Stanford v. Vida (Western District of Tex. (W.D. TEX) 2025)

Case details
Full caption
JASON STANFORD v. BEHROOZ P. VIDA
Country
United States
Jurisdiction
Federal
Court
Western District of Texas (W.D. TEX)
Decided
2025
Disposition
Dismissed
Majority
Mark Lane (J.) (unanimous Court)
1 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS AUSTIN DIVISION JASON STANFORD, Plaintiff, v. BEHROOZ P. VIDA, LAUREN M. NELSON, CHRISTOPHER SNEAD, JOSEPH LUCE, KEN STARR, MARCUS LEINART, RICHARD ANDERSON, LEINART LAW, PLLC, SPENCER FANE, LLP, ENGLAND CARRIER SERVICES, LLC, NFUSION CAPITAL FINANCE, LLC, GLOBALTRANZ ENTERPRISES, LLC, and VIDA LAW FIRM, PLLC, Defendants. § § § § § § § § § § § § § § § A-25-CV-792-DAE-ML ORDER ON IN FORMA PAUPERIS STATUS AND REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION ON THE MERITS OF THE CLAIMS TO THE HONORABLE DAVID A. EZRA UNITED STATES SENIOR DISTRICT JUDGE: The Magistrate Judge submits this Report and Recommendation to the United States District Judge pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b) and Rule 1 of Appendix C of the Local Court Rules of the United States District Court for the Western District of Texas, Local Rules for the Assignment of Duties to United States Magistrate Judges. Before the court is Plaintiff’s Application to Proceed In Forma Pauperis (Dkt. 2). Because Plaintiff is requesting permission to proceed in forma pauperis, this court must review and make a recommendation on the merits of Plaintiff’s claims pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e). I. REQUEST TO PROCEED IN FORMA PAUPERIS The court has reviewed Plaintiff Jason Stanford’s financial affidavit and determined Plaintiff is indigent and should be granted leave to proceed in forma pauperis. Accordingly, the Case 1:25-cv-00792-DAE Document 5 Filed 09/04/25 Page 1 of 12
2 court hereby GRANTS Plaintiff’s request for in forma pauperis status. This indigent status is granted subject to a later determination the action should be dismissed if the allegation of poverty is untrue or the action is found frivolous or malicious pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e). Plaintiff is further advised, although Plaintiff has been granted leave to proceed in forma pauperis, a court may, in its discretion, impose costs of court at the conclusion of this lawsuit, as in other cases. Moore v. McDonald, 30 F.3d 616, 621 (5th Cir. 1994). As stated below, this court has made a § 1915(e) review of the claims made in this complaint and is recommending Plaintiff’s claims be dismissed under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e). According to the indigent status, the Clerk of the Court shall file the complaint without payment of fees or costs or giving security therefor pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a). However, service upon Defendants should be withheld pending the District Judge’s review of the recommendations made in this Report. If the District Judge declines to adopt the recommendations, then service should be issued at that time upon Defendants. II. REVIEW OF THE MERITS OF THE CLAIM Because Plaintiff has been granted leave to proceed in forma pauperis, the court is required by statute to review the Complaint. Section 1915(e)(2) provides in relevant part that “the court shall dismiss the case at any time if the court determines that . . . the action or appeal (i) is frivolous or malicious; (ii) fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted; or (iii) seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). A complaint is frivolous, if it “lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact.” Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325, (1989); Siglar v. Hightower, 112 F.3d 191, 193 (5th Cir. 1997). A claim lacks an arguable basis in law when it is “based on an indisputably meritless legal theory.” Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 327. Case 1:25-cv-00792-DAE Document 5 Filed 09/04/25 Page 2 of 12
