United States v. Simmons (Mar. 10, 2026)

Case details
Full caption
United States of America v. Lorenzio Reshaud Simmons
Country
United States
Jurisdiction
Federal
Decided
Mar. 10, 2026
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA v. LORENIZO RESHAUD..., Slip Copy (2026) © 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.12026 WL 674372Only the Westlaw citation is currently available.United States District Court, E.D. North Carolina.UNITED STATES OF AMERICAv.LORENIZO RESHAUD SIMMONS, Defendant.NO. 4:25-CR-9-FL-1|Filed 03/10/2026Editor's Note: This decision contains discussion of citationreferences that are incorrect or do not actually exist. Theseinvalid citations appeared in the original court opinion andhave been preserved as written since they are part of theofficial record. Any links to these invalid citations have beenremoved.Attorneys and Law FirmsKimberly Dixon, Assistant U.S. Attorney, DOJ-United StatesAttorney's Office, Raleigh, NC, for United States of America.MEMORANDUM OPINIONLOUISE W. FLANAGAN United States District Judge*1 This matter came before the court for sentencing thisdate, with prior hearings in the case on sentencing occurringOctober 9, 2025, and December 8, 2025. Defendant appearedthrough counsel Lauren H. Brennan, and the governmentappeared through counsel Kimberly Dixon and Ashley Foxx.The court memorializes herein reasons for overruling in partand sustaining in part objections raised by defendant to thePresentence Investigation Report (“PSR”).BACKGROUNDWith a written plea agreement, defendant pleaded guilty todistribution of 40 grams or more of a mixture and substancecontaining fentanyl, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1),(b)(1)(B) (count three). As pertinent to the analysis herein,the parties stipulated in the plea agreement that “[t]he relevantand readily provable quantity of controlled substances to beused in the base offense level pursuant to USSG § 2Dl.1is at least 280 G but less than 12 KG of fentanyl, whichcorresponds to a base offense level of at least 28 but no morethan 34.” (Plea Agr. (DE 35) at 7).The probation office calculated base offense level 32, a two-level enhancement for maintaining a premises, and a three-level reduction for acceptance of responsibility, resultingin a total offense level of 31. Coupled with criminalhistory category I, this resulted in a guidelines range of108-135 months. In addendum to the PSR, the probationoffice summarized and addressed three objections raised bydefendant as follows:1. Paragraphs 9, 10, and 51: The defendant objects tothe use of the ‘fentanyl analogue’ conversion value andasserts that ‘fentanyl’ conversion should be applied.Additionally, the defendant objects to the quantity ofcontrolled substances he is held accounted for....2. Paragraphs 10 and 52: The defendant objects to the2-level increase for maintaining a premises for thepurpose of manufacturing or distributing a controlledsubstance....3. Paragraph 14: The defendant objects to the inclusion ofthis paragraph....(PSR Addendum (DE 40) at 16-18).A. Intrusion of Artificial Intelligence (“AI”) Issues atOctober 9, 2025, Sentencing HearingOn October 3, 2025, six days in advance of originalsentencing scheduled for October 9, 2025, defendant filedsentencing memorandum, through counsel, which containeda number of errors in its citations, quotations, andcase references. (DE 43) (hereinafter, “defendant's originalsentencing memorandum” in text, or “Def's Mem.,” incitations). Eleven such examples follow:• Defendant cites “United States v. Hazel, 696 F.3d473, 478 (4th Cir. 2012),” for the proposition thatthe “government bears the burden of establishing thefacts necessary to support the applicable guidelinerange.” (Def's Mem. (DE 43) at 4-5). There is no suchcase. There is a case named United States v. Hazel, 696F.2d 473 (6th Cir. 1983), but this is a Sixth Circuit casefrom a different year, which does not address sentencing.• Defendant cites “United States v. Angel, 102 F.3d 1066(4th Cir. 1996),” as containing the quoted language
