Thomas v. Pangburn (S.D. Ga. Oct. 6, 2023)

Case details
Country
United States
Jurisdiction
Federal
Court
Southern District of Georgia (S.D. GA)
Decided
Oct. 6, 2023
Disposition
Motion Denied
Majority
Christopher L. Ray (J.) (unanimous Court)
JERRY THOMAS, Plaintiff, v. KENNETH D. PANGBURN, Defendant., Slip Copy (2023) © 2024 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.12023 WL 9425765Only the Westlaw citation is currently available.United States District Court, S.D.Georgia, Savannah Division.JERRY THOMAS, Plaintiff,v.KENNETH D. PANGBURN, Defendant.CV423-046|Filed 10/06/2023ORDER AND REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONCHRISTOPHER L. RAY UNITED STATES MAGISTRATEJUDGE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA*1 Defendant Kenneth D. Pangburn moves to dismiss,doc. 48, Plaintiff Jerry Thomas's Amended Complaint, doc.23. Defendant is the Municipal Court Judge for the Cityof Hinesville and asserts judicial immunity. See doc. 48 at1, 7-9. Since, as explained below, Defendant is immune,the Court RECOMMENDS that his Motion to Dismiss beGRANTED, doc. 48, and Plaintiff's Amended Complaint beDISMISSED, doc. 23. Plaintiff has also moved for entry ofdefault, doc. 55, and to lift the stay on this case, doc. 56. SinceDefendant has not defaulted, Plaintiff's Motion for Entry ofDefault is DENIED. Doc. 55. If the District Judge adopts theundersigned's recommendation that this case be dismissed,Plaintiff's Motion to Lift the Stay should be DENIED asmoot. Doc. 56.I. BACKGROUNDPlaintiff received two citations that required him to appear inthe Hinesville Municipal Court. Doc. 23 at 1. Defendant, theMunicipal Court Judge for the City of Hinesville, oversawboth proceedings. Id. In both cases, Plaintiff challengedthe municipal court's jurisdiction, doc. 23-1 at 2-5, 9-12,and declared that because he had challenged the court'sjurisdiction, the court was stripped of jurisdiction andpowerless to act until the City of Hinesville affirmativelyproved jurisdiction to Plaintiff's satisfaction. Id. at 3-5, 10-12.He warned Defendant that if Defendant proceeded withoutjurisdiction, Defendant would “be violating the plaintiff['s]constitutional rights of due process of law under the 5th,7th, and 14th Amendments.” Doc. 23 at 3, 5. Defendantproceeded. Id. In at least one case, Defendant found that“subject matter and geographical [jurisdiction were] provenat trial” and denied Plaintiff's motion challenging jurisdictionin a handwritten note. Doc. 23-1 at 5.Plaintiff filed two cases against Defendant in this Court—onefor each of his citations and appearances before Defendant.See generally CV423-046 and CV423-047. Because the onlydifferences between the cases were when and for whichcitation Plaintiff appeared before Defendant, the two caseswere consolidated. Doc. 22. Plaintiff subsequently filed anAmended Complaint, brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §1983 like the originals, alleging that Defendant proceededagainst him without jurisdiction and thereby violated hisFifth, Seventh, and Fourteenth Amendment rights. Doc. 23at 2. Defendant now moves to dismiss, doc. 48, Plaintiff'sAmended Complaint, doc. 23, for failure to state a claim uponwhich relief can be granted. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).II. LEGAL STANDARDTo survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must “ ‘state aclaim to relief that is plausible on its face.’ [Cit.] A claimhas facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual contentthat allows the court to draw a reasonable inference that thedefendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroftv. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp.v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 554, 570 (2007)). When consideringa defendant's motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) of theFederal Rules of Civil Procedure, courts will accept all well-pleaded facts as true and construe them in the light mostfavorable to the plaintiff. Belanger v. Salvation Army, 556F.3d 1153, 1155 (11th Cir. 2009). Pro se pleadings areconstrued liberally.1 Bingham v. Thomas, 654 F.3d 1171,1175 (11th Cir. 2011). But the Court need not “accept as truea legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation.” Iqbal,556 U.S. at 678 (internal quotations omitted). Furthermore,“[i]f upon reviewing the pleadings it is clear that the plaintiffwould not be entitled to relief under any set of facts that couldbe proved consistent with the allegations, the court shoulddismiss the complaint.” Horsley v. Rivera, 292 F.3d 695,700 (11th Cir. 2002).III. ANALYSIS
JERRY THOMAS, Plaintiff, v. KENNETH D. PANGBURN, Defendant., Slip Copy (2023) © 2024 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.2A. Plaintiff's Motion for Default*2 Before turning to Defendant's Motion to Dismiss, doc.48, the Court must address Plaintiff's Motion for Entry ofDefault, doc. 55. Plaintiff predicates his request for defaultjudgment on the grounds that Defendant did not submitan answer to his Amended Complaint, doc. 23, within 14days as required by Rule 15(a)(3) of the Federal Rulesof Civil procedure. Doc. 55 at 2. Rule 15(a)(3) does notrequire an answer, though — it merely requires a response.A motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) is a responsivepleading. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(a) (entry of default isproper only “[w]hen a party against whom a judgment foraffirmative relief is sought has failed to plead or otherwisedefend”); Guice v. Postmaster General, U.S. Postal Service,747 F. App'x 827, 829 (11th Cir. 2018) (holding that defaultjudgment was not warranted where the defendant timely fileda motion to dismiss). Defendant filed his Motion to Dismisson July 27, 2023, 13 days after Plaintiff filed his AmendedComplaint. See generally docket. Defendant is not in default.Plaintiff's Motion for Entry of Default is, therefore, DENIED.Doc. 55. See, e.g., Jerome v. Barcelo Crestline, Inc., 2007 WL4224782, at *2 (N.D. Ga. Nov. 27, 2007) (denial of entry ofdefault is non-dispositive within the meaning of 28 U.S.C.§ 636(b)(1)(A).B. Defendant's Motion to DismissDefendant argues in his Motion to Dismiss that he is entitledto judicial immunity and that Plaintiff failed to state a claimfor equitable relief against him. Doc. 48 at 7-9. Specifically,he argues that he is entitled to absolute judicial immunityfrom monetary damages, id. at 7-8, and that Plaintiff has notpled a “ ‘really extraordinary cause[ ]’ ” sufficient to justifydeclaratory or injunctive relief, id. at 9 (quoting Pulliam v.Allen, 466 U.S. 522, 538 (1984)).The Court turns first to the issue of absolute judicialimmunity and monetary damages. As an initial matter,municipal judges are generally entitled to judicial immunity.See e.g., Harris v. Deveaux, 780 F.2d 911 (11th Cir. 1986)(finding Georgia municipal court judge entitled to judicialimmunity). Cf. McCullough v. Finley, 907 F.3d 1324(11th Cir. 2018) (Alabama municipal court judges entitledto judicial immunity). When determining whether a judgeenjoys immunity from monetary damages, courts consider:(1) whether the judge dealt with the plaintiff in a judicialcapacity and (2) whether the judge acted in the “clearabsence of all jurisdiction.” Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S.349, 356-62 (1978) (emphasis added); see also Dykes v.Hosemann, 776 F.2d 942, 945 (11th Cir. 1985) (applying theStump test). Plaintiff does not contest—and there can be noquestion—that Defendant dealt with Plaintiff in a judicialcapacity; Plaintiff's complaint is based on Defendant's actionswhile presiding over two court proceedings against Plaintiff.Doc. 23 at 1, 3-5. See Harper v. Merckle, 638 F.2d 848,858 (5th Cir. 1981) (listing the “precise act complained of [...]is a normal judicial function” and “the controversy centeredaround a case then pending before the judge” as factors thatsuggest a judicial act).2Plaintiff does, however, contest Defendant's jurisdiction.Plaintiff argues that when he challenged the municipal court'sjurisdiction, he thereby robbed the court of all jurisdictionover him until the prosecution established it. Docs. 23 at1-2; 50 at 2. Because that jurisdictional challenge supposedlystripped the municipal court of its jurisdiction, Defendantacted in the “clear absence of all jurisdiction” in allowingthe cases against Plaintiff to go forward. Stump, 435U.S. at 356-57. Plaintiff is mistaken. Challenging a court'sjurisdiction does not strip that court of jurisdiction. A courthas jurisdiction, or it does not. Whether jurisdiction existsis a matter of law. No “challenge” to jurisdiction altersits existence. Despite Plaintiff's repeated citations to lawhe erroneously believes says otherwise,3 “the question ofjurisdiction is ... one for judicial determination.” ChicotCnty. Drainage Dist. v. Baxter State Bank, 308 U.S. 371,377 (1940). A “court has the authority to pass upon its ownjurisdiction ....” Id. In at least one of the cases against Plaintiff,Defendant found that his court had jurisdiction over Plaintiff.See doc. 23-1 at 7 (Defendant finding that “subject matterand geographic [jurisdiction had been] proven at trial” anddenying Plaintiff's motion challenging jurisdiction).*3 More importantly, this Court finds that Defendant infact had subject matter jurisdiction in both cases. Defendantis a municipal court judge and presided over trials onPlaintiff's traffic citations.4 Doc. 23 at 1. Georgia municipalcourts “hav[e] jurisdiction over the violation of municipalordinances.” O.C.G.A. § 36-32-1; see also O.C.G.A. §36-32-10.2 (stating that misdemeanor offenses and ordinance
JERRY THOMAS, Plaintiff, v. KENNETH D. PANGBURN, Defendant., Slip Copy (2023) © 2024 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.3violations “may be tried upon a uniform traffic citation,summons, citation, or accusation”). Defendant had subjectmatter jurisdiction when he presided over trials on Plaintiff'straffic citations. A judge with subject matter jurisdiction doesnot act in the “clear absence of all jurisdiction.” Stump, 435U.S. at 356-57. See Dykes, 776 F.2d at 947-50 (holdingthat judges are entitled to absolute judicial immunity wherethey have subject matter jurisdiction, regardless of whetherthey have personal jurisdiction). Therefore, Defendant isentitled to absolute judicial immunity and cannot be liablefor monetary damages. To the extent Plaintiff seeks monetarydamages, he has failed to state a claim upon which relief canbe granted. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).Next, the Court considers the availability of declaratory andinjunctive relief. While “judicial immunity is not a bar toprospective injunctive relief against a judicial officer actingin her judicial capacity,” Pulliam, 466 U.S. at 541-42,to obtain “declaratory or injunctive relief, plaintiffs mustestablish that there was a violation, that there is serious riskof continuing irreparable injury if the relief is not granted,and the absence of an adequate remedy at law,” Bolin v.Story, 225 F.3d 1234, 1242 (11th Cir. 2000). Plaintiff's requestfor relief fails because he cannot show the absence of anadequate remedy at law because he had the right to appealDefendant's rulings. See O.C.G.A. § 5-3-4(a)–(b) (grantingsuperior and state courts appellate