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Univ. Mall v. Okorie
(2025)
Case details
Full caption
University Mall v. Okorie et al.
Country
United States
Jurisdiction
Federal
Decided
2025
Disposition
Motion Granted
Majority
Starrett (Justice)
IN
THE
UNITED
STATES
DISTRICT
COURT
FOR
THE
SOUTHERN
DISTRICT
OF
MISSISSIPPI
EASTERN
DIVISION
UNIVERSITY
MALL,
LLC
PLAINTIFF
V.
CIVIL
ACTION
NO.
2:24-CV-91-KS-MTP
IKECHUKWU
OKORIE,
ROYAL
OAKS
RENTAL
PROPERTIES,
LLC,
AND
INLAND
FAMILY
PRACTICE,
LLC
DEFENDANTS
ORDER
Before
the
Court
are
s
everal
fully-briefed
motions.
Plaintiff
University
Mall,
LLC
(“University
Mall”)
has
filed
a
Motion
for
Cont
empt
[240]
and
an
Emergency
Motion
for
Pre-
filing
Injunction
and
Other
Relief
[258].
The
Court
held
hearings
on
the
motions
on
August
26
and
2
7
,
2025.
Defendant
Ikechukwu
Okorie
has
also
filed
a
Motion
to
Correct
Min
ute
Entry
and
Supplement
Record
[275].
Having
considered
all
related
filings,
including
the
testimony
and
evidence
presented
at
the
hearings,
the
Court
gran
ts
the
Motion
for
Contem
pt
[240]
and
the
Motion
for
Pre-filing
Injunction
[258].
Th
e
Motion
to
Correct
Minute
Entry
[275]
is
granted
in
part
and
denied
in
all
other
respects.
1
I.
BACKGROUND
When
boiled
down
to
their
essenc
e,
the
facts
of
this
case
are
relatively
simple:
Defendant
Okorie
and
his
Defendant
companies
had
a
buil
ding
located
at
3700
Hardy
Street,
Hattiesburg,
Mississippi
(“3700
Hardy
Street”)
that
went
in
to
foreclosure.
The
building
also
housed
Defendants’
medical
clinics,
Inland
Family
Practice,
LLC,
and
St.
Michael’s
Urgent
Care
1
As
the
transcript
of
the
hearings
demonstrates,
the
Court
gave
Defendant
Okorie
considerable
leeway
in
his
testimony.
See
Trs.
[278],
[279],
[280].
Defendant’s
Motion
[275]
is
granted
only
to
the
extent
that
the
Court
has
considered
Defendant
Okorie’s
exhibits
referenced
in
the
Motion
[275].
In
all
other
respects,
the
Motion
is
denied.
Case
2:24-cv-00091-KS-MTP
Document
287
Filed
10/22/25
Page
1
of
21
2
(collectively,
“Inland
Family”).
Plaintiff
University
Mall
bought
3700
Hardy
Street
at
a
foreclosure
auction
on
March
28,
2024.
However,
at
this
point
the
story
veers
off
the
rails
and
becomes
much
more
complicated.
Instead
of
work
ing
to
reach
a
lease
agreement
with
Plaintiff
University
Mall
–
the
new
owner
of
3700
Hardy
Street
–
Defendant
Okorie
disputed
2
University
Mall’s
ownership
of
the
building,
he
and
Inland
Family
refused
to
vacate
the
building,
and
they
refused
to
pay
any
rent.
In
an
effort
to
evict
Defendants,
Plaintiff
brought
an
action
in
state
court
for
Unlawful
Entry
and
Detainer
pur
suant
to
Miss.
Code
Ann.
§
11-25-101,
et
seq
.,
that
Defendant
Okorie
removed
to
this
forum.
After
a
hearing
on
Plaintiff’s
complaint,
the
Court
ruled
in
favor
of
Plaintiff
University
Mall
and
awarded
possess
ion,
costs,
and
back
rent
of
$76,440.08
(calculated
at
the
rate
of
$9,800.00
per
month)
to
Plaintiff
on
November
21,
2024.
3
See
Order
[148];
J.
[149];
Abstract
of
J.
[203].
Despite
the
Court’s
ruli
ng,
Defendants
refused
to
budge.
Defendants’
failures
to
heed
this
and
subsequent
orders
issued
by
the
Court
form
the
ge
nesis
of
the
contempt
proceedings.
Pursuant
to
the
state
statute,
the
Court’s
November
21
Orde
r
[148]
included
a
contempt
warning,
which
stated
that
the
“Court
advises
De
fendants
that
the
‘judge
may
.
.
.
enforce
the
judgment
and
may
punish
for
contem
pt
of
process
thereon.’”
Or
der
[148]
at
16
(quoting
Miss.
2
A
partial
list
of
cases
in
which
Defendant
Okorie
has
disputed
the
ownership
of
3700
Hardy
Street
may
be
found
in
Order
[85],
Okorie
v.
Foxworth,
et
al.
,
Civil
Action
No.
2:24cv35-TBM-RPM
(S.D.
Miss.
June
4,
2025).
At
the
time
of
the
Order
[85],
Defendant
Okorie
had
filed
over
thirty
(30)
lawsuits
and
bankruptcy
appeals
before
the
United
States
District
Court
for
the
Southern
District
of
Mississippi.
The
list
in
Order
[85]
does
not
include
Okorie’s
state
court
actions
related
to
this
property.
See
Okorie
v.
University
Mall
,
2025-CP-192-COA
(still
pending
as
of
10/17/25);
Okorie
v.
Citizen’s
Bank
,
No.
2024-CP-166
(Miss.
Aug.
1,
2024)(affirming
the
Forrest
County
Chancery
Court’s
grant
of
summary
judgment
in
favor
of
Citizens
Bank
and
Wells
Fargo
Bank
and
dismissal
of
Okorie’s
claim
to
quiet
and
confirm
title
regarding
3700
Hardy
Street);
Okorie
v.
Citizens
Bank
,
2024-CP-462-COA
(Miss.
Ct.
App.
Apr.
16,
2024)(affirming
the
Forrest
County
Chancery
Court’s
dism
issal
of
Okorie’s
complaint
to
quiet
title
regarding
3700
Hardy
Street).
The
Court
notes
that
th
is
account
of
state
actions
is
based
on
a
review
of
the
docket
at
the
Mississippi
Supreme
Court
and
the
Mississippi
Court
of
Appeals,
and
it
does
not
include
actions,
if
any,
that
are
currently
pending
in
the
lower
state
courts
that
relate
to
3700
Hardy
Street
.
A
history
of
Defendant
Okorie’s
bankruptcy
litigation
may
be
found
at
In
re
Okorie
,
No.
19-50379-KMS,
2023
WL
7311173,
*3
(Bankr.
S.D.
Miss.
Nov.
6,
2023)(setting
forth
detailed
facts
and
history
of
the
case),
aff’d
,
No.
24-60255,
2024
WL
4471734
(5th
Cir.
Oct.
11,
2024).
3
On
July
30,
2025,
the
Fifth
Circuit
affirmed
the
Court’s
November
21,
2024,
Order
[148]
and
Judgment
[149].
See
Order
[276](Appeal
No.
24-60605).
The
mandate
issued
on
September
4,
2025.
Case
2:24-cv-00091-KS-MTP
Document
287
Filed
10/22/25
Page
2
of
21
3
Code
Ann.
§
11-25-113).
On
December
2,
2024,
the
Court,
again
pursuant
to
the
state
statute,
issued
a
Writ
of
Habere
Facias
Possessionem
directing
the
United
Stat
es
Marshal
to
deliver
“peaceful
possession”
of
3700
Har
dy
Street
to
Plaintiff.
