Valve Corp. v. Rothschild, No. 2:23-cv-01016-JNW (2026)

Case details
Full caption
Valve Corporation v. Rothschild et al.
Country
United States
Jurisdiction
Federal
Decided
2026
Disposition
Motion Denied
Majority
Jamal N. Whitehead (J.) (unanimous Court)
Valve Corporation v. Rothschild, Slip Copy (2026) © 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.12026 WL 353172Only the Westlaw citation is currently available.United States District Court, W.D. Washington,at Seattle.VALVE CORPORATION, Plaintiff,v.ROTHSCHILD et al., Defendants.CASE NO. 2:23-cv-01016-JNW|Signed 02/09/2026Attorneys and Law FirmsAndrea A. Anderson, Pro Hac Vice, Womble Bond Dickinson(U.S.) LLP, Denver, CO, Dario A. Machleidt, Christopher P.Damitio, Kathleen Geyer, Kilpatrick Townsend & StocktonLLP, Seattle, WA, Blake Edward Marks-Dias, Colin M.George, Corr Cronin LLP, Seattle, WA, David A. Reed, ProHac Vice, Kilpatrick Townsend & Stockton LLP, Atlanta,GA, Marianthi Marcella Karas, Pro Hac Vice, KilpatrickTownsend & Stockton LLP, Los Angeles, CA, Kengyeh Chu,Pro Hac Vice, Kilpatrick Townsend & Stockton LLP, Raleigh,NC, for Plaintiff.Benjamin Charles Deming, Pro Hac Vice, DNL Zito, Dallas,TX, Eric R. Chad, Pro Hac Vice, Merchant & Gould,Minneapolis, MN, Joseph J. Zito, Pro Hac Vice, Rene A.Vazquez, Pro Hac Vice, DNL Zito, Washington, DC, DonaldR. McPhail, Pro Hac Vice, Vanguard Crest PC, Washington,DC, Mathew J. Cunanan, DC Law Group, Burien, WA, forDefendants.ORDER ON EVIDENTIARY MOTIONSJamal N. Whitehead, United States District Judge1. INTRODUCTION*1 This matter comes before the Court on three setsof pretrial evidentiary motions. First, Defendants move toexclude the testimony of Valve's experts: Professor PaulGugliuzza, Ramsey Al-Salam, Kimberly Schenk, and Dr.Adam Sorini. Dkt. No. 167-3. Second, Valve has filed ninemotions in limine. Dkt. No. 182. Third, Defendants havefiled six motions limine. Dkt. No. 184. The motions are fullybriefed. Additionally, the briefing on Defendants’ Daubertmotion raises a separate matter concerning the use of artificialintelligence in the filings submitted to this Court. The Courtaddresses each issue in turn.2. BACKGROUNDThis dispute is between Plaintiff Valve Corporation (“Valve”),a video game developer and distributor, and Leigh Rothschild(“Rothschild”); Display Technologies, LLC (“DT”); PatentAsset Management, LLC (“PAM”); Rothschild BroadcastDistribution Systems, LLC (“RBDS”); Attorney SamuelMeyler; and Meyler Legal PLLC. Valve sues Defendants,alleging among other things that they made bad-faithassertions of patent infringement against Valve.3. DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO EXCLUDEValve has retained experts whose opinions it intends torely on during their presentation of evidence. Valve retainedProfessor Paul Gugliuzza to present his opinion regardingthe patent enforcement industry and Defendants’ practices inrelation to that industry. Valve retained Ramsey Al-Salam,to offer his opinion on the reasonableness of Valve's legalfees. Valve also retained Kimberly Schenk, who will testifyabout the damages incurred by Valve and to rebut Defendants’claims that their patent “has been copied and is commerciallysuccessful.” And Valve retained Dr. Adam Sorini, Ph.D., whoopines on the validity of U.S. Patent 8,856,221.Defendants have retained no experts in support of theirdefense, but now seek to exclude the expert witness testimonyand opinions of Gugliuzza, Al-Salam, Schenk, and Sorini.Dkt. No. 167-3. The Court reviews the legal standard beforeaddressing each expert in turn.3.1 Legal StandardRule 702 of the Federal Rules of Evidence governs theadmission of expert opinion testimony in federal court:A witness who is qualified as an expertby knowledge, skill, experience,training, or education may testify inthe form of an opinion or otherwiseif the proponent demonstrates to thecourt that it is more likely than not that:
Valve Corporation v. Rothschild, Slip Copy (2026) © 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.2(a) the expert's scientific, technical,or other specialized knowledge willhelp the trier of fact to understandthe evidence or to determine a factin issue; (b) the testimony is basedon sufficient facts or data; (c) thetestimony is the product of reliableprinciples and methods; and (d) theexpert's opinion reflects a reliableapplication of the principles andmethods to the facts of the case.Fed. R. Evid. 702. Rule 702 is to be applied with a“liberal thrust favoring admission, [but] it requires that experttestimony be both relevant and reliable.” Messick v. NovartisPharms. Corp., 747 F.3d 1193, 1196 (9th Cir. 2014) (cleanedup). “Expert opinion testimony is relevant if the knowledgeunderlying it has a valid connection to the pertinent inquiry.And it is reliable if the knowledge underlying it has areliable basis in the knowledge and experience of the relevantdiscipline.” United States v. Sandoval-Mendoza, 472 F.3d645, 654 (9th Cir. 2006) (emphasis added) (citation modified).*2 The Rule 702 reliability inquiry assesses “not thecorrectness of the expert's conclusions but the soundness ofhis methodology.” Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc.,43 F.3d 1311, 1318 (9th Cir. 1995). The Supreme Court inDaubert set forth several factors that courts may considerin assessing reliability, such as testing, peer review andpublication, error rates, and scientific consensus. Daubert v.Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 593–94 (1993).But the inquiry is “flexible,” id., and courts have “broadlatitude” in deciding “whether Daubert’s specific factors are,or are not, reasonable measures of reliability in a particularcase[.]” Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 153(1999). “Shaky but admissible evidence” is to be attackedby “[v]igorous cross-examination, presentation of contraryevidence, and careful instruction on the burden of proof”—not exclusion. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 596.3.2 Gugliuzza.Gugliuzza is the Thomas W. Gregory Professor of Law atthe University of Texas Austin School of Law. His “scholarlyresearch focuses on patent law and patent litigation,”including “efforts by both state governments and the federalgovernment to regulate ‘bad faith’ assertions of patentinfringement.” Dkt. No. 138 (Gugliuzza Report) ¶¶ 2, 6–7.His 59-page expert report is broken up into four sections: (1)a “background of the patent system and patent enforcement”;(2) an explanation of the term “patent troll” and abusiveassertions of patent infringement; (3) a survey of statestatutes like the Washington Patent Troll Prevention Act,RCW 19.350 et seq.; and (4) his expert opinions as towhether “Defendants’ assertions of patent infringement wereconsistent with bad faith.” Id. 10.Defendants argue that Gugliuzza will be opining on issuesof law, rather than fact, and therefore should be excludedin full. The Court disagrees in part. Regarding emergent orspecialized areas of law, “expert testimony may help a juryunderstand unfamiliar terms and concepts.” United States v.Bilzerian, 926 F.2d 1285, 1294 (2d Cir. 1991). Gugliuzza isqualified to provide the jury with an understanding of thecomplexities of patent enforcement and abusive assertions ofpatent infringement, which are key issues as to Valve's PTPAclaim. The Court concludes that his testimony about thosetopics is reliable, relevant, and useful for the fact finder underRule 702.That said, the Court is mindful that “[i]ts use must be carefullycircumscribed to assure that the expert does not usurp eitherthe role of the trial judge in instructing the jury as to theapplicable law or the role of the jury in applying that law tothe facts before it.” Id. The Ninth Circuit has drawn a clearline in this area. In Hangarter v. Provident Life & AccidentInsurance Co., 373 F.3d 998 (9th Cir. 2004), the courtpermitted expert testimony that an insurer's conduct “deviatedfrom industry standards” in ways that “supported a findingof bad faith,” while holding that the expert could not testifythat the defendants “actually acted in bad faith.” Id. at 1016.As the Ninth Circuit has emphasized, “instructing the jury asto applicable law ‘is the distinct and exclusive province’ ofthe court.” Id. (quoting United States v. Weitzenhoff, 35 F.3d1275, 1287 (9th Cir.1993)).Applying this framework, the Court finds that portions ofGugliuzza's proposed testimony are admissible and portionsare not. Specifically, Gugliuzza may testify about thefollowing:(a) Background on the patent system and patentenforcement, including the role of the Patent andTrademark Office and the nature of patent rights;(b) The meaning of industry-specific terms and conceptsrelevant to the Parties’ presentations, such as “non-practicing entity,” “patent enforcement,” and “patent troll”;