jurisdiction “over a finaljudgment of a lower judicatory”); O.C.G.A. § 15-6-8(4)(B) (establishing superior courts' jurisdiction “[t]o exercise ageneral supervision over all inferior tribunals and to reviewand correct... the judgments of” among other “[m]unicipalcourts”); Smith v. Gwinnett Cnty., 542 S.E.2d 616, 617(Ga. Ct. App. 2000) (explaining the scope of superiorcourts' appellate jurisdiction). A state appellate process isan adequate remedy at law. Sibley v. Lando, 437 F.3d1067, 1074 (11th Cir. 2005) (per curiam); see also Tarver v.Reynolds, 808 F. App'x 752, 755 (11th Cir. 2020) (holdingdeclaratory and injunctive relief was improper because thereexisted “an adequate remedy at law: appeal through the state-court system”). That Plaintiff may have taken advantage ofhis right to appeal and was unsuccessful, see doc. 48 at 11, hasno bearing on the adequacy of the appeals process as a remedyat law. See e.g., Tarver, 808 F. App'x at 753 (finding the state-court appellate process to be an adequate remedy at law soas to prohibit injunctive or declaratory relief in the federalsystem even though the plaintiff had been unsuccessful inhis state-court appeals). Plaintiff's claim seeking declaratoryor injunctive relief, therefore, fail as a matter of law. To theextent Plaintiff seeks declaratory or injunctive relief, he hasfailed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Fed.R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).*4 For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiff is not entitledto monetary damages or declaratory or injunctive relief.Absolute judicial immunity bars monetary recovery, seeDykes, 776 F.2d at 947-50; the availability of the state-court appeals process bars declaratory and injunctive relief,Sibley, 437 F.3d at 1074. These are the only forms ofrelief Plaintiff seeks. Doc. 23 at 5 (requesting “injunctiverelief commanding [D]efendant to take correctional classes,”“a letter of apology” acknowledging “mistakes andwrongfulness,” and $100,000).5 As a matter of law, and forthe reasons stated above, he is not entitled to such relief. Infact, “it is clear that the plaintiff would not be entitled torelief under any set of facts that could be proved consistentwith the allegations.” Horsley, 292 F.3d at 700 (emphasisadded). Because Plaintiff is not entitled to any relief, he hasnecessarily failed to state a claim upon which relief could begranted. See id.; Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). On these groundsalone, the Court RECOMMENDS the case be DISMISSED.Defendant makes several other arguments in his motion todismiss. See doc. 48 at 6-7, 9-12. It is not necessary toaddress Defendant's remaining arguments because Plaintiff isnot entitled to any form of relief and his case should thereforebe dismissed. Horsley 929 F.3d at 700.C. Sanctions Against PlaintiffThe defects in Plaintiff's claims notwithstanding, he stillowes this Court an explanation—and, perhaps, a monetarysanction. Rule 11(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedurepermits courts to impose sanctions, including monetarysanctions, on any party that “present[s] to the court a pleading,written motion, or other paper” for “any improper purposes,such as to harass, cause unnecessary delay, or needlesslyincrease the cost of litigation,” Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(b)(1), or thatincludes frivolous arguments or “claims, defenses, and otherlegal contentions ... [un]warranted by existing law.” Fed. R.Civ. P. 11(b)(2). Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(c)(4)–(5). Pursuant tothose provisions, the Court directed Plaintiff to explain whatappeared to be intentionally misleading citations. See doc. 15at 2-14. As discussed below, he never provided an adequateexplanation.
