Sifuentes v. Capital One, No. 25-4123 (District of Utah (D. UTAH) 2026)

Case details
Full caption
DAVID ANGEL SIFUENTES, III v. CAPITAL ONE
Country
United States
Jurisdiction
Federal
Court
District of Utah (D. UTAH)
Decided
2026
Disposition
Affirmed
Panel
Federico (Circuit Judge); Baldock (Circuit Judge); Murphy (Circuit Judge)
DAVID ANGEL SIFUENTES, III, Plaintiff - Appellant, v...., Not Reported in Fed.... © 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.12026 WL 322610Only the Westlaw citation is currently available.United States Court of Appeals, Tenth Circuit.DAVID ANGEL SIFUENTES, III, Plaintiff - Appellant,v.CAPITAL ONE, Defendant - Appellee.No. 25-4123|February 6, 2026Editor's Note: This decision contains discussion of citationreferences that are incorrect or do not actually exist. Theseinvalid citations appeared in the original court opinion andhave been preserved as written since they are part of theofficial record. Any links to these invalid citations have beenremoved.(D.C. No. 2:22-CV-00190-JCB) (D. Utah)Before FEDERICO, BALDOCK, and MURPHY, CircuitJudges.ORDER AND JUDGMENT*Richard E.N. Federico Circuit Judge*1 David Angel Sifuentes, III appeals pro se from thedistrict court's order denying his fourth motion for relief fromjudgment in his civil case. Exercising jurisdiction under 28U.S.C. § 1291, we affirm.IThis matter dates to March 2022, when Sifuentes filed hisComplaint in the District of Utah. He alleged that CapitalOne had prescreened him for a credit offer and then reliedon inaccurate information to ultimately deny his application,which caused his credit score to decrease. He additionallyalleged that the denial of credit caused him to become “verymad, embarrassed and very upset.” He argued these factsconstituted intentional infliction of emotional distress as wellas a violation of the Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA).The district court clerk's office assigned Sifuentes’ Complaintto a magistrate judge and directed Sifuentes to inform thecourt within 28 days whether he consented to magistratejurisdiction. Sifuentes filed a motion to appoint counsel,which the court denied. He did not, however, timely consentto magistrate jurisdiction. The case was thus reassigned toa district judge, with referral to a magistrate judge under 28U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B).Exercising referral jurisdiction, the magistrate judge screenedthe Complaint consistent with 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). Themagistrate judge found that Sifuentes had failed to state aclaim under either of the causes of action in his Complaint.He also found that Sifuentes had not pleaded facts sufficientto establish venue. He did not consider dismissal or transferon that basis. Instead, he granted leave for Sifuentes to file anamended complaint. The magistrate judge warned that failureto remedy the identified pleading deficiencies would result ina recommendation of dismissal.About a month later, Sifuentes moved to file an out-of-time consent to magistrate jurisdiction. He also requestedan extension of time to file an amended complaint. Thecourt granted both his requests and reassigned the caseto a magistrate judge. Sifuentes then filed his AmendedComplaint consistent with the extended deadline. TheAmended Complaint brought eight claims: for violationsof the FCRA, Federal Trade Commission Act, EqualCredit Opportunity Act, Telephone Consumer ProtectionAct, Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, and Michigan ConsumerProtection Act, as well as for negligent and intentionalinfliction of emotional distress.The magistrate judge – now exercising full jurisdiction overthe case pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c), Federal Rule of CivilProcedure 73, and Sifuentes’ consent – found the AmendedComplaint had failed to properly state a federal claim. Heconcluded that leave for further amendment would provefutile. He dismissed the federal claims with prejudice and,declining to exercise supplemental jurisdiction, dismissed thestate law claims without prejudice.Sifuentes then filed a multitudinous series of papersattempting to unmoor the court's holdings. He appealed theorder dismissing his Amended Complaint, arguing that thedistrict court could not have dismissed his state law claimswithout deciding whether he had diversity jurisdiction. Thiscourt concluded that his Amended Complaint did not pleadsufficient facts to establish diversity jurisdiction and affirmed
DAVID ANGEL SIFUENTES, III, Plaintiff - Appellant, v...., Not Reported in Fed.... © 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.2the dismissal. Sifuentes v. Capital One, No. 23-4088, 2023WL 6060382 (10th Cir. Sept. 18, 2023). He then filedthree successive motions in the district court for relief fromjudgment. The court denied these motions. He appealed theorder denying the second such motion to the Tenth Circuit.This court found his arguments had not been preserved andaffirmed the district court. See Sifuentes v. Capital One, No.24-4034, 2024 WL 4362257 (10th Cir. Oct. 1, 2024).*2 Sifuentes filed yet another motion in the district court,this time to withdraw his consent to magistrate jurisdictionand to vacate the judgment because the dismissal of hisAmended Complaint violated his rights to jury trial andequal protection. The district court construed this fourth post-judgment motion as a motion to reconsider its prior denialsof relief from judgment. It issued a memorandum order onSeptember 26, 2025, holding as follows:As the court has explained to Mr.Sifuentes on two prior occasions, thearguments [in] his current motioncould have been raised in his firstmotion for relief from judgment butwere not. Thus, his current motionis an inappropriate vehicle to raisethose arguments. Therefore, the courtDENIES Mr. Sifuentes's motion forrelief from judgment under Rule 60(b).As a final matter, the court notifies Mr.Sifuentes that if he files any additionalmeritless motions in this case, thecourt will consider imposing filingrestrictions upon him.R. at 132.The present