United States v. (1) (Aug. 27, 2025)

Case details
Full caption
United States v. Michael Shane DeBaere (1)
Country
United States
Jurisdiction
Federal
Decided
Aug. 27, 2025
Disposition
Motion Denied
Majority
Elizabeth K. Dillon Chief (J.) (unanimous Court)
© 2025 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.UNITED STATES OF AMERICA v. MICHAEL SHANEDEBAEREUnited States District Court, W.D. Virginia, DANVILLE DIVISION. | August 27, 2025 | Slip Copy |2025 WL 2474926Document Detailsstandard Citation:UNITED STATES OF AMERICA v. MICHAEL SHANE DEBAERE,No. 4:19-CR-00009, 2025 WL 2474926 (W.D. Va. Aug. 27, 2025)All Citations:Slip Copy, 2025 WL 2474926Search DetailsSearch Query:adv: (openai "artificial intelligence" chatgpt "google gemini" "westlawcocounsel" "large language model") (hallucinat! fake fictitious spuriousnonexistent "non-existent" "made up" imagined /p (gpt ai "artificialintelligence" chatgpt chaton perplexity openai copilot "google gemini""google bard" grok "mata v. avianca" claude llm llms)) (hallucinat! fakefictitious spurious nonexistent "non-existent" "made up" imagined) +3(precedent case "legal authority" "legal case") & DATE(aft 1/1/2023)Jurisdiction:VirginiaDelivery DetailsDate:September 5, 2025 at 11:08 AMDelivered By: Client ID:NOCLIENTIDOutlineMEMORANDUMOPINION ANDORDER (p.1)All Citations (p.7)
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA v. MICHAEL SHANE DEBAERE, Slip Copy (2025) © 2025 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.12025 WL 2474926Only the Westlaw citation is currently available.United States District Court, W.D. Virginia,DANVILLE DIVISION.UNITED STATES OF AMERICAv.MICHAEL SHANE DEBAERECriminal Action No. 4:19-cr-00009|Filed 08/27/2025MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDERElizabeth K. Dillon Chief United States District Judge*1 Pending before the court are two pro se motionsfiled by defendant Michael Shane DeBaere: (1) amotion for early termination of supervised release(Mot. for Early Term. Sup. Rel., Dkt. No. 32); and (2) amotion to compel production of the probation office'ssupervision report (Mot. to Compel 1–5, Dkt. No. 38).No party has requested a hearing, and the court findsthat one is unnecessary to resolve these matters. For thereasons set forth below, both motions will be denied.I. BACKGROUNDThis is DeBaere's second motion for early terminationof supervised release within a two-year span. Thecourt's previous order denying his initial motionprovides a more detailed overview of the transferof his case from the United States District Courtfor the Middle District of North Carolina, as wellas subsequent modifications to his conditions ofsupervised release. (See Dkt. No. 31.)In brief, on February 25, 2015, DeBaere was sentencedto 70 months of imprisonment and 15 years ofsupervised release after pleading guilty to the crime ofaccessing, with intent to view, child pornography. (J.1–3, Dkt. No. 1-2.) He is currently in the sixth year ofhis supervised release, which is set to end on March 7,2034. (Order Transferring Jurisdiction 1, Dkt. No. 1.)The court denied DeBaere's first motion for earlytermination of supervised release primarily due tothe serious nature of his underlying offense, whichinvolved over 1,300 images of child pornography—including depictions of sadistic or masochisticconduct, bondage of children, and images ofprepubescent minors. (See generally Dkt. No. 31.) Atthe time, DeBaere had served less than five years—under one-third—of his 15-year supervised releaseterm.1 While acknowledging DeBaere's compliancewith the conditions of his supervised release andpersonal progress, the court emphasized that neithercompliance nor the passage of time alone justifies earlytermination. Given these factors and the continuingneed for deterrence and public safety, the court foundearly termination to be unwarranted. However, itclarified that the ruling “does not preclude DeBaerefrom seeking early termination of supervised release inthe future.” (Id. at 4 n.1.)Having now served over five years of supervisedrelease, DeBaere filed another motion seeking earlytermination. (Mot. for Early Term. Sup. Rel.) On thesame day, he sent a separate letter to his probationofficer requesting support and a recommendation fortermination of his supervised release, believing suchendorsement would carry significant weight with thecourt. (Probation Rec. Req. 6–12, Dkt. No. 38.) Shortlythereafter, the U.S. Probation Office emailed a two-page letter (hereafter “the report”) directly to thecourt, ultimately recommending that DeBaere remainon supervised release.2*2 Following receipt of the Probation Office's letter,the court ordered the United States to respond toDeBaere's motion. (Dkt. No. 33.) The governmentsubsequently filed its response in opposition. (Dkt.No. 35.) DeBaere then filed a reply in support ofhis motion. (Dkt. No. 36.) In connection with thatfiling, DeBaere submitted a separate motion to compel,seeking a copy of the report provided to the court bythe Probation Office. (Mot. to Compel.) He contendsthat he is entitled to the report and that it is necessaryto adequately respond to the government's opposition.(Id. at 1.) He further requests leave to file a supplementto his reply brief upon receipt and review of the report.(Id. at 5.) Because this report is directly relevant toDeBaere's early termination request, the court will first