Valve Corporation v. Rothschild, Slip Copy (2026) © 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.3*3 (c) Industry practices in patent enforcement, includingwhat constitutes typical patent licensing conduct, the useof demand letters, and the structure of patent assertionentities;(d) Whether Defendants’ specific conduct deviates fromstandard industry practices in patent enforcement.Gugliuzza may not testify about the following:(e) Whether Defendants acted in “bad faith” or “good faith”under the PTPA, including the statements in his reportthat Defendants’ 2023 letter “is a bad-faith assertion ofinfringement,” Dkt. No. 138 (¶ 120), and that the record“would support a finding that Defendants’ assertions ofinfringement were objectively baseless” Id. (¶ 108);(f) The legal meaning or elements of the statutory factorsunder RCW 19.350.020(2), or the application of thosefactors to this case;(g) His views on Federal Circuit precedent, constitutionalpatent policy, or law reform;(h) Inflammatory or pejorative characterizations—such as“bottom-feeder trolls,” “troll tax,” or “gamblers playingwith house money”—that go beyond objective descriptionand risk unfair prejudice under Rule 403.This latter restriction reflects the Court's independentobligation under Rule 403 to ensure that the probativevalue of expert testimony is not substantially outweighed bythe danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, ormisleading the jury. While the patent enforcement industrycontext is relevant, rhetoric designed to inflame rather thaninform has no place in expert testimony.Accordingly, Defendants’ motion to exclude Gugliuzza isGRANTED IN PART, consistent with guidelines set forthabove.3.3 Al-Salam.Al-Salam is a partner at Perkins Coie LLP in Seattle,Washington and has been practicing in the patent litigationfield in Seattle for over thirty years. Dkt. No. 224-2. Assuch, he has specialized knowledge as to the rates chargedby attorneys in the Seattle market, of the time necessary toallocate to particular litigation tasks, including those whichValve intends to seek recovery under should it prevail on itsPTPA claim. Id.Defendants argue that Al-Salam's opinions on the“reasonableness” of Valve's fees constitute impermissiblelegal conclusions, that his methodology is unreliable, and thathis testimony lacks “fit.” Dkt. No. 136 at 13–16. The Courtis not persuaded.As a threshold matter, Valve does not intend to rely on Al-Salam's testimony during its presentation to the jury as theissue of reasonable attorneys’ fees is “an issue for the Courtto decide.” Dkt. No. 152 at 11. The Rule 702 standard isaccordingly more flexible as to Al-Salam's opinions. SeeF.T.C. v. BurnLounge, Inc., 753 F.3d 878, 888 (9th Cir.2014) (“there is less danger that a trial court will be ‘undulyimpressed by the expert's testimony or opinion’ in a benchtrial” as opposed to a jury trial) (quoting Shore v. MohaveCnty., State of Ariz., 644 F.2d 1320, 1322– 23 (9th Cir. 1981)).On the merits, Al-Salam's opinion will aid the Court inthe “inherently difficult” task of determining the appropriatemarket rate for attorneys’ fees should such a determinationbecome necessary. Camacho v. Bridgeport Fin., Inc., 523F.3d 973, 979 (9th Cir. 2008) (quoting Blum v. Stenson,465 U.S. 886, 895 n. 11 (1984)). His thirty years ofexperience in patent litigation in the Seattle market providea reliable foundation for his opinions on prevailing ratesand the reasonableness of time spent on particular tasks.Defendants’ methodological objections go to the weight ofhis testimony, not its admissibility. See Daubert, 509 U.S.at 596 (“[S]haky but admissible evidence” is properly testedthrough “vigorous cross-examination, [and the] presentationof contrary evidence,” not exclusion).