State v. Alqahtani, No. 2-25-11 (2026)

Case details
Full caption
State of Ohio v. Abdullah M. Alqahtani
Country
United States
Jurisdiction
Federal
Decided
2026
Disposition
Affirmed
Majority
Miller (J.), joined by Willamowski, Waldick (J.)
STATE OF OHIO, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, v. ABDULLAH M...., Slip Copy (2026)2026-Ohio-1335 © 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.12026 WL 992449CHECK OHIO SUPREME COURT RULES FORREPORTING OF OPINIONS AND WEIGHT OF LEGALAUTHORITY.Court of Appeals of Ohio, Third District, Auglaize County.STATE OF OHIO, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE,v.ABDULLAH M. ALQAHTANI,DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.CASE NO. 2-25-11|Date of Decision: April 13, 2026Appeal from Auglaize County Municipal Court TrialCourt No. 2025 TRD 05151Judgment AffirmedAttorneys and Law FirmsAPPEARANCES: Abdullah M. Alqahtani, AppellantJoshua A. Muhlenkamp for AppelleeOPINION AND JUDGMENT ENTRYMILLER, J.*1 {¶1} Defendant-appellant, Abdullah Alqahtani(“Alqahtani”), brings this appeal from the September 11, 2025judgment of the Auglaize County Municipal Court findinghim guilty of speeding. On appeal, Alqahtani asserts the courterred by admitting radar evidence without sufficient proofof proper calibration and operation of the radar device. Healso argues that the trial court's finding of guilt was againstthe manifest weight of the evidence and the court abused itsdiscretion by denying his motion for a continuance. For thereasons that follow, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.Facts and Procedural History{¶2} On July 13, 2025, at approximately 1:37 a.m., whiletraveling northbound on State Route 66 in Auglaize County,Ohio State Highway Patrol Trooper Colin Costin (“TrooperCostin”) observed Alqahtani's vehicle traveling southboundtoward his cruiser. Trooper Costin visually estimated thatAlqahtani's vehicle was traveling at a rate of speed thatexceeded the speed limit of 55 miles per hour. He confirmedthis suspicion by utilizing his standard issue BEE III radardevice which indicated Alqahtani was travelling at 72 milesper hour. Trooper Costin issued Alqahtani a traffic citation,charging him with speeding in violation of R.C. 4511.21(D)(1). The citation was filed in the Auglaize County MunicipalCourt on July 14, 2025.{¶3} On July 15, 2025, Alqahtani filed a written plea of notguilty. The court accepted his plea and set the case for trialon August 14, 2025. On August 11, 2025, Alqahtani filed amotion to continue the trial. This motion was granted, andthe trial was set for August 28, 2025. On August 13, 2025,Alqahtani requested another continuance to obtain additionaldiscovery. The trial court denied the request.{¶4} At the August 28, 2025 bench trial, Trooper Costintestified that he performs a calibration check on the device atthe beginning and end of each shift, including the shift duringwhich he pulled over Alqahtani. Trooper Costin further statedthat on the day in question the device was in good workingorder and that, as an Ohio State Highway Patrol officer, hewas qualified to use the radar device. Additionally, the Stateentered the radar certification document into evidence whichshowed the device was calibrated on June 4, 2025, with thecalibration certification expiring on December 1, 2025. Atthe conclusion of the trial, the court took the matter underadvisement.{¶5} The trial court filed a judgment entry on September 11,2025 finding Alqahtani guilty of speeding in violation of R.C.4511.21(D)(1). The court imposed a $100 fine. Alqahtanitimely appealed, setting forth three assignments of error.First Assignment of ErrorThe trial court abused its discretion by admittingthe radar evidence without sufficient proof of propercalibration and operation, in violation of R.C. 4511.091and relevant case law.Second Assignment of ErrorThe trial court's finding of guilt was against the manifestweight and sufficiency of the evidence, as the prosecution
STATE OF OHIO, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, v. ABDULLAH M...., Slip Copy (2026)2026-Ohio-1335 © 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.2failed to prove the elements of speeding beyond areasonable doubt.