3d 769, 777–78 (5th Cir.2003).In the instant case, the Carmack Amendment does not applyto Union Pacific because Union Pacific was not transportingthe property that its train destroyed.1 See id. Union Pacificagrees that it was a “non-contracting railroad” and concedesthat Plaintiffs assert only a negligence claim, as opposed tothe Carmack Amendment claims, against the motor carriersinvolved in the crash. See Doc. 9 at 1–2. Because the CarmackAmendment does not apply to Union Pacific here, Plaintiffs'negligence claim against it is not preempted.B. NegligenceUnion Pacific argues that even if the negligence claim is notpreempted by the Carmack Amendment, Plaintiffs have failedto plead facts sufficient to establish negligence. Doc. 9 at 4–5. The Court disagrees.The elements of common law negligence are (1) a legalduty; (2) a breach of that duty; and (3) damages proximatelyresulting from the breach. Elephant Ins. Co., LLC v. Kenyon,644 S.W.3d 137, 144 (Tex. 2022). Plaintiffs have pleadedfacts to plausibly allege each element.Plaintiffs allege that Union Pacific is a railroad companythat operated a train and that it had a duty to exercisereasonable care towards Plaintiffs in that operation. Doc. 1 26. This is consistent with the duty of care imposed on railroadcompanies by Texas law. See Muniz v. Panhandle & Santa FeRy. Co., 285 S.W.2d 809, 815 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 1955,writ ref'd n.r.e.) (“Of course train operators are required touse reasonable care and prudence at such crossings.”); seealso So. Pac. Transp. Co. v. Luna, 707 S.W.2d 113, 117 (Tex.App.—Corpus Christi-Edinburg 1985) (holding that railroadcompany has duty of ordinary care) (citing Mo. K. & T. Ry.Co. v. Thomas, 28 S.W. 343, 344 (1894)), reversed on othergrounds, 724 S.W.2d 383 (Tex. 1987)).*3 Plaintiffs likewise allege that Union Pacific did not haveproper and required lookouts, did not operate the train at a safe
Compania General de Combustibles S.A., et al., Plaintiffs, v. RGR Global Logistics, LLC, et al., Defendants.,Slip Copy (2026) WESTLAW   © 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.3speed given the conditions, and failed to take the required andnecessary steps to slow down the train and avoid the collision.Id. This plausibly alleges that Union Pacific breached its duty.Finally, the Complaint plausibly pleads that Union Pacific'sbreach proximately resulted in Plaintiffs' damages bydescribing how Union Pacific's alleged failures caused afreight train to collide with the trailer carrying their property.Id. 27.C. Economic Loss DoctrineUnion Pacific claims that the economic loss doctrine barsPlaintiffs' recovery. Doc. 9 at 5. In Texas, a plaintiff may notrecover purely economic damages in actions for unintentionaltorts unaccompanied by personal or property injury. See LAN/STV v. Martin K. Eby Const. Co., Inc., 435 S.W.3d 234,235 (Tex. 2014). This doctrine additionally bars recovery for“economic loss resulting from bodily harm to another or fromphysical damage to property in which he has no proprietaryinterest.” Id. at 238.The economic loss doctrine does not apply here. Plaintiffsallege that their property, the shipment, was destroyed bythe train collision, and seek damages for its value. Doc. 1 27. Therefore, Plaintiffs are not merely seeking economicdamages, and their claim is not barred by the economic lossdoctrine.* * *The Carmack Amendment does not preclude Plaintiffs' statelaw negligence claim against Union Pacific because UnionPacific was not carrying Plaintiffs' cargo when the cargowas destroyed. Moreover, Plaintiffs have pleaded sufficientfacts about the train collision to render its negligence claimplausible. Finally, the economic loss doctrine is inapplicablehere. Plaintiffs have stated a claim upon which relief can begranted.IV. ORDER TO SHOW CAUSEIn its arguments on Plaintiffs' negligence claim, Union Pacificwrote “Railroads are entitled to presume motorists will obeytraffic laws” and cited to “Missouri Pac. R.R. Co. v. Shiflet,425 S.W.2d 662, 667 (Tex. 1968)” for this proposition. Doc. 9at 4. The Court, exercising due diligence, has been unable tolocate the above case. Neither the case name nor the reporterinformation yield results in Westlaw or LexisNexis, and thecase is not printed in the South Western Reporter. The Courttherefore has reason to believe that this case does not exist.Union Pacific is hereby ORDERED to provide the above caseto the Court, accompanied by a brief statement regarding thesearch engine or other tool(s) its counsel used to locate theopinion. Union Pacific shall provide this information no laterthan June 29, 2026. If counsel used artificial intelligence toaid in their legal research, they should explicitly state such.V. CONCLUSIONUnion Pacific's motion to dismiss is DENIED. Union Pacificis further ORDERED to produce the Missouri Pac. R.R. Co.v. Shiflet case which it citied in its Motion to Dismiss, and todo so no later than June 29, 2026.SO ORDERED.SIGNED at Houston, Texas, on the 23rd of June, 2026.All CitationsSlip Copy, 2026 WL 1799690Footnotes1In fact, Plaintiffs do not allege that Union Pacific is liable under the Carmack Amendment. See Doc. 1 26.End of Document© 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S.Government Works.
ProvenanceKnow exactly where this document came from.Members see the sourcing behind every authority on DocPost — so you can check the record yourself and cite with confidence.Request access