Stanford v. Leinart, No. 02-25-00529-CV (Northern District of Tex. (N.D. TEX) Apr. 2, 2026)

Case details
Country
United States
Jurisdiction
Federal
Court
Northern District of Texas (N.D. TEX)
Decided
Apr. 2, 2026
Disposition
Affirmed
Panel
Sudderth (C.J.); Womack (J.); Walker (J.)
Majority
Walker (J.)
In the Court of Appeals Second Appellate District of Texas at Fort Worth ___________________________ No. 02-25-00529-CV ___________________________ On Appeal from the 48th District Court Tarrant County, Texas Trial Court No. 048-366519-25 Before Sudderth, C.J.; Womack and Walker, JJ. Memorandum Opinion by Justice Walker JASON STANFORD, Appellant V. MARCUS LEINART, RICHARD ANDERSON, MIGUEL SERRANO-URDAZ, AND LEINART LAW FIRM, PLLC, Appellees
2 MEMORANDUM OPINION I. INTRODUCTION Following a federal district court’s order declaring him a vexatious litigant,1 Appellant Jason Stanford filed a pro se lawsuit against Appellees Marcus Leinart; Richard Anderson; Miguel Serrano-Urdaz; and Leinart Law Firm, PLLC (collectively, Leinart) in a Tarrant County district court. Leinart moved to have Stanford declared a vexatious litigant, and following a hearing, the trial court granted the motion. See Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. §§ 11.051, .053, .054. In seven appellate issues, Stanford, proceeding pro se, challenges the trial court’s order declaring him a vexatious litigant. He argues that (1) the federal vexatious-litigant order is void, (2) the trial court’s order is void because it relied on the void federal order, (3) the order does not comport with the Texas vexatious-litigant statute, (4) the order is an unconstitutional barrier to court access, (5) the order is overbroad and vague, (6) the order lacks required findings, and (7) Leinart committed fraud upon the court. We will affirm. 1See Stanford v. England Carrier Servs. LLC, No. 4:24-cv-00241-O-BP, 2024 WL 3732487, at *1 (N.D. Tex. Aug. 7, 2024), aff’d, 2025 WL 2978443 (5th Cir. Oct. 22, 2025).
3 II. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND In March 2024, Stanford filed a pro se complaint in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas against various trucking companies.2 Later that month, he also filed a document entitled “Joint Report Regarding Proposed Scheduling Order.”3 A federal magistrate judge questioned the report because no defendant had yet appeared in the case. Accordingly, after the defendants filed an answer, the magistrate ordered the parties to file statements explaining how the report had been prepared, who had filed it with the court, and whether it truthfully represented what it purported to represent. The defendants filed a statement explaining that none of them had agreed to the filed report nor would they have agreed to its contents. They further explained that none of them had authorized Stanford to sign their names on the report. Stanford did not file a response. The magistrate ordered Stanford to file a written response and appear for a hearing to show cause why he should not be sanctioned for filing a false and misleading document. Stanford did not file a written response or appear for the 2Earlier that month, Stanford had voluntarily dismissed a federal suit against the same trucking companies, explaining that he was dismissing the case “for refiling and correction of filing and clerical errors or the record.” 3The report purported to present the results of a February 9, 2024 teleconference between Stanford and the defendants. The report reflected that it had been “submitted” on February 22, 2024; however, Stanford did not file his complaint until March 4, 2024.