*2 {¶6} At the outset, we address the glaring misapplicationof case law presented in the brief Alqahtani submitted tothis court. We find the citations provided at best vaguelysupport appellant's claims and at worst are either completelyirrelevant to the matter at hand or, in at least one exampleof a case cited, do not seem to exist. Nevertheless, giventhis brief was submitted by a self-represented party, with theclaimed errors presenting non-complex issues, we decline tosua sponte strike the brief and dismiss the appeal, choosinginstead to afford a measure of grace and consider the meritsof the assignments of error.1First and Second Assignments of Error{¶7} In his first and second assignments of error, whichwe address together, Alqahtani contends that the trial courtimproperly admitted evidence of the radar device used byTrooper Costin, and his guilty conviction was founded oninsufficient evidence and is against the manifest weight of theevidence.Standards of Review{¶8} Although Alqahtani cross-examined Trooper Costinabout the radar device, he did not object to the admission ofthe radar device evidence at trial. Therefore, the admissionof this evidence is reviewed for plain error, and not abuseof discretion as Alqahtani contends. State v. Mitchell, 2019-Ohio-5168, 35 (3d Dist.). “For this Court to notice plainerror, the error must be an obvious defect in a trial'sproceedings, it must have affected substantial rights, and itmust have affected the outcome of the trial.” Id. “[E]ven whenthe minimum requirements have been met, a reviewing courtshould still be conservative in its application of plain-errorreview, reserving notice of plain error for situations involvingmore than merely theoretical prejudice to substantial rights.”State v. Steele, 2013-Ohio-2470, 30, citing State v. Long,53 Ohio St.2d 91, 94 (1978). “Notice of plain error ...is to be taken with the utmost caution, under exceptionalcircumstances and only to prevent a manifest miscarriage ofjustice.” Long at paragraph three of the syllabus.{¶9} As to Alqahtani's second assignment of error, theconcepts of sufficiency of the evidence and manifest weightof the evidence are legally distinct. “An appellate court'sfunction when reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence tosupport a criminal conviction is to examine the evidenceadmitted at trial to determine whether such evidence, ifbelieved, would convince the average mind of the defendant'sguilt beyond a reasonable doubt.” State v. Jenks, 61 OhioSt.3d 259 (1991), paragraph two of the syllabus, supersededby state constitutional amendment on other grounds, State v.Smith, 80 Ohio.St.3d 89 (1997). Consequently, “[t]he relevantinquiry is whether, after viewing the evidence in a light mostfavorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact couldhave found the essential elements of the crime proven beyonda reasonable doubt.” Id. “In deciding if the evidence wassufficient, we neither resolve evidentiary conflicts nor assessthe credibility of witnesses, as both are functions reserved forthe trier of fact.” State v. Jones, 2013-Ohio-4775, 33 (1stDist.).*3 {¶10} Finally, when reviewing whether a conviction isagainst the manifest weight of the evidence, “an appellatecourt must review the entire record, weigh the evidence andall reasonable inferences, consider the credibility of witnessesand determine whether, in resolving conflicts in the evidence,the factfinder ‘clearly lost its way and created such a manifestmiscarriage of justice that the conviction must be reversedand a new trial ordered.’ ” State v. Williams, 2024-Ohio-2307, 22 (3d Dist.), quoting State v. Thompkins, 78 Ohio St.3d380, 387 (1997). “A reviewing court must, however, allow thetrier of fact appropriate discretion on matters relating to theweight of the evidence and the credibility of the witnesses.”State v. Sewell, 2016-Ohio-7175, 8 (3d Dist.), citing Statev. DeHass, 10 Ohio St.2d 230 (1967), paragraph one of thesyllabus. “Only in exceptional cases, where the evidence‘weighs heavily against the conviction,’ should an appellatecourt overturn the trial court's judgment.” State v. Haller,2012-Ohio-5233, 9 (3d Dist.), quoting State v. Hunter, 2011-Ohio-6524, 119.Analysis{¶11} “To prove a case of speeding based on the readingof a radar gun, [the State] is required to show the accuracyand reliability of the device; that the unit was in goodcondition for accurate work; and the operator's qualificationsby training and experience to use the device.” State v. Helke,2007-Ohio-5483, 7 (3d Dist.).2 “[T]he results of a speed-measuring device using either radar or laser technology areadmissible in court without expert testimony establishing,or the court taking judicial notice of, the reliability of the
