United States v. Action (Aug. 27, 2025)

Case details
Full caption
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA v. MICHAEL SHANE DEBAERE Criminal Action
Country
United States
Jurisdiction
Federal
Decided
Aug. 27, 2025
Disposition
Motion Denied
Majority
Elizabeth K. Dillon Chief (J.) (unanimous Court)
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA v. MICHAEL SHANE DEBAERE, Slip Copy (2026) © 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.12026 WL 185125Only the Westlaw citation is currently available.United States District Court, W.D. Virginia,DANVILLE DIVISION.UNITED STATES OF AMERICAv.MICHAEL SHANE DEBAERECriminal Action No. 4:19-cr-00009|Filed 01/23/2026Editor's Note: This decision contains discussion of citationreferences that are incorrect or do not actually exist. Theseinvalid citations appeared in the original court opinion andhave been preserved as written since they are part of theofficial record. Any links to these invalid citations have beenremoved.Attorneys and Law FirmsDuty Assistant Roanoke, Michael Coleman Adams, Kristin(Inactive Acct) Johnson, U.S. Attorneys, DOJ-United StatesAttorney's Office, Roanoke, VA, for United States ofAmerica.MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDERElizabeth K. Dillon Chief United States District Judge*1 By memorandum opinion and order entered August 27,2025, the court denied defendant Michael Shane DeBaere'smotion for early termination of supervised release and motionto compel production of the probation office's supervisionreport. (Dkt. No. 40 (denying Dkt. Nos. 32, 38).) Since thattime, DeBaere has filed numerous documents related to thatinitial request for relief. First, in September 2025, the Clerkreceived from DeBaere two additional motions. In the first,he challenges the court's August 27 opinion and order, askingthe court to “alter or amend” that order. (Dkt. No. 41.) Inthe second, he asks for leave to exceed the page limit for hissupporting memorandum. (Dkt. No. 42.)Then, in December 2025, he filed a series of documents.These included: several documents titled as “Notices of Non-Opposition,” in which he pointed out that the United Stateshad not responded to his motion to alter or amend judgmentand argued that its failure to respond should be treated as non-opposition (Dkt. Nos. 44, 46); documents the Clerk docketedas a supplemental memorandum and second supplementalmemorandum in support of his motion to alter judgment(Dkt. Nos. 45, 47); a request for ruling (Dkt. No. 46); anda motion to expedite decision (Dkt. No. 48), received bythe Clerk on December 11, 2015, in which he requesteda removal of the several special conditions of supervisedrelease. These included a removal of a condition requiringperiodic polygraph testing, and he requested a ruling on thator a “stay” prior to a scheduled polygraph test on December16, 2026. (Dkt. No. 48.)The court has considered all DeBaere's submissions. For thereasons discussed herein, the court will deny his motion tofile his first memorandum, and the court will not considerthat document. Despite the failure of the United Statesto respond to his initial motion to alter or amend, thecourt also will deny his motion to alter or amend. As forhis December motions, the motion for ruling (Dkt. No.46) will be denied as moot. The document docketed as a“Second Supplemental Memorandum” by the Clerk (Dkt.No. 47) appears to be instead a motion for leave to file hissupplemental memorandum (Dkt. No. 45). So, the Clerk willbe directed to correct that docket entry, and the court will grantthat motion and consider his supplemental memorandum,which is already on the docket. The court also will directthat the supplemental memorandum (Dkt. No. 48), whichagain requests early termination of his release term, be re-docketed as a new motion seeking that relief. In it, he asks thatthe court analyze his request under the amended sentencingguidelines, effective November 1, 2025, including U.S.S.G. §5D1.4. Separately, DeBaere moves the court to delete specialconditions E & F (Dkt. No. 48), which require sex offendertreatment and permit polygraph examinations.1 The courtwill require the United States to respond to those two motions.I. BACKGROUND*2 The background of this case is set forth in the court'sprior opinions and orders denying DeBaere's requests forearly termination of his fifteen-year supervised release term(Dkt. Nos. 31, 40), and the court will not repeat thatbackground here. In his motion to alter or amend, DeBaerecontends that the court's most recent denial “overlookedcritical factual matters, misapprehended matters of law, andfailed to properly consider the relevant 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA v. MICHAEL SHANE DEBAERE, Slip Copy (2026) © 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.2factors, which, if corrected, would reasonably alter theoutcome.” (Mot. 2, Dkt. No. 41.) He asks for the court toreconsider its order pursuant to its “inherent authority tocorrect interlocutory orders” and states that the motion is“guided by the principles of Federal Rules of Civil Procedure59(e) and 60(b).” (Mem. Supp. of Mot. to Alter or Am.