USA v. Sethi, No. 4:20-CR-77-SDJ (Aug. 28, 2025)

Case details
Full caption
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA v. SAMEER PRAVEEN SETHI
Country
United States
Jurisdiction
Federal
Decided
Aug. 28, 2025
Disposition
Motion Denied
Majority
Sean D. Jordan (J.) (unanimous Court)
© 2025 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.UNITED STATES OF AMERICA v. SAMEER PRAVEEN SETHIUnited States District Court, E.D. Texas, Sherman Division. | August 28, 2025 | Slip Copy | 2025 WL2483977Document Detailsstandard Citation:UNITED STATES OF AMERICA v. SAMEER PRAVEEN SETHI, No.4:20-CR-77-SDJ, 2025 WL 2483977 (E.D. Tex. Aug. 28, 2025)All Citations:Slip Copy, 2025 WL 2483977Search DetailsSearch Query:adv: (openai "artificial intelligence" chatgpt "google gemini" "westlawcocounsel" "large language model") (hallucinat! fake fictitious spuriousnonexistent "non-existent" "made up" imagined /p (gpt ai "artificialintelligence" chatgpt chaton perplexity openai copilot "google gemini""google bard" grok "mata v. avianca" claude llm llms)) (hallucinat! fakefictitious spurious nonexistent "non-existent" "made up" imagined) +3(precedent case "legal authority" "legal case") & DATE(aft 1/1/2023)Jurisdiction:TexasDelivery DetailsDate:September 5, 2025 at 10:54 AMDelivered By: Client ID:NOCLIENTIDOutlineMEMORANDUMOPINION ANDORDER (p.1)All Citations (p.5)
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA v. SAMEER PRAVEEN SETHI, Slip Copy (2025) © 2025 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.12025 WL 2483977Only the Westlaw citation is currently available.United States District Court,E.D. Texas, Sherman Division.UNITED STATES OF AMERICAv.SAMEER PRAVEEN SETHICRIMINAL NO. 4:20-CR-77-SDJ|Filed 08/28/2025MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDERSEAN D. JORDAN UNITED STATES DISTRICTJUDGE*1 The Court has received pro se DefendantSameer Praveen Sethi's Motion to Inform Courtof Newly Discovered Exculpatory Evidence andRequest for Time to Present Rule 33 Motion BeforeSentencing, (Dkt. #398), Defendant's Response toGovernment's Opposition to Motion to Inform Courtof Newly Discovered Exculpatory Evidence, (Dkt.#402), Defendant's Motion Declaring ConstitutionalDuress and Formal Objection to Sentencing WithoutRemedy of Constitutional Violations, (Dkt. #406), andDefendant's Notice to Court of Attorney Offer to Serveas Custodial Counsel and Request for Appointment,(Dkt. #407) (the “Motions”). Having reviewed Sethi'sfilings, the Court hereby construes the Motions torequest the following: (1) an extension of time toprepare evidence for a Rule 33 hearing, (2) a hearingon a Rule 33 motion, (3) the appointment of standbycounsel, and (4) a show cause hearing on variousconstitutional violations. After considering the record,the parties' filings, and the applicable law, the CourtDENIES these requests. Sentencing will occur asscheduled on August 28, 2025.I. BACKGROUNDThis case began over five years ago when DefendantSethi was initially indicted on multiple counts of wirefraud and money laundering in March 2020. (Dkt.#1). He had his initial appearance and arraignmentin December 2020. (Dkt. #14). A First SupersedingIndictment was returned in June 2021. (Dkt. #38).Sethi initially reached a binding plea agreement withthe Government under Federal Rule of CriminalProcedure 11(c)(1)(C) and pleaded guilty to the moneylaundering count in the First Superseding Indictment.But he then reversed course and attempted to withdrawhis guilty plea, maintaining that he was innocent andhad been coerced by counsel to plead guilty. TheCourt denied Sethi's motion to withdraw his plea,but at his prior sentencing hearing the Court rejectedthe parties' plea agreement, and, pursuant to Rule 11,Sethi withdrew his guilty plea. Thereafter, Sethi's casewas set for trial. Following a multi-week trial, Sethiwas convicted by a jury on seven counts of wirefraud and one count of money laundering, see (Dkt.