STATE OF OHIO, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, v. ABDULLAH M...., Slip Copy (2026)2026-Ohio-1335 © 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.3scientific principles underlying that technology. However,the fact-finder is required to determine whether the evidencepresented concerning the accuracy of the particular speed-measuring device and the qualifications of the person whoused it is sufficient to support a conviction based on thedevice's results.” City of Brook Park v. Rodojev, 2020-Ohio-3253, 19. The trial court relied on Rodojev in itsjudgment entry for a finding that, based on the evidencepresented at trial, the radar device in question was accurate,in proper working condition, and its operator was sufficientlyqualified.{¶12} Alqahtani claims that the trial court's reliance onRodojev was misplaced, because Rodojev still requires case-specific proof of the radar unit's accuracy and operation.Indeed, in Rodojev the Supreme Court of Ohio indicatedthat although the results of a speed-measuring deviceare admissible without expert testimony, “determinationsinvolving the sufficiency and weight of the evidence [are still]to be made on a case-by-case basis.” Id. at ¶18. The recordshows that such case-specific proof of accuracy and operationof the radar device were provided as part of the State's caseagainst Alqahtani.{¶13} “The trial court is the finder of fact in a bench trial.”Harrold v. Homsher, 2002-Ohio-4688, 20 (3d Dist.). Itis the job of the fact finder to weigh the evidence anddetermine the credibility of the witnesses and, as such, maychoose to believe a witness in all of their testimony, someof their testimony, or to discredit them entirely. In re K.S.,2026-Ohio-79, 16 (3d Dist.). In the present case, TrooperCostin testified that he had properly completed the necessarycalibration checks, that the radar device was in good workingcondition, and that he was qualified as a graduate of theOhio State Highway Patrol Academy to use the device. Asfact-finder, the court found this testimony sufficient to admitthe radar evidence in order for the State to prove beyond areasonable doubt that Alqahtani was speeding. We find thatTrooper Costin's testimony along with the radar certificationdocument submitted into evidence, viewed in the light mostfavorable to the prosecution, was sufficient proof from whichany rational fact finder could determine the accuracy of thespeed-measuring device and the qualifications of its operatorto support a conviction based on the device's results.*4 {¶14} Similarly, we find the trial court's guiltyverdict was not against the manifest weight of theevidence. Alqahtani claims that Trooper Costin displayed anargumentative demeanor during the traffic stop and wouldnot advise him of the reason for the stop until Alqahtanifirst provided identification. At trial and in his appellate briefhe attempted to claim the trooper's alleged confrontationalbehavior evidenced a “preconceived notion [that] could havecolored his testimony on the radar reading and visual estimate,further tipping the manifest weight against conviction.” Incontrast, Trooper Costin testified that he followed properprotocol, the order of questions during a traffic stop holdsno significance, and there is no script given to state highwaypatrol troopers to follow when conducting a traffic stop.3Alqahtani's accusation of prejudice does not refute theevidence that he was travelling over the speed limit.{¶15} Giving the fact-finder its appropriate discretion inweighing the evidence and assessing the credibility of thewitness, we do not find this to be an exceptional casemanifesting a miscarriage of justice such that a new trialmust be ordered. The State established Trooper Costin'squalifications and the functionality of the speed-measuringdevice at trial. Alqahtani did not present adequate evidence torefute these established claims.{¶16} Alqahtani's argument in his first assignment of errorthat the trial court erred by admitting the radar evidence wasbased on the trier of fact's assessment of the credibility ofTrooper Costin's testimony. Consequently, because we findthe admittance of the radar device testimony sufficient, we donot make a finding of plain error as to the admission of theradar evidence showing Alqahtani was traveling at 72 milesper hour.{¶17} In addition, on appeal Alqahtani argues for the firsttime that Trooper Costin's actions were contrary to the stepsrequired in the manual for the BEE III radar device, thespecific device used by the trooper to record Alqahtani'sspeeding violation. Although Alqahtani attached to his briefwhat appears to be various excerpts from the manual, theactual manual was not presented as part of his cross-examination of Trooper Costin, so it cannot be considered forthe first time on appeal. See, Grove v. Grove, 2001-Ohio-2109, 5 (3d Dist.) (“Evidence not part of the record that is attachedto an appellate brief cannot be considered by a reviewingcourt.”) Alqahtani purports to cite multiple cases for theproposition that there is a burden on the prosecution to showthat strict calibration requirements were met in accordancewith the BEE III radar manual. We find the cases cited aremisapplied and irrelevant as to the arguments presented byAlqahtani such that they do not warrant further discussion.