(“Mem.”) 1, Dkt. No. 43.)The court has reviewed these alleged errors and finds thatmost do not warrant any discussion, but it will discuss a fewbriefly herein. To the extent its prior order was unclear, itclarifies its reasoning herein. The court nonetheless stands byits prior decision to deny the requested relief for the reasonsdiscussed below. As DeBaere suggests it should, however, thecourt will treat his December 2025 filings as a new request forearly termination of supervised release and for considerationof that request under the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines, asrevised in November 2025.II. DISCUSSIONA. Motion for Leave to FileDeBaere's first motion asks for permission to file his 82-page typed memorandum, which fleshes out the numerousassignments of error listed in his motion. He seeks leave tofile it because of its excessive length. The court has readthrough the memorandum and if the only issue were length, itwould permit it to be filed and would consider the argumentstherein. However, a review of the sources it cites, even inthe first twenty pages, readily reveals that it suffers from thesame problems as DeBaere's earlier filings, which the courtidentified in detail in its last opinion. Specifically, DeBaerecites to some fictitious sources, cites to some improperlynamed sources, and includes quotations that do not existanywhere in the cited sources.2*3 The court does not know whether these repeatedmischaracterizations and outright fabrications—whichgenerally appear to strongly support DeBaere's arguments—are the result of his use of generative AI or instead amore nefarious attempt to mislead the court. See generallyKruglyak v. Home Depot U.S.A., Inc., 774 F. Supp. 3d767, 770-71 (W.D. Va. 2025) (discussing the shortcomingsof generative AI and noting that it is “widely known thatsuch platforms sometimes ‘hallucinate,’ ” which in the legalresearch context “can include the generation of fictitious casecites and misrepresentations of case summaries of holdings”).The court's prior opinion noted various similar types of issueswith citations and authorities relied upon by DeBaere andwarned him of the possibility of sanctions for such conduct.(Mem. Op. 5 n.6; see also id. at 6–8 & nn.7–8 (discussingvarious issues with citations and authorities relied upon byDeBaere).)3 The court will not wade through eighty pages ofcitations and quotations to determine which ones are accurate,which ones misrepresent and mischaracterize actual cases,which ones comes from real, but miscited sources, and whichones are entirely fictional. It is not only misleading to the courtat the outset, but ultimately a waste of the court's time andresources, trying to sort through the many fictitious citationscontained within his filing to find a kernel of support for hisarguments.Instead, the court will deny DeBaere's motion for leave tofile that document. The court nonetheless has considered thebasic contours of his arguments, which are contained withinhis motion. DeBaere is further warned that if he files anyfurther documents and attributes quotations to cases that donot contain those quotations, provides erroneous citations orcites to cases that do not exist, or mischaracterizes the holdingor reasoning of cases, the court may impose sanctions,including but not limited to striking such documents, refusingto consider them, and/or imposing monetary sanctions.B. Motion to Alter or AmendIn his motion asking the court to alter or amend hisjudgment, DeBaere relies on the court's “inherent authority”to reconsider its ruling, but he also cites to Federal Rulesof Civil Procedure 59(e) and 60(b). The Fourth Circuit hasheld that Rule 59(e) Rule does not apply to motions that arecriminal in nature, United States v. Goodwyn, 596 F.3d 233,235 n.* (4th Cir. 2010), and the same reasoning would applyto Rule 60(b).Nonetheless, many courts “typically evaluate” a motion toreconsider in a criminal case “under the same standardsapplicable to a civil motion to alter or amend judgmentpursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(e),” which requires (1) aclear error of law; (2) newly discovered evidence; (3) anintervening change in the controlling law; or (4) a manifestinjustice. See, e.g., United States v. Peters, 856 F. App'x230, 236 (11th Cir. 2021) (affirming district court's denialof motion to reconsider earlier denial of motion to terminatesupervised release because it “did not make previouslyunavailable arguments or rely on new evidence”). Especiallywith DeBaere's arguments focusing on “errors of law” or“manifest injustice,” the court finds it appropriate to do the