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA v. LORENIZO RESHAUD..., Slip Copy (2026) © 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.2“drug quantity finding must be supported by reliable andspecific evidence in the record.” (Def's Mem. (DE 43) at7). There is no such case, nor any case from the UnitedStates Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit using thatquoted language.*2 • Defendant cites “United States v. Brehm, 442 F.3d1291, 1293 (4th Cir. 2006),” as containing the quotedlanguage “any uncertainty should be resolved in thedefendant's favor.” (Def's Mem. (DE 43) at 7). This is anEleventh Circuit case, and it does not contain the quotedlanguage.• Defendant cites “United States v. Nealy, 232 F.3d825, 829 (4th Cir. 2000),” for the proposition thatthe “government cannot meet its burden through,speculation, estimation, or reliance on unreliablemeasurement methods.” (Def's Mem. (DE 43) at 7). Thisis an Eleventh Circuit case, and it does not mentionspeculation, estimation, or measurement.• Defendant cites “United States v. Edwards, 188 F.3d230, 232 (4th Cir. 1999),” as containing the quotedlanguage “the weight of materials that are not controlledsubstances, such as the packaging, should not beincluded in determining the quantity of drugs forsentencing purposes.” (Def's Mem. (DE 43) at 8).Edwards does not contain the quoted language. Indeed,it does not even address a drug offense.• Defendant cites “United States v. Harrision [sic], 918F.2d 469, 473 (4th Cir. 1990)” as containing the quotedtext that laboratory testing provides “more precise andreliable evidence” than field measurements. (Def's Mem.(DE 43) at 9). This is a Fifth Circuit case (with thedefendant's name “Harrison”), not a case from the FourthCircuit, and it does not contain the quoted text.In sum, nearly all cases citations in defendant's originalsentencing memorandum were to cases that did not exist, weredecided by a different court than specified, or addressed topicsor contained quoted texts different from those specified. Uponreview in preparation for October 9, 2025, sentencing hearing,the court determined that defendant's memorandum bore thehallmarks of generation, at least in some parts, by ArtificialIntelligence (“AI”).1At hearing October 9, 2025, of her own initiative, defensecounsel noted errors in defendant's original sentencingmemorandum. With respect to counsel's AI usage, sheexplained:Your Honor, I went online and wasjust trying to frame out my argument,typed some things in on A.I., spit itout, then I went in and started pluggingthings in. And obviously you haveto go in; it's not going to give youcorrect case citations. So I framed myargument out, and then saved my draft,went back and worked on it later. Andwhen I PDF'd the version, I PDF'd myfirst draft version as opposed to myfinal version which has the actual casecitations in the Fourth Circuit that arecorrect. It cites to cases like Gilliamand Stewart and cases that are actuallyFourth Circuit cases, not imaginarycases.In reflection, defendant's original sentencing memorandumwas filed in contravention of the Local Criminal Rulesbecause it contained at least 11 statements of law whichwere “false statement[s] of ... law,” made without recognitionof “the existence of pertinent legal authorities” and “legalpremises properly applicable to the case.” (Rules ofProfessional Conduct, Rule 3.3(a), comments 1, 2, 4). Inaddition, defendant's original sentencing memorandum didnot include argument “with appropriate citations.” LocalCriminal Rule 47.2.*3 Grave consequences that can result from using AI as atool for drafting memoranda and other legal documents. Ascounsel readily acknowledged at the first sentencing hearing,it is “really scary” what AI can do as a legal drafting tool. (Tr.(DE 58) at 5). As the instant case demonstrates, AI will insertcase names and citations for cases that do not exist, or witha wrong court designation, or most critically, AI will inventor fabricate language as quoted content that is not present inthe cited case or that has nothing to do with the subject matterof it. See Jones v. Kankakee Cnty. Sheriff's Dep't, 164 F.4th967, 969 (7th Cir. 2026) (noting these are “the hallmarks ofa so-called AI ‘hallucination,’ a circumstance where an AIlarge language model generates an output that is fictional,inaccurate, or nonsensical”).