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA v. MICHAEL SHANE DEBAERE, Slip Copy (2025) © 2025 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.2address the motion to compel before considering themotion for early termination of supervised release.II. DISCUSSIONA. Motion to Compel Production of the ProbationSupervision Report3Following the government's opposition to his motionfor early termination of supervised release (Dkt. No.35), DeBaere wrote to his probation officer on May6, 2025, requesting a copy of the report submittedby the U.S. Probation Office to the court in responseto his motion. (See First Letter to Probation 13–16,Dkt. No. 38.) He argued that, because the governmentrelied on the report to oppose his motion and the courtmay also rely on it in ruling, access to the report is“critical to [his] ability to respond effectively, correctmisrepresentations, and highlight favorable evidenceof compliance.” (Id. at 14.)When the U.S. Probation Office did not respondpromptly, DeBaere sent a follow-up letter on May15, 2025, requesting an update on the status ofhis request and providing additional support for hisperceived right to access the report. (See SecondLetter to Probation 17–19, Dkt. No. 38.) On May19, 2025, the Probation Office responded by phone,informing DeBaere that the Office does not disclosesuch documents to defendants. (Mot. to Compel at2.) Thereafter, on May 30, 2025, DeBaere filed amotion to “compel the United States Probation Officeto produce all supervision reports, notes, memoranda,correspondence, polygraph results, and other recordsmaintained or submitted by the Probation Office,that document Defendant's compliance, conduct, orrisk assessment, that were submitted in responseto Defendant's Motion for Early Termination ofSupervised Release.” (Mot. to Compel 1.)As a preliminary matter, contrary to DeBaere'scontention, the report was shared exclusively with thecourt. There is nothing in the record to suggest thatthe government had access to the report or relied on itin any way when preparing its response in opposition.Thus, DeBaere's assertion that “the government filedan opposition [ ], referencing a supervision reportprepared by the Probation Office,” is unfounded. (Mot.to Compel 2.) Nowhere in the government's oppositiondoes it reference a probation report.4 (See Dkt. No. 35.)Accordingly, any claim that DeBaere was prejudicedby an inability to fully respond to the government'sopposition—based on the mistaken belief that thegovernment had access to the report while he did not—is without merit. In any event, the court considersthe motion under a narrower lens: whether DeBaerehas a right to access the report submitted solely to thecourt in response to his motion for early terminationof supervised release. For the reasons that follow, thecourt finds that DeBaere has no such right.1. None of the authorities cited by DeBaereestablish any right to access the probation reportsubmitted to the court.*3 DeBaere cites a range of authorities that he claimsentitle him to access the report submitted to the courtin response to his motion for early termination ofsupervised release, including “18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(1),Guide to Judiciary Policy, Vol. 8, Part E, § 220.40,Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 32.1, [ ] theFifth Amendment's Due Process Clause[,]” and other“inherent [court] authority.” (Mot. to Compel 2–3.)The court addresses each in turn.First, 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(1) permits a court to modifya term of supervised release after considering thesentencing factors outlined in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), ifsuch a modification is “warranted by the conduct of thedefendant released and the interest of justice.” Whilethis provision is relevant to the court's considerationof DeBaere's early termination motion, it provides noexpress or implied right for a defendant to access aprobation officer's report submitted in connection withthat motion. Therefore, § 3583(e)(1) does not providea legal basis for disclosure.5Second, DeBaere cites what purports to be a quotationfrom the Guide to Judiciary Policy, Vol. 8, Pt. E,§ 220.40, stating: “When supervision records aresubmitted to the court for proceedings, such asmodification or termination of supervision, [they]shall be made available to the defendant or counsel,unless confidentiality is required to protect thirdparties.” (Mot. to Compel 2.) However, the courtis unable to verify the existence of this provision—§ 220.40 does not exist in the cited volume ofthe Guide, and the quoted language does not appear
