compliance with the terms of our earlier remand, absence of substantial evidence to support the Commission’s findings, and failure to comply with statutory mandates. We find, however, that the Commission has fully complied with our earlier mandate and with the applicable statutes and that its findings are supported by substantial evidence. In view of the extensive powers delegated to the Commission and the limited scope of review entrusted to this court, it is our duty to deny the petitions.
I.
Congress has given the Federal Power Commission broad responsibility for the development of national policies in the area of electric power. In Section 4(e) of the Federal Power Act, 16 U.S.C. § 797(e) (1964), the Commission is authorized
“To issue licenses for the purpose of constructing, operating, and maintaining dams, water conduits, res-servoirs, power houses, transmission lines or other project works necessary or convenient for the development and improvement of navigation and for the development, transmission, and utilization of power across, along, from, or in any of the streams or other bodies of water over which Congress has jurisdiction *
There are statutory limitations on the issuance of such licenses. Section 10(a) of the Act, 16 U.S.C. § 803(a) (1964), requires
“That the project adopted shall be such as in the judgment of the Commission will be best adapted to a comprehensive plan for improving or developing a waterway or waterways for the use or benefit of interstate or foreign commerce, for the improvement and utilization of waterpower development, and for other beneficial public uses, including recreational purposes *
The Commission is now obliged also to consider the environmental factors covered by the National Environmental Policy Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321 et seq. (§ 1970).
In the Federal Power Act Congress granted the Commission “sweeping authority and a specific planning responsibility.” The Act “was the outgrowth of a widely supported effort on the part of conservationists to secure the enactment of a complete scheme of national regulation which would promote the comprehensive development of the nation’s water resources.” Scenic Hudson, supra at 613 and authorities cited there.
The scope of review of the Commission’s exercise of its authority and responsibility is narrowly limited. The Act, § 313(b), provides that “[t]he finding of the Commission as to the facts, if supported by substantial evidence, shall be conclusive.” 16 U.S.C. § 8251(b). In assessing the factual contentions raised in the petitions, this court’s authority “is essentially narrow and circumscribed.” Permian Basin Area Rate Cases, 390 U.S. 747, 766, 88 S.Ct. 1344, 1360, 20 L.Ed.2d 312 (1968). The licensing of projects such as the Storm King plant and the evaluation of their environmental impact has been entrusted to “the informed judgment of the Commission, and not to the preferences of reviewing courts.” Id. at 767, 88 S.Ct. at 1360.
The statutory standard of substantial evidence is “something less than the weight of the evidence and the possibility of drawing two inconsistent conclusions from the evidence does not prevent an administrative agency’s finding from being supported by substantial evidence.” Consolo v. Federal Maritime Commission, 383 U.S. 607, 620, 86 S.Ct. 1018, 1026, 16 L.Ed.2d 131 (1966). In a recent case involving these principles of court review, the Supreme Court said:
“Insofar as the Court of Appeals’ opinion implies that there was not substantial evidence to support a finding of some benefits, it is clearly wrong. And insofar as the court’s opinion implies that the responsibilities assumed by Gainesville in combination with the benefits found to accrue to Florida Power were insufficient to constitute ‘compensation * reasonably due,’ the Court of Appeals overstepped