are originally designed as unabrasive or relatively non-abrasive, it would be illogical to conclude that his patent could be infringed by a belt designed and manufactured as an abrasive instrument but which became relatively non-abrasive because it was worn by use. This was referred to on several occasions during the progress of the trial and none of the witnesses for GPC were ever able to give the Court a satisfactory formula by which it could be told when an 8/0, 9/0, or 10/0 belt ceased to be abrasive and became an infringer of the process in the Alexander patent.”
We affirm this finding also.
General Plywood described its treating belt as “non-abrasive” or “relatively non-abrasive,” “non-metallic,” “flexible,” and “yielding.” None of these descriptive terms are appropriate to describe the 10/0 aluminum oxide grit sandpapers which United States Plywood employed.
We do not ignore General Plywood’s argument that U. S. Plywood’s results were really achieved by either the crushing of the grit on the “modified” belts, or the use of worn belts, or by the rapid filling of the belts with wood particles so as to terminate any substantial abrasive action. We have, however, noted in the record testimony which certainly constitutes substantial evidence that the 10/0 sanding employed by U. S. Plywood did remove significant amounts of stock. Observers testified to visible dust and the necessity of dust collectors on the “Micro-Fine” process where General Plywood contends such were not necessary in microsealing.
Infringement is generally a question of fact for the trial court. On review this court does not reverse a finding of noninfringement unless we can say it is “clearly erroneous.” Rule 52(a) Fed.R.Civ.P.; Toledo Scale Corp. v. Westinghouse Electric Corp., 351 F.2d 173 (C.A. 6, 1965); Maytag v. Murray Corp. of America, 318 F.2d 79, 82 (C.A. 6, 1963).
We do not think that this record allows us to say that the District Judge’s finding of noninfringement was “clearly erroneous.” The trial judge heard extensive testimony for 40 trial days. Much of the evidence on infringement was conflicting. We think the view he took of the evidence was at least a “permissible” one and hence not clearly erroneous. United States v. Yellow Cab Co., 338 U.S. 338, 342, 70 S.Ct. 177, 94 L.Ed. 150 (1949).
Over and above what we have already said on the issue of infringement and at least somewhat persuasive to us is the fact that the record appears to demonstrate that what U. S. Plywood did was essentially to move a fine sanding operation which was already being used in the industry for finish polishing to an earlier point in the production process and apply it to wood in the white panels. If Alexander’s patent should be broadly enough construed so as to apply to this operation, then it would be hard to ascribe to it the novelty, as opposed to prior-art, which is required for invention.
The District Judge found that General Plywood was not guilty of misuse of its patent. We agree. This record provides no indication that the patent in suit is being employed for leverage to sell either other patents or other unpatented goods and services. Morton Salt Co. v. G. S. Suppiger Co., 314 U.S. 488, 62 S.Ct. 402, 86 L.Ed. 363 (1942); Rocform Corp. v. Acitelli-Standard Concrete Wall, Inc., 367 F.2d 678 (C.A. 6, 1966).
U. S. Plywood alleges that the product “tied-in” was a resin sold by Reichhold Chemical, Inc. But no microseal licensee was required to purchase this resin; nor was any company refused a license under the Alexander patent because of failure to purchase this resin.
The District Judge also found that U. S. Plywood had not been guilty of breach of trust.