*4 Accordingly, Defendants’ motion to exclude Al-Salam isDENIED.3.4 Schenk.Kimberly Schenk is Vice President at Charles RiverAssociates (“CRA”), an international consulting firmdedicated to advising clients and counsel in the areas ofbusiness valuation, licensing, and litigation support services.Dkt. No. 224-1 1 She is a Certified Public Accountant,certified in Financial Forensics by the American Instituteof Certified Public Accountants, a member of the AmericanIntellectual Property Law Association and the American BarAssociation's Intellectual Property Law Section. Id. 8. Herexpert report and testimony concern damages due to Valve
Valve Corporation v. Rothschild, Slip Copy (2026) © 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.4should it prevail on its breach of contract and PTPA/CPAclaims. Id. at 1.Defendants first argue that Schenk's opinions relatedto Defendants’ “commercial success” or “copying” arequestions of law. But Schenk's opinion is limited to whetherDefendants’ history of settlements supports a finding ofcommercial success or copying. See, e.g., Dkt. No. 224-1 77. Her opinion does not reach “an ultimate issue of law.”Hangarter, 373 F.3d at 1016.Defendants next argue that Schenk's damages calculationsare unreliable because she has no basis to opine on thereasonability of attorney rates and hours worked. But Schenkrelies on the expert opinion of Al-Salam, an attorney withdecades of experience in patent litigation, for her assumptionsas to those rates and fees, see Dkt. No. 224-1 ¶¶ 53–54, whichis permissible under Rule 703.Defendants next argue that Schenk's testimony does not helpthe jury reach the issues which it must necessarily decide.But Schenk's report and testimony speak directly to damages,an issue which the jury will determine should Valve prevailon its breach of contract or CPA/PTPA claims. This sametestimony includes an allocation of costs which Valve claimsit incurred due to Defendants’ actions, which assists—butdoes not replace—the jury's role as the ultimate finder of factregarding damages.Accordingly, Defendants’ motion to exclude Schenk isDENIED.3.5 Dr. Sorini.Defendants claim that by dismissing their infringementcounterclaim, “[t]he issue of validity has thus been removedfrom the case” and so the expert opinion of Dr. Sorini,which concerns the validity of the ’221 Patent, should beexcluded in its entirety. See Dkt. No. 136 at 20; Dkt. No.167 at 10. However, this argument fails because Defendantshave not moved to dismiss Valve's invalidity claim and theissue remains ripe for the Court's consideration. See EpicGames, Inc. v. Acceleration Bay LLC, No. 4:19-CV-04133-YGR, 2020 WL 1557436, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 1, 2020) (“TheSupreme Court has expressed a preference for deciding issuesof patent validity independent of any infringement claimin order to prevent wasteful re-litigation and provide finalresolution to accused infringers.”) (citing Cardinal Chem. Co.v. Morton Int'l, Inc., 508 U.S. 83, 100–01 (1993)). Defendantsraise no other arguments regarding Dr. Sorini's testimony.Accordingly, Defendants’ motion to exclude Dr. Sorini isDENIED.4. MOTIONS IN LIMINE4.1 Legal standard.*5 “A motion in limine is a procedural mechanism to limitin advance [of trial] testimony or evidence in a particulararea.” United States v. Heller, 551 F.3d 1108, 1111 (9th Cir.2009). They're “useful tools to resolve issues which wouldotherwise ‘clutter up’ the trial.” Palmerin v. City of Riverside,794 F.2d 1409, 1413 (9th Cir. 1986). Motions in limine mustidentify the specific evidence sought to be excluded anddetail the reasoning for inadmissibility. United States v. Lewis,493 F. Supp. 3d 858, 861 (C.D. Cal. 2020) (citing ColtonCrane Co., LLC v. Terex Cranes Wilmington, Inc., No. 08-CV-08525-PSG (PJWx), 2010 WL 2035800, at *1 (C.D. Cal.May 19, 2010)). A motion devoid of specificity or merelyreminding the court to follow established rules will be denied.See id. Trial courts need no reminder of their fundamentalduty to enforce the federal rules during trial—that much isself-evident and requires no motion to secure.Trial courts possess broad discretion when ruling on motionsin