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA v. MICHAEL SHANE DEBAERE, Slip Copy (2025) © 2025 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.3in any official source, including statutes, case law,or recognized judiciary policy. It appears that thequotation is entirely fabricated.6 Accordingly, thisfictitious source provides no basis for compellingdisclosure of the probation report.*4 Third, DeBaere cites Federal Rule of CriminalProcedure 32.1, arguing that although the rule does notexplicitly require disclosure of the probation report, “itimplies a right to access evidence used in terminationproceedings to ensure a fair hearing.” (Mot. toCompel 3.) The court disagrees. Nothing in thetext of Rule 32.1 supports such implication, andDeBaere offers no supporting case law to suggestotherwise. While an individual facing a supervisedrelease revocation hearing may be entitled to accessevidence used against him—which could include aprobation report—that scenario is not present here.An early termination motion does not implicate thesame procedural safeguards. Accordingly, Rule 32.1also does not support DeBaere's motion.Fourth, DeBaere argues that the Fifth AmendmentDue Process Clause entitles him to access theprobation report, citing Morrissey v. Brewer, 408U.S. 471 (1972). However, Morrissey addressedprocedural protections in parole revocation—not theearly termination of supervised release. The Court heldthat due process under the Fourteenth Amendmentrequires a parolee to receive notice of the claimedparole violation and an opportunity for a hearing beforeparole can be revoked. Id. at 488–89. In that case,parole was revoked based solely on a parole officer'swritten report, without any notice of the allegations,a hearing, or any opportunity to confront witnessesor challenge the evidence. The Court outlined theminimum due process protections required in thatcontext, including the “disclosure to the parolee ofevidence against him.” Id. at 489. These proceduralprotections apply in the context of parole revocation—not in connection with a motion for early terminationof supervised release, where different interests are atstake. Cf. Greenholtz v. Inmates of Neb. Penal & Corr.Complex, 442 U.S. 1, 9 (1979) (explaining that “parolerelease and parole revocation are quite different”because “[t]here is a crucial distinction between beingdeprived of a liberty one has, as in parole, and beingdenied a conditional liberty that one desires”); Piercev. Kobach, No. 24-3048, 2024 WL 2860044, at *2n.3 (10th Cir. June 6, 2024) (acknowledging same).DeBaere also cites a fictitious case, United States v.Zai, 939 F.3d 740, 746 (6th Cir. 2019), to supporthis due process argument.7 Although two unpublishedSixth Circuit decisions titled United States v. Zaido exist, neither addresses due process rights orthe disclosure of probation materials.8 Accordingly,none of the due process authorities cited by DeBaereestablish a constitutional right to access the probationreport.*5 Fifth, and finally, DeBaere contends that “[c]ourtshave inherent authority to compel production ofdocuments necessary for fair adjudication.” (Mot. toCompel 3.) He relies on United States v. Figurski,545 F.2d 389, 391 (4th Cir. 1976), and United Statesv. Emmett, 749 F.3d 817, 821 (9th Cir. 2014), butneither case supports his argument. In Figurski, theFourth Circuit upheld the district court's refusal togrant a defendant access to the presentence reportof a government witness. 