weeks earlier but didn’t get plate #. Agreed that 1 possibility, that we might have walked into something else____
Later the letter stated:
Found good safe parking in D. Ferry. Then tried to get a cab. I cleaned car again including finding in trunk an oil receipt from Md in bag of oil cans which I threw out [w/] other garbage in Grand Union lot. Now was 12:10 waited for a cab for 15 min.
(Emphasis in original.) After being informed at 12:30 a.m. that the cab was off duty, Buck and Evans “decided we should drive car nearer to motel and ditch. While T got room I went to a phone booth in motel lot passed a mgr? A p. car pulled thru lot [w/o?] stopping or slowing down.” The letter next detailed the events of the following morning. It began with Buck and Evans looking around their car, seeing nothing odd, and driving to Dobbs Ferry; continued with their observations of particular cars; and ended with their arrests. Involved in the arrests were a maroon car, a blue van, and a brown car driven by one of the men Buck had seen in the brown car in the Friendly’s parking lot.
Buck’s letter made no mention of their having acquired a weapon during the trip.
II. DISCUSSION
Section 922(g) of 18 U.S.C. makes it unlawful “for any person ... who has been convicted in any court of[ ] a crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year [or] who is a fugitive from justice ... to ship or transport any firearm or ammunition in interstate or foreign commerce.” There is no question that at the time of her arrest, Buck was a convicted felon, as well as a fugitive from justice, and that she possessed a loaded revolver. She contends principally that the evidence was insufficient to support a finding beyond a reasonable doubt that she had transported the revolver across any state line. See United States v. Gjurashaj, 706 F.2d 395, 398 (2d Cir.1983) (government required to establish each element of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt). In particular, she argues that (1) there was no direct evidence that she possessed the weapon in two different states, (2) the surveillance by the agents was noncontinuous and thus could not support an inference from her possession of the weapon on arrest that she had possessed it earlier when she crossed the New York-Connecticut borders, and (3) her letter could not fill in the gaps in the agents’ surveillance because the letter did not purport to detail every event that had occurred during the period in question.
As our precedents emphasize, one who challenges on appeal the sufficiency of the evidence to convict bears a “very heavy burden.” United States v. Davis, 767 F.2d 1025, 1040 (2d Cir.1985); United States v. Martino, 759 F.2d 998, 1002 (2d Cir.1985). The government was not required to exclude every possibility but that of guilt, see Holland v. United States, 348 U.S. 121, 139-40, 75 S.Ct. 127, 137-38, 99 L.Ed. 150 (1954); United States v. Soto, 716 F.2d 989, 993 (2d Cir.1983), and the test on appeal is whether, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the government, Glosser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60, 80, 62 S.Ct. 457, 469, 86 L.Ed. 680 (1942), “the jury, drawing reasonable inferences from the evidence, may fairly and logically have concluded that the defendant was guilty beyond a reasonable doubt,” United States v. Carson, 702 F.2d 351, 361 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 462 U.S. 1108, 103 S.Ct. 2456-57, 77 L.Ed.2d 1335 (1983). We conclude that Buck has not carried her burden.
Like any other fact, the interstate transportation of a weapon may be proved by direct evidence or by circumstantial evidence. Direct evidence, of course, would consist of proof, such as testimony by one having first-hand knowledge, that the defendant had the weapon in his possession as he crossed a state line. Most reported decisions discussing proof of the interstate transportation element of the § 922(g) offense have involved circumstantial evidence, i.e., evidence of facts from which the defendant’s possession of the weapon as he crossed a state line may be inferred.