#38, #273), and immediately remanded into custodypending sentencing, (Dkt. #280 at 1).Through nearly all the proceedings in this Court,through trial and post-trial, Sethi has been representedby various lawyers. First, he was represented byattorneys at the Federal Public Defenders Office;and then, by a retained attorney, Arnold Spencer.Several months after Sethi entered a guilty pleato money laundering, Spencer withdrew fromthe representation. (Dkt. #90, #103). F. ClintonBroden was then substituted as counsel of record.(Dkt. #91, #103). Eventually, the attorney-clientrelationship between Broden and Sethi suffered a “totalbreakdown,” resulting in Broden also withdrawingfrom representation of Sethi. (Dkt. #144, #150). RafaelDe La Garza was then appointed by the Court torepresent Sethi, joined before trial by James Whalen.(Dkt. #150, #175). After trial, De La Garza and Whalenboth moved to withdraw representation because“the attorney-client relationship ha[d] deterioratedto the point that continued representation would beunreasonably difficult for [De La Garza and Whalen]to render effective assistance of counsel[.]” (Dkt. #311at 1). At that time, Sethi requested that he be allowed toproceed pro se, (Dkt. #310), which the Court ultimatelygranted in accordance with Sethi's rights under Farettav. California, 422 U.S. 806, 807, 95 S.Ct. 2525, 45L.Ed.2d 562 (1975), (Dkt. #361).
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA v. SAMEER PRAVEEN SETHI, Slip Copy (2025) © 2025 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.2II. RULE 33 MOTION*2 Sethi has provided the Court no reason to consider(another) Rule 33 motion, nor is there any reason foran extension of time for Sethi to prepare an additionalsuch motion. First, the Court has already consideredand denied Sethi's previous request for relief underRule 33. See (Dkt. #354) (denying Sethi's motionsmade under Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure 29and 33). Second, Sethi claims that the basis for sucha renewed Rule 33 motion is his purported discoveryof “new exculpatory evidence.” But Sethi has failedto produce any such evidence, so further delay ofhis sentencing is unwarranted. In this regard, Sethiwas convicted on December 10, 2024. The Court hasrescheduled his sentencing hearing, originally set forApril 11, 2025, several times. Now, eight months afterhis conviction, there is no legitimate reason to delaySethi's sentencing further.Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 33(a) authorizescourts to grant a defendant's request for a newtrial “if the interest of justice so requires.” A courtmay reweigh evidence and assess the credibility ofwitnesses when considering whether the interest ofjustice requires a new trial. United States v. Arnold,416 F.3d 349, 360 (5th Cir. 2005). However, a court'sdiscretion to grant a new trial is not unlimited. Id.A new trial “ordinarily should not be granted ‘unlessthere would be a miscarriage of justice or the weight ofevidence preponderates against the verdict.’ ” UnitedStates v. Wright, 634 F.3d 770, 775 (5th Cir. 2011)(quoting United States v. Wall, 389 F.3d 457, 466 (5thCir. 2004)). A court should not order a new trial simplybecause the court believes a different verdict wouldhave been more reasonable. Arnold, 416 F.3d at 360(quoting United States v. Robertson, 110 F.3d 1113,1118 (5th Cir. 1997)). Indeed, new trials based on acourt's reweighing of the evidence presented to thejury should be granted only in “exceptional cases.”Robertson, 110 F.3d at 1120 n.11 (citation omitted).Generally, motions for a new trial are disfavored.United States v. Smith, 804 F.3d 724, 734 (5th Cir.2015).First, the Court previously considered Sethi's Motionfor Acquittal and Motion for New Trial based onhis allegations regarding the insufficiency of proofof wire fraud. (Dkt. #312). The Court denied thatmotion, outlining in great detail each count of Sethi'sconviction and the evidence presented at trial. (Dkt.