JERRY THOMAS, Plaintiff, v. KENNETH D. PANGBURN, Defendant., Slip Copy (2023) © 2024 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.4Plaintiff failed to comply with Orders directing him toexplain the intent and origin of citations which did notlead to any valid authority but were designed to appearvalid throughout his briefing in this case. See docs. 37& 39; see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(c)(3) (granting courtspermission to order a party “to show cause why conductspecifically described in the order has not violated” Rule11(b)). After Defendant informed the Court that his counselcould not locate many of the cases Plaintiff referenced,the Court reviewed Plaintiff's response to the Court's Orderconcerning consolidation, doc. 12, and identified ten casesPlaintiff cited that simply did not exist. See doc. 15 at 2-11.Yet the cases appeared legitimate, conforming to expectedcitation conventions. Because Plaintiff cited real authorityin his other submissions to the Court, see, e.g., doc. 32,the Court could not conclude that the false citations werethe result of excusable mistakes. Doc. 15 at 12. Instead,they might represent an “ ‘improper purpose’ or a completefailure to conduct an ‘investigation reasonable under thecircumstances.’ ” Id. at 13. Concerned that Plaintiff's fictitiouscitations might “have a more nefarious purpose,” id. at 12,the Court ordered Plaintiff to show cause why he shouldnot be sanctioned, id. at 14. Plaintiff apologized for “anyunintentional mistakes,” doc. 16 at 1, but did not explainwhere the erroneous citations came from. See generally id.The Court directed Plaintiff on June 8, 2023, to “explainhow the erroneous citations identified in the Court's priorOrder came to appear in his submissions” so the Court could“determine whether sanctions [were] required.” Doc. 17 at 2.Plaintiff's explanation was due to the Court no later than June27, 2023. Id. That deadline was extended, sua sponte, untilAugust 1, 2023. Doc. 46 at 2. Though Plaintiff eventuallyresponded to the Order, his explanation of the fabricatedcases' origins was severely lacking. Doc. 47. He offered that“the citations in question were included due to an unfortunateerror on [his] part,” explaining that he “relied on research [he]conducted by [him]self” and “assumed the citations providedwere accurate and reliable.” Id. at 1. Plaintiff did not explainwhat sources he relied on during his research or where hefound the sham cases.*5 A court may impose Rule 11 sanctions “ ‘when theparty files a pleading in bad faith for an improper purpose.’” Worldwide Primates, Inc., v. McGreal, 87 F.3d 1252,1254 (11th Cir. 1996) (quoting Jones v. Int'l RidingHelmets, Ltd., 49 F.3d 692, 694 (11th Cir. 1995)). Whilethe Court accepts Plaintiff's apology for his fake citations,docs. 39 at 2 & 47 at 1-2, his failure to explain their origincasts doubt on his intentions again. The Court considersboth Plaintiff's use of fictitious citations and his evasiveresponse to a direct order from this Court in determiningwhether sanctions are required. “Many harms flow from thesubmission of fake opinions.” Mata v. Avianca, Inc., ___F. Supp. 3d ___, 2023 WL 4114965, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. June22, 2023). Fake citations waste both the Court's and theopposing party's time and resources, cast doubt on “judgesand courts whose names are falsely invoked as authors of thebogus opinions” and the “part[ies] attributed with fictionalconduct,” and “promote[ ] cynicism about the legal professionand the American judicial system.” Id. Both considerations—the harms Plaintiff's fictitious citations caused and hisnonresponse to the Court's Order to explain their origin—weigh heavily against Plaintiff. The Court finds Plaintiffhas engaged in bad faith by “delaying or disrupting thelitigation [through the fictitious citations and by] hamperingenforcement of a court order.” In re Sunshine Jr. Stores,Inc., 456 F.3d 1291, 1304 (11th Cir. 2006) (discussingcourts' inherent power to impose sanctions). Sanctions areappropriate in this instance.The Court has discretion in deciding what sanctions toimpose. Sanctions are only “limited to what suffices to deterrepetition of the conduct or comparable conduct by otherssimilarly situated,” Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(c)(4), and can bemonetary or nonmonetary directives, including dismissal.See. e.g., McDonald v. Emory Healthcare Eye Center, 391F. App'x 851, 853 (11th Cir. 2010) (holding that a districtcourt did not abuse its discretion in dismissing a Petitioner'scomplaint as a sanction for numerous Rule 11(b) violations).The Court believes that dismissal is an appropriate sanctionthat is sufficient to “deter repetition of the conduct orcomparable conduct by other similarly situated.” Fed. R. Civ.P. 11(c)(4); see also Dawson v. Lennon, 797 F.2d 934,935 (11th Cir. 1986) (“[W]hile dismissal of an action withprejudice is a sanction of last resort, it is appropriate incases involving bad faith.”). Monetary sanctions would also,under the circumstances, appear excessively harsh. See doc.38 at 1 (Plaintiff acknowledging that the potential monetarysanctions talked about in the Court's Order, doc. 37 at 13,“would have severe personal consequences”); see also docketentry dated Feb. 27, 2023 (payment of $402 filing fee);Thomas v. Pangburn, CV423-047, docket entry dated Feb. 27,2023 (same). Although dismissal of these claims as a sanctionfor his conduct may be redundant, given the discussion oftheir merits above, the Court is satisfied that it is a sufficientdeterrent, under the totality of the circumstances.