See
Writ
[163].
In
re
sponse
to
Defendant
Okorie’s
Motions
for
Clar
ification
[152]
and
[154]
,
the
Court
explained
the
meaning
of
contempt
and
reiterated
that
University
Ma
ll
was
entitled
to
possession
of
3700
Hardy
Street
in
an
Order
entered
on
December
3,
2024.
See
Order
[168].
Defenda
nts
still
refused
to
vacate
the
premises
and,
in
the
meantime,
had
appealed
the
Court’
s
Order
[148]
without
posting
a
supersedeas
bond.
4
See
Notice
of
Appeal
[150].
On
December
4,
2024,
the
Fifth
Circuit
Court
of
Appeals
issued
two
separate
orders
denying
Defendant
O
korie’s
motions
to
stay
eviction.
See
Orders
[169],
[170]
(both
in
Appeal
No.
24-60605).
In
a
third
order
entered
on
December
4,
the
Fifth
Circuit
denied
Defendant
Okorie’s
motion
for
emergency
in
junction
pending
a
ruling
on
his
petition
for
mandamus
(seeking
to
stop
this
C
ourt’s
proceedings)
and
issued
a
sanctions
warning
stating,
“[w]e
CAUTION
Petitioner
[Okorie]
that
th
e
future
filing
of
repetitive
or
frivolous
motions
in
this
court
may
result
in
the
imposition
of
sa
nctions,
including
dismissal,
moneta
ry
sanctions,
and
restrictions
on
his
ability
to
file
pleadings
in
this
court
and
any
court
subject
to
this
court’s
jurisdiction.”
Order
[172]
at
1-2
(Appeal
No.
24-60613).
That
same
day,
December
4,
2024,
this
Court
issu
ed
the
first
of
several
orders
giving
Defendants
until
December
18,
2024,
to
vacate
the
building
and
remove
its
contents.
See
Orders
[171]
(entered
12/4/24),
[175]
(e
ntered
12/6/24;
denying
stay);
[
181]
(entered
12/13/24);
[184]
(entered
12/17/24).
Each
Order
reiterated
th
e
December
18
deadline
for
vacatur
of
3700
Hardy
Street.
The
Orders
at
[171]
and
[181]
included,
yet
again,
contempt
warnings.
And
the
December
17
Order
emphasized
that
“[p]ursu
ant
to
Mississippi
Code
Annotat
ed
§
89-7-35(4),
any
personal
4
Defendants
did,
however,
eventually
make
two
rental
payments
in
the
amount
of
$1,633.35
(from
Okorie)
and
$2,286.69
(from
Inland
Family)
pursuant
to
the
Court’s
Order
[171].
See
Docket
entries
of
12/6/24
and
12/13/24.
Case
2:24-cv-00091-KS-MTP
Document
287
Filed
10/22/25
Page
3
of
21
4
property
left
by
Defendants
on
the
premises
of
37
00
Hardy
Street
‘shall
be
deemed
abandoned
and
may
be
disposed
of
by’
Plaint
iff
University
Mall
‘without
further
notice
or
obligation’
to
Defendants,
subject
to
the
rights
or
intere
sts,
if
any,
of
a
Chapter
7
Trustee
in
either
bankruptcies
of
Defendant
Inland
Family
or
Defendant
Okorie
.”
[184]
at
2
(empha
sis
in
original).
In
the
meantime,
on
December
9,
2024,
the
Fifth
Circuit
issued
an
order
denying
Defendant
Okorie’s
renewed
emergency
motion
for
st
ay
of
execution
of
eviction
proceedings.
See
Order
[176](Appeal
No.
24-60605).
In
the
Order,
the
Fifth
Circuit
gave
Defendant
Okorie
another
sanctions
warning,
stating,
“we
again
WARN
Appella
nt
[Okorie]
that
furthe
r
meritless
efforts
to
stay
the
district
court’s
judgmen
t
by
future
frivolous
filings
in
this
court
may
result
in
the
imposition
of
sanctions,
including
dismissal,
moneta
ry
sanctions,
and
restrict
ions
on
his
ability
to
file
pleadings
in
this
court
and
any
cour
t
subject
to
this
court’s
jurisdiction.”
Id.
at
2.
The
following
day,
the
same
Fifth
Circuit
panel
issued
an
Order
denying
Defenda
nt
Okorie’s
motion
for
clarification
in
his
mandamus
action.
See
Order
[177]
(entered
12/10/24;
Appeal
No.
24-
60613).
Early
on
the
morning
of
December
18,
2024,
offi
cers
of
the
United
States
Marshal
Service
secured
the
building
for
Plaintiff.
See
Return
[185].
According
to
subsequent
filings
by
Plaintiff
and
testimony
at
the
contempt
h
earing,
3700
Hardy
Street
appeared
on
that
day
as
if
Inland
Family
employees
had
simply
walked
out
of
the
buildin
g
at
the
close
of
busin
ess
on
December
17,
leaving
behind
all
of
the
building’
s
contents,
including
computers,
me
dical
records,
me
dical
equipment,
toxic
medical
waste,
and
Defenda
nt
Okorie’s
personal
property.
5
In
other
words,
Defendant
5
With
permission
of
the
Bankruptcy
Court
and
Trustee,
on
January
15,
2025,
University
Mall
paid
$4,966.41
to
a
moving
company
to
dispose
of
medical
waste,
pack
up
and
secure
personal
property,
medical
records,
and
contents
of
3700
Hardy
Street.
All
of
the
packed
items
were
moved
to
a
secure
storage
trailer,
for
which
University
Mall
has
continued
to
pay
monthly
rental.
See
[271-1].
Case
2:24-cv-00091-KS-MTP
Document
287
Filed
10/22/25
Page
4
of
21
5
Okorie
made
no
effort
whatsoever
to
comply
with
the
Court’s
or
ders
to
vacate
the
premises
by
December
18,
2024.
On
December
20,
2024,
Defendant
Okorie
filed
a
Notice
to
the
Court
[186]
advising
that
Inland
Family
Practice’s
Chapter
11
bankruptcy
had
been
converted
to
a
Chapter
7
bankruptcy
on
December
17.
See
Notice
[184];
see
also
Bankr.
Order
[186-1].
Thereaf
ter,
the
Bankruptcy
Court
held
a
hearing
on
the
matter
on
January
7,
2025,
and
it
subsequently
entered
a
Final
Decree/Order
Closing
Case
on
March
19,
2025.
See
Order
[469],
In
re
Inland
Family
Practice
Center,
LLC
,
No.
19-50020-KMS
(Bankr.
S.
D.
Miss.
Mar.
19,
2025).
Since
the
Court
entered
its
Order
[148]
in
November
2024,
the
case
has
dragged
through
post-judgment
proceedings
due,
in
no
small
part,
to
Defendant
Okorie’s
effort
s.
At
this
juncture,
the
Court
will
not
give
a
blow-by-blow
account
of
this
case’s
post-judgment
procedural
history.
The
nearly
one
hundred
fifty
docket
entries
since
November
2024
speak
for
themselves.
However,
along
the
way,
the
case
has
spawned
Plaintiff’s
Motion
for
Contempt
[240],
which
Plaintiff
brought
after
Defendant
Okorie
faile
d
to
vacate
the
premises
pursu
ant
to
the
Court’s
Orders
and
after
the
Bankruptcy
Court
dismissed
Inland
Family’s
bankruptcy.