#354). The Court concluded that Sethi's case didnot present one of the “exceptional cases” in whichthe Court should grant a new trial because “theGovernment presented sufficient evidence for the juryto find that Sethi acted fraudulently with a specificintent to defraud his investors.” (Dkt. #354 at 19).Second, Sethi has failed to put forth new evidence thatwarrants a new trial under Rule 33. Sethi continuallyclaims that new, exculpatory evidence was obtainedby court-appointed investigator Darrell R. James inMarch 2025, i.e., after his trial and the jury verdict.(Dkt. #402 at 3). Sethi has also attached James'sinvestigative report from March 12, 2025 twice. (Dkt.#332-1); (Dkt. #373-1). Nowhere in the report doesJames include or mention any supposed exculpatoryevidence. Among the report's eight exhibits, noneinvolve anything resembling a “verification from theSenior General Counsel of Hess Corporation.” (Dkt.#398 at 2). All claims Sethi makes based on the report'scontents were argued during trial and addressed by theCourt in its previous order denying relief under Rules29 and 33. See (Dkt. #354).Third, Sethi has had more than enough time toprepare and present any newly discovered exculpatoryevidence. However, rather than producing suchevidence to the Court in his seven letters sinceallegedly discovering the evidence in March, orhis nine court filings since being granted pro sestatus, Sethi has produced nothing. In this regard,Sethi contends that all his “previous filings wereproper notifications of ongoing investigation, notpresentations of complete evidence,” (Dkt. #402 at3), because he has not had “adequate time forproper preparation and presentation of a Rule 33motion,” (Dkt. #402 at 19).*3 This assertion is meritless. Sethi's case has beenpending for more than five years, and it was tried lessthan a year ago. Sethi had ample time and resourcesto present any exculpatory evidence at trial, and sincetrial he has had eight months to do so. In the post-trialperiod, he filed a motion seeking relief under Rule 29and Rule 33, which was denied in a detailed opinion.(Dkt. #354). In the five months that have elapsed
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA v. SAMEER PRAVEEN SETHI, Slip Copy (2025) © 2025 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.3since Sethi claims he discovered new evidence, he haswritten seven letters to the Court totaling 139 pages.There is no “new evidence” in these submissions.Two months have elapsed since the Court grantedSethi pro se status. Since then, he has filed 224 pagesacross nine pro se filings with the Court. Again,there is no “new evidence” in these submissions.Instead, Sethi repeatedly makes conclusory assertionsabout supposed new evidence with nothing to supportsuch statements. See (Dkt. #332); (Dkt. #350 at 1)(stricken); (Dkt. #373 at 10–13); (Dkt. #375 at 11–13);(Dkt. #381 at 6–7); (Dkt. #391 at 11–13). The Court iswell within its discretion to deny Sethi's latest attemptat obfuscation, obstruction, and delay.In short, the Court previously considered and deniedSethi's Rule 33 motion. (Dkt. #312, #354). Since then,Sethi has produced nothing that changes the Court'sdecision. Granting another one of his requests wouldmerely serve to delay justice. Therefore, the Courtdenies granting an extension of time or ordering ahearing to consider a new trial.III. FARETTASethi misunderstands his Faretta rights. Sethi claimsthat under Faretta, the Constitution not onlyprotects “the right to self-representation,” but alsoguarantees “the tools necessary to present [your]own defense.” (Dkt. #402 at 6). Without these tools,Sethi alleges that he has the “formal title of self-representation,” but, in reality, he has only “ ‘pro sedesignee’ status.” (Dkt. #398 at 10–11); (Dkt. #402 at5–6). On Sethi's telling, without “the State supply[ing]the resources needed for an indigent, pro se litigantto present a defense,”1 his constitutional right to self-representation is not properly protected. (Dkt. #402 at7).Sethi has it backwards. Faretta refutes rather thansupports his argument. For example, Sethi purportsto quote Faretta for the following proposition: “TheConstitution ... has recognized the right to self-representation ... but that right is meaningless if theaccused is denied the tools necessary to present hisown defense.” (Dkt. #402 at 6). But, these words donot