JERRY THOMAS, Plaintiff, v. KENNETH D. PANGBURN, Defendant., Slip Copy (2023) © 2024 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.5The Court also notes here that Defendant asserts thatPlaintiff's arguments in his underlying challenges to theMunicipal Court's jurisdiction are frivolous because theyassert “sovereign citizen” theories. Doc. 48 at 6-7. Sovereigncitizens “believe they are not subject to the jurisdiction ofthe courts.” United States v. Sterling, 738 F.3d, 228, 233n.1 (11th Cir. 2013). Courts have repeatedly and summarilyrejected sovereign citizen arguments as frivolous. See e.g.,id.; United States v. Benabe, 654 F.3d 753, 761-67 (7thCir. 2011) (recommending that sovereign citizen theories “berejected summarily, however they are presented”); Roachv. Arrisi, 2016 WL 8943290, at *2 (M.D. Fla. Jan. 7,2016) (noting that sovereign citizen theories have not onlybeen consistently rejected by the courts, but they have beendescribed as “utterly frivolous,” “patently ludicrous,” and “awaste of [the plaintiff's] time as well as the court's time”);Townsend v. Georgia, 2019 WL 1009421, at *2 (S.D. Ga.Feb. 11, 2019) (holding the same). Rule 11(b) prohibits thesubmission of frivolous arguments to the Court and Rule11(c) allows the Court to sanction parties who submit sucharguments.*6 Defendant is correct to flag some of Plaintiff's argumentsas characteristic of a frivolous sovereign citizen claim.6 Doc.48 at 3-5, 6-7. For example, Plaintiff strongly objects tothe term “pro se,” instead insisting that he is proceeding“in propia persona sui juris,” doc. 23 at 1, and arguingbefore the municipal court that he was “in Propia personasui juris, a natural person specially appearing in his ownright being of sound, mind, body, soul and spirit,” doc. 23-1at 2, 9. Sovereign citizens often believe there is a material,legal difference between identifying as a pro se plaintiffor defendant and identifying as a “natural person,” “humanbeing,” or “living soul.” See e.g., Trevino v. Florida, 687 F.App'x 861, 862 (11th Cir. 2017) (dismissing as frivolous asovereign citizen lawsuit filed by a “living, breathing, fleshand blood human being”); Townsend, 2019 WL 1009421, at*2 n. 3 (noting that a plaintiff referring “to himself in thethird person as ‘a living Human being’ and ‘living soul’ isalso typical of such frivolous sovereign-citizen claptrap”).There is not. Plaintiff also premises his complaint on themunicipal court's supposed lack of jurisdiction over him,insisting that his challenge to jurisdiction “did, in fact, deprivethe court of subject matter jurisdiction.” Doc. 50 at 4. Heasserts that courts have no power to determine their ownjurisdiction, doc. 23 at 4, and that whenever a judge actswithout jurisdiction, “the judge is engaged in [an] act or actsof treason.” Id. at 2. As already stated, sovereign citizens“believe they are not subject to the jurisdiction of the courts”and often make baseless jurisdictional challenges or deny acourt's jurisdiction altogether. Sterling, 738 F.3d at 233n.1. Whether Thomas acknowledges the label “sovereigncitizen,” then, his pleadings in this Court and those he filed inthe Municipal Court, which form the basis of his claims, arequite obviously of that ilk.Though frivolous, Plaintiff's sovereign citizen arguments donot merit sanctions for two reasons. First, Rule 11(c)(1) ofthe Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requires notice and areasonable opportunity to respond before the imposition ofsanction. The Court raises the possibility of sanctions forPlaintiff's frivolous arguments for the first time here today,meaning Plaintiff has had no notice or opportunity to respondto the allegations that his claim is frivolous and sanctions maybe appropriate. Even where a party has violated Rule 11(b),the Court cannot impose sanctions without