religious freedoms are curtailed by prison officials, the Government must show compelling justification for such deprivations. Barnett v. Rodgers, 133 U.S. App.D.C. 296, 410 F.2d 995 (1969); accord, Walker v. Blackwell, 411 F.2d 23 (5th Cir. 1969), citing Jackson v. Godwin, 400 F.2d 529 (5th Cir. 1968), and Long v. Parker, 390 F.2d 816 (3d Cir. 1968). If, in the case of convicted prisoners, “stringent standards are to be applied to governmental restrictions [of religious practices], and rigid scrutiny must be brought to bear on the justifications for encroachments on such rights,”9 then it seems to follow that, in the case of an untried detainee who is not a disciplinary problem, even more rigid standards ought to be brought to bear.
The error of the district court resides in its granting defendant's motion for summary judgment. Summary judgment is proper only when “there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ.P.Rule 56(c). “Any doubt as to the existence of a genuine issue of fact is to be resolved against the moving party. . . Documents filed in support of a motion for summary judgment are to be used to determine whether issues of fact exist and
not to decide the fact issues themselves.”
Krieger v. Ownership Corp., 270 F.2d 265, 270 (3d Cir. 1959);
accord, Bowman Steel Corp. v. Lumbermens Mutual Casualty Co., 364 F.2d 246 (3d Cir. 1966); Janek v. Cele-brezze, 336 F.2d 828 (3d Cir. 1964). The burden of demonstrating the justification for a motion for summary judgment lies with the movant. Adickes v. S. H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 153-161, 90 S.Ct. 1598, 26 L.Ed.2d 142 (1969).
Here, viewing the inferences flowing from the facts alleged in the complaint “in the light most favorable to the party opposing the motion [for summary judgment],”10 we conclude that defendant has failed to demonstrate his entitlement to summary judgment. For example, it can be inferred that plaintiff has alleged that the prison regulations are overbroad and that the evidence will show that they were not reasonably related to the maintenance of proper order in the prison, or that they were unreasonably applied to him. In addition, if daily visits by the Chaplain would satisfy the constitutional standards, a dispute still exists whether those visits were in fact made. Furthermore, defendant has placed into controversy the bona fides of plaintiff’s claim that he is a practicing Catholic. Triable issues exist, therefore, as to the breadth and reasonableness of the prison regulations as applied to untried detainees who do not present disciplinary problems, whether the Chaplain conducted daily visits to the maximum security cell-block, and also, whether plaintiff was in fact a Catholic at all.
Although the district court did not ground its action on mootness, the defendant argued both here and below that the case was moot because plaintiff at the time of argument could have attended congregate religious services. However, we have noted that alleviation of an alleged constitutional violation does not moot a prisoner’s claim for actual and punitive damages. Wilson v. Prasse, 404 F.2d 1380, 1382 n.3 (3d Cir. 1968).11 And in view of the recent Su
9
Jackson v. Godwin, 400 F.2d at 541.
10
Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., supra, at 158-159, 90 S.Ct. at 1609, quoting United States v. Diebold, Inc., 369 U.S. 654, 655, 82 S.Ct. 993, 8 L.Ed.2d 176 (1962).
11
Section 1983 actions should “be read against the background of tort liability that makes a man responsible for the natural consequences of Ms actions.” *151Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 163, 187, 81 S.Ct. 473, 484, 5 L.Ed.2d 492 (1961). The underlying philosophy of tort law that allows pecuniary recovery for injuries, even after they have healed, is that the plaintiff should be compensated for the harm he has suffered. Money damages may constitute appropriate relief in Section 1983 eases. Monroe v. Pape, supra; Sostre v. McGinnis, 442 F.2d 178, 205 (2nd Cir. 1971); accord, Basista v. Weir, 340 F.2d 74 (3rd Cir. 1965).