appear in Faretta—or, for that matter, anywherein the United States Reports or Federal Reporter.In fact, at Sethi's provided pincite, Faretta statesthe opposite: “When an accused manages his owndefense, he relinquishes, as a purely factual matter,many of the traditional benefits associated with theright to counsel.” Faretta, 422 U.S. at 835. Therefore,when someone seeks to proceed pro se, they “mustknowingly and intelligently forgo those relinquishedbenefits” in order to waive the right to counsel with“eyes open” to “the dangers and disadvantages of self-representation.” Id. (citation omitted).At his Motion to Withdraw Counsel Proceedings,(Dkt. #405), the Court warned Sethi over fivetimes about “the dangers and disadvantages of self-representation.” Faretta, 422 U.S. at 835. The Courtwarned him that he would have to “navigate a thicketof both procedural and substantive challenges to ensurethat he receives the best possible outcome,” (Dkt.#405 at 9:12–14), that he “might damage hiscase through his lack of familiarity with federalprocedure,” (Dkt. #405 at 10:1–2), and that he“would also lose his right to appeal based on thecompetency of his representation at sentencing,” (Dkt.#405 at 10:3–4). The Court inquired into Sethi'seducational background, employment history, lack oflegal training or knowledge, medical conditions, andhis understanding of his conviction and potentialsentence. The Court told Sethi that he was “going tobe on [his] own” and that the Court was not going to“tell [him] or even advise [him] how [he] should handle[his] case at sentencing.” (Dkt. #405 at 16:24–17:2).Sethi confirmed that he understood his constitutionalright to be represented by an attorney, (Dkt. #405 at17:5–8), and the consequences of proceeding withoutan attorney, (Dkt. #405 at 18:19–24).*4 To ensure that Sethi understood his situation, theCourt asked Sethi himself to explain the consequencesof proceeding pro se, which he stated clearly: “I couldmake a mistake because I don't know the law. [Thegovernment,] [t]hey're experts. I could lose my appeal.And I could see many years in prison.” (Dkt. #405at 19:6–8). After finishing this colloquy, the Courttwice “strongly urge[d] [Sethi] not to try to represent[him]self.” (Dkt. #405 at 19:9–23). After warning him“not to abandon legal representation,” the Court thenasked Sethi again given the penalties that he mightsuffer at sentencing and the difficulties that arise fromproceeding pro se whether he wished to represent
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA v. SAMEER PRAVEEN SETHI, Slip Copy (2025) © 2025 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.4himself. (Dkt. #405 at 19:22–20:3). Sethi said, “I do,Your Honor.” (Dkt. #405 at 20:4).Even still, the Court again warned Sethi and asked himif he wanted to proceed pro se. After letting Sethi speakat great length, (Dkt. #405 at 20:20–39:19), the Courtwarned Sethi “not to abandon legal counsel” due to his“unfamiliarity with the law,” listing the numerous legalerrors in his statement to the Court and how they couldinjure his case. (Dkt. #405 at 40:4–41:2). Throughoutthe hearing, the Court made one thing clear: “[I]t is abig mistake for [Sethi] to abandon counsel.” (Dkt. #405at 41:2). Yet, “after everything [the Court] discussedtoday and after all the admonitions [the Court] [has]given [Sethi],” Sethi continued clearly and repeatedlyto affirm his decision to invoke his constitutional rightand proceed pro se. (Dkt. #405 at 44:12–17).After taking the motion under advisement, the Courtdetermined that “[o]n this record,” Sethi had “madea knowing and intelligent decision to waive his rightto counsel.” (Dkt. #361 at 8). Therefore, to protecthis right to self-representation, the Court had to grantSethi's motion and allow him to proceed pro se.Such a right, however, extends no further than thatdetermination. Contrary to what Sethi asserts, “prose designee” is not a cognizable legal category. (Dkt.