3 A claim lacks an arguable basis in fact when it describes “fantastic or delusional scenarios.” Id. at 327-28. Pro se complaints are liberally construed in favor of the plaintiff. Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 20-21 (1972). However, pro se status does not offer a plaintiff an “impenetrable shield, for one acting pro se has no license to harass others, clog the judicial machinery with meritless litigation, and abuse already overloaded court dockets.” Farguson v. MBank Houston N.A., 808 F.2d 358, 359 (5th Cir. 1986). A. Frivolous Litigant History Jason Stanford, a resident of Irving, Texas, is a repeat pro se filer who was declared a vexatious litigant by the United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas, where he must seek leave before filing any new litigation. See Stanford v. England Carrier Servs. LLC, No. 4:24-CV-00241-O-BP, 2024 WL 3732487, at *1 (N.D. Tex. Aug. 7, 2024). The Northern District also sanctioned Stanford under Rule 11 for knowingly filing false and misleading documents. England Carrier, No. 4:24-CV-00241-O-BP, Dkt. 24 (July 23, 2024). Since then, he has filed several cases in this District. See Stanford v. State of Texas, No. 1:24-CV-01132-RP (W.D. Tex. Sept. 24, 2024); Stanford v. Vida, No. 1:25-CV-00817-DAE-ML (“Vida (II)”) (W.D. Tex. May 28, 2025). In Vida (II), the undersigned recently examined this history and recommended that Stanford’s federal causes of action be dismissed with prejudice as frivolous and his state-law causes of action be dismissed without prejudice. No. 1:25-cv-00817-DAE, Dkt. 6 at 9. The undersigned further warned Stanford that he may be subject to sanctions or a pre-filing injunction bar if he continues filing frivolous litigation in this court. Id. Case 1:25-cv-00792-DAE Document 5 Filed 09/04/25 Page 3 of 12
4 B. Analysis Stanford’s assertion of federal jurisdiction is based on his Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (“RICO”) and RICO conspiracy claims against several Defendants “for their coordinated pattern of racketeering activity, including obstruction of justice, extortion, fraud, and conspiracy to suppress meritorious legal claims through attorney misconduct, judicial bias, and bankruptcy fraud.” Dkt. 1 (Compl.) at 1; 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968. This suit duplicates all save one of his defendants in Vida (II) and shares many defendants with his Texas and England Carrier suits. Compl. at 1. He also asserts state-law claims under the court’s supplemental jurisdiction. Stanford alleges venue is proper in this District as state court proceedings in Travis County form the factual basis for several of his claims. He further alleges that “one or more Defendants transact business, committed acts of racketeering, and caused harm to Plaintiff in this district.” Compl. at 5. Stanford further alleges that he “resided in the district at relevant times and sustained substantial injury within it.” Id. at 6. Stanford does not specify which actions occurred here or what harm he suffered here. Notably, venue would also be proper in the Northern District, where he is barred from filing. 1. Defendants and Claims Stanford brings claims against Behrooz P. Vida, the Chapter 7 Trustee in his bankruptcy matter and Vida’s law firm, Vida Law Firm, PLLC. He sues corporate entities England Carrier Services, LLC (“ECS”); NFusion Capital Finance, LLC; and GlobalTranz Enterprises, LLC (collectively, the “Corporate Defendants”). He also sues the attorneys who represented these entities: Lauren M. Nelson, Christopher Snead, Joseph Luce, Ken Starr, and Spencer Fane LLP, attorneys Nelson and Snead’s firm. Finally, he sues his own previous counsel: Marcus Leinart, Richard Anderson, and Leinart Law, PLLC. Case 1:25-cv-00792-DAE Document 5 Filed 09/04/25 Page 4 of 12
5 Stanford asserts the following claims: • Count 1—violation of RICO, 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c), based on the predicate acts of wire fraud, obstruction of justice, and abuse of fiduciary positions, against all Defendants acting in concert, Compl. at 10-13; • Count 2—conspiracy to violate RICO, 18 U.S.C. § 1962(d), based on coordinated misconduct and interlocking relationships to suppress meritorious legal claims against all Defendants, Compl. 13-18; • Count 3—common law fraud against “Defendants” based on fraudulent filings, unauthorized bankruptcy schedule submissions, and knowingly false legal assertions, Compl. at 18-21; • Count 4—fiduciary breach by previously retained counsel Leinart and Anderson and trustee Vida based on filing bankruptcy schedules without Stanford’s consent, undervaluing the estate, and acting in bad faith, Compl. at 21-25; • Count 5—extortion and tortious interference with freight contracts against the Corporate Defendants and their counsel, Compl. 25-27; and • Count 6—fiduciary breach against Vida for self-dealing, conflicts of interest, and court-enabled misconduct, Compl. at 27-34. 