4 scheduled show-cause hearing. Instead, he filed a notice of voluntary dismissal of his claims without prejudice. On July 23, 2024, the day after Stanford filed that notice, the magistrate issued an order along with findings, conclusions, and recommendations to the district-court judge. The order stated that Stanford had “violated Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure by knowingly filing a false and misleading document among the papers in this case.” The order struck the report and admonished Stanford for filing a false and misleading document and for failing to explain the document and appear at the show-cause hearing as ordered. The magistrate’s findings included a recommendation to United States District Judge Reed O’Connor that the court should dismiss Stanford’s case with prejudice because “Stanford previously dismissed a ‘federal- or state-court action based on or including the same claim’ as claims in the instant suit[; therefore] the ‘notice of dismissal operates as an adjudication on the merits.’” In August 2024, Judge O’Connor accepted the magistrate’s findings and conclusions and issued orders dismissing Stanford’s case with prejudice and declaring him a vexatious litigant “due to the number of cases he ha[d] recently filed and due to his apparent attempt to deceive the Court.” In November 2024, Stanford filed a voluntary petition for relief under Chapter 7 of the United States Bankruptcy Code in the Northern District of Texas. Stanford retained Leinart to represent him in the bankruptcy proceeding. During this time, even though his claims against the trucking companies had been dismissed with
5 prejudice, Stanford continued filing pro se lawsuits against them. He also filed multiple related lawsuits against attorneys, law firms, and judges. In March 2025, Stanford filed a pro se lawsuit against the bankruptcy estate’s trustee and Leinart in a Tarrant County district court. He then filed notices of removal with the bankruptcy court to remove all claims and causes of action that had been asserted in the state courts.4 In response, Leinart moved to withdraw as Stanford’s counsel, and the bankruptcy court granted the withdrawal. In July 2025, the bankruptcy trustee moved to abandon Stanford’s claims against Leinart. The trustee’s motion noted that Stanford had commenced an adversary proceeding against Leinart for legal malpractice, breach of fiduciary duty, fraud, and civil conspiracy.5 The motion explained that the bankruptcy court had 4According to the U.S. bankruptcy judge’s memorandum opinion and order, Stanford had filed—before filing for bankruptcy—twelve different lawsuits in either state or federal court, including lawsuits against two Texas state court judges who had been assigned to his cases. After filing for bankruptcy, Stanford filed six different notices of removal with the bankruptcy court to “remove pending claims and causes of action from [six] of the state court cases.” The notices of removal had the effect of initiating six different adversary proceedings with the bankruptcy court. 5Stanford alleged that Leinart had “submitted false schedules and failed to amend those schedules in the chapter 7 bankruptcy case (causing incongruence with the chapter 13 case), depriving the estate of valuable claims against multiple third-party wrongdoers—including [the trucking companies].” In other words, Stanford argued that Leinart should have submitted bankruptcy schedules suggesting that his claims against the trucking companies had significant, recoverable value and that Leinart should be liable for damages owed by the trucking companies. Indeed, Leinart filed schedules with the bankruptcy court, but Stanford—while still represented by Leinart—filed pro se amended schedules that superseded Leinart’s previously-filed schedules.
6 required the trustee to express an opinion on the nature of the claims against Leinart, and the trustee opined that “the recovery based on damages, if any, [is] of inconsequential value to the estate.” That same month, Stanford filed another pro se lawsuit against Leinart in a Tarrant County district court, alleging the same claims from March 2025.6 Leinart filed an answer and moved to declare Stanford a vexatious litigant under Chapter 11 of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code. See id. §§ 11.051, .054. Leinart’s motion argued that Stanford had no reasonable probability of prevailing in the suit because (1) he sought the same damages allegedly owed by the trucking companies, which had already been denied with prejudice in federal court; (2) his theory that Leinart had “submitted false schedules” in his bankruptcy suit was mooted when he, acting pro se, filed amended schedules that superseded the previously-filed schedules; and (3) the bankruptcy trustee moved to abandon his claims because the “damages, if any, are of inconsequential value.” The motion further argued that Stanford’s lawsuit against Leinart was based on the same or substantially similar facts, transitions, or occurrences as his matter against the trucking companies in which the federal vexatious-litigant order was issued. Leinart explained that Stanford sought to recover the same damages against Leinart that he had sought 6Within thirty days of filing his original petition—and before Leinart had filed an answer—Stanford filed six more pleadings and motions, including a motion for summary judgment and motion for sanctions.