limine. Heller, 551 F.3d at 1111. Denial of a motion inlimine does not guarantee admission of contested evidence,but merely indicates that without trial context, the courtcannot make a proper determination regarding exclusion. Seeid. And if the court grants a motion in limine, it may stillrevisit its earlier ruling based on the events at trial. Ohlerv. United States, 529 U.S. 753, 758 n.3 (2000) (“[I]n liminerulings are not binding on the trial judge, and the judge mayalways change his mind during the course of a trial.”).4.2 Valve's reply.Valve seeks leave to file a reply in support of its motionsin limine, for the express purpose of “correcting a numberof factual and legal misrepresentations made in Defendants’opposition[.]” Dkt. No. 211. In this district, parties areinstructed that they cannot file replies in support of a motionin limine. LCR 7(d)(5) (“No reply papers shall be filed.”). Therules say what they mean. Accordingly, the Court DENIESValve's motion for leave and will not consider the argumentsmade in the proposed reply brief, Dkt. No. 211-1.4.3 Valve's motions in limine.
Valve Corporation v. Rothschild, Slip Copy (2026) © 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.51. Valve's first motion in limine seeks to preclude Defendantsfrom “introducing evidence or making arguments relatedto every written discovery request and deposition questionDefendants refused to answer...[or] failed to respond to duringfact discovery.” Dkt. No. 182 at 5–10. The Court has alreadygranted Valve similar relief based on Defendants’ discoverymisconduct, including an exclusionary sanction and a juryinstruction telling the jury that Defendants did not complywith their discovery obligations. See Dkt. No. 230. TheCourt will not extend these sanctions further at this stage.Accordingly, the motion is DENIED.2. Valve moves to prevent Defendants from arguing orintroducing facts at trial relating to good/bad faith basesfor patent infringement other than those explicitly discussedin their motions to dismiss, as referred to by Defendants’response to a contention interrogatory. Dkt. No. 182 at 10–11. Specifically, Valve moves to exclude Defendants fromarguing that their “approach to resolution has at all timesbeen appropriate and reasonable,” and that “majority of the‘bad acts’ alleged by Valve are specifically excluded frombeing considered or construed” under RCW 19.350.020(5).Id. But in both of Defendants’ motions to dismiss, theyargued an attempt was made to “negotiate and appropriateremedy in a reasonable manner,” and discuss the good faithexclusions under RCW 19.350.020(5). Valve may test thesearguments via cross-examination and the introduction ofcontrary evidence, but there is no basis for outright exclusion.The motion is DENIED.*6 3. Valve moves to exclude all evidence and argument thatthe Meyler Defendants acted in good faith by performing pre-suit and pre-assertion diligence related to the 2022 lawsuitor June 2023 letter. Dkt. No. 182 at 11–13. Valve argues theMeyler Defendants used the attorney-client privilege as botha sword and a shield by affirmatively arguing that their pre-demand efforts were reasonable, ethical, and done in goodfaith, only for Meyler to invoke attorney-client privilege as abasis for his refusal to respond certain deposition inquiries. Id.(citing Chevron Corp. v. Pennzoil Co., 974 F.2d 1156, 1162(9th Cir. 1992)).On this record, the Court declines to exclude all evidenceand argument related to whether Meyler Defendants’ pre-demand efforts were done in good faith. The privilege disputeunderlying this motion arose during Meyler's August 2025deposition but was not brought before the Court througha motion to compel or for a protective order. As a result,the record before the Court does not address “whether theclaimed noncompliance involved willfulness, fault, or badfaith.” R & R Sails, Inc. v. Ins. Co. of PA, 673 F.3d 1240,1247 (9th Cir. 2012). A categorical exclusion is a significantsanction, and the Court is not prepared to impose one ona record developed only through motion in limine briefing.Accordingly, the motion is DENIED.That said, denial of this motion does not endorse the practiceof invoking privilege