2. RICO Claims Stanford’s RICO claims are premised upon predicate acts of mail and wire fraud under 18 U.S.C. §§ 1341 and 1343, obstruction of justice under 18 U.S.C. § 1503, and the abuse of position by fiduciaries in violation of federal bankruptcy law. He further pleads a cause of action for the conspiracy to violate RICO and requests monetary damages for Defendants’ alleged RICO violations. Civil RICO claims have three common elements: “(1) a person who engages in (2) a pattern of racketeering activity, (3) connected to the acquisition, establishment, conduct, or control of an enterprise.” Abraham v. Singh, 480 F.3d 351, 355 (5th Cir. 2007) (citation modified). “Racketeering activity consists of two or more predicate criminal acts that are (1) related and (2) amount to or pose a threat of continued criminal activity.” Id. (citation modified). “The predicate acts can be either state or federal crimes.” In re MasterCard Int'l Inc., 313 F.3d 257, 262 (5th Cir. Case 1:25-cv-00792-DAE Document 5 Filed 09/04/25 Page 5 of 12
6 2002). A civil plaintiff may recover treble damages and attorney fees if he is “injured in his business or property by reason of a violation” of RICO’s criminal provisions. 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c). A RICO plaintiff must allege and prove he suffered an injury to his business or property and that such injury occurred by reason of a substantive violation of the provisions of section 1962. See Hughes v. Tobacco Inst., Inc., 278 F.3d 417, 422 (5th Cir. 2001). Section 1962(d) makes it unlawful “for any person to conspire to violate” any of RICO’s criminal provisions. 18 U.S.C. § 1962(d). Because Stanford’s RICO claims involve fraud, his Complaint must also satisfy heightened pleading requirements. Under Rule 9(b), “[i]n alleging fraud or mistake, a party must state with particularity the circumstances constituting fraud or mistake. Malice, intent, knowledge, and other conditions of a person's mind may be alleged generally.” FED. R. CIV. P. 9(b). “At a minimum, Rule 9(b) requires allegations of the particulars of time, place, and contents of the false representations, as well as the identity of the person making the misrepresentation and what he obtained thereby.” Benchmark Elecs., Inc. v. J.M. Huber Corp., 343 F.3d 719, 724 (5th Cir. 2003) (citation modified). The Fifth Circuit's “precedent interprets Rule 9(b) strictly, requiring the plaintiff to specify the statements contended to be fraudulent, identify the speaker, state when and where the statements were made, and explain why the statements were fraudulent.” Flaherty & Crumrine Preferred Income Fund, Inc. v. TXU Corp., 565 F.3d 200, 207 (5th Cir. 2009) (citation modified). Stanford alleges that the predicate criminal acts upon which his RICO claims rest include the filing of a fraudulent UCC-3 Termination Statement, the submission of false bankruptcy schedules, a coercive settlement call by Trustee Vida, false statements in court filings, filings made in reliance on Stanford’s vexatious litigant label, and the fraudulent suppression of judicial Case 1:25-cv-00792-DAE Document 5 Filed 09/04/25 Page 6 of 12
7 admissions and exhibits. Compl. at 10-12. These allegations merely describe events that took place in Stanford’s previous litigations and bankruptcy matters. Stanford fails to allege any facts that support his conclusory allegations of wrongdoing by the parties who litigated for or against him. For instance, Stanford asserts that Defendants engaged in wire fraud by making false statements in court filings; however, Stanford alleges no facts to support that the filings were false or that his assertions are truthful. See id. at 11. Furthermore, despite Stanford citing two cases to the contrary, the undersigned has not found any direct support for Stanford’s contention that court filings may form the basis for RICO claim predicated on wire fraud. See id. at 13 (citing two cases that the undersigned has determined do not exist). Likewise, Stanford fails to assert any facts to support that the UCC-3 Termination Statement filed by ECS was fraudulent or without authorization from NFusion. As for the coercive settlement call by Trustee Vida, Stanford asserts that Vida made an extortionate demand by “attempting to coerce Plaintiff into accepting a $20,000 buyout from adversary defendants for adversary cases with a documented value exceeding $4.4 million.” Id. As defined under RICO, extortion means “the obtaining of property form another, with his consent, induced by wrongful use of actual or threatened force, violence, or fear, or under color of official right.” 18 U.S.C. § 1951. Stanford makes no allegations that Vida actually obtained any property from Stanford or that Stanford consented to the settlement offer conveyed by Vida. In short, the undersigned finds no allegations of criminal activity and a failure to state a claim for the predicate act of extortion. Stanford does admit, however, that Judge Morris, the judge presiding over Stanford’s Northern District bankruptcy proceedings, declined to issue any disciplinary actions against Vida. Compl. at 8. Stanford further admits that Judge Morris denied Stanford’s motions for disgorgement of legal fees, failed to sanction Vida for allegedly relying on false schedules, and Case 1:25-cv-00792-DAE Document 5 Filed 09/04/25 Page 7 of 12