appeal arises from the September 26 order.Sifuentes purports to present three issues in this appeal.First, he argues that the magistrate judge did not have“subject-matter jurisdiction” to decide his motion, which hecharacterizes on appeal as an attempt to “vacate the referenceof the case” to the magistrate judge. Op. Br. at 3. Second, heargues that the September 26 order is void ab initio becauseit was entered without jurisdiction. And, third, he argues thatthe magistrate judge erred by construing his “jurisdictionalmotion” as a successive motion for reconsideration.IIWe review de novo the district court's ruling on a Rule 60motion. United States v. Buck, 281 F.3d 1336, 1344 (10th Cir.2002). Because he appeals pro se, we hold him to a “lessstringent standard” than represented parties. Hall v. Bellmon,935 F.2d 1106, 1110 (10th Cir. 1991). We will not, however,“assume the role of [his] advocate.” Id.We begin with Sifuentes’ first argument on appeal. Sifuentesargues that the magistrate judge was not authorized by statuteto determine his own jurisdiction. But Sifuentes’ argumentis founded on apparently fabricated authorities. A search oflegal databases indicates that the U.S. District Court for theDistrict of Columbia did not decide a case in 2008 called “Inre Search of a Nextel Cellular Telephone.” Contra Op. Br. at3. The citation to the federal reporter supplied by Sifuentesretrieves a case of a different name that does not contain thelegal proposition for which it is cited. Additionally, Sifuentespurports to quote from Sinclair v. Wainwright, 814 F.2d 1516(11th Cir. 1987). See Op. Br. at 4. But the language fromSifuentes’ brief appears nowhere in Sinclair. He does nobetter with statutory authority. 28 U.S.C. § 636(c)(4) statesthat “[t]he court” – not the district judge, as Sifuentes claims– may “vacate a reference of a civil matter to a magistratejudge.”1It is axiomatic that “[a]n appellant must support his argumentswith legal authority.” Davison v. Comm'r, No. 24-9000,2025 WL 827693, at *3 (10th Cir. Mar. 17, 2025) (citingUnited States v. Banks, 451 F.3d 721, 728 (10th Cir. 2006)).But those authorities must actually exist and support thepropositions for which they are cited. When a party relieson nonexistent cases or cites to actual cases that do notstand for the propositions asserted, that party has failed toabide by Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 28(a)(8)(A).See Order to Show Cause, Amarsingh v. Frontier Airlines,Inc., No. 24-1391, slip op. at 8 (10th Cir. Sept. 5, 2025).Neither status as a pro se litigant nor the use of generativeartificial intelligence excuses violations of this rule. Id.; seeGarrett v. Selby Connor Maddux & Janer, 425 F.3d 836, 841(10th Cir. 2005) (stating Rule 28 “applies equally to pro selitigants” (citation omitted)). Even if Sifuentes had made acolorable legal argument – and he has not – this would besufficient grounds to dismiss his case. Moore v. City of DelCity, No. 25-6002, 2025 WL 3471341, at *3 (10th Cir. Dec.3, 2025).
DAVID ANGEL SIFUENTES, III, Plaintiff - Appellant, v...., Not Reported in Fed.... © 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.3*3 Sifuentes’ second issue presented, like the first, ispremised on a theory that the magistrate judge did not havestatutory authority to hear the case. So, for the reasonsexplained above, the second argument also fails.Sifuentes’ third issue presented is no more meritorious thanthe first two. He argues that the district court did not reachthe merits because it had incorrectly construed the motionas arising under Rule 60 rather than 28 U.S.C. § 636(c)(4).But Sifuentes is mistaken. Section 636(c)(4) does not createa procedural mechanism to unseat a final judgment. Thus,Sifuentes’ argument must be brought under the mechanismprovided by Rule 60. The court correctly declined to reach themerits. But Sifuentes’ motion would have failed on the meritsanyway.On the merits, Sifuentes’ argument is that the magistratejudge should have allowed Sifuentes to withdraw consentdue to “extraordinary circumstances.” See Op. Br. at 4. Thereis nothing extraordinary about Sifuentes’ circumstances.He consented to the magistrate judge's jurisdiction. Themagistrate judge found his complaint lacking. Sifuentes’amendments did not cure the problems with the pleadings.And now, having lost several times over, Sifuentes regrets thedecisions that brought him here. These are entirely ordinarycircumstances. As the magistrate judge rightly determined,the arguments that Sifuentes makes now could – and should– have been raised in prior briefing.Finally, we address Sifuentes’ stray argument that thedistrict court's “threat” of filing restrictions was an abuse ofdiscretion. Op. Br. at 6. It was not. For one, the district courtdid not take any action that we can review on appeal. Moreto the point, Sifuentes has spent years attempting to revivenon-meritorious claims with frivolous theories of law. Thedistrict court was right to warn Sifuentes that further meritlessmotions may result in filing restrictions.AFFIRMED.Entered for the CourtAll CitationsNot Reported in Fed. Rptr., 2026 WL 322610Footnotes*After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined unanimously that oral argumentwould not materially assist in the determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R.34.1(G). The case is therefore ordered submitted without oral argument.This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata,and collateral estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its persuasive value consistent with Federal Rule ofAppellate Procedure 32.1 and Tenth Circuit Rule 32.1.1We do not rule out the possibility that other authority might support Sifuentes’ argument. But Sifuentes hasnot cited such authority. Based on the arguments and authority that Sifuentes puts before us, we find no meritto Sifuentes’ contention that magistrate judges lack the power to rule on motions to withdraw consent.End of Document© 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.
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