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA v. MICHAEL SHANE DEBAERE, Slip Copy (2026) © 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.3same, and will apply a type of Rule 59(e) standard to hisrequest. For the reasons set forth herein, the court DENIESDeBaere's motion to alter or amend judgment.4 The courtdiscusses its reasons briefly below but also incorporates byreference its most recent opinion.*4 As to his more recent requests that: (1) the court evaluateanew a request for early termination of his supervised releaseterm pursuant to the revised U.S. Sentencing Guidelines,5and (2) alternatively, that it modify certain conditions of hissupervised release term, the court will obtain a response fromthe United States before ruling on those requests.C. Alleged ErrorsThe decision about whether to reduce a supervised releaseterm is within the discretion of the court, United States v.Pregent, 190 F.3d 279, 282 (4th Cir. 1999), and the courtabuses that discretion only if “it acts arbitrarily or irrationally,fails to consider judicially recognized factors constraining itsexercise of discretion, relies on erroneous factual or legalpremises, or commits an error of law,” United States v.Dillard, 891 F.3d 151, 158 (4th Cir. 2018) (internal quotationmarks omitted). Having reviewed its prior decisions on theissue, the court is satisfied that it appropriately weighed thecorrect sentencing factors, did not act arbitrarily, and did notrely on erroneous factual or legal premises or commit an errorof law. It continues to believe that termination of DeBaere'ssupervised release term at the time of its decision was notwarranted.6At the outset, the court rejects DeBaere's arguments that hismotion to alter or amend judgment must be granted becausethe United States failed to file a timely opposition to it. First,it is not the practice in this district to require responses by thegovernment to every pro se, post-judgment motion filed in acriminal case. Instead, the court typically orders a responseto such motions when it requires a response. In any event,even if the court treated the failure to respond as an indicationthat the United States does not oppose the relief sought, thatdoes not mean the court must grant it. As just noted, thedecision as to whether to terminate a supervised release termearly or to modify terms of supervised release is a decisionsquarely within the court's discretion. Pregent, 190 F.3d at282. The court is not bound in this circumstance by anyrecommendation made by, or position taken by, the UnitedStates. See, e.g., United States v. Zoukis, No. 22-6263, 2023WL 8728601, at *1 (4th Cir. Dec. 19, 2023) (affirming orderdenying motion for early termination of supervised releaseeven though government had no objection). Thus, regardlessof any response or non-response by the United States, thecourt is required to evaluate a request for early terminationand reach its own decision.In asking that the court revisit its prior decision, DeBaereasserts that the court's order contained numerous factual,legal, and analytical errors. Most of his arguments, however,are simply disagreements with the result reached by thecourt or the weight the court attached to a particular factor circumstance. These alleged “errors” do not constitutethe type of “clear error” referenced in Rule 59(e) and likestandards.*5 For example, he insists that the court did not considerhis current behavior or his progress while on release, butthe court noted and discussed that compliance and progressand commended him for it. (Mem. Op. 12–13, 14–15.) Itjust did not believe that his progress weighed heavily enoughto overcome the other factors that still called for him to besupervised.He also believes the court should have assigned moreweight to his demonstrated rehabilitation and his “substantialcompliance” while on supervised release and shouldhave given less weight to his original offense, to“inconclusive 2022 polygraphs,” and to the probation officer'smemorandum and generalized claims of risk based on sexoffenders generally. He argues that the court improperlyanalyzed the sentencing factor of avoiding unwarrantedsentencing disparities, improperly comparing him to otherswho committed the same offense rather than on others withsimilar records who were granted termination. But theseagain are challenges to the weight that the court assigned therelevant factors. None of these alleged “errors” are errors oflaw or fact that constitute an abuse of discretion. In short,nothing DeBaere has argued causes the court to question itsprior decision.DeBaere identifies two errors, however, that could constitutea mistake of fact or law, had the court made them, whichit did not. First, DeBaere contends that the court mistakenlyidentified his offense as possession of pornography, ratherthan accessing with intent to view under 18 U.S.C. § 2252A(a)(5)(B). DeBaere is incorrect.The court correctly identified his offense on the first pageof its opinion. (Mem. Op. 1, Dkt. No. 40.) Elsewhere indiscussing other cases, it referred to that statutory provision as