8 threatened Stanford with a vexatious litigant designation. Id. Therefore, the undersigned finds that the few facts Stanford did allege support that Vida acted according to his duties and other judges declined to sanction him. Finally, as relates to Stanford’s conspiracy claim, the undersigned finds that Stanford alleges no facts that support the existence of an agreement between Defendants to knowingly commit two or more predicate acts. See Cnty. of El Paso v. Jones, 2009 WL 4730305, at *25 n.11 (W.D. Tex. Dec. 4, 2009) (holding that a civil RICO conspiracy claim requires factual allegations that defendants knowingly entered into an agreement to commit two or more predicate acts in furtherance of the RICO conspiracy). Stanford pleads a “common scheme” existed; however, the undersigned finds his allegations to be conclusory and insufficient to state a claim for conspiracy to violate RICO. Accordingly, Stanford has failed to allege a pattern of racketeering activity connected to the acquisition, establishment, conduct, or control of an enterprise that resulted in injury to his business or property or a conspiracy to commit such activity. Therefore, the undersigned recommends that Stanford’s RICO claims be dismissed with prejudice as frivolous. 3. State Law Claims Aside from Stanford’s RICO claims, he asserts only state-law causes of action. Because the undersigned is recommending dismissal of Stanford’s federal claims, and there is not diversity between the parties, it is within the court’s discretion to dismiss Stanford’s remaining claims. See Enochs v. Lampasas Cnty., 641 F.3d 155, 161 (5th Cir. 2011) (holding that the Fifth Circuit’s “general rule is to dismiss state claims when the federal claims to which they are pendent are dismissed”) (citations omitted). Common-law fraud, breach of fiduciary duty, extortion, and tortious interference are all state-law claims. Therefore, the court has “dismissed all claims over Case 1:25-cv-00792-DAE Document 5 Filed 09/04/25 Page 8 of 12
9 which is has original jurisdiction” and may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction. 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3). Accordingly, the undersigned recommends dismissal of Stanford’s remaining state claims for lack of jurisdiction. III. VEXATIOUS LITIGANT WARNING A court possesses the inherent power “to protect the efficient and orderly administration of justice,” including “the power to levy sanctions in response to abusive litigation practices.” In re Stone, 986 F.2d 898, 902 (5th Cir. 1993). Sanctions may be appropriate when a pro se litigant has a history of submitting multiple frivolous claims. Mendoza v. Lynaugh, 989 F.2d 191, 195-97 (5th Cir. 1993). No pro se litigant has the “license to harass others, clog the judicial machinery with meritless litigation, and abuse already overloaded court dockets.” Farguson, 808 F.2d at 360. In addition to monetary sanctions, “[a] district court has jurisdiction to impose a pre-filing injunction to deter vexatious, abusive, and harassing litigation.” Baum v. Blue Moon Ventures, 513 F.3d 181, 187 (5th Cir. 2008). District courts are permitted to act sua sponte in imposing restrictions on future filings. Qureshi v. United States, 600 F.3d 523, 526 (5th Cir. 2010). However, the court must notify the litigant and provide him an opportunity to be heard on the matter before imposing a sua sponte pre-filing injunction on the vexatious litigant. Id. Stanford has previously been named a vexatious litigant by the Northern District, and this is his third suit in this District in which it was recommended his case be dismissed as frivolous and now his second warning. Courts may appropriately dismiss an in forma pauperis action as frivolous, when the action “seek[s] to relitigate claims which allege substantially the same facts arising from a common series of events which have already been unsuccessfully litigated by the IFP plaintiff.” Wilson v. Lynaugh, 878 F.2d 846, 850 (5th Cir. 1989).The Fifth Circuit held that a complaint is malicious when it “duplicates allegations of another pending federal lawsuit by the same plaintiff.” Pittman Case 1:25-cv-00792-DAE Document 5 Filed 09/04/25 Page 9 of 12