first issuing “a‘show-cause’ order to provide notice and an opportunity to beheard.” Kaplan v. DaimlerChrysler, A.G., 331 F.3d 1251,1255 (11th Cir. 2003). Second, Plaintiff does not raise thesearguments in this Court. While the underlying bases for hisclaims against Defendant involve the sovereign-citizen-esqueargument that he had the ability to strip the municipal courtof its jurisdictional power, Plaintiff does not challenge thisCourt's jurisdiction. And though he may submit his filings“in propia persona sui juris,” doc. 23 at 1, he does notattempt to claim any special rights or considerations as a“natural person specially appearing in his own right being ofsound, mind, body, soul and spirit” like he did in Defendant'scourt, doc. 23-1 at 2, 9. For the above reasons, sanctioningPlaintiff for relying on frivolous sovereign citizen theories isinappropriate.Now, however, Plaintiff has been informed that ajurisdictional challenge does not strip a court of jurisdictionand that courts have the power to determine their ownjurisdiction. Chicot Cnty. Drainage Dist. v. Baxter StateBank, 308 U.S. 372, 377 (1940). He is also aware nowthat identifying himself as “in propia persona” or “in propiapersona sui juris” does not change the Court's analysis of hisclaim or confer upon him any special benefit or consideration.“Pro se” simply means that a party is filing for himself, onhis own behalf, without a lawyer, Pro Se, BLACK'S LAWDICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019); an unrepresented party whorefers to themselves as a pro se does not put themselves atany kind of disadvantage. It is the correct term to use and the
JERRY THOMAS, Plaintiff, v. KENNETH D. PANGBURN, Defendant., Slip Copy (2023) © 2024 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.6one courts expect to see. Plaintiff is advised that future filingsrelying on a similar frivolous sovereign citizen theory couldlead to Rule 11 sanctions.IV. CONCLUSION*7 Defendant enjoys absolute judicial immunity againstclaims for monetary damages and Plaintiff's claims seekingdeclaratory or injunctive relief fail as a matter of law.Because Plaintiff is not entitled to any relief, this case shouldbe DISMISSED. Alternatively, his Amended Complaintshould be DISMISSED as a sanction pursuant to Rule11(b). Because the Court believes that dismissal, given thediscussion above, is sufficient to deter Plaintiff from theconduct he has engaged in here, the Court will not imposemonetary sanctions on Plaintiff at this time. It hopes that ifPlaintiff should ever appear before this Court again, he willdraw on this experience to avoid any future sanctions.This report and recommendation (R&R) is submitted to thedistrict judge assigned to this action, pursuant to 28 U.S.C.§ 636(b)(1)(B) and this Court's Local Rule 72.3. Within 14days of service, any party may file written objections tothis R&R with the Court and serve a copy on all parties.The document should be captioned “Objections to MagistrateJudge's Report and Recommendations.” Any request foradditional time to file objections should be filed with theClerk for consideration by the assigned district judge.After the objections period has ended, the Clerk shall submitthis R&R together with any objections to the assigned districtjudge. The district judge will review the magistrate judge'sfindings and recommendation pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §636(b)(1)(C). The parties are advised that failure to timely fileobjections will result in the waiver of rights on appeal. 