Doc
Post
E-signatures
PlayMaker
Second Chair
Verbatim
Sign in
→
Request access
Sister City Logistics, Inc. v. Fitzgerald
(2025)
Case details
Full caption
Sister City Logistics, Inc. v. John Fitzgerald
Country
United States
Jurisdiction
Federal
Decided
2025
Disposition
Motion Denied
IN
THE
UNITED
STATES
DISTRICT
COURT
FOR
THE
SOUTHERN
DISTRICT
OF
GEORGIA
AUGUSTA
DIVISION
U.S
asTwcr
court
SOUTHERN
DISTRICT
OF
GEORGIA
SISTER
CITY
LOGISTICS,
INC.,
Plaintiff,
V.
JOHN
FITZGERALD,
Defendant.
*
■k
*
*
*
CV
124-148
JUN
2
7
2025
FILED
ORDER
Before
the
Court
are
Plaintiff's
motion
to
remand
(Doc.
5)
;
Defendant's
motion
to
compel
arbitration
and
stay
this
action
(Doc.
6);
Plaintiff's
motion
to
disqualify
Defendant's
counsel
(Doc.
8);
Plaintiff's
second
motion
to
remand
(Doc.
12)
;
Plaintiff's
motion
to
adopt
prior
pleadings
(Doc.
13);
Defendant's
renewed
motions
to
compel
arbitration
and
stay
this
action
(Docs.
22,
23);
and
Plaintiff's
motion
to
stay
(Doc.
25)
.
For
the
following
reasons.
Plaintiff's
first
motion
to
remand
(Doc.
5),
motion
to
disqualify
Defendant's
counsel
(Doc.
8),
and
motion
to
stay
(Doc.
25)
are
DENIED
AS
Plaintiff's
motion
to
adopt
prior
pleadings
(Doc.
13)
and
second
motion
to
remand
(Doc.
12)
are
GRANTED;
and
Defendant's
motions
to
compel
arbitration
and
stay
the
action
(Docs.
6,
22,
23)
are
DENIED
AS
MOOT.
Case
1:24-cv-00148-JRH-BKE
Document
34
Filed
06/27/25
Page
1
of
9
MOOT;
I.
BACKGROUND
On
a
Georgia
suit
in
the
State
Court
of
Richmond
County,
Georgia,
asserting
various
tort
and
breach
of
contract
claims
against
Defendant,
a
at
^'Deidre
on
of
(Id.
at
41.
)
On
August
2024,
Defendant
filed
a
of
removal
pursuant
to
28
U.S.C.
§§
1331,
1441,
and
1446.
(Doc.
1,
at
1.
)
On
August
30,
2024,
Plaintiff
filed
a
motion
to
remand
based
on
lack
of
federal
question
jurisdiction.
(Doc.
5.)
Deidre
Scott
again
signed
the
motion
as
Plaintiff's
^^Attorney-in-Fact."
(Id.
at
10.
)
On
September
5,
2024,
Defendant
filed
its
first
motion
to
compel
arbitration
and
stay
the
action
pending
arbitration.
(Doc.
6.
)
The
following
day.
Plaintiff
filed
a
motion
to
disqualify
Defendant's
counsel
due
to
conflicts
of
interest,
which
again
was
signed
by
Deidre
Scott,
Fact."
(Doc.
8,
at
11.
)
Plaintiff
did
not
respond
to
Defendant's
motion
to
compel
arbitration
and
stay
the
action.
On
September
9,
2024,
Attorney
Pierre
Ifill
(^'Attorney
Ifill")
appeared
on
behalf
of
Plaintiff,
and
on
September
12,
2024,
he
filed
an
amended
complaint
(the
''Amended
Complaint")
(Doc.
11),
a
second
motion
to
remand
(Doc.
12),
and
a
motion
to
adopt
Plaintiff's
prior
"pro
se"
pleadings
(Doc.
13)
.
Defendant
timely
Case
1:24-cv-00148-JRH-BKE
Document
34
Filed
06/27/25
Page
2
of
9
August
5,
2024,
Plaintiff,
corporation,
filed
Georgia
resident.
(Doc.
1-2,
1,
24-40.)
The
complaint
was
signed,
Scott,
Attorney-in-Fact,"
behalf
Plaintiff.
29,
notice
a
""^Attorney-in-
responded
in
opposition
to
Plaintiff
s
original
motion
remand,
to
remand.
(Docs.
14,
19,
21.)