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA v. MICHAEL SHANE DEBAERE, Slip Copy (2026) © 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.4being the offense of possession of child pornography, (id. at13–14), but that subdivision can be violated in either fashion(either by possessing or by accessing with intent to view). Andalthough it referred to him possessing images (id. at 11, 13),that language is contained within the PSR. To the extent theopinion can be interpreted as reflecting that the court believedhe had been convicted of possession, the court now clarifiesthat it understood then—and understands now—the offenseof conviction.DeBaere also insists that the court considered the “need forthe sentence imposed to reflect the seriousness of the offense”under § 3553(a)(2)(A), a factor it is not permitted to considerunder § 3583(e)(1). DeBaere is correct that, when consideringwhether to terminate a term of supervised release early, onlycertain of the § 3553(a) factors are relevant, while others arenot included in the list of factors to be considered. 18 U.S.C.§ 3583(e). In particular, the court is not to consider the kindsof sentences available, § 3553(a)(3), nor should it consider“the need for the sentence imposed to reflect the seriousnessof offense, to promote respect for the law, and to providejust punishment for the offense,” § 3553(a)(2)(A). The courtshould consider, however, the nature and circumstances of theoffense and the history and characteristics of the defendant,§ 3553(a)(1), as well as the need for the sentence to detercriminal conduct, protect the public, and avoid unwarrantedsentencing disparities, § 3553(a)(2)(B)–(C), (a)(6).7 Thecourt's opinion several times referred to the “serious” natureof his criminal offense, but the nature and circumstances ofthe offense are a consideration that the court may—and must— consider. To the extent the court's opinion can be readas being based on a consideration of § 3553(a)(2)(A), thecourt disavows any such reliance. The court considered thesignificance of the offense in terms of the number of imagesand type of images involved, as well as in his admissionsabout his attraction to young girls, to reach the conclusionthat a substantial term of supervised release was still needed.And it continues to believe that a longer term than whathe had served as of August 2025, although without anyknown violations or problems, was required both to protectthe public and to avoid unwarranted sentencing disparities, asit discussed in its opinions. Thus, neither of these purported“errors” require the court to reconsider or alter its prior ruling.*6 For the foregoing reasons, DeBaere's motion to alter oramend judgment will be denied.D. December 2025 MotionsThe December 2025 motions are addressed in the orderbelow. Succinctly summarized, the court will deny as moothis request for a ruling, will grant DeBaere leave to file asupplemental memorandum, which is more properly treatedas a new motion requesting early termination, will deny hisrequest for expedited relief as moot, and will take his requestsfor substantive relief under advisement and require the UnitedStates to respond before issuing any ruling.III. CONCLUSION AND ORDERFor the reasons set forth herein and set forth in the court'sAugust 27, 2025 Memorandum Opinion and Order, the courthereby ORDERS that:1. DaBaere's pro se motion for leave to exceed the pagelimit (Dkt. No. 42) is DENIED; and because of the manyerroneous and misleading citations and quotations in hissupporting memorandum, the court has not consideredit; and2. if DeBaere files any future document with the courtthat attributes quotations to legal authorities that do notcontain those quotations; provides erroneous citations;cites to legal authorities, including cases, that do notexist; mischaracterizes the holding or reasoning oflegal authorities; or engages in similar conduct that ismisleading, the court may impose sanctions, includingbut not limited to striking such documents, refusing toconsider them, and/or imposing monetary sanctions;3. DeBaere's pro se motion to alter or amend order denyingearly termination of supervised release (Dkt. No. 41) isDENIED;4. DeBaere's “request for a ruling” (Dkt. No. 46) isDENIED AS MOOT because the court has now ruled onthe motion to alter or amend judgment;5. DeBaere's pro se filing docketed as a “secondsupplemental memorandum” (Dkt. No. 47) is moreproperly docketed as DeBaere titled it, which isas a “Motion for Leave to File SupplementalMemorandum” (Dkt. No. 45); the Clerk is thusDIRECTED to change the docket text of Dkt. No. 47 toreflect the correct title; and the motion for leave to file(Dkt. No. 47) is GRANTED;6. The court construes DeBaere's supplementalmemorandum (Dkt. No. 45) as also being a renewed
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA v. MICHAEL SHANE DEBAERE, Slip Copy (2026) © 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.5motion for early termination of his supervised releaseterm. Thus, the Clerk is DIRECTED to docket thatmotion again separately as a motion for early terminationof supervised release;7. DeBaere's motion requesting a deletion of certainsupervised release conditions (Dkt. No. 48) is DENIEDIN PART and TAKEN UNDER ADVISEMENT INPART. It is DENIED insofar as it seeks a stay or anexpedited ruling on that motion to prevent a polygraphscheduled on a date in the past. It is TAKEN UNDERADVISEMENT insofar as it requests modification anddeletion of those two specific conditions; and8. Not later than twenty-one days after entry of thisorder, the United States shall file a response toDeBaere's two remaining pending motions: his motionseeking early termination of supervised release under theamended guidelines and his alternative motion seeking amodification of the terms of his supervised release (Dkt.No. 48). If DeBaere wants to file any reply, he shall do sonot later than fourteen days after service of the responseon him.