Plaintiff
has
also
filed
a
Motion
for
Pre-filing
Injunction
[258].
This
motion
was
prompted
by
Okor
ie’s
threatened
lawsuit
against
Plaintiff,
Plaintiff’s
Texas
and
Mississippi
counsel,
and
their
resp
ective
law
firms
that
Okorie
subsequently
filed
on
July
29,
2025,
when
Plaintif
f
sought
to
garnish
Okorie’s
Texas
bank
accounts.
See
Okorie
v.
University
Mall,
LLC,
et
al.
,
Civil
Action
No.
4:
25-cv-817-SDJ-AGD
(E.D.
Tex.)(dismissed
on
8/25/25).
The
Court
has
held
hearings
on
the
Motions
[240]
and
[258],
and
it
is
now
ready
to
rule.
Case
2:24-cv-00091-KS-MTP
Document
287
Filed
10/22/25
Page
5
of
21
6
II.
MOTION
FOR
CONTEMPT
Considering
this
procedural
background,
the
C
ourt
turns
to
the
Motion
for
Contempt
[240].
Plaintiff
University
Mall
has
moved
for
civil
contempt
against
Defend
ant
Okorie
personally
because
he
has
claimed
to
be
the
owner
of
the
building
and
the
landlord
of
the
companies
that
operated
there.
He
also
sought
relief
in
his
person
al
capacity
regarding
the
contents
of
the
building.
See
Motion
[234].
The
civil
contempt
analysis
is
relatively
simple.
To
prove
ci
vil
contempt,
the
movant
must
demonstrate
“(1)
that
a
court
order
was
in
effect,
and
(2)
that
the
order
required
certain
conduct
by
the
respondent,
and
(3)
that
the
respondent
failed
to
comp
ly
with
the
court's
order.
To
determine
compliance
with
an
order,
the
court
simply
asks
whether
the
respondent”
did
what
the
order
required.
FDIC
v.
LeGrand,
43
F.3d
163,
170
(5th
Cir.
1995)(citation
omitted).
“If
he
has
not,
the
burden
shifts
to
the
respondent
to
rebut
this
conclusion,
demonstrate
an
inability
to
comply,
or
present
other
relevant
defenses.”
Id.
“Willfulness
is
not
an
el
ement
of
civil
contempt.”
Petroleos
Mexicanos
v.
Crawford
Enters.,
826
F.2d
392,
401
(5th
Cir.
1987)
.
“In
a
civil
contempt
proceeding,
the
movant
bears
the
burden
of
esta
blishing
the
elements
of
contempt
by
clear
and
convincing
evidence.”
Travelhost,
Inc.
v.
Blandford,
68
F.3d
958,
961
(5th
Cir.
1995).
In
this
case,
having
considered
the
filings,
th
e
Court’s
Orders,
as
well
as
the
testimony
and
evidence
received
at
th
e
hearing,
the
Court
finds
that
Plai
ntiff
has
established
by
clear
and
convincing
evidence
that
Defendant
O
korie
should
be
held
in
civil
co
ntempt
of
the
Court’s
Orders.
See
LeGrand
,
43
F.3d
at
170.
First,
there
was
a
Novemb
er
21,
2024,
Court
order
in
effect
awarding
possession
of
the
building
to
Plaintiff.
See
Order
[148],
J.
[149].
Second,
this
Order
[148]
was
followed
by
a
series
of
Orders,
starting
on
December
4,
2024,
giving
Pl
aintiff
a
deadline
of
December
18,
2024,
to
vacate
3700
Hardy
Street.
See
Orders
[171],
[175],
[181],
[184];
see
also
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7
Order
[168](entered
12/3/24;
reitera
ting
award
of
possession
to
Plaint
iff;
explaining
contempt).
The
Fifth
Circuit
also
denied
his
requests
for
stay
in
three
sepa
rate
Orders
entered
on
December
4
and
one
on
December
9.
Most
importantly,
the
condition
of
3700
Hardy
Street
on
the
morning
of
December
18,
2024,
demonstrates
that
Okorie
made
no
effort
to
comply
with
the
Court’s
Orders.
Finally,
in
an
effort
to
provide
full
disclosure
about
the
curren
t
condition
of
3700
Hardy
Street,
the
parties,
counsel,
and
the
C
ourt
inspected
the
property
on
th
e
morning
of
August
26,
2025,
in
conjunction
with
the
motion
hear
ings.
Tr.
[278]
at
59-63.
At
this
point,
the
burden
shifts
to
Defendant
O
korie
to
“demonstrate
an
inability
to
comply,
or
present
other
relevant
defenses.”
LeGrand
,
43
F.3d
at
170.
In
many
in
stances,
it
is
helpful
to
use
a
metaphor
to
paint
the
picture
of
the
facts
of
a
case
to
assist
the
reader
and
the
appellate
court
in
understanding
what
has
transpired
beyond
the
fact
s
presented
in
a
cold
tr
anscript
of
a
hearing
and
the
filings
before
the
Court.
In
this
case,
the
Court
is
at
a
loss
for
metaphors
that
can
adequately
explain
the
testimony
presen
ted
by
Dr.
Okorie
as
to
why
he
chos
e
not
to
obey
the
court’s
order.
In
short,
Okorie’s
testimony
was
purposely
evasive,
revisionist,
and
rambling.
An
examination
of
his
testimony
shows
that
he
fa
iled
to
meet
his
burden.
A
starting
point
is
the
ownershi
p
of
Inland
Family.
Okorie
te
stified
both
that
he
was
the
sole
owner
of
Inland
Family,
yet
he
had
no
control
over
it.
Instead,
he
asserted
that
Inland
Family’s
bankruptcy
attorney
6
and
a
bankruptcy
trustee
appointed
after
the
December
18,
2024
deadline
to
vacate
the
premises
were
responsible
for
making
decisions
about
whether
Inland
should
vacate.
This
is
directly
contrary
to
a
filing
signed
by
O
korie
on
December
13,
in
which
he
stated
“Dr.
Okorie
maintains
personal
ownership
of
the
pr
operty
and
acknowledges
his
responsibility
to
6
Defendant
Okorie’s
bankruptcy
counsel
never
made
an
appear
ance
in
this
action.
Furthermore,
in
a
January
7,
2025,
hearing
before
the
Bankruptcy
Court,
his
bankruptcy
counsel
admitted
that
he
had
not
been
actively
involved
in
the
bankruptcy
case
for
two
years.
See
Tr.
[275-2]
at
6:9;
18:13-14
(Please
note
that
the
page
numbers
are
those
assigned
by
the
CM/ECF
system.).
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vacate.
Inland
Family
Practice’s
status
as
a
tenant
does
not
shif
t
compliance
obligations
for
the
premises
to
a
trustee
or
any
othe
r
party.”
Resp.
[182]
at
4.
More
over,
contrary
to
his
assertions,
Okorie’s
ability
to
coordinate
a
move
was
not
constrained
by
Inland
Family’s
conversion
from
Chapter
11
to
Chapter
7
bankruptcy
on
the
eve
of
the
December
18
deadline,
as
the
conversion
did
not
revive
any
automatic
stay.
See
In
re
State
Airlines,
Inc.
,
873
F.2d
264,
268
(11th
Cir.
1989)(finding
that
a
conversion
order
doe
s
not
trigger
an
au
tomatic
stay))
Finally,
Okorie’s
testimony
that
he
had
no
contro
l
over
the
property
is
di
rectly
contrary
to
testimony
that
he
gave
later
in
the
hearing,
upon
questioning
by
the
Court
when
he
refused
to
answer
questions
presented
by
Plaintiff’s
counsel:
The
Court:
Did
you
have
the
abili
ty
to
remove
these
items?
