“ 4. Does the making of a genuine writing or instrument, signed by the party making it or purporting to make it with his own name, which instrument is false only in its statement of facts, for the purpose of defrauding the United States, constitute che ‘falsely making’ of a writing or instrument within the meaning of section 5418 of the Revised Statutes ?
“ 5. Is it necessary that an instrument ‘ falsely made,’ purporting to be an affidavit, and actually, knowingly used for the purpose of defrauding the United States, contrary to the statute,, should be sworn to before a person authorized to administer oaths for such purposes in order to constitute án offence under section 5418 Revised Statutes?
“ 6. Is a notary public authorized to administer oaths and take and certify affidavits of the character and for the purposes for which the affidavit set out in the indictment is alleged to have been prepared or used ? ”
Most of these are, by the settled doctrine of this court, insufficient to invoke its jurisdiction. They seem eminently liable to the objection that they are designed to split up the case before the court into fragments upon which, before a trial or decision by that court, it is intended to obtain the opinion of this court. There are none of them, except the last one we have mentioned, which present, in the manner that we have frequently pointed out, clear and distinct propositions of law to which this court can respond. Fire Insurance Association v. Wickham, 128 U. S. 426; Dublin Township v. Milford Savings Institution, 128 U. S. 510. But they require, if they should be answered at all, an examination of this very voluminous and loose statement of facts found in the indictment before an answer could be made, and even then there is no certainty that the answers would turn upon any difficulty existing in the minds, of the court which framed them for our consideration:
It-is apparent, however, that the question we have suggested, the last of the series of six, is a distinct and clear proposition of law, which may be necessary, and probably is essential, to a decision of the demurrer. It can hardly be supposed that a defendant indicted for perjury can be held to' be guilty, unless the oath, in regard to which the perjury is charged, was taken