*7 The Clerk is DIRECTED to send a copy of thismemorandum opinion and order to Mr. DeBaere, allcounsel of record, and the United States Probation Office.Additionally, the Clerk shall provide Mr. DeBaere a copy ofthe updated public docket sheet.All CitationsSlip Copy, 2026 WL 185125Footnotes1Those Special Conditions state:E. The defendant shall submit to polygraph or any other court approved testing to monitor the defendant'scompliance while on supervision.F. The defendant shall submit to an evaluation/risk assessment by a qualified mental health professionalapproved by the probation officer, who is experienced in the treatment of sexual offenders. The evaluationmay include psychological and physiological testing (i.e. plethysmograph exams). The defendant shalltake all medications reasonably related to his or her condition; complete all treatment recommendations,which may include physiological testing (i.e. polygraph exams), and abide by all rules, requirements andconditions imposed by the treatment provider until discharged from treatment by the provider.(Mem. Op. & Order 4, 12–13, 19, Dkt. No. 29.)2By way of example only, on page 9, DeBaere includes a lengthy quotation attributed to the Third Circuit'sdecision in United States v. Melvin, 978 F.3d 49, 53 (3d Cir. 2020), but the quoted material is not in that case.Similarly, many of the citations on page 11 are not to existing cases (or at least not to cases with the citationsgiven), and the quoted language does not appear in any other case that the court could find. In the one case onthat page with a correct citation, the quoted language does not appear. DeBaere also cites to United States v.Emmett, 749 F.3d 817 (9th Cir. 2014), across several pages. (Mem. 18–19.) While he correctly describes thatthe Emmett court vacated and remanded a district court's decision denying early termination of supervisedrelease, he states that the court did so because the lower court erroneously focused “almost exclusively” onthe nature of the offense conduct, rather than on the defendant's post-release compliance and rehabilitation.In fact, though, none of that analysis appears in Emmett. Instead, the denial of early termination was vacatedand remanded simply because the district court did not adequately explain its sentencing decision, notbecause of the lower court's failure to focus on any particular factor. Moreover, the entire sentence DeBaereincludes as a quotation is nowhere in that opinion. His mischaracterization of Emmett is particularly egregious
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA v. MICHAEL SHANE DEBAERE, Slip Copy (2026) © 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.6because this court discussed Emmett in the text of its last opinion and discussed its very basic holding. (SeeMem. Op. 8.)Yet another example of a mischaracterization appears in the paragraph after discussing Emmett whereDeBaere attributes the quote, “static rehashing of past severity,” to a different case. (Mem. 19.) The quotationappears nowhere in that decision or in any other federal case or secondary source that the court could locatein Westlaw.3The court referred to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11 in its prior opinion but recognizes that many courtshave held or suggested that Rule 11 is not applicable in criminal cases, cf. United States v. White, 980 F.2d836, 843 (2d Cir. 1992). Nonetheless, the court has an inherent power to impose sanctions in a criminal case.Chambers v. Nasco, 501 U.S. 32, 46–49 (1991). See also Orr v. United States, No. 1:03 CR 35-M, 2008WL 4186935, at *1 (N.D. Miss. Sept. 8, 2008) (identifying three sources for a district court's power to imposesanctions and concluding that a court's inherent power is the only proper vehicle for imposing a sanctionagainst a pro se party in a criminal case).4In the context of compassionate-release motions (where there is currently no limit on the number of suchmotions a defendant may file), the Fourth Circuit has instructed district courts to treat such a motion as a“new motion for compassionate release.” United States v. Hedspeth, No. 22-6943, 2023 WL 7124547, at *1(4th Cir. Oct. 30, 2023). Because DeBaere's arguments here refer to specific alleged errors in the court'sprior opinion, the court declines to treat his September 2025 motion as a new motion for early termination ofsupervised release and believes it is more properly treated as a type of motion to reconsider.5Unlike his September motion, at least one of his December 2025 filings suggests that the court could “construethis filing as a new motion for early termination.” (Dkt. No. 45, at 6–7.)6As noted, the court will consider his request anew under the amended sentencing guidelines in the contextof ruling on his latest motions after it has received a response from the United States.7Notably, the court's memorandum opinion never expressly stated that it was considering the need for thesentence imposed to reflect the seriousness of the offense. And in listing the factors that the court shouldconsider, it did not include that factor. (Mem. Op. 10.)End of Document© 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.
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