7 against the trucking companies and that those claims had been dismissed with prejudice. Leinart’s motion, among other things, included a copy of the federal vexatious-litigant order and the bankruptcy trustee’s motion to abandon Stanford’s claims against Leinart. Stanford responded to Leinart’s motion, arguing that the federal vexatious-litigant order was void.7 But before the trial court could hear Leinart’s motion, a Dallas County district court issued an order declaring Stanford a vexatious litigant. Leinart notified the trial court of the Dallas County district court’s vexatious-litigant order. On October 1, 2025, the parties appeared for a hearing on Leinart’s motion. That same day, the trial court signed an order declaring Stanford a vexatious litigant and requiring him to furnish security in the amount of $25,000 by November 1, 2025, to avoid dismissal of his claims with prejudice. Stanford then filed notice of an interlocutory appeal, challenging the trial court’s vexatious-litigant order.8 7His response also contained an apparent threat of further litigation: [Stanford] gives formal notice here that every lawyer, law firm, or defendant who invokes, advances, or otherwise relies upon the fraudulently applied vexatious litigant label in any current or future proceeding will be individually named as a defendant in a civil action for fraud upon the court, obstruction of justice, and—in the case of attorneys—legal malpractice and breach of fiduciary duty. This is not a hypothetical possibility; it is a 100% guarantee. 8Since filing his notice of appeal, Stanford has filed at least ten motions in this court—many of which were filed before Leinart filed its brief. His various filings include (1) motion and formal complaint of procedural avoidance and denial of access to court; (2) motion to vacate void vexatious-litigant designation and strike all
8 While the interlocutory appeal was pending, the trial court’s November 1, 2025 deadline passed without Stanford furnishing the required security. Consequently, Leinart moved to dismiss Stanford’s claims. The trial court granted Leinart’s motion and dismissed Stanford’s claims with prejudice. III. DISCUSSION As a preliminary matter, we address Leinart’s argument that we should summarily affirm the trial court’s vexatious-litigant order because Stanford has “waived any error on appeal due to briefing waiver by failing to comply with the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure.” To present an issue to this court, a party’s brief shall contain, among other things, a clear and concise argument in support of the contentions made, with appropriate citations to authorities and to the record.9 Tex. R. App. P. references from state records; (3) mandate to take judicial notice of adjudicated facts and orders in related proceedings; (4) motion to take judicial notice of controlling law and public-record materials demonstrating the voidness of N.D. Tex. No. No. 4:24-cv-00241-O-BP’s vexatious-litigant order; (5) motion to take judicial notice and give full faith and credit to bankruptcy court orders as conclusive adjudicative facts establishing breach of fiduciary duty, legal malpractice, litigation fraud, and conspiracy; (6) emergency motion for equitable and injunctive relief; (7) emergency motion to declare underlying judgment for lack of jurisdiction, suggestion of lack of jurisdiction, and request for immediate action under Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 2; (8) motion to take judicial notice of jurisdictional facts and void predicate orders in support of that rule; (9) motion for mandatory judicial notice of adjudicative facts reflected in the record and in other court orders and filings; and (10) motion for mandatory judicial notice of adjudicative facts pleaded in his reply to Leinart’s response to motion for mandatory judicial notice. 9Pro se appellants are held to the same standards as licensed attorneys and must comply with the applicable laws and rules of procedure; otherwise, pro se parties “would be given an unfair advantage over [parties] represented by counsel.” Mansfield
9 38.1(i). Unlike some of the pro se appellate briefs filed in this court that lack citations to authorities and to the record, Stanford’s brief facially provides citation to both. However, a review of his citations reveals that many of them misrepresent the record or misstate the law10—including by presenting fictitious authority.11 State Bank v. Cohn, 573 S.W.2d 181, 184–85 (Tex. 1978) (“There cannot be two sets of procedural rules, one for litigants with counsel and the other for litigants representing themselves.”); Flores v. Off. Depot, Inc., No. 02-10-00311-CV, 2011 WL 2611140, at *2 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth June 30, 2011, no pet.) (mem. op.); Strange v. Cont’l Cas. Co., 126 S.W.3d 676, 677–78 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2004, pet. denied). An appellant—whether pro se or represented by counsel—must properly present his appeal in accordance with the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure. Flores, 2011 WL 2611140, at *2; Strange, 126 S.W.3d at 678. 10As outlined in Leinart’s appellate brief, Stanford misstates the holdings of several cases. The following are but a few examples of his misstatements: • Stanford quotes Cook v. Cameron, 733 S.W.2d 137, 140 (Tex. 1987); and State ex. rel. Latty v. Owens, 907 S.W.2d 484, 486 (Tex. 1995) as follows: “A judgment rendered without jurisdiction is a nullity and may be attacked at any time”—but neither of these cases include the quoted language. • Stanford’s purported quote from Yesh Music v. Lakewood Church, 727 F.3d 356, 362–63 (5th Cir. 2013), on page one of his brief does not appear within that opinion, nor does Yesh Music cite to Williams v. Ezell, 531 F.2d 1261 (5th Cir. 1976), as he represents. • Stanford quotes Valley v. Rapides Parish Sch. Bd., 118 F.3d 1047, 1050 (5th Cir. 1997), as stating “[a] void judgment cannot be given preclusive effect in another tribunal.” This quote appears nowhere in the opinion. See id. • Stanford cites In re K.A.F., 160 S.W.3d 923, 928 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2005, no pet.) for the proposition that “Texas appellate courts bear a non-discretionary obligation to vacate void orders sua sponte.” But that opinion deals only with the timeline for perfecting an appeal in a termination of parental rights case and does not include the words “non-discretionary,” “vacate,” “void,” or “sua sponte.” Id.