10 v. Moore, 980 F.2d 994, 995 (5th Cir. 1993). Although Stanford changes his legal theories and slightly varies his defendants, the substance of his complaints remains overwhelmingly consistent. Therefore, the undersigned finds that Stanford is engaging in a pattern of frivolous and malicious filings pursuant to the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). Furthermore, the undersigned found at least two unidentifiable cases cited in Stanford’s Complaint: United States v. Green, 786 F.3d 1051, 1055 (8th Cir. 2015) (claiming “electronic filings submitted to a court as part of a fraudulent scheme may constitute wire fraud”), and United States v. Hatten, 31 F.3d 1449, 1454 (9th Cir. 1994) (claiming the Ninth Circuit held that the use of court submissions in furtherance of fraudulent conduct was sufficient to support wire fraud charges). Compl. at 13. The undersigned has not found any proof that these cases are legitimate. Similarly, the undersigned could not find evidence of two quotations Stanford relied on in his Complaint. Id. at 2, 4. Stanford allegedly quoted Villegas v. Schmidt, 788 F.3d 156 (5th Cir. 2015), to assert that “[t]he Barton Doctrine does not apply to actions taken by the trustee outside the scope of his authority, or that are malicious, fraudulent, or in bad faith,” and he allegedly quoted Leonard v. Vrooman, 383 F.2d 556 (9th Cir. 1967), for the proposition that “[w]here the trustee’s acts are not only unauthorized but also involve personal wrongdoing, he may be held personally liable.” Compl. at 2, 4. Although these cases are real, neither contains the quotation attributed to it. These false citations and quotations indicate that Stanford is continuing a pattern of misrepresentations to the court. Accordingly, the undersigned WARNS Stanford that he may be subject to sanctions, including monetary sanctions or a pre-filing injunction barring him from filing future suits, if he continues to file frivolous and malicious claims or otherwise abuse his access to the judicial system. In light of his litigation history and now his citation to non-existent cases and use of Case 1:25-cv-00792-DAE Document 5 Filed 09/04/25 Page 10 of 12
11 fabricated quotations, the undersigned ORDERS Stanford to file a copy of every case he cites and indicate where any quoted passages are located with any future filing in this District. IV. ORDER AND RECOMMENDATIONS The undersigned hereby GRANTS Plaintiff’s Application to Proceed In Forma Pauperis (Dkt. 2) and RECOMMENDS the District Judge DISMISS WITH PREJUDICE Plaintiff’s RICO claims as frivolous pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) and DISMISS WITHOUT PREJUDICE Plaintiff’s state-law claims. The undersigned further RECOMMENDS that the District Judge WARN Stanford that continuing to file frivolous or duplicative suits in this court may result in imposition of monetary sanctions and a pre-filing bar. The referral of this case to the Magistrate Judge should now be canceled. V. WARNING The parties may file objections to this Report and Recommendation. A party filing objections must specifically identify those findings or recommendations to which objections are being made. The District Judge need not consider frivolous, conclusive, or general objections. See Battles v. United States Parole Comm’n, 834 F.2d 419, 421 (5th Cir. 1987). A party’s failure to file written objections to the proposed findings and recommendations contained in this Report within fourteen (14) days after the party is served with a copy of the Report shall bar that party from de novo review by the District Judge of the proposed findings and recommendations in the Report and, except upon grounds of plain error, shall bar the party from appellate review of unobjected-to proposed factual findings and legal conclusions accepted by the Case 1:25-cv-00792-DAE Document 5 Filed 09/04/25 Page 11 of 12
12 District Judge. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C); Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140, 150–53 (1985); Douglass v. United Services Auto. Ass’n, 79 F.3d 1415 (5th Cir. 1996) (en banc). SIGNED September 4, 2025. _______________________________ MARK LANE UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE Case 1:25-cv-00792-DAE Document 5 Filed 09/04/25 Page 12 of 12
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