STATE OF OHIO, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, v. ABDULLAH M...., Slip Copy (2026)2026-Ohio-1335 © 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.4{¶18} Finding no plain error in the admission of the radardevice evidence, we overrule the first assignment of error.Further, we conclude the record provides sufficient evidenceto support the finding of guilt and the trial court's verdictwas not against the manifest weight of the evidence or amiscarriage of justice. Accordingly, we overrule the secondassignment of error.Third Assignment of ErrorThe trial court abused its discretion by denyingAppellant's motion for continuance to obtain discovery,prejudicing the defense in violation of Crim.R. 16.{¶19} In his third assignment of error, Alqahtani contendsthat he was prejudiced when the trial court denied his motionto continue the trial in order for him to obtain additionaldiscovery.Standard of Review{¶20} “The grant or denial of a continuance is within thesound discretion of the trial judge and we will not reversea determination regarding a continuance absent an abuse ofdiscretion.” City of Fostoria v. Flinders, 2020-Ohio-4263, 23 (3d Dist.). “The term ‘abuse of discretion’ connotes morethan an error of law or judgment; it implies that the court'sattitude is unreasonable, arbitrary, or unconscionable.” Stateex rel. Edwards v. Toledo City School Dist. Bd. Of Edn., 72Ohio St.3d 106, 107 (1995).Analysis*5 {¶21} “The Supreme Court of Ohio has created alist of factors to be considered in evaluating a motionfor continuance, which includes: the length of delayrequested, whether other continuances have been requestedand received; inconvenience to litigants, witnesses, and thetrial court; whether the delay is for legitimate reasons ordilatory, purposeful, or contrived; whether the defendantcontributed to the circumstances giving rise to the request,and any other relevant factors.” Flinders, at 24, citing Statev. Unger, 67 Ohio St.2d, 65, 68 (1981).{¶22} Upon examining the record in this case, we find thetrial court was properly within its discretion in refusing togrant the continuance. Specifically, in his letter to the court inresponse to the denial of his motion to continue and at trial,Alqahtani requested additional time to obtain “full officernotes”, a “radar log”, and body camera footage. In the sameletter, Alqahtani confirmed that the prosecution “provided allavailable material.”{¶23} At trial, Trooper Costin testified he is not required tokeep a log of the radar calibration checks he performs at thebeginning and end of each of his shifts, and the State reiteratedthat all available notes and materials had been delivered toAlqahtani pursuant to his discovery request. Alqahtani hasnot directed our attention to any legal authority that states aradar log is required to be kept by an officer operating sucha device. Nonetheless, Alqahtani persisted in his request fora document that does not exist. Alqahtani acknowledged onthe record that he was in possession of officer notes includedwith the citation that contain a “brief narrative” of the eventssurrounding his traffic stop but contends that the “full officernotes ... are missing.” Beyond Alqahtani's assertion, he pointsto no proof or facts that would create a reasonable inferencethat a radar log or more detailed notes exist and were withheldfrom him. As to his request for the body camera footage,we find Alqahtani's contention bizarre, because in his pretrialcorrespondences with the trial court not only does he admitthe prosecution provided him with the body camera footage,he describes in some detail what is found on the recording.{¶24} Given that the record demonstrates the prosecutioncomplied fully with Alqahtani's discovery request, we do notfind the trial court abused its discretion in denying Alqahtani'smotion for a continuance. Appellant's third assignment oferror is, accordingly, overruled.Conclusion{¶25} Having found no error prejudicial to the Appellantherein in the particulars assigned and argued in theassignments of error, we affirm the judgment of the AuglaizeCounty Municipal Court.Judgement AffirmedJUDGMENT ENTRYFor the reasons stated in the opinion of this Court, theassignments of error are overruled and it is the judgment andorder of this Court that the judgment of the trial court is
STATE OF OHIO, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, v. ABDULLAH M...., Slip Copy (2026)2026-Ohio-1335 © 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.5affirmed with costs assessed to Appellant for which judgmentis hereby rendered. The cause is hereby remanded to the trialcourt for execution of the judgment for costs.It is further ordered that the Clerk of this Court certify a copyof this Court's judgment entry and opinion to the trial courtas the mandate prescribed by App.R. 27; and serve a copy ofthis Court's judgment entry and opinion on each party to theproceedings and note the date of service in the docket. SeeApp.R. 30.Mark C. Miller, JudgeJohn R. Willamowski, JudgeJuergen A. Waldick, JudgeWILLAMOWSKI, and WALDICK, J. J., concur.All CitationsSlip Copy, 2026 WL 992449, 2026-Ohio-1335Footnotes1“Pro se litigants are held to the same rules and procedures as those litigants who retain counsel.” Jones v.Booker, 114 Ohio App.3d 67, 70 (10th Dist. 1996), quoting Meyers v. First Nat'l Bank, 3 Ohio App.3d 209,210 (1st Dist. 1981). Accordingly, a pro se litigant may not knowingly “make a false statement of fact or lawto a tribunal.” Prof.Cond.R. 3.3(a)(1). Furthermore a pro se litigant must not “engage in conduct involvingdishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation” or “engage in conduct that is prejudicial to the administrationof justice.” Prof.Cond.R. 8.4(c)-(d). “It is well established that courts possess inherent authority to manageproceedings essential to their function, to control the conduct of those who appear before them, and tosanction conduct that abuses the judicial process.” State v. Coleman, 2026-Ohio-965, 39 (11th Dist.).Striking a filing containing fabricated and misplaced authority is an appropriate remedy a court could employ.See, id. at ¶103-104.2Appellant incorrectly cites R.C. 4511.091 as the source for this rule. While R.C. 4511.091 addresses thearrest of an individual based on radar and other devices, it does not place such a burden on the prosecutionas Alqahtani claims.3Moreover, Alqahtani fails to offer any support for the notion that an officer must state the reason for a trafficstop before requesting identification from a driver, nor can we find any such requirement in the law to thateffect.End of Document© 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.
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