10 Leinart asserts that “Stanford has failed to comply with the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure because his Appellant’s Brief fails to set forth cogent arguments with supporting legal authority and relevant record citations, and he has also repeatedly misrepresented the record and both misquoted and misrepresented the holdings of key case authority.” Leinart thus argues that we should conclude that Stanford has waived his issues on appeal and affirm the trial court’s order. We agree that Stanford’s briefing is inadequate and that his gross misrepresentations of the record and misstatements of the law are unacceptable,12 but 11On page eighteen of his appellate brief, Stanford cites to Anderson v. Hood, 472 S.W.3d 524, 529 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2015, no pet.). “Anderson v. Hood” is a fabricated case and appears to be a “hallucinated” authority generated from the use of artificial intelligence. Our review of the citation leads to King v. Commonwealth, 472 S.W.3d 523 (Ky. Ct. App. 2015), and the only case with a comparable name is Anderson v. Hood Cnty., 958 S.W.2d 448 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 1997, no pet.)—a workers’ compensation case. “[C]itation of nonexistent cases that appear to have been generated by [artificial intelligence] is unacceptable.” Albelbaisi v. Mustang Materials, LLC, No. 05-24-00617-CV, 2025 WL 1384772, at *2 (Tex. App.—Dallas May 13, 2025, no pet.) (mem. op.). 12The federal magistrate’s July 23, 2024 order warned Stanford against such conduct. The order provides: The Court ADMONISHES Mr. Stanford for filing a false and misleading document with this Court. Attempting to deceive the Court is an abuse of the judicial process and the very opposite of the good faith participation on which the justice system depends. The Court also ADMONISHES Mr. Stanford for failing to explain this document and appear at a hearing as ordered. Such behavior is highly disrespectful to the Court and counterproductive to the litigation process. Accordingly, Plaintiff Jason Stanford is ORDERED not to file misleading documents with the Court in the future, or further sanctions may issue, including but not limited to monetary sanctions.
11 we attempt to “reach the merits of an appeal whenever reasonably possible.” Perry v. Cohen, 272 S.W.3d 585, 587 (Tex. 2008). Because we can ascertain the issues he intends to present for our review, we will reach the merits of Stanford’s appeal. A. THE FEDERAL VEXATIOUS-LITIGANT ORDER In his first issue, Stanford argues that the federal vexatious-litigant order is void because he voluntarily dismissed the federal complaint and “immediately divested the federal court of subject-matter and personal jurisdiction.” We lack jurisdiction to review the federal order. We do not have jurisdiction to disturb the rulings of federal judges. See Tex. Gov’t Code Ann. §§ 22.201(c), 22.220(a) (“Each court of appeals has appellate jurisdiction of all civil cases within its district of which the district courts or county courts have jurisdiction when the amount in controversy or the judgment rendered exceeds $250, exclusive of interest and costs.”); see also In re Murphy, No. 08-02-00172-CR, 2002 WL 1729945, at *1 (Tex. App.—El Paso July 25, 2002, orig. proceeding) (mem. op.) (“It is axiomatic that this Court lacks the authority to entertain [relator’s] petition because it cannot review decisions of the federal courts.”); Cuellar v. Livingston, No. 03-13-00304-CV, 2013 WL 4516142, at *1 (Tex. App.—Austin Aug. 22, 2013, no pet.) (mem. op.) (“We may only exercise jurisdiction over causes that arise out of the Stanford has seemingly elected to disregard the magistrate’s admonishment by filing a document—his appellate brief—that contains misleading content with this court.
12 State-level district or county courts within our district and are without jurisdiction over the federal courts.”). Accordingly, we hold that we lack jurisdiction over this issue because Stanford seeks review of a federal order.13 We overrule Stanford’s first issue. B. THE STATE VEXATIOUS-LITIGANT ORDERS In his second issue, Stanford contends that “the Dallas County and Tarrant County vexatious-litigant orders are likewise void in all aspects because they rest entirely upon the void federal findings.” 1. Dallas County’s Vexatious-Litigant Order Stanford seeks our review of the Dallas County vexatious-litigant order. We lack jurisdiction to review the Dallas County order. As noted, “each court of appeals has appellate jurisdiction of all civil cases within its district of which the district courts or county courts have jurisdiction when the amount in controversy or the judgment rendered exceeds $250, exclusive of interest and costs.” Tex. Gov’t Code Ann. § 22.220(a). This court—the Second Court of Appeals—“is composed of the counties of Archer, Clay, Cooke, Denton, Hood, Jack, Montague, Parker, Tarrant, Wichita, Wise, and Young.” Id. § 22.201(c). 13Contrary to his argument, the federal vexatious-litigant order is not void—it was affirmed by the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit. Stanford v. England Carrier Servs., L.L.C., No. 25-10483, 2025 WL 2978443, at *1 (5th Cir. Oct. 22, 2025) (“After reviewing the parties’ briefs and the record, we find no reversible error. We AFFIRM.”).