Mr.
Okorie:
Yes,
Your
Honor.
Yes,
Your
Honor.
I
had
the
ab
ility
to
remove
it,
yes,
Your
Honor.
The
Court:
Nobody
was
keeping
you
from
it,
were
they?
Mr.
Okorie:
Nobody
was
keeping
me
from
it
–
yes,
Your
Honor.
Nobody
was
keeping
me
from
doing
that
up
until
they
evicted
us.
Tr.
[280]
at
38:16-24.
Even
so,
Defendant
Okorie
argued
that
he
did
not
vacate
the
building
because
he
had
appeals
pending
and
hoped
that
the
Fifth
Circuit
would
grant
hi
s
requests
for
a
stay.
Okorie
maintained
this
argument
despite
his
failure
to
file
a
supe
rsedeas
bond,
which
could
have
enabled
a
stay.
See
Fed.
R.
Civ.
P.
62.
Okorie
also
testified
that
his
request
for
a
stay
was
denied
by
the
Fifth
Circuit
late
on
the
evening
of
December
17,
so
he
was
unable
to
comply
with
the
Court’s
order
to
vacate
by
December
18.
However,
the
tim
ing
of
the
Fifth
Circui
t’s
orders
directly
contradicts
Okorie’s
testimony.
Th
e
Fifth
Circuit
issued
three
sepa
rate
orders
denying
a
stay
of
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this
Court’s
proceedings
on
December
4,
2025,
followed
by
another
order
on
December
9,
2025.
The
Fifth
Circuit
did
not
enter
a
ny
order
related
to
Okorie’s
app
eal
of
this
case
on
December
17,
2024.
Likewise,
Defendant
Okorie’s
te
stimony
that
he
did
not
have
th
e
financial
resources
to
pay
for
a
move
are
belied
by
the
evidence.
Okor
ie
testified
that
he
was
funding
Inland
Family’s
operations
at
great
personal
sacrifice.
Howeve
r,
Okorie
admitted
that
he
transferred
$25,000
to
his
wife
on
November
22,
2024,
the
day
after
the
Court
awarded
po
ssession
to
University
Mall;
that
he
transferred
$23,000
from
In
land
Family’s
debtor-in-posse
ssion
account
to
his
personal
account
between
December
4
and
13;
that
Inland
ha
d
receivables
of
$74,000
in
the
weeks
leading
up
to
the
December
18
deadline;
and
that
he
ha
d
over
$12,000
in
a
day-trader
account
during
the
time
in
question.
Tr.
[280]
at
40-58;
[271-14]
(che
ck);
[271-16]
at
40
(day-trader
account
statement).
On
January
10,
2025,
he
also
signed
and
personally
guaranteed
a
lease
on
another
property
so
he
could
relocate
the
clinic.
[271-13].
University
Mall
spent
nearly
$5,000
to
remove
a
good
portion
of
the
personal
propert
y
contents
of
the
building.
Ba
sed
on
the
fore
going
financial
records,
Defendant
Okorie
had
the
funds
to
facilitate
a
move
by
the
deadline
of
December
18,
2024.
Moreover,
Okorie’s
tes
timony
that
he
did
not
have
sufficien
t
time
to
execute
a
move
is
not
credible.
He
testified
that
the
fourteen-day
pe
riod
that
the
Court
gave
him
on
December
4,
2024,
was
not
enough
time
to
coordinate
a
move.
This
fourteen-day
peri
od
came
nearly
two
weeks
after
the
Court’s
November
21,
2024
judgm
ent
granting
possession
of
the
building
to
Plaintiffs,
which
was
nearly
eight
months
after
the
building
wa
s
sold
at
auction
on
March
29,
2024.
However,
on
January
7,
2025,
he
asserted
in
emails
to
the
bankruptcy
court
and
other
interested
parties
that
he
could
move
the
contents
of
the
building
within
ten
days.
[271-10]
(emails).
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In
sum,
Defendant
Okorie
has
failed
to
carry
his
burden
to
“demonstr
ate
an
inability
to
comply,
or
present
other
relevant
defenses.”
LeGrand
,
43
F.3d
at
170.
He
admitted
under
oath
that
no
one
kept
him
fro
m
removing
the
items
from
the
build
ing
in
advance
of
the
December
18,
2024,
deadline.
His
efforts
to
obtain
a
stay
were
not
only
denied
by
this
Court,
but
were
also
denied
by
the
Fifth
Circuit
four
teen
days
and
nine
da
ys
–
not
mere
hours
–
in
advance
of
the
December
18
deadline.
The
record
demonstrates
that
he
had
the
financial
resources
to
facilitate
a
move.
And,
finally,
his
testim
ony
and
January
2025
ema
ils
demonstrate
that
he
was
willing
to
relocate
the
property
within
a
ten-day
period
in
January
2025,
see
[271-10],
yet
he
willingly
chose
not
to
obey
the
Court’s
Orders
giving
him
at
le
ast
fourteen
days
to
vacate
in
December
2024.
Thus,
the
Court
has
determined
that
Plaintiff
University
Mall
has
established
by
clear
and
convincing
evidence
that
Defendant
Okorie
stands
in
civil
cont
empt
of
the
Court’s
Orders
mandating
that
he
vacate
3700
Hardy
Street
by
D
ecember
18,
2024.
Moreover,
it
has
concluded
that
Defendant
Okorie
has
failed
to
demonstrate
an
inability
to
comply
or
present
other
relevant
defenses.
Accordingly,
the
Court
must
de
termine
the
method
for
compensating
Plaintiff
University
Mall
for
Defendant
Okorie’s
failure
to
obey
Court
orders.
“When
a
party
disobeys
a
court
order,
the
court
uses
a
civil
contempt
proceeding
to
either
compel
compliance
or
compensa
te
a
litigant
for
damages
resu
lting
from
the
noncompliance.”
Rousseau
v.
3
Eagles
Aviation,
Inc.
,
130
F.
App'x
687,
690
(5th
Cir.
2005
).
In
this
case,
Defendant
Okorie
has
demonstrated
repeatedly
that
Court
orders
are
inadequa
te
to
compel
his
compliance.
Consequently,
the
Court
must
cons
ider
the
best
method
to
compensa
te
Plaintiff
University
Mall
for
Defendant
Okorie’s
non-complia
nce.
“‘Compensatory
civil
c
ontempt
reimburses
the
injured
party
for
the
.
.
.
losses
flowing
from
noncompliance
and
expenses
reasonably
and
necessarily
incurred
in
the
attempt
to
enforce
compliance.’
An
award
of
attorney's
fees
is
an
appropriate
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sanction
where
a
party
incurs
add
itional
expenses
as
a
result
of
th
e
other
party's
noncompliance.”
Id.
(citations
omitted).
However,
the
Supreme
Court
has
cautioned
district
courts
to
use
their
discretion
and
judgment
in
crafting
these
awards
by
employing
a
“but-for
causation
standard.”
Goodyear
Tire
&
Rubber
Co.
v.
Haeger
,
581
U.S.
101,
109-110
(2017).
On
the
other
hand,
district
courts
“‘need
not,
and
indeed
should
not,
become
green-eyeshade
account
ants
(or
whatever
the
contemporary
equivalent
is).’”
Id.
at
110
(citations
omitted).
Utilizing
the
but-for
causation
stan
dard,
Plaintiff
University
Mall
should
not
be
in
this
unenviable
position.