In
response
to
the
Amended
Complaint,
Defendant
also
filed
a
renewed
motion
to
compel
arbitration
and
stay
)^
9,
2024,
the
day
before
Plaintiff's
to
motion
was
due.
Attorney
Ifill
filed
a
motion
to
stay
all
deadlines
due
to
the
effects
of
Hurricane
Helene
on
the
Augusta
area.
(Doc.
25,
at
1.
)
Then,
on
October
16,
2025,
the
Parties
jointly
filed
a
motion
for
an
extension
of
time
for
Plaintiff
to
respond
to
Defendant's
renewed
motion
to
compel
arbitration
and
stay
the
action,
as
well
as
to
reply
in
support
of
Plaintiff
s
second
motion
to
remand,
representing
that
the
extension
request
[d]
and
moot[ed]"
Plaintiff's
pending
motion
to
stay.
(Doc.
27,
at
27.
)
The
Court
granted
the
joint
motion,
extending
Plaintiff's
deadline
to
file
both
briefs
to
November
11,
2024.
(Doc.
28.
)
Accordingly,
Plaintiff's
motion
to
stay
(Doc.
25)
is
DENIED
AS
MOOT.
Despite
the
extension.
Plaintiff
made
no
further
filings,
and
on
November
19,
2024,
Attorney
John
Edward
Brown
(^^Attorney
Brown")
appeared
on
Plaintiff's
behalf.
(Doc.
29.)
On
March
5,
2025,
^
Defendant's
renewed
motion
to
compel
arbitration
and
stay
the
action
appears
on
the
docket
twice.
(See
Docs.
22,
23.)
Because
the
motions
are
substantively
identical,
the
Court
DENIES
AS
MOOT
the
first
entry.
(Doc.
22.)
Case
1:24-cv-00148-JRH-BKE
Document
34
Filed
06/27/25
Page
3
of
9
to
motion
disqualify
Defendant's
counsel,
and
second
motion
to
the
action
pending
arbitration.
(Doc.
23.
On
October
response
Defendant's
renewed
^'supersede
Defendant
answered
Plaintiff's
Amended
Complaint,
and
on
March
21,
2025,
Defendant
filed
a
notice
of
supplemental
authority
relevant
to
Plaintiff's
pending
motions
to
remand.
31.)
The
motions
are
now
ripe
for
the
Court's
review.
II.
DISCUSSION
The
Court
addresses
each
motion
in
turn.
A.
Motion
to
Adopt
Prior
Pleadings
The
Court
first
addresses
Plaintiff's
motion
to
adopt
its
prior
pleadings
improperly
filed
by
Deidre
Scott,
Fact."
(Doc.
13.
)
Plaintiff
represents
this
will
a
smooth
transition
of
legal
representation
while
preserving
Plaintiff's
claims"
and
will
not
prejudice
the
Defendant.
(Id.
at
2.
)
Defendant
does
not
oppose
the
motion.
It
is
well
established
under
both
Georgia
law
and
federal
law
that
an
individual
cannot
represent
a
corporation
^^pro
se."
Eckles
V.
Atlanta
Tech.
Grp.,
Inc.,
485
S.E.2d
22,
26
(Ga.
1997);
Palazzo
V.
Gulf
Oil
Corp.,
764
F.2d
1381,
1385
(11th
Cir.
1985)
.
Nonetheless,
the
Eleventh
Circuit
has
made
clear
that
pro
se
plaintiffs
who
attempt
to
incorrectly
represent
a
corporation
or
estate
should
be
given
an
opportunity
to
obtain
counsel
and
cure
any
deficiencies.
Iriele
v.
Griffin,
65
F.4th
1280,
1285
(11th
Cir.
2023);Palazzo,
764
F.2d
at
1386.
As
such.
Plaintiff's
motion
to
adopt
prior
pleadings
(Doc.
13)
is
GRANTED,
and
all
pleadings
Case
1:24-cv-00148-JRH-BKE
Document
34
Filed
06/27/25
Page
4
of
9
{Doc.
^^Attorney-in-
^^ensure
filed
by
Scott
are
hereby
adopted
by
Attorney
Ifill
as
counsel
for
Plaintiff.
B.
Motions
to
Remand
Because
they
raise
a
question
as
to
the
Court's
jurisdiction,
the
Court
next
addresses
the
two
motions
to
remand.
(Docs.
5,
12.)
As
a
preliminary
matter,
the
Court
assumes
Attorney
Ifill's
amended
motion
to
remand
(Doc.