13 Dallas County is not located in our appellate district, and thus, we do not have jurisdiction to review an order from a Dallas County district court.14 See id. 2. Tarrant County’s Vexatious-Litigant Order Stanford argues that the Tarrant County vexatious-litigant order is void because it relied upon a “void federal finding.” Notwithstanding his representation to this court, the federal vexatious-litigant order is not void. See Stanford, 2025 WL 2978443, at *1. Because the federal order is not void, we conclude that this argument lacks merit.15 We overrule Stanford’s second issue. C. THE TRIAL COURT’S FINDINGS In his third issue, Stanford maintains that the “Dallas County order (DC-25-13688)[16] and the Tarrant County order (048-366519-25) are invalid because neither 14Stanford appealed the Dallas County vexatious-litigant order to the appropriate appellate court—the Fifth Court of Appeals in Dallas. See Stanford v. Last, No. 05-25-01295-CV, 2025 WL 3757207, at *1 (Tex. App.—Dallas Dec. 29, 2025, no pet.) (mem. op.). The Dallas court dismissed the appeal following Stanford’s failure to file an appellate brief. Id. 15He also alleges that the Tarrant County order “irreconcilably conflicts with the conclusive judicial findings rendered” in the federal bankruptcy proceeding. But he has inadequately briefed this complaint because he made no citation to the record to support the allegation. See Tex. R. App. P. 38(i). 16As noted, we do not have jurisdiction to review the Dallas County order. Accordingly, we will not address this part of Stanford’s third issue.
14 order makes or recites the mandatory findings required by Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code §§ 11.053–.055.” 1. Law on Vexatious Litigants Chapter 11 of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code provides that a “defendant may, on or before the 90th day after the date the defendant files [its] original answer or makes a special appearance, move the court for an order[ ] (1) determining that the plaintiff is a vexatious litigant[ ] and (2) requiring the plaintiff to furnish security.” Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 11.051. If the trial court determines that the plaintiff is a vexatious litigant after a hearing, there are then two methods of controlling his behavior. See Dunlap v. City of Fort Worth, No. 02-21-00130-CV, 2021 WL 5028767, at *3 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Oct. 28, 2021, no pet.) (mem. op.). Here, the trial court’s order used both methods. Under the first method, the trial court shall order “the plaintiff to furnish security for the benefit of the moving defendant” and then “determine the date by which the security must be furnished.” Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. §§ 11.051, .053, .055(a), (b). If the plaintiff fails to timely post the security, the trial court is required to dismiss “litigation as to a moving defendant.” Id. § 11.056. With the second method, the trial court may “enter an order prohibiting a person from filing, pro se, a new litigation in a court to which the order applies under this section without permission of the appropriate local administrative judge.”
15 Id. § 11.101. A prefiling order entered by a district court applies to each court in this state. See id. § 11.101(e). 2. Standard of Review and Applicable Law We review the trial court’s finding that a litigant is vexatious under an abuse of discretion standard. Dunlap, 2021 WL 5028767, at *4; Amrhein v. Bollinger, 593 S.W.3d 398, 404 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2019, no pet.). Under this standard, we are not permitted to simply substitute our judgment for that of the trial court: On an abuse of discretion challenge, we are not free to substitute our own judgment for the trial court’s judgment. Bowie Mem[’l] Hosp[.] v. Wright, 79 S.W.3d 48, 52 (Tex. 2002). We can only find an abuse of discretion if the trial court “acts in an arbitrary or capricious manner without reference to any guiding rules or principles.” Bocquet v. Herring, 972 S.W.2d 19, 21 (Tex. 1998). The court’s decision must be “so arbitrary and unreasonable as to amount to a clear and prejudicial error of law.” BMC Software Belg. N.V. v. Marchand, 83 S.W.3d 789, 801 (Tex. 2002). Applying these principles, we must determine whether the trial court’s application of the vexatious litigant statute constitutes an abuse of discretion. Harris v. Rose, 204 S.W.3d 903, 905 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2006, no pet.). Section 11.054 of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code sets out the criteria for finding a plaintiff to be a vexatious litigant. See Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 11.054. The first is “that there is not a reasonable probability that the plaintiff will prevail in the litigation against the defendant.” Id. The next requires proof that the plaintiff is vexatious and provides three alternatives of proof. Id.; see Dunlap, 2021 WL 5028767, at *5; Akinwamide v. Transp. Ins. Co., 499 S.W.3d 511, 532 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2016, pet. denied). Relevant to this case,