545 F.2d at 392. Thecourt emphasized that, “information contained in apresentence report should not be disclosed to thirdparties unless lifting confidentiality is required to meetthe ends of justice.” Id. at 391. Notably, Figurski arosein the context of a criminal trial, where the defendantsought the report for impeachment purposes duringcross-examination—a markedly different context fromDeBaere's request, which relates to a motion forearly termination of supervised release. Similarly,Emmett is inapposite. Although the case involved amotion for early termination of supervised release,the issue in Emmett was whether the district courthad provided a sufficient explanation for denying themotion. The Ninth Circuit vacated and remanded thedenial because the district court failed to articulate anylegal reasoning or cite any authority. Emmett, 749 F.3dat 820. The court emphasized that the district courtruled on the motion just five days after it was filed,without receiving a response from the government orthe probation office. Id. at 819. Nothing in Emmettsuggests that a defendant is entitled to access probationrecords as part of an early termination motion.Therefore, neither Figurski nor Emmett provides alegal foundation for DeBaere's motion to compel, andhis reliance on them is misplaced.In sum, DeBaere has failed to identify any validlegal authority—constitutional, statutory, procedural,
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA v. MICHAEL SHANE DEBAERE, Slip Copy (2025) © 2025 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.4or otherwise—that entitles him to access the probationreport submitted to the court in response to hismotion for early termination of supervised release.The authorities he relies upon are either fabricated,misquoted, inapposite, or mischaracterized. The courtnow turns to the relevant legal authority thataffirmatively establishes DeBaere is not entitled tosuch disclosure.2. DeBaere is not entitled to the probation report.Although DeBaere cited a fictitious provision of theGuide to Judiciary Policy, Vol. 8, Pt. E (see supraSection II.A.1), this authority nonetheless providesuseful guidance in evaluating his motion to compeldisclosure of the probation report submitted to thecourt in response to his request for early terminationof supervised release. Section 510.10(a) of the Guidestates:While a person may retain a copy of his orher presentence report under Rule 32(e) of theFederal Rules of Criminal Procedure, probationand supervised release files are under the court'sjurisdiction. Disclosure of file content is determinedby the chief probation officer under Guide, Vol. 20,Ch. 8 (Testimony and Production of Records).Furthermore, the United States Probation Office“functions as a legally constituted arm of the judicialbranch, with federal probation officers serving bothas confidential advisors to, and officers of, the UnitedStates District Court.” United States v. Reyes, 283 F.3d446, 470 (2d Cir. 2002) (citing 18 U.S.C. § 3602(a));see also Fuller-Avent v. U.S. Prob. Off., 226 F. App'x1, 2 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (“Federal probation offices areadministrative units of the United States courts, andthus are not subject to the Privacy Act.”). Accordingly,the decision to disclose a probation report preparedin connection with a motion for early termination ofsupervised release lies squarely within the discretionof the court.Federal probation officers are statutorily obligatedto “keep informed, to the degree required by theconditions specified by the sentencing court, as to theconduct and condition of a probationer or a personon supervised release, who is under his supervision,and report his conduct and condition to the sentencingcourt.” 18 U.S.C. § 3603(2). As the Ninth Circuithas recognized, “[o]ff-the-record communicationsbetween judges and probation officers are a normalpart of the administration of justice, and not theleast improper.... [E]ffective supervision calls for freeand informal communication between judges andprobation officers.” In re Jud. Misconduct, 583 F.3d597, 597 (9th Cir. 2009). It is the longstanding practiceof this court to preserve the confidentiality of allcommunications between the Probation Office and thecourt regarding supervised release, absent exceptionalcircumstances. This confidentiality is essential topromoting candid assessments by probation officersand ensuring effective oversight of individuals undersupervision.*6 For these reasons, DeBaere's motion to compeldisclosure of the probation officer's report—preparedexclusively for judicial review in connection with hismotion for early termination of supervised release—will be denied.B. Motion for Early Termination of SupervisedReleaseWith the motion to compel now resolved, the courtturns to DeBaere's request for early termination of hissupervised release. (Mot. for Early Term. Sup. Rel.)Under 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(1), a court may, afterconsidering the factors set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a),“terminate a term of supervised release ... at anytime after the expiration of one year of supervisedrelease ... if it is satisfied that such action is warrantedby the conduct of the defendant and the interest ofjustice.” As at sentencing, courts consider severalfactors, including the nature and circumstances ofthe offense, the history and characteristics of thedefendant, the need for the sentence imposed toafford adequate deterrence, the need to protect thepublic from further crimes of the defendant, and theneed to avoid unwarranted sentence disparities amongsimilarly situated defendants. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a).Courts have discretion whether to grant earlytermination of supervised release, even when theconditions for termination are met. Folks v. UnitedStates, 733 F. Supp. 2d 649, 651 (M.D.N.C. 2010). Inaddition, the inquiry is broader than the individual'sconduct. Id. (citing United States v. Pregent, 190
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA v. MICHAEL SHANE DEBAERE, Slip Copy (2025) © 2025 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.5F.3d 279, 282–83 (4th Cir. 1999). “Circumstances thatjustify early discharge have included exceptionallygood behavior that makes the previously imposedterm of supervised release ‘either too harsh orinappropriately tailored to serve’ general punishmentgoals.” Id. (quoting United States v. Lussier, 104 F.3d32, 36 (2d Cir. 1997)). Neither the passage of time norfull compliance with the terms of supervised releaseare sufficient bases to warrant early termination. Id. at651–52 (collecting cases).In support of his motion, DeBaere emphasizes oversix years of full compliance with the conditionsof his release, including abstaining from controlledsubstances, maintaining lawful employment, avoidingnegative influences, and consistently reporting tohis probation officer. He contends that supervisionis no longer necessary, as he has completedall required programming and has demonstratedmeaningful rehabilitation and reintegration into thecommunity. Although he has actively pursuedalternative employment, he notes that his efforts havebeen unsuccessful—suggesting that the conditions ofsupervision may be hindering his opportunities. Heargues that early termination would remove theseconstraints, further support his reintegration, andexpand the range of opportunities available to him.(Mot. for Early Term. Sup. Rel. 12–16.)The United States opposes the motion, emphasizingthe serious nature of DeBaere's offense and notinghis admission, at the time of the offense, that hewas sexually attracted to young girls and derivedsexual gratification from the images he possessed.The government argues that he may still pose arisk of reoffending, and that continued supervisionis necessary to protect public safety and deter futuremisconduct. It maintains that his request relies solelyon his compliance—an expected condition of release—and lacks any compelling justification for earlytermination. While acknowledging DeBaere's desirefor a “renewed sense of freedom” and commending hiscompliance to date, the government ultimately urgesthe court to deny the motion. (See generally Dkt. No.35.)*7 In his reply, DeBaere reaffirms his position,reiterating that his compliance with his supervisedrelease conditions satisfies the § 3553(a) factors.(See generally Dkt. No. 36.) He argues that thegovernment's opposition improperly relies on “[his]past conduct, speculation, perpetual supervision, non-statutory burdens, and erroneous PSR enhancements,”in violation of § 3583(e)(1)'s “forward-lookingdirective.” (Id. at 1.) He maintains that his supervisionhas already met its rehabilitative and deterrentgoals, and that continued oversight serves no furtherpurpose. Accordingly, he asks the court to grant earlytermination.9 (Id.)The court has also received a letter from DeBaere'sprobation officer, which confirms that he has compliedwith all directives, has been polite and courteousto the probation officer during all interactions, andhas maintained self-employment as a painter, stableresidence with his mother, and ongoing family contact,including frequent visits from his children. However,the probation officer declines to recommend earlytermination, citing guidance under § 360.20(b) ofthe Guide to Judiciary Policy, Vol. 8, Part E, whichstates that officers “should not recommend persons forearly termination who have an identified higher riskto community safety.” The officer further notes thatwhile DeBaere's conduct is commendable, six yearsremains a relatively short period of supervised releasefor a sex offender. The only minor concerns of recordare two inconclusive polygraph results from June andDecember 2022, with no other violations or issuesnoted.While the court commends DeBaere for his continuedcompliance with the terms and conditions of hissupervised release, it is unable to grant earlytermination at this time. A renewed analysis of thesentencing factors set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)does not support early termination and, in large part,reflects the same reasoning articulated in the court'sprior denial of DeBaere's early termination request.