If
Defendant
Okorie
had
simp
ly
obeyed
the
Court’s
Orders
to
vacate
the
building
by
December
18,
2024,
3700
Hardy
Street
coul
d
have
been
rented
to
a
paying
tenant,
the
parties
would
have
gone
their
sepa
rate
ways,
and
all
of
them
c
ould
have
foregone
this
painful
litigation.
But
that
did
not
happen.
Considering
the
Court’s
authority,
it
has
se
veral
methods
to
compensate
Plaintiff
University
Mall
for
Defendant
Okorie’s
noncomplia
nce
with
Court
orders.
Accordingly,
the
Court
grants
the
following
compensatory
remedies:
1.
Defendants’
failure
to
vacate
the
building
converted
it
into
a
storage
unit
for
Defendants
at
Plaintiff’s
expense
and
caused
Plainti
ff
to
lose
rental
to
a
paying
tenant.
Accordingly,
the
Court
hereby
awards
Univ
ersity
Mall
per
diem
rent
from
December
18,
2024,
to
the
September
4,
2025,
the
date
on
wh
ich
the
Fifth
Circui
t’s
mandate
issued
affirming
this
Court’s
decision.
See
[276-1].
At
the
ra
te
of
$326.67
per
day
(as
calculated
by
the
Court’s
Orders
at
[148]
a
nd
[171]),
Defendant
Okorie
owes
Plaintiff
rental
in
the
amount
of
$
85,260.87
for
that
time
period.
2.
Defendant
Okorie
is
require
d
to
reimburse
Plaintiff
fo
r
its
out-of-pocket
expenses
related
to
moving
the
personal
property
from
the
building
in
the
amount
of
$4,966.41,
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as
well
as
any
related
trailer
storage
expenses
at
the
rate
of
$375
per
month
since
March
12,
2025.
See
[271-1]
at
2.
3.
Defendant
Okorie
is
hereby
ordered
to
pay
in
advance
for
a
third-party
contractor/mover
(subject
to
Plaintiff’s
approval)
to
re
move
the
abandoned
remaining
personal
property,
excluding
fixtures,
from
3700
Hardy
Street
and
transfer
the
remaining
items
to
a
secure
location
at
Defe
ndant
Okorie’s
expense,
to
be
stored
at
Defendant
Okorie’s
expense
until
such
time
as
the
judg
ment
and
the
compensatory
sanctions
imposed
by
this
Order
are
satisfie
d.
If
Defendant
Okorie
chooses
to
sell
the
items,
the
proceeds
shall
be
used
first
to
satisfy
the
Judgment
[149]
and
compensatory
sanctions
imposed
by
this
Court
and
the
Bankruptcy
Court.
Beginning
on
the
date
of
this
Order
and
until
the
remaining
personal
property
is
removed,
the
rental
clock
be
gins
running
anew
such
that
Defendant
Okorie
will
owe
$326.27
rental
for
each
day
that
his
and/or
Inland
Family’s
personal
property
remains
in
3700
Hardy
Street.
Neither
Defendant
Okorie
nor
any
of
his
employees
will
be
allowed
on
the
premises
of
3700
Hardy
Street
during
the
moving
process.
4.
Defendant
Okorie
and
other
Defendants
sh
all
indemnify
and
hold
harmless
University
Mall
for
any
claims
by
lienhol
ders
or
owners
of
the
pers
onal
property
abandoned
in
the
building.
5.
Defendant
Okorie
is
ordered
to
pay
University
Mall’s
attorney’s
fees
incurred
pursuing
this
detainer
action.
Universi
ty
Mall
should
submit
an
itemiz
ed
bill
to
the
Court
in
the
form
of
a
motion
at
its
earliest
convenience.
6.
University
Mall
is
entitled
to
all
legal
post-judgment
remedies
to
available
to
it
to
satisfy
the
amounts
due
in
this
Order.
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The
Court
hereby
advises
Defendant
Okorie
that
,
should
he
fail
to
pa
y
these
compensatory
sanctions,
he
may
be
found
in
criminal
contempt.
See
International
Unio
n,
United
Mine
Workers
v.
Bagwell
,
512
U.S.
821
(1994)(“Due
process
traditionally
requires
that
criminal
laws
provide
prior
notice
both
of
th
e
conduct
to
be
prohibited
and
th
e
sanction
to
be
imposed.”).
III.
MOTION
FOR
PRE-FILING
INJUNCTION
[258]
Plaintiff
has
also
moved
for
a
pre-filing
injunction
against
De
fendant
Okorie,
and
the
Court
held
a
hearing
on
the
matter.
As
an
initial
basis
for
th
e
Motion
[258],
Plaintiff
pointed
to
Okorie’s
threatened
and
ultimately
filed
lawsuit
against
Plaintiff,
its
Texas
and
Mississippi
counsel,
as
well
as
their
respective
law
firms,
wh
ich
sought
to
stop
Plaintiff’s
ga
rnishment
of
Okorie’s
Texas
bank
accounts.
Plaintiff
has
also
set
out
in
great
detail
the
many
other
wa
ys
that
it
asserts
that
Defendant
Okorie
has
abused
the
court
system.
See
[261].
In
his
Response
[260]
and
Sur-reply
[263],
Defendant
Okorie
maintains,
in
ge
neral,
that
all
of
his
filings
ha
ve
been
made
in
good
faith,
on
behalf
of
him
and
his
patients.
He
argues,
fu
rthermore,
that
any
burden
on
the
Court
has
been
created
by
Plaintiff’s
misconduct
without
any
attempt
to
name
or
even
allege
what,
if
any,
misconduct
Plaintiff
engaged
in.
In
Baum
v.
Blue
Moon
Ventures
,
LLC
,
the
Fifth
Circuit
set
out
four
factors
a
court
must
consider
when
determining
whethe
r
it
should
impose
a
pre-filing
in
junction
or
modify
an
existing
injunction
to
deter
“vexatious”
filings.
1.
A
party’s
history
of
li
tigation,
in
particular
whether
he
has
filed
vexatious,
harassing,
or
duplicative
lawsuits;
2.
Whether
the
party
had
a
good
faith
ba
sis
for
pursuing
the
litigation,
or
simply
intended
to
harass;
Case
2:24-cv-00091-KS-MTP
Document
287
Filed
10/22/25
Page
13
of
21
14
3.
The
extent
of
the
burden
on
the
courts
and
other
parties
resulting
from
the
party’s
filings;
and
4.
The
adequacy
of
alternative
sanctions.
Baum
v.
Blue
Moon
Ventures
,
LLC
,
513
F.3d
181,
189
(2008).
Defendant
Okorie
is
no
stranger
to
this
standard,
as
the
Bankruptcy
Court
for
th
e
Southern
District
of
Mississippi
followed
Baum
when
it
adjudicated
him
as
a
“v
exatious
litigant”
in
Bankruptcy
Case
No.
19-50379-KMS.
This
Court
has
upheld
that
determinati
on,
it
has
been
affirmed
by
the
Fi
fth
Circuit,
and
the
mandate
has
issued.
See
Order
[11]
at
9,
Civil
Action
No.
2:
24cv51-KS-MTP
(quoting
Bankruptcy
Order
[1198]
at
13-14,
No.
19-50379-KMS),
aff’d
,
In
re
Okorie
,
Order
[88-2],
A
ppeal
No.
24-60469
(1/15/25)(docketed
at
[27]
in
Ci
vil
Action
No.
2:24cv51-KS-MTP).