16 Subsection (3)—the third alternative of proof—provides that “the plaintiff has previously been declared to be a vexatious litigant by a state or federal court in an action or proceeding based on the same or substantially similar facts, transition, or occurrence.” Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 11.054(3). 3. The Order Contained the Requisite Findings Stanford challenges the trial court’s findings regarding the vexatious-litigant criteria, but his challenge fails because he misrepresents the record and misunderstands the applicable law. Stanford first complains that the trial court failed to find that there was no reasonable probability that he would prevail in his litigation against Leinart. But the trial court’s order rebuts this complaint. The order recites that “[p]ursuant to Texas Civil Practice & Remedies Code § 11.054, the Court finds that there is no reasonable probability that [Stanford] will prevail in this litigation against [Leinart].” Thus contrary to Stanford’s representation, the order demonstrates that the trial court found that he was unlikely to prevail in his suit against Leinart. We conclude that this argument lacks merit. Stanford next alleges that the order fails to recite “the mandatory findings required by Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code §§ 11.053–.055 — including (a) identification of any prior actions finally determined adversely to [Stanford and] (b) identification of any issue that was vexatiously litigated.” Subsection (3) requires proof that a plaintiff has previously been declared to be a vexatious litigant—it does
17 not mandate that the trial court make findings regarding prior actions adverse to the plaintiff or identify issues that were vexatiously litigated. Id. Leinart moved pursuant to Subsection (3), and the trial court declared Stanford a vexatious litigant under that Subsection. The order mirrors the language found in Subsection (3) and recites that the trial court found that “[Stanford] has been previously declared to be a vexatious litigant by a state or federal court in an action or proceeding based on the same or substantially similar facts, transition, or occurrence.” Therefore, contrary to Stanford’s assertion that the trial court did not recite the “mandatory findings,” the order reflects that the trial court found that Stanford had previously been declared a vexatious litigant. See id. No further additional findings under this Subsection were required. See id. We conclude that this argument lacks merit. Accordingly, because the order reflects that the trial court found that there was no reasonable probability that Stanford would prevail in his suit against Leinart and that he had previously been declared a vexatious litigant, we hold that the order contained the requisite findings. See id. § 11.054. 4. No Abuse of Discretion To the extent that Stanford seeks to challenge the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the trial court’s order, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by declaring him a vexatious litigant. See Dunlap, 2021 WL 5028767, at *4.
18 Leinart timely moved to declare Stanford a vexatious litigant. See Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 11.051. Leinart’s motion alleged that Stanford had no reasonable probability of prevailing in the suit because he sought the same damages that had been previously dismissed with prejudice in federal court, any error by Leinart was mooted when Stanford filed amended bankruptcy schedules, and the federal bankruptcy trustee determined that Stanford’s damages were inconsequential. See id. § 11.051. The motion also asserted that Stanford had been previously declared a vexatious litigant in federal court in an action or proceeding based on the same or substantially similar facts, transition, or occurrence. See id. § 11.054(3). In support of its motion, Leinart included (1) Stanford’s complaint in the federal court case, (2) the magistrate’s order admonishing Stanford for filing false and misleading documents, (3) the magistrate’s recommendation of dismissal with prejudice of Stanford’s suit, (4) the bankruptcy trustee’s motion to abandon the Leinart claims, and (5) Judge O’Connor’s order finding Stanford to be a vexatious litigant. Leinart later supplemented its evidence by providing the trial court with the Dallas County district court’s order declaring Stanford a vexatious litigant. Relying upon this evidence—and following a hearing at which Stanford was present and participated—the trial court granted Leinart’s motion. On the state of this record, we cannot conclude that the trial court abused its discretion by declaring Stanford a vexatious litigant. We overrule Stanford’s third issue.