(See Dkt. No. 31.)The nature and circumstances of the offense to whichDeBaere pleaded guilty remain very serious and weighheavily against early termination. DeBaere possessedmore than 1,300 images of child pornography,including depictions of sadistic or masochistic conductand bondage of children, with some of the imagesbeing of prepubescent minors. Moreover, DeBaereadmitted at the time of the offense that he is attracted to
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA v. MICHAEL SHANE DEBAERE, Slip Copy (2025) © 2025 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.6young girls. This admission is relevant not only to thenature of the offense, but also to DeBaere's personalcharacteristics, both of which must be consideredunder § 3553(a)(1). These facts, standing alone,reflect a serious criminal offense and an enduringconcern about the underlying conduct that warranted asubstantial term of supervised release.The court also finds that the fifteen-year term ofsupervised release imposed in DeBaere's case isconsistent with sentences commonly imposed insimilar cases involving convictions under 18 U.S.C.§§ 2252A(a)(5)(B) and 2252A(b)(2). For example, inUnited States v. Grimmett, Case No. 5:12-cr-00178,2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 49606, *1 (S.D. W. Va. Mar.14, 2025), the defendant was sentenced to fifteenyears of supervised release following a guilty pleato possession of child pornography in violation of§§ 2252A(a)(5)(B) and 2252A(b)(2). Similarly, inMcMinn v. United States, No. 2:16-CR-140, 2022WL 1633622, at *2 (E.D. Va. May 23, 2022), thedefendant received a twenty-year term of supervisedrelease for a conviction under § 2252A(a)(5)(B). InUnited States v. Stevens, No. CR MJG-12-0136, 2018WL 835717, at *1 (D. Md. Feb. 13, 2018), the courtimposed a lifetime term of supervised release after aconviction for possession of child pornography under§ 2252A(a)(5)(B). As § 3553(a)(6) directs courtsto avoid unwarranted sentence disparities amongsimilarly situated defendants, the court finds DeBaere'ssentence to be well-aligned with sentencing practicesin comparable cases within the Fourth Circuit.*8 While DeBaere has been fully compliant withthe terms of his supervised release for more than sixyears, this fact does not, in and of itself, provide asufficient basis to warrant early termination. Courtswithin the Fourth Circuit have consistently heldthat “full compliance with the terms of supervisedrelease [is not a] sufficient bas[i]s to warrant earlytermination.”10 United States v. Farris, No. 5:14-CR-0008, 2021 WL 1588972, at *2 (W.D. Va. Apr. 22,2021) (citing Folks, 733 F.Supp.2d at 652 (collectingcases)). Compliance with conditions of supervisedrelease is expected, not exceptional. Therefore, thecourt gives minimal weight to DeBaere's record ofcompliance. As the court in United States v. Whisnantobserved, “Defendant's [compliant] conduct while onsupervised release neither weighs in favor, nor against,early termination.” No. 1:14-cr-00024, 2024 WL1526135, at *3 (W.D.N.C. Apr. 8, 2024). In Grimmett,despite the defendant having served over half ofa 15-year supervised release term and maintainingfull compliance without incident, the court deniedearly termination, finding those facts insufficient toovercome the § 3553(a) considerations given theseriousness of the underlying conviction. Case No.5:12-cr-00178, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 49606, *1–3.Here, DeBaere has not yet served half of his supervisedrelease term, and although his compliance to dateis commendable, it is not a basis that justifies earlytermination.Also, while the court acknowledges the constraintsof supervised release, including the struggles ofobtaining new employment, these are not justificationsthat warrant early termination. See United States v.Gross, No. CR 05-0717 ADS, 2012 WL 259923,at *2 (E.D.N.Y. Jan. 27, 2012) (“[T]he fact thatsupervised release has made it difficult to findnew employment is not a reason to grant earlytermination.”). Unfortunately, these struggles willlikely follow DeBaere well beyond the conclusionof his supervised release. However, the court findsgreat hope and optimism in DeBaere's complianceand actions over the past six years. Based on theinformation before the court, it is apparent thatDeBaere is well on his