found Loewendick’s violation willful, assessing a $33,000 fine. Id., slip op. at 9, 16 O.S.H. Cas. (BNA) at 1959. Loewendiek petitions for review of the Commission’s order.
II.
We begin with the appropriate standard of review, which is both critical to our conclusion and a little unusual because of the unique relationship between the Commission and the Secretary. Each has distinct regulatory responsibilities under the OSH Act. See Martin, 499 U.S. at 147-48, 111 S.Ct. at 1174-75. The Secretary sets occupational safety and health standards, issues citations, and assesses fines for violations of OSHA regulations. 29 U.S.C. §§ 665, 658-659. The OSH Act gives adjudicatory powers to the Commission, a three-member body appointed by the President and confirmed by the Senate. §§ 651(b)(3), 661. Because the Commission’s powers are solely adjudicatory, the Secretary, not the Commission, has the authority to make enforcement decisions and to offer definitive interpretations of OSHA regulations. As the Supreme Court explained in Martin, Congress designed the Commission to be a “ ‘neutral arbiter’ ” possessing “the type of nonpolicymaking adjudicatory powers typically exercised by a court in the agency-review context.” Martin, 499 U.S. at 154-55, 111 S.Ct. at 1178 (quoting Cuyahoga Valley Ry. v. United Transp. Union, 474 U.S. 3, 7, 106 S.Ct. 286, 288, 88 L.Ed.2d 2 (1985)). Thus, for example, the Commission may not issue a citation that the Secretary has withdrawn. See Cuyahoga Valley Ry., 474 U.S. at 6-7, 106 S.Ct. at 287-88. For the same reason, the Commission must defer to the Secretary’s reasonable interpretations of OSHA regulations, even when the Secretary offers those interpretations for the first time during litigation before the Commission. Martin, 499 U.S. at 157, 111 S.Ct. at 1179 (“[T]he Secretary’s litigating position before the Commission is as much an exercise of delegated lawmaking powers as is the Secretary’s promulgation of a workplace health and safety standard.”).
Our review of Commission fact-finding and application of law to facts follows standard administrative law principles. We accept the Commission’s findings of fact if they are “supported by substantial evidence on the record considered as a whole.” 29 U.S.C. § 660(a). We accept the Commission’s other findings and conclusions if they are not arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or contrary to law. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (1994).
Well-known principles govern our review of agency interpretations of agency regulations. We owe “substantial deference” to the agency's interpretation, which has “ ‘controlling weight unless it is plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the regulation.’ ” Thomas Jefferson Univ. v. Shalala, — U.S. -, -, 114 S.Ct. 2381, 2386, 129 L.Ed.2d
405 (1994) (quoting Bowles v. Seminole Rock & Sand Co., 325 U.S. 410, 414, 65 S.Ct. 1215, 1217, 89 L.Ed. 1700 (1945)). Absent constitutional or statutory violations, the only circumstance in which we do not defer is where “an ‘alternative reading is compelled by the regulation’s plain language or by other indications of the [agency’s] intent at the time of the regulation’s promulgation.’ ” Id. at ---, 114 S.Ct. at 2386-87 (quoting
Gardebring v. Jenkins, 485 U.S. 415, 430, 108 S.Ct. 1306, 1314, 99 L.Ed.2d 515 (1988)). When considering orders of the Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission, we tailor our review to the distinct functions of the Commission and of the Secretary. Because the Secretary, not the Commission, is the policymaker, we defer to the Secretary’s interpretation, unless, of course, the interpretation is unreasonable or plainly contrary to the regulation’s language or purpose. See Martin, 499 U.S. at 156-57, 111 S.Ct. at 1178-79. According to Martin, we defer even where the Secretary offers his interpretation in the context of litigation before the Commission. See id. at 157, 111 S.Ct. at 1179 (“The Secretary’s interpretation of OSH Act regulations in an administrative adjudication ... is agency action, not a post hoc rationalization of it.”). We do not owe the same deference to interpretations independently offered by the Commission, which has no more authority to depart from the Secretary’s interpretations of OSHA regulations than do we. See id. at 154, 156, 111 S.Ct. at 1178, 1179. As we have explained, a review