to shield the specifics of one's diligencewhile simultaneously arguing that the diligence was adequate.The Court will address any sword-and-shield issues as theyarise at trial. If a witness testifies on direct that pre-demanddiligence was performed but then invokes privilege on cross-examination to avoid questioning about the substance of thatdiligence, the Court may limit the scope of the testimony,strike it, or give an appropriate instruction.4. Valve next seeks an order prohibiting discussion ofirrelevant and unduly prejudicial subjects. Dkt. No. 182 at 13–14. While the Court strains to envision a scenario in whichsome of the information referred to by Valve would have anybearing on claims at issue in this trial, the Court will notspeculate about the relevance of that information without thecontext of trial itself. Accordingly, the motion is DENIED.5. Valve seeks to prevent Defendants from arguing orintroducing evidence that Valve breached or “voided” theGSLA. Dkt. No. 182 at 14–15. Defendants admitted in theirAnswer that Valve “has a valid and enforceable covenantnot to sue for the ’221 patent.” Dkt. No. 80 (Answers to ¶¶32–34). That admission is a judicial admission. PermittingDefendants to argue at trial that Valve breached or voided theGSLA would directly contradict this admission. Accordingly,the motion is GRANTED.6. Valve seeks to allow reference to RBDS's counterclaimfor infringement of the ’221 Patent and the subsequentvoluntary dismissal. Dkt. No. 182 at 15–17. This issue isa matter of public record and speaks to Valve's argumentthat Defendants’ business model involves filing unreasonablepatent infringement demands in bad faith. Accordingly, themotion is GRANTED.7. Valve seeks to limit Defendants’ rebuttal presentation onthe issue of patent validity to (i) presumption of validityand (ii) secondary considerations of licensing. Dkt. No.182 at 17–18. The motion is GRANTED IN PART. Tothe extent that Defendant Rothschild is the named inventorof the ’221 Patent, he may testify about matters squarely
Valve Corporation v. Rothschild, Slip Copy (2026) © 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.6within his personal knowledge, such as the nature of hisinvention and his personal involvement in the patent process.He may not, however, offer testimony that amounts to anexpert opinion on patentability. Defendants did not serve anexpert report addressing validity and did not depose Valve'sinvalidity expert. Permitting Rothschild to offer what wouldamount to expert opinion testimony on patentability at trial—including analysis of prior art references or claim-by-claimcomparisons—would effectively circumvent those discoveryobligations. Valve may probe the accuracy and veracity ofRothschild's testimony on cross-examination.*7 8. Valve seeks to preclude Defendants from introducingevidence and making arguments “related solely to legal issuesto be decided by the Court.” Dkt. No. 182 at 18–20. Valveidentifies several examples, including arguments about a“cure” provision in Section 3.5 of the GSLA, Defendants’mitigation defense, and the recoverability of attorney's fees.The motion is DENIED as unnecessary. The division of laborbetween judge and jury is not a matter for the parties toestablish by motion. The Court will define the applicable lawand instruct the jury accordingly. The parties must confinetheir trial presentations to the facts and may not argue mattersof law to the jury. To the extent specific disputes ariseat trial about whether a particular argument constitutes animpermissible legal argument, the parties must raise the issueoutside the jury's presence.The Court notes that, to the extent Valve's motionencompasses the “cure” provision in Section 3.5 of theGSLA, the Court has already construed that provisionas a matter of law. Dkt. No. 218 at 9. Similarly, theCourt granted summary judgment on Defendants’ failure-to-mitigate affirmative defense. Dkt. No. 218 at 14. Accordingly,neither the “cure” provision nor the mitigation defense maybe argued to the jury in any form.9. Valve finally moves to preclude Defendants from arguingthat licensees “use” the subject matter claimed in patentsbased on