11thCir. R. 3-1; see Symonette v. V.A. Leasing Corp., 648 F. App'x787, 790 (11th Cir. 2016); Mitchell v. United States, 612 F.App'x 542, 545 (11th Cir. 2015).SO REPORTED AND RECOMMENDED, this 6th day ofOctober, 2023.All CitationsSlip Copy, 2023 WL 9425765Footnotes1Plaintiff strongly objects to being called a pro se. See docs. 23 at 1, 5-6; 23-1 at 2, 5, 7, 9-10, 12, 14-16. TheCourt notes, however, that he is proceeding on his “own behalf; without a lawyer.” Pro Se, BLACK'S LAWDICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019).2In Bonner v. City of Prichard, 661 F.2d 1206, 1209, (11th Cir. 1981) (en banc), the Eleventh Circuitadopted as binding precedent all decisions of the former Fifth Circuit handed down prior to October 1, 1981.3Plaintiff relies heavily on Rescue Army v. Mun. Ct. of City of Los Angeles, 171 P.2d 8 (Cal. 1946), for theproposition that “ ‘[a] court has no jurisdiction to determine its own jurisdiction.’ ” Doc. 23 at 3, 5; see also docs.23-1 at 3, 10; 50 at 2. As Defendant points out in his reply brief, doc. 54 at 1, Rescue Army holds that courtsdo have jurisdiction to determine their own jurisdiction. See Rescue Army, 171 P.2d at 11. Furthermore,the quote Plaintiff recites appears nowhere in that case. This is not Plaintiff's first mistake of this kind. Seeinfra section III(b). Even if Rescue Army said what Plaintiff asserts that it does, it is, charitably, obscure whatforce a decision by the California Supreme Court has in a United States District Court considering a claimunder federal law.4Plaintiff does not say what he received citations for in his Amended Complaint. See e.g., doc. 23 at 1 (sayinghe “was given a Citation ... on a matter of Precept for Enforcement”). However, “a court may take noticeof another court's order ... for the limited purpose of recognizing ... the subject matter of the litigation.”United States v. Jones, 29 F.3d 1549, 1553 (11th Cir. 1994); see also Fed. R. Evid. 201 (“A judicially
JERRY THOMAS, Plaintiff, v. KENNETH D. PANGBURN, Defendant., Slip Copy (2023) © 2024 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.7noticed fact must be one not subject to reasonable dispute in that it is ... capable of accurate and readydetermination by resort to sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned.”). Plaintiff appealedDefendant's decisions through the Georgia court system, and an order from the Georgia Court of Appealsreveals that Plaintiff was charged “with several traffic offenses.” Thomas v. City of Hinesville, No. A22A1058Ga. App. Ct. Apr. 27, 2022, at 1, available at https://www.gaappeals.us/wp-content/themes/benjamin/docket/results_one_record.php?docr_case_num=A22A1058 (last visited Oct. 3, 2023). Pursuant to Rule 201 andJones, the Court takes judicial notice of the Georgia Court of Appeals' Order insofar as it reveals that thesubject matter of Plaintiff's trial before Defendant was traffic citations.5Plaintiff requests slightly different relief in Plaintiff's Opposition to Defendant's Motion to Dismiss than herequests in his Amended Complaint. Doc. 50 at 6-7. Regardless of whether it is appropriate for the Courtto consider a change that was only included in a response brief and was not accompanied by a request toamend the complaint, Plaintiff's new requested relief is still solely comprised of monetary damages and formsof injunctive and declaratory relief—relief he is not entitled to.6While Plaintiff may not refer to himself as a sovereign citizen, his verbiage does not change the fact that headopts sovereign citizen theories. See doc. 50 at 6 (arguing Defendant is wrong to call Plaintiff a “sovereigncitizen” because Plaintiff has been using the term “in proper persona”); Henry v. Fernandez-Rundle, 773 F.App'x 596, 597 (11th Cir. 2019) (“Whether [Plaintiff] wishes to call himself a sovereign citizen or not, it isclear that his complaint is premised on the same types of legal theories advanced by other sovereign citizensseeking to assert immunity from prosecution.”).End of Document© 2024 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.
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