19 D. THE ORDER’S EFFECTS In his fourth issue, Stanford asserts that “requiring [him] to post $25,000 as ‘security’ and imposing a statewide pre-filing ban operates as an unconstitutional financial and procedural barrier to court access.” We disagree. This court and several of our sister courts have concluded that the vexatious-litigant statute in Chapter 11 of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code does not violate a vexatious litigant’s constitutional due process rights nor prohibit his access to the courts. Clifton v. Walters, 308 S.W.3d 94, 101–02 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2010, pet. denied) (overruling appellant’s argument that Chapter 11 denies equal protection and access to court); see In re Potts, 357 S.W.3d 766, 769 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2011, orig. proceeding) (concluding that Chapter 11 does not violate constitutional due process rights); Johnson v. Sloan, 320 S.W.3d 388, 389–90 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2010, pet. denied) (concluding that appellant was not denied due process by the trial court’s enforcement of Chapter 11’s pre-filing requirement); In re Johnson, No. 07-07-0245-CV, 2008 WL 2681314, at *2 (Tex. App.—Amarillo Jul. 9, 2008, orig. proceeding) (mem. op.) (concluding that vexatious litigant statute does not violate due process by requiring dismissal if suit is filed without permission of local administrative judge); Leonard v. Abbott, 171 S.W.3d 451, 457–58 (Tex. App.—Austin 2005, pet. denied) (rejecting constitutional challenges to Chapter 11 including
20 due process claim based on vagueness). Stanford has not addressed this precedent, nor has he identified a compelling reason to depart from it.17 With respect to the security requirement, Stanford broadly claims that requiring him to post $25,000 is a barrier to court access without explaining how or why it is punitive, disproportionate, or unconstitutional.18 On the contrary, several courts have upheld similar required securities. See, e.g., Beasley v. Soc’ of Info. Mgmt., Dall. Area, No. 05-19-00607-CV, 2020 WL 5087824, at *10–11, n. 8 (Tex. App.—Dallas Aug. 28, 2020, pet. denied) (mem. op.) (affirming $422,032 security in vexatious-litigant order); Leonard, 171 S.W.3d at 455 (affirming $80,000 security in vexatious-litigant order). Accordingly, we hold that the order’s pre-filing requirement and required security are not “unconstitutional financial and procedural barrier[s] to court access.”19 17We note that the vexatious-litigant statute does not categorically bar Stanford from prosecuting a lawsuit; rather, he is required to seek permission from the local administrative judge before filing pro se litigation. See Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 11.101(a). 18The security-requirement issue was not originally before us when Stanford filed his notice of interlocutory appeal. See Hollis v. MHMR of Tarrant Cnty., No. 02-19-00150-CV, 2019 WL 4124383, at *5, n.6 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Aug. 29, 2019, no pet.) (mem. op.). However, the trial court’s entry of a final judgment caused the interlocutory vexatious-litigant order to merge into the final judgment. Id.; Roccaforte v. Jefferson Cnty., 341 S.W.3d 919, 924–25 (Tex. 2011). 19Stanford also argues that the order was “issued without adequate pleading, notice, or an evidentiary hearing affording [him] a meaningful opportunity to be heard, in violation of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments and Texas due-process principles.” His argument lacks merit and is rebutted by the record. Leinart filed a motion to declare Stanford a vexatious litigant, Stanford responded to the motion, and he personally appeared at the hearing on Leinart’s motion. Despite his
21 We overrule Stanford’s fourth issue. E. THE ORDER’S SCOPE In his fifth issue, Stanford contends that the order “exceeds the authority of Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 11.101(a)[ ]and is facially overbroad and vague.” We disagree. Stanford first argues that the order is vague and exceeds the scope of the authority of Section 11.101(a) by serving as an “injunction barring ‘any new litigation in a court in Texas.’” But the order mirrors the language found in Section 11.101(a), prohibiting Stanford from “fil[ing] as a pro se party any new litigation in a court in Texas without first obtaining permission from the appropriate local administrative judge as required by Texas Civil Practice & Remedies Code [S]ection 11.102(a).” See Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 11.101(a). The order does not exceed the scope of Section 11.101(a). We conclude that this argument lacks merit. He next asserts that the order “threat[ening] dismissal with prejudice absent payment” is unauthorized and void. He is mistaken. That is precisely the intended purpose of Section 11.056. Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 11.056. Section 11.056 provides that the trial court “shall dismiss a litigation as to a moving defendant if a plaintiff ordered to furnish security does not furnish the security within the time set by the order.” Id. § 11.056. Counter to his assertion, Section 11.056 requires a representation to this court, there was a pleading, notice, and an evidentiary hearing on the motion.