way towards full rehabilitation.However, the court finds further supervision is stillneeded at this time.In sum, although DeBaere's compliance with theconditions of supervised release is commendable, itdoes not outweigh the serious nature of the underlyingoffense, the need for continued deterrence, and theimportance of protecting the public. Moreover, giventhe relatively short period of supervised release hehas served compared to the full fifteen-year term,and compared to other similarly situated defendants,the court finds that continued supervision remainsappropriate. Accordingly, DeBaere's motion for earlytermination of supervised release will be denied.III. CONCLUSION AND ORDER*9 For the foregoing reasons, it is hereby ORDEREDthat DeBaere's motion to compel production of the
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA v. MICHAEL SHANE DEBAERE, Slip Copy (2025) © 2025 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.7probation office's supervision report (Dkt. No. 38)is DENIED. It is further ORDERED that DeBaere'smotion for early termination of supervised release(Dkt. No. 32) is DENIED WITHOUT PREJUDICE.The Clerk is directed to send a copy of thismemorandum opinion and order to Mr. DeBaere, allcounsel of record, and the United States ProbationOffice.All CitationsSlip Copy, 2025 WL 2474926Footnotes1DeBaere's conviction carried a mandatory minimum of five years of supervised release at sentencing.2This letter was sent exclusively to the court and was not shared with DeBaere or the government. Thecontents of the letter are discussed below. (See infra Sec. II.B.)3As noted above, the report is a two-page letter submitted to the court by the Probation Office. The courtemphasizes this to make clear that it is the only document at issue in DeBaere's motion to compel. AlthoughDeBaere's motion lists various materials he believes may have been submitted by the Probation Office inconnection with his early termination motion, the court confirms that it received only the two-page letter.4The only references to probation in the government's response appear when it states that “the United Statesunderstands that [DeBaere] has remained fully compliant with the terms and conditions of his supervisedrelease” (Dkt. No. 35 at 2), and when it argues that “the close supervision by his Probation Officer and theconditions of his release have likely contributed to his success thus far” (Id. at 3). These statements do notsuggest or imply that the government had access to, or relied upon, the report submitted to the court bythe Probation Office.5DeBaere also cites to the Fourth Circuit's decision in United States v. Ketter, 908 F.3d 61, 65 (4th Cir. 2018),in support of his § 3583(e)(1) argument. (Mot. to Compel 2.) However, that case involved a defendant'schallenge to the reasonableness of his sentence and did not concern a motion to compel or a request forearly termination of supervised release. Accordingly, Ketter is not relevant to the issues currently beforethe court.6While courts are to construe pro se filings liberally, see Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007), thecourt is concerned by DeBaere's reliance on an apparent fictitious quotation attributed to a non-existentlegal authority. Rule 11(b)(1) states that “[b]y presenting to the court a pleading, written motion, or otherpaper ... an attorney or unrepresented party certifies to the best of the person's knowledge, information,and belief, formed after an inquiry reasonable under the circumstances [that] ... it is not being presentedfor any improper purpose, such as to harass, cause unnecessary delay, or needlessly increase the cost oflitigation [.]” Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(b)(1). As courts have recognized, the basic requirement of Rule 11 is “thatan unrepresented party or a represented party's attorney conduct a prefiling investigation of law and factwhich is objectively reasonable under the circumstances.” Harmon v. O'Keefe, 149 F.R.D. 114, 116 (E.D.Va. 1993) (citing Brubaker v. City of Richmond, 943 F.2d 1363, 1373 (4th Cir. 1991)); see Fed. R. Civ. P.11(b). A violation of Rule 11(b) may warrant sanctions. Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(c); see e.g., Kruglyak v. HomeDepot U.S.A., Inc., 774 F. Supp. 3d 767, 772 (W.D. Va. 2025) (declining to impose sanctions on a pro selitigant for citing fictitious cases generated by AI, finding no bad faith, but emphasizing that “[i]f counsel relieson AI or other technology to draft a filing, he remains responsible for ensuring the filing is accurate and doesnot contain fabricated caselaw or quotations”). While the court cannot determine what sources DeBaererelied upon in drafting his motion to compel, it emphasizes that he remains responsible for verifying theaccuracy and validity of all authority he cites.7Not only does the cited case not exist, but DeBaere once again includes a wholly fabricated quotation: “Thecourt's failure to provide Zai with the probation report or its substance prevented him from addressing itscontents, which informed the court's § 3553(a) analysis. This was reversible error.” (Mot. to Compel 4.) The