In
the
past
several
years,
this
Court
ha
s
been
weighed
down
by
the
burden
of
Okorie’s
baseless
pro
se
litigation
stemming
from
his
efforts
to
not
only
contest
the
foreclosure
of
3700
Hardy
Street
but
also
contest
his
bankruptcy
proceeding
in
Bankruptcy
Case
No.
19-50379-KMS.
As
of
May
2025,
Okorie
had
filed
thirteen
(13)
adversary
proceedings
related
to
his
Bankruptcy
Case
No.
19-50379-KMS.
7
As
of
May
2025,
he
had
filed
thirty-
one
(31)
separate
civil
actions
in
this
Court,
all
in
his
pro
se
capacity,
and
none
of
which
(to
date
)
has
yielded
a
decision
in
his
favor.
8
As
described
supra
,
Okorie
has
even
filed
baseless
litig
ation
in
the
Eastern
District
of
7
For
brevity’s
sake,
the
Court
will
list
only
the
case
numb
ers:
AP
19-06032-KMS,
AP
19
-06040-KMS,
AP
20-06015-
KMS,
AP
23-06017-KMS,
AP
23-06019-KMS,
AP
23-06020-KMS,
AP
23-06021-KMS,
AP
23-06022-KMS,
AP
23-
06023-KMS,
AP
24-06017-KMS,
AP
24-06018-KMS,
AP
24-06027-KMS,
AP
25-06008-KMS.
8
Again,
for
brevity’s
sake,
the
Court
will
list
only
the
case
numbers:
1:22-cv-00040-TBM-BWR;
2:23-cv-00100-
TBM-RPM;
2:23-cv-00104-HSO-BWR;
2:23-cv-00172-HSO-BWR;
2:23-cv-00173-HSO-RPM;
2:23-cv-00190-
TBM-RPM;
2:24-cv-00017-HSO-BWR;
2:24-cv-00020-HSO-BWR;
2:24-cv-00021-TBM-RPM;
2:24-cv-00030-
KS-MTP;
2:24-cv-00035-TBM-RPM;
2:24-cv-00046-HSO-BWR;
2:24-cv-00047-KS-MTP;
2:24-cv-00050-TBM-
RPM;
2:24-cv-00051-KS-MTP;
2:24-cv-00052-TBM-RPM;
2:24-cv-00061-HSO-BWR;
2:24-cv-00063-TBM-RPM;
2:24-cv-00089-TBM-RPM;
2:24-cv-00091-KS-MTP;
2:24-cv-00111-TBM-RPM;
2:24-cv-00141-MPM-RPM;
2:24-
cv-00146-TBM-RPM;
2:24-cv-00181-HSO-BWR;
2:25-cv-00005-KS-MTP;
2:25-cv-00021-TBM-RPM;
2:25-cv-
00042-TBM-RPM;
2:25-cv-00044-HSO-BWR;
2:25-cv-00045-HSO-BWR;
2:25-cv-00047-KS-MTP;
2:25-cv-
00065-KS-MTP.
For
another
listing
of
Okorie’s
civil
actions
filed
since
receiving
his
Chapter
7
discharge
in
October
2021,
see
Brief
[11]
at
p.8,
n.1,
Okorie
v.
Priority
One
Bank,
et
al.
,
Civil
Action
No.
2:25cv45-HSO-BWR
(S.D.
Miss.
Jul.
15,
2025).
By
that
filing’s
count,
Okorie
has
filed
at
least
sixt
y
(60)
federal
court
lawsuits,
adversary
complaints,
Case
2:24-cv-00091-KS-MTP
Document
287
Filed
10/22/25
Page
14
of
21
15
Texas
related
to
this
action.
9
As
of
the
date
of
this
Order,
O
korie
has
filed
eighteen
(18)
separate
appeals
of
this
Court’s
deci
sions
to
the
Fifth
Circuit.
10
The
Fifth
Circuit
has
denied
relief
to
him
in
sixteen
of
those
appeals
and
has
issued
multiple
sanctions
wa
rnings,
as
described
supra
.
11
Dr.
Okorie’s
baseless
filings
have
even
reached
th
e
Supreme
Court,
which
has
denied
his
appeals.
12
And,
as
described
supra
in
Note
2,
Defendant
Okor
ie
has
filed
parallel
acti
ons
in
the
courts
of
the
State
of
Mississippi.
As
illustrated
by
the
foregoing
listing
of
cases
,
and
as
set
forth
in
Plaintiff’s
briefing,
see
[261],
Defendant
Okorie
has
faile
d
to
demonstrate
a
good
faith
basi
s
for
litigation.
Put
another
way,
his
conduct
amounts
to
bad
faith.
See
Carroll
v.
Abide
(In
re
Carroll)
,
850
F.3d
811,
816
(5th
Cir.
2017);
see
also
Okorie
v.
Citizens
Bank
,
Civil
Action
No.
2:24cv35-TBM-RPM,
743
F.
Supp.
3d
807,
812
(S.D.
Miss.
2024)(noting
the
Cour
t’s
power
to
reference
and
compile
cases
pending
before
the
District
Cour
t).
Defendant
Okorie’s
litiga
tion
is
crafted
to
harass
opposing
litigants.
He
also
continues
to
ignore
court
ru
lings,
as
demonstrated
by
his
failure
to
obey
the
rulings
of
the
Court
in
this
case
and
his
failure
to
pay
sanctions
imposed
by
the
Bankruptcy
Court
and
affirmed
by
this
Court.
See
Okorie
v.
Lentz
,
Civil
Action
No.
2:24cv51-KS-MTP,
2024
WL
4186937
(S.D.
Miss.
Sept.
9,
2024),
aff’d
,
In
re
Okorie
,
No.
24-60499,
2024
WL
4867073
(5th
Cir.
Nov.
22,
2024).
And
Okorie
continues
to
misre
present
those
rulings
in
his
filings
and
in
hearings
before
the
Court.
Okorie
generates
an
over-stretched
firehose
of
motions
and
duplicative
or
appeals
all
arising
from
and/or
related
to
his
bankruptcy
case.
9
See
Okorie
v.
University
Mall,
LLC,
et
al.
,
Civil
Action
No.
4:25-cv-817-SDJ-AGD
(E.D.
Tex.)(dismissed
on
8/25/25).
10
See
Appeal
Nos.
23-60505;
24-60166;
24-60254;
24-60255;
24-60273;
24-60345;
24-60376;
24-60377;
24-
60442;
24-60469;
24-60472;
24-60605;
24-60613;
25-60047;
25-60048;
25-60185;
25-60431;
25-60490.
11
The
two
remaining
appeals
are
still
in
the
briefing
stage.
See
Appeal
Nos.
25-60431
and
25-60490.
12
See
Supreme
Court
Appeal
Nos.
24A562
(denying
application
for
stay
in
this
action);
24A998
(granting
extension
of
time
of
file
petition
for
writ
of
certiorari
in
Fifth
Circuit
Appeal
No.
24-60469);
25M5
(denying
Okorie’s
Motion
for
out
of
time
petition
for
writ
of
certiorari
in
Fifth
Circuit
Appeal
No.
24-60469).
Case
2:24-cv-00091-KS-MTP
Document
287
Filed
10/22/25
Page
15
of
21
16
actions
across
a
wide
spectrum
of
courts
and
juri
sdictions.
He
makes
duplicative
filings
in
cases
before
the
Court,
and
he
even
produces
fi
lings
that
do
not
relate
to
this
action.
See,
e.g.
Notice
[286]
(filed
10/20/25).