12)
was
intended
to
supplant
the
original
motion
to
remand
(Doc.
5),
thereby
mooting
the
original.^
As
such,
the
original
motion
to
remand
(Doc.
5)
is
DENIED
AS
MOOT
and
the
Court
turns
to
the
merits
of
the
amended
motion
to
remand
(Doc.
12)
.
"Federal
courts
are
courts
of
limited
jurisdiction.
They
possess
only
that
power
authorized
by
Constitution
and
statute.
2
The
Court
notes,
however,
that
Attorney
Ifill's
communications
with
Defendant's
counsel
make
his
intentions
as
to
the
original
motion
to
remand
unclear.
(See
Doc.
14-1,
at
10.)
The
Court
therefore
takes
this
opportunity
to
address
a
troubling
issue
with
the
original
motion.
The
original
motion
to
remand,
filed
pro
se,
is
littered
with
non-existent
case
law
and
falsified
quotations
that
do
not
appear
in
the
cited
authorities.
(See
Doc.
5;
see
also
Doc.
14,
at
5-6
(providing
a
table
of
inaccurate
and
fictitious
references
in
Plaintiff's
original
motion
to
remand)
.)
The
Court
recently
imposed
Rule
11
sanctions
against
a
plaintiff
proceeding
pro
se
who
relied
on
sham
legal
authority,
and
the
Court
will
not
hesitate
to
do
so
again
if
it
finds
sanctions
are
warranted.
See
Nichols
v.
Walmart,
Inc.,
No.
CV
124-
236,
2025
WL
1178592,
at
*2
(S.D.
Ga.
Apr.
23,
2025)
(finding
dismissal
of
case
a
proper
sanction
for
plaintiff's
reliance
on
fake
case
citations);
see
also
O'Brien
v.
Flick,
No.
24-61529-CIV,
2025
WL
242924,
at
*6
(S.D.
Fla.
Jan.
10,
2025)
("Courts
that
have
addressed
the
practice
consistently
agree
that
the
use
of
fake
legal
authority
is
problematic
and
warrants
sanctions.")
.
Despite
his
communications
with
Defendant's
counsel,
the
Court
is
giving
Attorney
Ifill
the
benefit
of
the
doubt
by
assuming
he
did
not
intend
to
adopt
the
original
motion;
nonetheless,
the
Court
warns
that
any
further
use
of
fake
legal
authority
will
result
in
a
show
cause
order
as
to
why
the
culpable
party
or
attorney
should
not
be
sanctioned.
Case
1:24-cv-00148-JRH-BKE
Document
34
Filed
06/27/25
Page
5
of
9
Diedre
which
is
not
to
be
expanded
by
judicial
decree."
Kokkonen
v.
Guardian
Life
Ins.
Co.
of
Am.,
511
U.S.
375,
377
(1994)
(internal
citations
omitted)
.
As
such,
a
defendant
may
only
remove
an
action
from
state
court
if
the
federal
court
would
possess
original
jurisdiction
over
the
subject
matter.
28
U.S.C.
§
1441(a)
.
Federal
district
courts
have
jurisdiction
over
all
civil
actions:
(1)
under
the
Constitution,
laws,
or
treaties
of
the
United
States";
and
(2)
"where
the
matter
in
controversy
exceeds
the
sum
or
value
of
$75,000,
exclusive
of
interest
and
costs,
and
is
between
citizens
of
different
States."
28
U.S.C.
§§
1331,
1332.
On
a
motion
to
remand,
the
burden
of
establishing
federal
jurisdiction
is
placed
upon
the
party
seeking
removal.
Williams
V.
Best
Buy
Co.,
269
F.3d
1316,
1319
(11th
Cir.
2001)
.
It
is
well
established
that
removal
jurisdiction
is
construed
narrowly,
with
all
doubts
resolved
in
favor
of
remand.
Mann
v.
Unum
Life
Ins.
Co.
of
Am.,
505
F.
App'x
854,
856
(11th
Cir.
2013)
(citation
omitted)
.
In
evaluating
a
motion
to
remand,
the
federal
court
makes
its
"determinations
based
on
the
plaintiff's
pleadings
at
the
time
of
removal;
but
the
court
may
consider
affidavits
and
deposition
transcripts
submitted
by
the
parties."
Crowe
v.
Coleman,
113
F.3d
1536,
1538
(11th
Cir.
1997)
(citation
omitted)
.
Defendant
relies
on
federal
question
jurisdiction
as
grounds
for
removal.
