February 26, 2001 appeal was premature and ineffective to confer appellate jurisdiction to review the district court’s final judgment, entered on March 2, 2001, which disposed of all claims asserted in the complaint. Stoney Point argues that Underwood erred in failing to file a notice of appeal within 30 days of the final judgment as required by Fed. R.App. P. 4(a)(1)(A).
Underwood opposes dismissal, arguing that his notice of appeal was timely filed within 30 days of the court’s January 29, 2001 order denying him leave to file a motion for reconsideration. Underwood argues that the district court’s January 29, 2001 order contained a declaration that its December 22, 2000 order granting partial summary judgment was “final,” thus, Underwood’s time to appeal began to run from the date of the court’s January 29, 2001 declaration. Underwood additionally asserts that “[a]ll claims need not be finally determined before an appeal is pursued. The only requirement is that the claim being appealed is final.”
Underwood is mistaken as to when a judgment is final for purposes of judicial review. Absent certification under Fed. R.Civ.P. 54(b), a judgment disposing of only some asserted claims is not final for appeal purposes. See Aleut Tribe v. United, States, 702 F.2d 1015, 1020 (Fed.Cir.1983) (“an appeal from an Order that disposes of only some claims of an action may not be made without waiting for a decision on the remainder of the case, unless the requirements of Rule 54(b) of the Federal Rule of Civil Procedure are met”); see also 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a) (this court has jurisdiction “of an appeal from a final decision of the district court of the United States ... if the jurisdiction of that court was based, in whole or in part, on section 1338 of this title”). In addition, contrary to Underwood’s assertion, a notice of appeal must be filed “within 30 days after the judgment ... is entered,” not within 30 days of an order declaring a judgment to be “final.”2 Fed. R.App. P. 4(a)(1)(A); 28 U.S.C. § 2107. While the district court granted partial summary judgment on the infringement and invalidity claims on December 22, 2000, it did not “enter” final judgment until March 2, 2001.
Moreover, Fed. R.App. P. 4(a)(2)3 is unavailable to save Underwood’s premature appeal. In FirsTier Mortgage Company v. Investors Mortgage Insurance Company, 498 U.S. 269, 276, 111 S.Ct. 648, 112 L.Ed.2d 743 (1991), the Supreme Court considered the parameters of Rule 4(a)(2) and stated:
Rule 4(a)(2) was intended to protect the unskilled litigant who files a notice of appeal from a decision that he reasonably but mistakenly believes to be a final judgment, while faffing to file a notice of appeal from the actual final judgment ... In our view, Rule 4(a)(2) permits a notice of appeal from a nonfinal decision to operate as a notice of appeal from the final judgment only when a district court announces a decision that would be appealable if immediately followed by the entry of judgment. In these instances, a litigant’s confusion is understandable,
2
Although Underwood argues otherwise, the district court’s January 29, 2001 order does not contain a declaration as to finality. It merely asserts that a Fed.R.Civ.P. 59(e) motion to amend must be filed within 10 days of judgment and that Underwood’s motion was not submitted within that time period. It does not state that the order was a final judgment for appeal purposes.
3
Fed. R.App. P. 4(a)(2) provides that "[a] notice of appeal filed after the court announces a decision or order—but before the entry of the judgment or order—is treated as filed on the date of and after the entry.”