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA v. LORENIZO RESHAUD..., Slip Copy (2026) © 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.3Such errors in briefing are particularly burdensome regardingtime and effort of the court and the party on the other side,where the fact of filing by an attorney casts the appearanceof accurate, pertinent authorities. Their falsity only can berevealed by careful scrutiny. As observed here, such errors���really [take] away from [the court's] obvious understandingof what [counsel is] trying to say in [the court's] review of[defendant's] case.” (Tr. (DE 58) at 6). The court allowedcounsel to file a corrected brief, noting “there are lessons tobe learned.” (Id. at 6). Hearing was continued.B. December 8, 2025, Sentencing HearingIn advance of this hearing defendant filed amendedsentencing memorandum. (DE 45) (hereinafter, “defendant'samended sentencing memorandum” in text, or “Def's Am.Mem.,” in citations). Supplement followed including thecurriculum vitae of an expert, Edward Brown (“Brown”),proffered by defendant. (DE 52). The probation office filedthe operative revised PSR October 30, 2025, to account foramendments to the guidelines. (DE 47).December 8, 2025, the court heard argument on defendant'sobjection relating to whether the drugs at issue “should becalled a fentanyl analog or something different.” (Tr. (DE 55)at 3). The court “overrul[ed]” the objection in this part. (Id. at12). Defendant thereafter presented his “expert ... to explainwhy fluorofentanyl is not even confirmed as being present” inthis case. (Id. at 12-13). The government presented testimonyof Patti Carroll, forensic scientist with the North CarolinaState Crime Laboratory regarding the same issues, (Id. at45-79), followed by testimony of Brian Murphy, agent withHalifax County Sheriff's Office, regarding chain of custody.(Id. at 82-98).Upon conclusion, the court directed the government to filea sentencing memorandum with supplemental photographexhibits as forecasted by it, followed by a responseby defendant. The court stated it would reconvene thesentencing, without having “to have the witnesses back,”March 10, 2026. (Tr. 104, 107). The government's sentencingmemorandum followed on the record February 1, 2026, withreliance upon an index of items seized from defendant, as wellas forecasted color photographs. The government argues thatthe court should adopt base offense level 32, consistent withthe PSR.In his response filed February 17, 2026, defendant maintainsthat part of his objection based on argument that analysisby the North Carolina State Crime Laboratory was not“sufficiently reliable to determine whether the substanceidentified was in fact” fluorofentanyl,2 and the remainingpart of his objection “that he is responsible for no morethan the amount of controlled substance equivalent to a baseoffense level 28.” (Def's Resp. (DE 59) at 1, 8). Defendantnotes that although he calculates a drug weight at no morethan 673.25 kilograms of converted drug weight, “whichequates to a base offense level of 26,” where “defendantstipulated in the plea agreement that the base offense levelwas between a 28 and 34,” he “will not argue for the court toassign a base offense level below a 28.” (Id. at 8, n. 9).C. March 10, 2026, Sentencing Hearing*4 At third sentencing hearing, the court noted it hadoverruled that part of defendant's objection related to fentanylanalog, and defendant's objection to the two-level increase formaintaining a premises, as well as defendant's objection toparagraph 14 of the PSR. As such, focus this date narrowed onremaining part of defendant's objection related to base offenselevel, discussed below.COURT'S DISCUSSIONAs pertinent to the portion of defendant's objection remainingfor decision at March 10, 2026, sentencing hearing, thegovernment must prove the drug weight attributable to thedefendant by a preponderance of the evidence. United Statesv. McGee, 736 F.3d 263, 271 (4th Cir. 2013). It “may meet itsburden by presenting evidence that the court deems sufficientto establish the quantity of drugs attributable to a defendant.”United States v. Gilliam, 987 F.2d 1009, 1013 (4th Cir.1993). “ ‘[T]he district court's calculation of the quantity ofdrugs attributable to a defendant for sentencing purposes’ isa classic factual determination.” United States v. Jones, 767F. App'x 567, 568 (4th Cir. 2019) (quoting United States v.Crawford, 734 F.3d 339, 342 (4th Cir. 2013)).“[T]he court may consider relevant information withoutregard to its admissibility under the rules of evidenceapplicable at trial, provided that the information has sufficientindicia of reliability to support its probable accuracy,”U.S.S.G. § 6A1.3(a), including “information concerninguncharged criminal conduct” or “conduct [that] did notresult in a conviction.” Id. comment. In particular, “[d]irector hearsay testimony of lay witnesses as to the amountsattributable to the defendant can provide sufficiently reliable