licenses. Dkt. No. 182 at 20–21. The motion isDENIED. Defendants may offer testimony about the statusof their patents and licensees. Whether a license reflectsactual use of a patented technology or merely a litigationsettlement is a factual dispute that Valve explores throughcross-examination and the introduction of contrary evidence.4.4 Defendants’ motions in limine.1. Defendants first seek to prohibit the introductionof pleadings and documents from other cases involvingRothschild as inadmissible. Dkt. No. 184 at 1–3. Valvehas withdrawn its intention to present certain exhibits, butwhether the remainder are admissible depends on the contextof trial. Therefore the motion is DENIED.2. Defendants next seek to exclude certain third-party mediaposts, such as articles, blog posts, website articles, Wikipediacitations, web citations, and other “reputation” evidence asinadmissible. Dkt. No. 184 at 2. The Court will not speculateabout the admissibility of such information without thecontext of trial itself. Accordingly, the motion is DENIED.3. Defendants next seek to exclude certain depositiondesignations from witnesses. The motion is DENIED on thebasis that Defendants fail to identify which designations theyseek to exclude, and the basis on which the specific exclusionshould be taken.4. Defendants next seek to exclude “Docket Navigator”searches. Valve has withdrawn its intention to present thisevidence, so the motion is DENIED as MOOT.5. Defendants next seek to exclude any introduction of “priorart” as irrelevant in the face of a non-existent motion todismiss on Valve's invalidity claim. Dkt. No. 184 at 6–7.Because no such motion was filed, the motion is DENIED.6. Defendants finally seek to exclude evidence/argumentimplying the Meyler Defendants violated ethics rules,committed “litigation misconduct,” or similar characterattacks. Dkt. No. 184 at 7. Whether or not this information ismore prejudicial than probative to Valve's CPA/PTPA claimsremains to be seen and is contingent on the context of trial.Accordingly, the Motion is DENIED.5. ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE*8 Defendants’ originally filed Daubert motion, Dkt.No. 136, contained fabricated case citations, nonexistentquotations, and fake quotes attributed to Valve's expertreports. Defendants’ counsel has acknowledged that acontract attorney used AI in preparing the brief. Dkt. No. 158.But counsel's letter leaves important questions unanswered,and the corrected brief, Dkt. No. 167-3, apparently stillcontains errors, Dkt. No. 169 at 2–3. The Court has treatedthe corrected brief as the operative pleading for purposes of
Valve Corporation v. Rothschild, Slip Copy (2026) © 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.7the Daubert analysis above, but that does not resolve whethersanctions are warranted.The Court ORDERS Defendants’ lead counsel, Joseph J. Zito,to SHOW CAUSE why sanctions should not be imposedunder Rule 11. Within TWENTY-ONE (21) days, counselmust file a sworn declaration addressing:(a) Whether any AI tools were used to process, summarize,or analyze Valve's expert reports, and if so, the identityof those tools and whether materials designated asconfidential under the Protective Order were submitted toany AI platform;(b) Whether the corrected brief at Dkt. No. 167-3 containsany remaining inaccurate citations or quotations, and if so,identification of each;(c) A description of the supervisory procedures in place forthe contract attorney referenced in counsel's letter at thetime of filing; and(d) A detailed description of the specific measures counselhas implemented to ensure that AI-generated content is notsubmitted to this Court in future filings.6. CONCLUSIONThe parties must comply with the Court's rulings at trial. Ifquestions arise about the application or scope of the Court'srulings, they should be addressed outside the jury's presence.All CitationsSlip Copy, 2026 WL 353172End of Document© 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.
ProvenanceKnow exactly where this document came from.Members see the sourcing behind every authority on DocPost — so you can check the record yourself and cite with confidence.Request access