Farms, Inc., 893 F.2d 919, 924 (7th Cir.1990);
Corcoran v. Chicago Park Dist., 875 F.2d 609, 611 (7th Cir.1989). In our review, we take the well-pleaded allegations of the complaint as true,
Reichenberger v. Pritchard, 660 F.2d 280, 282 (7th Cir.1981);
Janowsky v. United States, 913 F.2d 393, 395 (7th Cir.1990), and we consider the facts alleged in the light most favorable to the non-moving party.
Henry C. Beck Co. v. Fort Wayne Structural Steel, 701 F.2d 1221, 1223 (7th Cir.1983). The motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim must receive careful scrutiny and is not often granted.
See Rothner v. City of Chicago, 929 F.2d 297, 302 (7th Cir.1991) (citing
Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46, 78 S.Ct. 99, 101-02, 2 L.Ed.2d 80 (1957));
Kaiser Aluminum & Chem. Sales, Inc. v. Avondale Shipyards, Inc., 677 F.2d 1045, 1050 (7th Cir.1982).
We believe that the district court, which cited the rule requiring well-pleaded allegations, see Reichenberger, 660 F.2d at 280, and like cases, was applying the proper standard with respect to this general matter. Still, the court erred in concluding that the scope of CERCLA liability under the facts of this ease was strictly constrained by corporate limited liability principles. Of course, it is generally settled that the shareholders, directors and officers of a corporation are not liable for the obligations or delicts of the corporation.3 But several courts have held that, despite the apparent clash between CERCLA “owner” and “operator” responsibility and the shield protecting corporate officers and directors from responsibility for corporate violations, corporate officers and directors may well be liable as “operators” within the meaning of CERCLA. 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601(20)(A), 9607(a); see also, e.g., Riverside Mkt. Dev. Corp. v. International Bldg. Prods., Inc., 931 F.2d 327, 330 (5th Cir.1991) (“CERCLA prevents individuals from hiding behind the corporate shield when, as ‘operators,’ they themselves actually participate in the wrongful conduct prohibited by the Act.”); United States v. Kayser-Roth Corp., 910 F.2d 24, 26-27 (1st Cir.1990) (noting cases in which shareholders were held hable as “operators” under CERCLA); United States v. Northeastern Pharmaceutical & Chemical Co., 810 F.2d 726, 743-44 (8th Cir.1986) (holding that Congress intended CERCLA liability to attach to corporate officers).4 We agree that the direct, personal liability provided by CERCLA “is distinct from the derivative liability that results from ‘piercing the corporate veil ... ’ ” Riverside, 931 F.2d at 330 (citing Northeastern Pharmaceutical, 810 F.2d at 744). This view is consistent with both the language and the legislative history of CERCLA. As the court noted in John Boyd Co. v. Boston Gas Co., 775 F.Supp. 435 (D.Mass.1991), Congress had at least two important goals when it enacted CERCLA:
First, Congress intended that the federal government be immediately given the tools necessary for a prompt and effective response to the problems of national magnitude resulting from hazardous waste disposal. Second, Congress intended that those responsible for problems caused by the disposal of chemical poisons bear the costs and responsibility for remedying the harmful conditions they created.... These statutory goals indicate the corporate form alone will not shield entities that exhibit significant indicia of responsibility from CERCLA liability.
3
See, e.g., Main Bank of Chicago v. Baker, 86 Ill.2d 188, 56 Ill.Dec. 14, 21, 427 N.E.2d 94, 101 (1981); Gallagher v. Reconco Builders, 91 Ill.App.3d 999, 47 Ill.Dec. 555, 559, 415 N.E.2d 560, 564 (1980); see cf. Klein v. Board of Tax Supervisors, 282 U.S. 19, 24, 51 S.Ct. 15, 16, 75 L.Ed. 140 (1930) (Holmes, J.) ("[I]t leads nowhere to call a corporation a fiction. If it is a fiction, it is a fiction created by law with intent that it should be acted on as if true.").
4
On the other hand, courts have often been willing to vindicate limited liability principles in cases in which the plaintiffs fail to state with particularity their demand that defendants be held liable as owners or operators. See, e.g., Cash Energy, Inc. v. Weiner, 768 F.Supp. 892, 895 (D.Mass.1991) (complaint failed to state whether officers were being charged as “owners” or “operators” and upholding “corporate law principle” that officers must be personally involved to be liable); see cf. In re Acushnet River & New Bedford Harbor Proceedings, 675 F.Supp. 22, 34-35 (D.Mass.1987) (finding that corporate parent was separate from subsidiary for liability purposes despite fact that party alleged that subsidiary benefitted from parent’s accounting and financial planning systems).