On
multiple
occasions,
he
ha
s
asked
other
state
and
federal
courts
to
stay
this
action.
See,
e.g.
Motion
[72]
at
3,
Okorie
v.
Foxworth
,
Civil
Action
No.
2:24cv35-TBM-RPM
(S.D.
Miss.
Nov.
25,
2024);
Okorie
v.
University
Mall,
LLC,
et
al.
,
Civil
Action
No.
4:25-cv-817-
SDJ-AGD
(E.D.
Tex.)(dismisse
d
on
8/25/25);
Order
#255090,
Okorie
v.
Citizens
Bank
,
No.
2024-
CP-00462
(Miss.
Dec.
16,
2024);
see
also
[261-2]
(Motion,
Okorie
v.
Citizens
Bank
,
Civil
Action
No.
24-cv-141-SM,
Nov.
4,
2024,
Chancery
Court
of
Forrest
County,
Miss.).
Even
the
Fifth
Circuit’s
sanctions
warnings
have
not
cu
rbed
his
enthusiasm
for
litigation.
Okorie’s
conduct
could
be
interp
reted
as
an
effort
to
interf
ere
with
the
at
torney/client
relationship
of
parties
opposing
hi
m
in
litigation,
thus
depriving
pa
rties
of
their
right
to
counsel,
as
well
as
interfere
with
the
functions
of
the
C
ourt.
Okorie
has
developed
a
pattern
of
suing
attorneys
of
opposing
parties,
th
e
judges
assigned
to
his
cases,
13
and
bankruptcy
trus
tees
in
at
least
fourteen
other
cases
when
he
does
not
like
the
ru
lings,
and
he
has
moved
to
disqualify
counsel
in
at
least
thirteen
actions.
See
[261]
at
8-10.
He
sued
Plaintiff’s
Mississippi
counsel,
Texas
counsel,
and
their
respective
law
firms
wh
en
Plaintiff
attempte
d
to
garnish
his
ba
nk
accounts
pursuant
to
this
Court’s
judgment.
See
Okorie
v.
University
Mall,
LLC,
et
al.
,
Civil
Action
No.
4:25-cv-817-
SDJ-AGD
(E.D.
Tex.)(dismissed
on
8/25/25).
He
also
moved
to
disqualify
Pl
aintiff’s
counsel
in
this
case,
which
the
Court
denied
after
a
hearing.
See
Text
Only
Order
9/24/24;
Tr.
[190]
at
60-
62
(Okorie’s
testimony
stating
he
su
ed
Plaintiff’s
counsel
for
“me
ddling”
in
his
foreclosure
and
eviction;
asserting
that
Plaintiff’s
counsel
should
be
disqualified).
13
Defendant
Okorie
sued
the
undersigned
in
Okorie
v.
Starrett
,
Civil
Action
No.
2:24cv141-MPM-RP.
Final
judgment
of
dismissal
with
prejudice
was
entered
on
March
12,
2025.
There
has
been
no
appeal.
Case
2:24-cv-00091-KS-MTP
Document
287
Filed
10/22/25
Page
16
of
21
17
Moreover,
the
speed
at
which
he
generates
filings
reveals,
nor
does
he
dispute,
that
he
uses
artificial
intelligence
to
generate
his
pleadings.
See
Sur-reply
[263]
at
3.
While
he
has
testified
that
he
personally
reviews
his
filings
for
citation
accuracy,
the
filings
themselves
say
otherwise.
In
filings
in
this
action,
the
Court
has
found
mu
ltiple
instances
of
artificial
intelligence
“hallucinated”
citations
of
cases
and
rulings
that
simply
do
not
exist.
See,
e.g.,
Motion
[214]
at
2-
5;
Resp.
[223]
at
3-6;
Sur-reply
[263]
at
3
(citing
non-existent
case
United
States
v.
Morgan
,
2017
WL
1387302,
at
*3
(N.D.
Cal.
Apr.
18,
2017)).
Okorie
also
attributes
non-existent
rulings
and
quotes
to
existing
cases.
See,
e.g.
,
Resp.
[260]
at
4
(citing
Kaepa,
Inc.
v.
Achilles
Corp.
,
76
F.3d
624,
628
(5th
Cir.
1996)).
Moreover,
this
Court
has
admonished
a
nd/or
sanctioned
him
in
other
civil
actions
for
“hallucinated”
citati
ons
and
inappropriate
case
citations.
See,
e.g.,
Order
[72]
at
3
n.1,
Okorie
v.
Poncho
,
Civil
Action
No.
2:24cv52-TBM-RPM
(S.D.
Miss.
Aug.
21,
2025);
Order
[1198]
at
9-11,
In
re
Okorie,
No.
19-50379-KMS
(Bankr.
S.D.
Miss.
Mar.
25,
2024),
aff’d
,
Okorie
v.
Lentz
,
No.
2:24cv51-KS-MTP
,
2024
WL
4186937,
at
*1
(S.D.
Miss.
Sept.
9,
2024),
aff’d
sub
nom.
Matter
of
Okorie
,
Appeal
No.
24-60469,
2024
WL
4867073
(5th
Cir.
Nov.
22,
2024).
Given
Okorie’s
history
of
litigation
before
this
Court,
the
Court
“has
reason
to
believe
that
[Okorie]
will
continue
to
file
lawsuits
in
an
effort
to
receive
the
result
that
he
believes
he
is
entitled,
but
which
the
law
does
not
support.”
Nix
v.
Major
League
Baseball
,
No.
H-21-4180,
2022
WL
2118986,
at
*21
(S.D.
Tex.
June
13,
2022).
Likewise,
th
is
“future
litigation
‘would
be
repetitive,
vexatious,
previously
resolved,
and
meritless.’”
Id.
(citation
omitted).
As
the
Court
found
in
Nix
,
an
“injunction
is
necessary
to
prevent
or
respond
to
such
filings.”
Id.
This
area
of
the
law
is
well-
settled
and
long-standing.
See
Day
v.
Allstate
Ins.
Co.
,
788
F.2d
1110,
1115
(5th
Cir.
1986)(holding
that
a
district
court
may
impose
a
pre-filing
injunction,
which
would
bar
a
litigant
from
filing
any
additional
actions
without
first
obtaining
leave
from
the
district
court,
to
deter
Case
2:24-cv-00091-KS-MTP
Document
287
Filed
10/22/25
Page
17
of
21
18
vexatious
filings).
An
injuncti
on
should
be
“tailored
to
protect
the
courts
and
innocent
parties,
while
preserving
the
legitimate
rights
of
litigants.”
Farguson
v.
MBank
Houston,
N.A.
,
808
F.2d
358,
360
(5th
Cir.
1986).
The
Court
is
also
mindful
that
“[t]he
right
of
a
ccess
to
the
courts
is
neither
absolute
nor
unconditional
and
there
is
no
c
onstitutional
right
of
access
to
the
courts
to
prosecute
an
action
that
is
frivolous
or
malicious.”
Baum
,
513
F.3d
at
193
(citation
omitted).
Along
those
lines,
the
Court
finds
that
the
Bankruptcy
Court
provided
a
model
for
a
pre-
filing
injunction
that
has
been
upheld
on
appeal.
See
Matter
of
Okorie
,
Appeal
No.
24-60469,
2024
WL
4867073
(5th
Cir.
Nov.
22,
2024).