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA v. MICHAEL SHANE DEBAERE, Slip Copy (2025) © 2025 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.8court reiterates that DeBaere is responsible for verifying the accuracy and legitimacy of all authority he cites.See supra n.6. The inclusion of fictitious or fabricated citations in future filings may result in the impositionof sanctions. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(c).8Both unpublished opinions arise from the same case involving a defendant's appeal of a district court's denialof a motion for early termination of supervised release. In the first appeal, the Sixth Circuit held that the districtcourt abused its discretion by failing to demonstrate meaningful consideration of the relevant 18 U.S.C. §3553(a) factors, as required under 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(1). United States v. Zai, No. 22-3371, 2022 WL17832201, at *7 (6th Cir. Dec. 21, 2022). There, the district court had merely signed and refiled the ProbationOffice's Supervision Report—without explanation—which the Sixth Circuit found insufficient to satisfy thecourt's obligation to consider the § 3553(a) factors. On remand, the district court conducted a proper §3553(a) analysis and again denied the motion. United States v. Zai, No. 1:12-cr-71, 2023 U.S. Dist. LEXIS39965, *5 (N.D. Ohio, Mar. 9, 2023). Zai appealed again, but this time the Sixth Circuit affirmed, holdingthat the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying his motion for early termination of supervisedrelease, as it had properly considered the relevant § 3553(a) factors and provided a sufficient explanationfor its ruling. United States v. Zai, No. 23-3248, 2024 WL 84084, at *2–4 (6th Cir. Jan. 8, 2024).9Much like his motion to compel, DeBaere's brief is replete with fabricated and mischaracterized case law.For example, he cites United States v. Parisi, 363 F. Supp. 3d 281, 287–88 (W.D.N.Y. 2019), for theproposition that another district court granted early termination of supervised release for a similar offense,emphasizing the defendant's compliance. However, this case is entirely fabricated. DeBaere's 11-page filingincludes more than 70 citations, and while the court will not address each fabricated or misrepresented caseindividually, it re-emphasizes that DeBaere is solely responsible for ensuring the accuracy and validity ofall legal authorities he cites. Failure to do so in the future may result in the imposition of sanctions. (Seesupra n.6.)10DeBaere challenges the reasoning in Farris and contends that his compliance with the terms of supervisedrelease constitutes “changed circumstances” and “exceptionally good behavior” sufficient to justify earlytermination, citing United States v. Ponce, 22 F.4th 1045 (9th Cir. 2022). (Mot. for Early Term. Sup. Rel. 12.)However, DeBaere mischaracterizes the holding in Ponce. In that decision, the Ninth Circuit clarified thatearly termination motions are governed by the standard set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(1), which permitstermination if the court “is satisfied that such action is warranted by the conduct of the defendant releasedand the interest of justice.” The court expressly rejected the notion that a showing of “exceptionally goodbehavior” or “changed circumstances” is a prerequisite to relief. Rather, such circumstances may warranttermination of supervised release. Ponce, 22 F.4th at 1047. Instead, district courts must evaluate suchmotions by considering the relevant factors set forth in § 3553(a) and determine if a defendant's conductwarrants termination and whether termination serves the interest of justice. Id.This court has applied the correct legal standard, consistent with Ponce. As explained herein, the court findsthat the applicable § 3553(a) factors support the continuation of DeBaere's term of supervised release atthis time.End of Document© 2025 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S.Government Works.
ProvenanceKnow exactly where this document came from.Members see the sourcing behind every authority on DocPost — so you can check the record yourself and cite with confidence.Request access