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA v. LORENIZO RESHAUD..., Slip Copy (2026) © 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.4evidence of [drug] quantity,” for purposes of sentencing.United States v. Sampson, 140 F.3d 585, 592 (4th Cir. 1998).“[W]here courts have evidence of a number of transactions,they [are] permitted to multiply that number by an averageweight-per-transaction to reach an estimate.” United States v.Hickman, 626 F.3d 756, 769 (4th Cir. 2010). However, courtsmust “make conservative approximations,” so that “whenchoosing between a number of plausible estimates of drugquantity a court must err on the side of caution.” Id. “[A]court cannot uphold a drug quantity calculation on the basisof hunch or intuition.” Id. at 770.Here, there are considerable defects and issues with thegovernment's evidence that preclude a determination by thecourt of a drug quantity exceeding that needed to establishbase offense level 28. The government in its brief implicitlyrecognizes that only amounts attributed to drugs found in the“Waner Bridge Road residence,” as opposed to the vehiclesat that location, reliably may be traced to defendant. (Gov'sMem. (DE 57) at 3-5). The government invites the courtto work backwards, by process of elimination, from thetotal amount of drugs seized May 4, 2023, and to subtractprobable amounts that would have needed to be seized fromthe vehicles, to reach a drug weight equivalent to base offenselevel 28 (fentanyl analog between 70 grams and 100 grams3).(Id. at 4-5).*5 A useful guide in determining the significance of theitems of evidence as it bears upon base offense level is thedrug quantity table at U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1, which reveals the keyweight thresholds, as follows:Level 32 - At least 300 G but less than 1 KG of a FentanylAnalogue [Government's position]Level 30 - At least 100 G but less than 300 G of a FentanylAnalogueLevel 28 - At least 70 G but less than 100 G of a FentanylAnalogue [Defendant's position per plea agreement].See U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(c)(4-6) (emphasis added).Here, the government has not articulated sufficiently inits brief or argument the actual evidence that proves thatdefendant should be held accountable for more than 100grams of a Fentanyl Analogue, as would be required for abase offense level greater than level 28. The governmentconcedes the “property sheet” attached as an exhibit toits memorandum, “is lacking details that would have beenhelpful for the Court and the parties to more easily determinethe defendant[']s [base offense level].” (Gov's Mem. (DE 57)at 5). Indeed that property sheet references a series of articlesseized, comprising in each instance an “envelope” containingfentanyl or suspected fentanyl, but with no further locationindicators other than the address of the property. (DE 57-1).The government cites to testimony by Murphy that only“one white baggie” was found in the vehicles and that“all of the other controlled substances” were found in the“locked bedroom.” (Tr. (DE 55) at 85). But, the governmentacknowledges that upon cross-examination, “Murphy agreedwith defense counsel that there was more than a single bagwith powdered substances in them found in the vehicles,which is accurate.” (Gov. Mem. (DE 57) at 4 (citing Tr. (DE55) at 90-91)). The government also notes its photographsshow “numerous baggies located in the vehicles.” (Id.). Whileit contends “most of them are empty,” the photographs arenot so clear as the government suggests. (Id.; see DE 57-2).Further, although the government in its argument urged thecourt to rely upon the photographs, the court finds thephotographs too unclear in context and form to provide a basisfor attributing or not attributing drug quantities to defendant.In sum, the government leaves to the court to piece togethertoo much from the evidence and the testimony. Where thegovernment bears the burden of proving drug quantity by apreponderance of the evidence, and where the government'sevidence is infected by a lack of precision and detail thatwould allow a reliable estimate in excess of 100 grams offentanyl analog attributed directly to defendant, the courtsustained defendant's objection to drug quantity in excess ofthat needed to establish base offense level 28.CONCLUSIONFor the foregoing reasons, and as discussed on the record,the court OVERRULED in part and SUSTAINED in partdefendant's objections.DATED, this the 10th day of March, 2026.All CitationsSlip Copy, 2026 WL 674372
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA v. LORENIZO RESHAUD..., Slip Copy (2026) © 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.5Footnotes1Additionally, the defendant's memorandum included repetitive argument sections, with issues about drugquantity.2In his response memorandum, defendant uses the spelling “Flourofentanyl” (capitalized, and with an“ou”). (E.g., Def's Resp. (DE 59) at 1-2). In the instant memorandum opinion, the court uses the spelling“fluorofentanyl,” (not capitalized and with a “uo”), as that is the spelling used in the official transcript, thePSR, the government's brief, reported circuit court opinions that have reference the substance, and scientificsources. See United States v. Dorelus, 154 F.4th 1349, 1351 (11th Cir. 2025); United States v. Jordan, 100F.4th 714, 717 (6th Cir. 2024); United States v. Payne, 99 F.4th 495, 499 (9th Cir. 2024); see also, e.g.,United States Centers for Disease Control, Morbidity and Mortality Weekly Report (MMWR), “Notes fromthe Field: Overdose Deaths Involving Para-fluorofentanyl — United States, July 2020–June 2021,” https://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/volumes/71/wr/mm7139a3.htm [https://perma.cc/26FZ- CY6Z]. For ease of reference,in the citation in the text above, the court does not quote the spelling used by defendant.3There is a typographical error in the government's memorandum where it states this range as “at least 70Gbut less than 100 KG” of fentanyl analog. (Gov. Mem. (DE 57) at 5) (emphasis added). The court interpretsthis range instead to be correctly noted as “at least 70G but less than 100 G” of fentanyl analog. See U.S.S.G.§ 2D1.2End of Document© 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.
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