Accordingly,
the
Court
he
reby
orders
the
following:
Defendant
Okorie
is
hereby
enjoined
from
filing
any
future
lawsuits
seeking
relief
related
to
or
stemming
from
his
bankruptcy
actions,
this
case,
and
any
other
case
he
has
filed
(both
pending
and/or
dismissed)
in
the
Southern
District
of
Mississippi
as
of
the
date
of
this
Order
without
first
requesting
and
obtaining
leave
of
Court.
Likewi
se,
Defendant
Okorie
is
enjoined
from
filing
any
future
pleadings,
motions,
or
other
documents
seeking
relief
from
this
Court
in
this
case
or
in
any
case
involving
University
Mall
and/or
its
counsel
without
first
requesting
and
obtaining
leave
of
Court.
Any
motion
for
leave
must:
1.
Not
exceed
two
pages,
2.
Attach
the
proposed
filing,
3.
Explain
why
the
proposed
filing
is
not
frivolous,
4.
Explain
why
the
proposed
filing
is
not
an
attack
on
any
previous
order
entered
by
the
Court
in
this
case
or
any
related
proceeding,
and
5.
Shall
certify,
by
affidavit
or
under
penalty
of
perjury,
that
the
proposed
filing
raises
a
new
issue
that
has
not
already
been
rejected
by
the
Court
or
is
not
currently
pending
be
fore
the
Court.
Case
2:24-cv-00091-KS-MTP
Document
287
Filed
10/22/25
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of
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19
In
addition,
Defendant
Okorie
is
enjoined
from
filing
a
motion
fo
r
leave
to
file
relief
related
to
or
stemming
from
his
bankruptcy
actions,
this
case,
and
any
other
case
he
has
filed
(both
pending
and/or
dismissed)
in
the
Southe
rn
District
of
Mississippi
as
of
the
date
of
this
Order
without
first
purging
himself
of
the
contempt
sanctions
imposed
by
the
Bankr
uptcy
Court
in
No.
19-50379-KMS
and
the
sanctions
impo
sed
by
this
Order.
In
other
words,
until
Defendant
Okorie
pays
his
sanctions,
he
cannot
file
a
motion
for
leave
to
file
another
action
or,
for
that
matter,
any
other
new
action
based
on
the
aforementioned
parameters.
The
same
injunction
applies
to
cases
involving
University
Mall
and/or
its
counsel;
that
is,
until
Defendant
Okorie
pays
hi
s
sanctions,
he
cannot
file
a
motion
for
leave
to
file
future
pleadings
,
motions,
or
other
documen
ts
seeking
relief
from
this
Court
in
this
case
or
in
any
case
i
nvolving
University
Mall
and/or
its
counsel.
The
Court
next
turns
to
the
scope
of
the
injunction.
“The
All
Wr
its
Act
provides
that
federal
courts
may
‘issue
all
writs
necessary
or
a
ppropriate
in
aid
of
their
respective
jurisdictions
and
agreeable
to
the
usages
and
principles
of
law.’”
Newby
v.
Enron
Corp.
,
302
F.3d
295,
301
(5th
Cir.
2002)(citing
28
U.S.C.
§
1651(a)).
Furthermore,
“[a]lthough
th
e
Anti-Injunction
Act
is
an
absolute
bar
to
any
federal
court
action
that
has
the
effect
of
staying
a
pending
state
court
proceeding
unless
the
action
falls
within
a
designat
ed
exception,
it
does
not
preclude
injunctions
against
a
[litigant’s]
filing
of
prospective
state
court
actions.”
Id.
(citing
28
U.S.C.
§
2283)(other
citations
omitted).
The
Court
has
carefully
considered
the
Plain
tiff’s
request
for
a
pre-filing
injunction
that
extends
throughout
the
Fifth
Circuit.
During
th
e
hearing
on
this
matter
,
the
Court
expressed
reservations
about
ordering
su
ch
a
wide-ranging
pre-filing
in
junction.
However,
upon
further
reflection,
the
Court
finds
that
one
is
justified
u
nder
these
circumstances.
Defendant
Okorie
has
demonstrated
that
he
is
willing
and
able
to
take
hi
s
style
of
litigation
on
the
road
to
the
federal
and
Case
2:24-cv-00091-KS-MTP
Document
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state
courts
of
Texas.
And
he
ha
s
repeatedly
filed
duplicative
actions
in
the
state
and
federal
courts
of
Mississippi.
The
Fifth
Circuit
has
“upheld
an
order
enjo
ining
a
litigant
from
bringing
any
future
litigation
on
any
claim
arising
fro
m
a
particular
fact
situation,
wh
ere
the
litigant
was
abusing
the
court
system
by
harassing
his
opponents.”
Id.
(citing
Harrelson
v.
United
States
,
613
F.2d
114,
116
(5th
Cir.
1980)).
And
the
Harrelson
order
applied
to
both
fe
deral
and
state
lawsuits.
Id.
Accordingly,
the
Court
finds
that
it
is
appropriate
for
this
pre-filing
injunction
to
apply
to
federal
courts
within
the
Fifth
Circuit
a
nd
to
state
courts
in
the
States
of
Mississippi
and
Texas.
Thus,
at
this
time,
the
Court
hereby
enjoins
Defendant
Okorie
from
filing
any
new
cases
throughout
the
United
States
District
Courts
of
the
Fifth
Circuit
(which
encompa
sses
Mississippi,
Louisiana,
and
Texas),
as
well
as
the
State
Courts
of
Mississippi
and
Texas
seeking
relief
related
to
or
stemming
from
his
bankruptcy
actions,
this
case,
and
any
other
case
he
has
filed
(both
pending
and/or
dismissed)
in
the
Southern
District
of
Mississippi
as
of
the
date
of
this
Order
without
first
requesting
and
obtaining
leave
of
Court
from
the
Ch
ief
Judge
of
the
appropriate
court
or
his/her
delegee.
Moreover,
Defendant
Okor
ie
is
enjoined
from
filing
a
moti
on
for
leave
to
file
relief
in
the
aforementioned
federal
and
state
courts
rela
ted
to
or
stemming
from
his
bankruptcy
actions,
this
case,
and
any
other
case
he
has
filed
(both
pe
nding
and/or
dismissed)
in
the
Southern
District
of
Mississippi
as
of
the
date
of
this
Order
without
first
purging
himself
of
the
contempt
sanctions
imposed
by
the
Bankruptcy
Court
in
No.
19-50379-
KMS
and
the
sanctions
imposed
by
this
Order.
The
Court
also
orders
Defendant
Okorie
to
file
a
copy
of
this
Order
with
any
filing
that
he
makes
in
any
other
court.
Case
2:24-cv-00091-KS-MTP
Document
287
Filed
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21
IV.
CONCLUSION
For
the
reasons
discussed
above
,
the
Court
hereby
grants
Pl
aintiff
University
Mall’s
Motion
for
Contempt
[240]
and
Motion
for
Pre
-filing
Injunction
[258].
Defendant
Okorie’s
Motion
to
Correct
Minute
Entry
[275]
is
grante
d
in
part
and
denied
in
all
other
respects.
14
SO
ORDERED
AND
ADJUDGED,
this
22nd
day
of
October,
2025.
/s/
Keith
Starrett
KEITH
STARRETT
UNITED
STATES
DISTRICT
JUDGE
14
As
stated
supra
at
n.1,
Defendant
Okorie’s
Motion
[275]
is
grante
d
only
to
the
extent
that
the
Court
has
considered
Defendant
Okorie’s
exhibits
referenced
in
the
Motion
[2
75].
In
all
other
respects,
the
Motion
is
denied.
Case
2:24-cv-00091-KS-MTP
Document
287
Filed
10/22/25
Page
21
of
21
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