(Doc.
1,
at
2,
4-6.)
Specifically,
he
argues
Count
IV
of
the
complaint
asserts
a
claim
for
retaliation
arising
under
Case
1:24-cv-00148-JRH-BKE
Document
34
Filed
06/27/25
Page
6
of
9
''arising
Title
VII
of
the
Civil
Rights
Act
of
1964.
(Id.
at
2-3.)
According
to
Defendant,
although
Plaintiff
does
not
expressly
identify
whether
the
claim
is
brought
under
state
or
federal
law,
^'the
allegations
in
Count
IV
make
clear
that
this
cause
of
action
arises
out
of
federal
law."
(Id.
at
3.
)
In
its
amended
motion
to
remand.
Plaintiff
argues
there
is
no
federal
question
jurisdiction
because
the
Amended
Complaint,
filed
September
12,
2024,
no
longer
includes
any
federal
claims.
(Doc.
12,
at
2.
)
Though
Defendant
originally
argued
Plaintiff's
deletion
of
its
federal
claim
from
the
Amended
Complaint
does
not
deprive
the
Court
of
subject
matter
jurisdiction,
it
has
since
acknowledged
the
Supreme
Court's
subsequently
published
decision
in
Royal
Canin
U.
S.
A.,
Inc.
v.
Wullschleger,
604
U.S.
22
(2025),
holding
otherwise.
(Doc.
21,
at
6;
Doc.
31,
at
2.
)
Removal
jurisdiction
on
federal
question
is
by
the
well-pleaded
complaint
rule.
Franchise
Tax
Bd.
v.
Constr.
Laborers
Vacation
Tr.,
463
U.S.
1,
13-14
(1983)
.
Under
the
well-
pleaded
complaint
rule,
''[o]nly
state-court
actions
that
originally
could
have
been
filed
in
federal
court
may
be
removed
to
federal
court
by
the
defendant
.
.
.
.
The
rule
makes
the
plaintiff
the
master
of
the
claim;
he
or
she
may
avoid
federal
jurisdiction
by
exclusive
reliance
on
state
law."
Caterpillar
Inc.
V.
Williams,
482
U.S.
386,
392
(1987)
(citations
omitted);
see
also
Merrell
Dow
Pharms.
Inc.
v.
Thompson,
478
U.S.
804,
808
Case
1:24-cv-00148-JRH-BKE
Document
34
Filed
06/27/25
Page
7
of
9
based
a
governed
n.6
(1986)
Jurisdiction
may
not
be
sustained
on
a
theory
that
the
plaintiff
has
not
advanced."
(citations
omitted))
.
In
line
with
this
principle,
the
Supreme
Court
recently
held
that,
"[w]hen
a
plaintiff
amends
[its]
complaint
following
[its]
suit's
removal,
a
federal
court's
jurisdiction
depends
on
what
the
new
complaint
says."
Wullschleqer,
604
U.S.
at
30.
Accordingly,
''[i]f
.
.
.
the
plaintiff
eliminates
the
federal-law
claims
that
enabled
removal,
leaving
only
state-law
claims
behind,
the
court's
power
to
decide
the
dispute
dissolves."
Id.
Wullschleqer
makes
clear
that
when
federal
question
jurisdiction
ceases
to
exist
under
a
complaint
upon
amendment,
so
too
does
supplemental
jurisdiction.
Id.
Here,
Plaintiff's
Amended
Complaint
removes
any
reference
to
retaliation,
eliminating
the
sole
federal
claim
upon
which
removal
was
anchored.
(Doc.
11.)
Accordingly,
in
light
of
the
Supreme
Court's
holding
in
Wullschleqer,
the
Court
no
longer
possesses
federal
question
jurisdiction,
nor
does
it
have
supplemental
jurisdiction
over
the
remaining
state
law
claims.
Plaintiff's
motion
to
remand
is
therefore
GRANTED,
and
all
motions
still
pending
in
this
case
(Docs.
6,
8,
23)
are
DENIED
AS
MOOT.
III.
CONCLUSION
Based
on
the
foregoing,
IT
IS
HEREBY
ORDERED
Plaintiff's
first
motion
to
remand,
motion
to
disqualify
Defendant's
counsel,
and
Case
1:24-cv-00148-JRH-BKE
Document
34
Filed
06/27/25
Page
8
of
9
Provenance
Know exactly where this document came from.
Members see the sourcing behind every authority on DocPost — so you can check the record yourself and cite with confidence.
Request access