22 trial court to dismiss a case following a vexatious litigant’s failure to furnish security within the prescribed time. See id. With respect to his complaint that the dismissal was with prejudice, Texas appellate courts have affirmed dismissals with prejudice pursuant to Section 11.056, and he offers no reasoning as to why the dismissal should have been without prejudice. See, e.g., Retzlaff v. GoAmerica Commc’ns Corp., 356 S.W.3d 689, 699 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2011, no pet.); Drum v. Calhoun, 299 S.W.3d 360, 374 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2009, pet. denied); Nell Nations Forist v. Vanguard Underwriters Ins. Co., 141 S.W.3d 668, 670–71 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2004, no pet.). We conclude that this argument lacks merit. Stanford also claims that “Section 11.101(a) mandates that a pre-filing order ‘state in writing the reasons for the finding’ and list ‘each case relied upon.’” This claim is patently untrue and a misstatement of the law. The entirety of Section 11.101(a) is as follows: A court may, on its own motion or the motion of any party, enter an order prohibiting a person from filing, pro se, a new litigation in a court to which the order applies under this section without permission of the appropriate local administrative judge described by Section 11.102(a) to file the litigation if the court finds, after notice and hearing as provided by Subchapter B, that the person is a vexatious litigant. Id. § 11.101(a). Unmistakably absent from Section 11.101(a) is Stanford’s fictitious quote that supposedly requires a trial court to provide written reasons and referenced cases in support of its vexatious-litigant order. See id. We admonish Stanford for making such
23 a fabricated claim and attempting to mislead this court. We conclude that this argument lacks merit. Accordingly, we hold that the order does not exceed the scope of Sections 11.101 and 11.056 and that it is not overbroad or vague. We overrule Stanford’s fifth issue. F. THE ORDER’S CRITERIA In his sixth issue—substantially related to his third and fifth issues—Stanford argues that the trial court erred by declaring him a vexatious litigant because there is an “absence of findings of frivolousness or bad faith.” He maintains that the trial court erred by declaring him a vexatious litigant “without finding that his claims were frivolous, brought in bad faith, or unlikely to prevail, as § 11.054(3) requires.” But again, he misstates the law. As discussed above, Section 11.054 provides that “[a] court may find a plaintiff a vexatious litigant if the defendant shows that there is not a reasonable probability that the plaintiff will prevail in the litigation against the defendant” and that “the plaintiff has previously been declared to be a vexatious litigant by a state or federal court in an action or proceeding based on the same or substantially similar facts, transition, or occurrence.” Id. § 11.054(3). Section 11.054 makes no mention whatsoever of frivolous or bad-faith claims. See id. § 11.054. Rather, among other things, the Section requires the defendant to show “that there is not a reasonable probability that the plaintiff will prevail in the litigation against the defendant.” Id.
24 We again note that the order reflects that the trial court found “that there is no reasonable probability that [Stanford] will prevail in this litigation against [Leinart]” and that “[Stanford] has previously been declared to be a vexatious litigant by a state or federal court in an action or proceeding based on the same or substantially similar facts, transition, or occurrence.” Accordingly, because the order satisfies Section 11.054’s criteria for finding a plaintiff to be a vexatious litigant, we hold that the trial court did not err by failing to make findings that Stanford’s claims were frivolous or brought in bad faith.20 See id. We overrule Stanford’s sixth issue. G. COMPLAINTS AGAINST LEINART In his seventh issue, Stanford claims that Leinart’s motion to declare him a vexatious litigant misrepresented the procedural history of the federal vexatious-litigant order and that filing such “a motion based on a known void federal order constitutes fraud upon the court and a violation of the Texas Disciplinary Rules of 20Stanford did not request that the trial court make findings of fact or conclusions of law. See Watson v. City of San Marcos, No. 03-23-00768-CV, 2024 WL 3586024, at *4 (Tex. App.—Austin July 31, 2024, pet. denied) (holding that a trial court is not required to file findings of fact or conclusions of law “because the vexatious[-]litigant issue was not tried in a conventional bench trial”); Willms v. Am. Tire Co., Inc., 190 S.W.3d 796, 802–03 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2006, pet. denied) (reasoning that while findings of fact and conclusions of law may have been helpful, they were not required because the vexatious-litigant issue was not tried in a conventional bench trial and noting that the vexatious-litigant statute does not require written findings of fact and conclusions of law).
25 Professional Conduct.”21 This issue is resolved by our disposition of his first and second issues. Stanford’s claim rests entirely upon us holding that the federal vexatious-litigant order is void. But as discussed, we lack jurisdiction to review the federal vexatious-litigant order—and contrary to his representation—the order is not void. Because the federal order is not void, we conclude that Stanford’s argument that Leinart’s motion was fraudulent and based on “a known void federal order” lacks merit.22 We overrule Stanford’s seventh issue. IV. CONCLUSION Having overruled Stanford’s seven issues, we affirm the trial court’s order declaring him a vexatious litigant.23 /s/ Brian Walker Brian Walker Justice Delivered: April 2, 2026 21Stanford also asserts that Leinart engaged in a “pattern of litigation fraud.” But he cites nothing in the record that would support his assertion, and he does not cite to where in the record he raised this claim with the trial court to preserve it for our review on appeal. See Tex. R. App. P. 33.1(a). 22Stanford’s appellate brief is rife with hypocrisy. He alleges that Leinart committed fraud on the court by making false statements of law and engaging in dishonest conduct. In the same breath—with an apparent sense of impunity—he severely misrepresents the record and grossly misquotes the law. 23In light of our disposition, all pending motions are denied.
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