#398 at 10–11); (Dkt. #402 at 5–7). Faretta guaranteesonly that a defendant may choose to represent himself.The Court's duty is to protect a defendant's abilityto make that choice. Faretta, 422 U.S. at 832–35.To be sure, the perils of proceeding pro se can besubstantial, but Sethi cannot now feign ignorance ofthem. Therefore, Sethi has suffered no violation of hisconstitutional rights under Faretta or otherwise.IV. STANDBY COUNSELSethi mistakenly believes that the Court has a duty toappoint him standby counsel. Not so. Pro se defendantshave no constitutional right to standby counsel. UnitedStates v. Oliver, 630 F.3d 397, 413–14 (5th Cir. 2011)(citations omitted). As the Fifth Circuit has held, “adefendant's statutory right to choose pro se or attorneyrepresentation is ‘disjunctive’; a defendant has a rightto one or the other, but not a combination of thetwo.” United States v. Mikolajczyk, 137 F.3d 237, 246(5th Cir. 1998) (citing United States v. Daniels, 572F.2d 535, 540 (5th Cir. 1978)). The trial court may,within its discretion, appoint standby counsel. See, e.g.,United States v. Taylor, 933 F.2d 307, 311–13 (5th Cir.1991). But a trial court “need not countenance abuseof the right to counsel or the right to waive it.” Id. at311. Indeed, a defendant has no right to “choreographspecial appearances by counsel” or to repeatedly“alternate his position on counsel in order to delay histrial or otherwise obstruct the orderly administrationof justice.” Id. (citations omitted). Regardless, “theproper role of standby counsel is quite limited ... moreakin to that of an observer” than “counsel” under theSixth Amendment. Id. at 312–13.Based on the Court's reading of Sethi's motion, heoffers no new reasons for the Court to grant himstandby counsel. In his reply briefing, (Dkt. #402),Sethi seems to be requesting “[r]equired [c]ustodialand/or [s]tandby [c]ounsel,” (Dkt. #402 at 11), as amatter of right. But, as stated above, no such rightexists. In choosing to proceed pro se, Sethi has waivedhis constitutional right to counsel. Additionally, theCourt already considered and denied Sethi's argumentthat standby counsel is needed “to facilitate accessto protected evidence.” (Dkt. #402 at 19); see also(Dkt. #407). The Court finds that the reasoning of itsprevious Order, (Dkt. #396), was correct. Further, theCourt notes that Sethi's complaints about access tosealed filings is not well taken. He had access to thesealed materials in this case before and during trial, aswell as during the post-trial period when his counselfiled post-trial motions on his behalf.2*5 Finally, the Court must correct Sethi on therecord. He claims that during “a March 2025 hearing,this Court attempted to appoint James Whalen asstandby counsel.” (Dkt. #406 at 10). This is inaccurate.The Court noted that it was going to “consider verystrongly” appointing either Whalen or De La Garza asstandby counsel for sentencing. (Dkt. #405 at 57:25–58:2). At that time, Whalen stated that he did notthink he could serve in such a role because Sethi hadapparently filed grievances with the Texas state baragainst both Whalen and De la Garza.In its discretion, the Court has determined not toappoint standby counsel. Sethi has proved unableto work with several experienced criminal defenselawyers, each of whom provided able representation.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA v. SAMEER PRAVEEN SETHI, Slip Copy (2025) © 2025 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.5Sethi also successfully requested that he be allowed toproceed pro se. Sethi has no right to standby counsel,and the Court will not appoint such counsel.V. SHOW CAUSE HEARINGFinally, the Court construes Sethi's filings to requesta “show cause hearing” on various “constitutionalviolations,” to include violations of his “fundamentalrights” in the sentencing process.To begin, Sethi alleges the Government has committeda Brady violation with regard to his “newly discoveredevidence.” But Sethi fails to identify any actualviolation of Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 83 S.Ct.1194, 10 L.Ed.2d 215 (1963). To constitute a Bradyviolation, “[t]he evidence at issue must be favorableto the accused, either because it is exculpatory,or because it is impeaching; that evidence musthave been suppressed by the State, either willfullyor inadvertently; and prejudice must have ensued.”Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S. 263, 281–82, 119 S.Ct.1936, 144 L.Ed.2d 286 (1999). Here, Sethi fails toallege any of these elements. In fact, as he himself“respectfully clarifies ... he [does] not accuse thegovernment of having the new evidence and thensuppressing it.” (Dkt. #402 at 3–4). Without an allegedsuppression, his claim of a Brady violation fails.Sethi also alleges violations of numerous constitutionalrights that protect defendants' due process rights duringa trial. For example, Sethi claims a violation of his“Constitutional Right to Present Evidence,” underChambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 93 S.Ct.1038, 35 L.Ed.2d 297 (1973). (Dkt. #398 at 5–6).He quotes Chambers as standing for the propositionthat “the Constitution guarantees criminal defendants‘a meaningful opportunity to present a completedefense.’ ” (Dkt. #398 at 5–6). Not only does this quotenot exist, but the case is inapposite. Chambers involveda violation of the right to a fair trial. Here, Sethi hadhis day in court. In fact, he had three weeks.Throughout his latest filings, Sethi marshals numerousfabricated quotes, vague assertions, and nonexistentcase law to support his claims that his constitutionalrights are being violated. After full consideration of theMotions and the applicable law, the Court finds thatthere are no constitutional violations. Therefore, theCourt denies his request for a show cause hearing.VI. CONCLUSIONSethi has made a stream of filings with the Court inrecent months, and particularly since he was permittedto proceed pro se. It is his right to make such filings,but none of them has merit. Having reviewed Sethi'svoluminous submissions, the Court notes that Sethirepeatedly misquotes case law, misrepresents the facts,and attempts to obstruct the due course of courtproceedings with dilatory filings and obfuscation. Forexample, as part of his latest attempt at delay, Sethipurports to quote nineteen cases that he asserts supporthis claim that his case presents a “constitutionalcrisis.” (Dkt. #402). Upon inspection, none of thecited authorities support Sethi's cause. Indeed, eighteenof the purported quotations from various cases arecomplete fabrications, and in some instances Sethihas cited cases that do not exist. See (Dkt. #402).The common theme in Sethi's submissions is hisunrelenting attempt to mislead and manipulate theCourt, and to delay the proceedings in this case.*6 For these reasons, the Court DENIES theMotions, (Dkt. #398, #402, #406, #407), construed as arequest for (1) an extension of time to prepare evidencefor a Rule 33 hearing, (2) a Rule 33 motion hearing,(3) the appointment of standby counsel, and (4) a showcause hearing.Sethi's sentencing hearing will proceed as scheduledon August 28, 2025.So ORDERED and SIGNED this 28th day ofAugust, 2025.All CitationsSlip Copy, 2025 WL 2483977Footnotes
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA v. SAMEER PRAVEEN SETHI, Slip Copy (2025) © 2025 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.61While not explicitly naming what these resources would be, Sethi does claim that he has been disadvantagedby being subject to the following conditions: “limited unreliable phone time, a loud environment from which hemust work, constant telephone connection problems, no desk, no chair, no basic office supplies, no privateworkspace, no ability to communicate with third-party resources, and due to standard restrictions imposedat the detention facility, cannot even physically inspect the final copy of his filings.” (Dkt. #402 at 9).2In fact, the Court knows Sethi had more than enough access to the sealed evidence because he hadthe opportunity to violate the multiple protective orders issued by photocopying and disseminating sealedevidence. (Dkt. #337, #346).End of Document© 2025 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S.Government Works.
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