Viken v. Schuelke, No. 27-CV-24-18387 (2026)

Case details
Full caption
Judicial District. Hennepin County Christine VIKEN v. Hannah SCHUELKE
Country
United States
Jurisdiction
Federal
Decided
2026
Disposition
Motion Denied
Viken v. Schuelke, 2026 WL 968103 (2026) WESTLAW   © 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.12026 WL 968103 (Minn.Dist.Ct.) (Trial Order)District Court of Minnesota,Fourth Judicial District.Hennepin CountyChristine VIKEN, Earl Clausen, Plaintiffs,v.Hannah SCHUELKE, Sculpin Holdings, LLC, Lake AreaProperty Solutions, LLC, John Doe, and Mary Roe, Defendants.No. 27-CV-24-18387.January 14, 2026.*1 Editor's Note: This document contains discussion of unverified citations, likely generatedby AI tools used by a party or counsel. These citations are not attributable to the Court. Theunverified citations have been preserved as part of the official record, but links are unavailable.Order Denying Defendant Schuelke's Motion to Dismiss, Striking Schuelke'sAmended Answer and Counterclaims, and Issuing Order to Show CauseNelson Peralta, Judge.This matter came on for a motion hearing before the Honorable Nelson Peralta, Judge of District Court, at the Hennepin CountyGovernment Center located at 300 South Sixth Street in the City of Minneapolis, County of Hennepin, State of Minnesota, onOctober 21, 2025, via Zoom.Sydney Maglio, Esq. and Christopher Wilcox, Esq. appeared on behalf of Plaintiffs.Luke Bellville, Esq. (“Bellville”) appeared on behalf of Defendant Schuelke (“Defendant Schuelke” or “Schuelke”).There were no other appearances at this hearing.Based upon the evidence adduced, arguments of counsel, and all of the files, records, and proceedings herein, the Court makesthe following:ORDER1. Defendant Schuelke's motion to dismiss Plaintiffs' Complaint for lack of standing is denied.2. Plaintiffs' motion to strike Defendant Schuelke's Amended Answer and Counterclaims is granted.3. Defendant Schuelke's motion to dismiss Plaintiffs' motion for Rule 11 sanctions as untimely is denied.4. Defendant Schuelke's motion to dismiss Plaintiffs' motion for Rule 11 sanctions for not complying with the “safe harbor”time provisions is denied.
Viken v. Schuelke, 2026 WL 968103 (2026) WESTLAW   © 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.25. Plaintiffs' motion for Rule 11 sanctions against Defendant Schuelke and her attorney, Luke Bellville, is denied.6. However, the Court, on its own initiative, having described herein the specific conduct that appears to violate Rule 11.02,hereby issues an Order directing counsel for Defendant Schuelke, Luke Bellville, at a hearing to be scheduled, to show causewhy he has not violated Rule 11.02 with respect to the following conduct:a. In Schuelke's Memorandum of Law in Support of Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Standing, citing cases which do notsupport the proposition and/or argument advanced by Schuelke; andb. In three instances in Schuelke's Memorandum of Law in Support of Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Standing, attributingquoted language to cases when such language does not appear in the cases.7. The attached Memorandum of Law is hereby incorporated.8. Prior Orders. All prior orders not inconsistent with the terms of this Order remain in full force and effect.9. If you have any questions, please contact Judge Peralta's chambers. The opposing party must be copied on all communicationsto Chambers.Phone: (612) 322-6953E-mail: 4thJudgePeraltaStaff()courts.state.mn.usAddress: Hennepin County Government Center Attn: Judge Nelson Peralta 300 South Sixth Street, C-12 Minneapolis, MN55487IT IS SO ORDERED.Dated: January 13, 2026BY THE COURT:Peralta, Nelson 2026.01.13 18:44:14 -06′00′Nelson Peralta*2 Judge of District CourtMEMORANDUM OF LAWI. Procedure and BackgroundThis matter arises out of a title dispute over a condominium in Hennepin County located at 16 Grove St., Unit 16B, Minneapolis,Minnesota (“the property”). On July 13, 2018, Plaintiffs (vendors) entered into a contract for deed with Zachary Norman(vendee), but Norman defaulted on the contract for deed and allegedly abandoned the property in June/July 2024. On July 11,2024, a mechanic's lien was allegedly recorded by Lake Area and Peterson, purportedly relating to Brandon Peterson drillingthrough the locks to the property, after which Hannah Schuelke accessed the property. The dispute in this case arises when, onOctober 8, 2024, Schuelke purportedly conveyed, via quitclaim deed, an alleged one-half interest in the property to Sculpin.
Viken v. Schuelke, 2026 WL 968103 (2026) WESTLAW   © 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.3The quitclaim deed was recorded with the Hennepin County Recorder. Plaintiffs sued to quiet title on the property, claimingthat Schuelke's quitclaim deed is void and that neither Schuelke nor Sculpin have an ownership interest in the property.On December 4, 2024, Plaintiffs filed a Summons and Complaint alleging quiet title (against Schuelke and Sculpin), quiet title(against Defendant Lake Area), slander of title against all Defendants, trespass and ejectment (against Schuelke), and seekingdeclaratory judgment against Defendants Schuelke (that the quitclaim deed she conveyed to Sculpin is of no effect) Sculpin andLake Area.1 The Complaint seeks relief of, among other things, quieting title for all interests recorded or unrecorded occurringafter the recording of the contract for deed, an Order declaring the quitclaim deed between Schuelke and Sculpin void and of nolegal effect, and an Order declaring that Schuelke (and the other codefendants) have no right, title and interest in the property.It also seeks an award of Plaintiffs' actual and special damages.On July 16, 2025, Schuelke filed and served an Answer and Affirmative Defenses. Among the affirmative defenses is “Lack ofStanding,” which asserts that “Plaintiffs lack standing to assert certain claims based on the status of the property and contractualrelationships not involving Defendant.”On August 7, 2025, twenty-two (22) days after service of the Answer, Schuelke filed and served an Amended Answer,Affirmative Defenses and Counterclaims against Plaintiffs. The Amended Answer makes minor modifications/amendmentsto the “Specific Responses” section of the Answer, adds two additional affirmative defenses (quantum meruit and unjustenrichment, and statutory rights to abandoned property) and adds nine Counterclaims. The nine Counterclaims includedUnlawful Ouster, Unlawful Exclusion, Eviction, Quantum Meruit and Unjust Enrichment, Interference with Statutory Rights,Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress, Criminal Unlawful Ouster or Exclusion, Violation of Minn. Stat. § 504B.285, andContempt of Court.*3 On September 30, 2025, Plaintiffs filed a Notice of Motion and Motion to strike Schuelke's Amended Answer andCounterclaims “as improper under Rule 15.01.” On the same date, Plaintiffs filed a Notice of Motion and Motion againstSchuelke and her attorney seeking dismissal of Schuelke's Amended Answer and Counterclaims and imposition of Rule 11sanctions “for defending against Schuelke's frivolous claims and false assertions related to Plaintiffs.”On September 9, 2025, Defendant Schuelke filed a Notice of Motion and Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Standing and aMemorandum of Law in Support of the motion to dismiss. Plaintiffs filed a Memorandum of Law in Opposition to Schuelke'smotion to dismiss on October 20, 2025. On October 9, 2025, Defendant Schuelke filed responsive motions to Plaintiffs' motionfor Rule 11 sanctions seeking to strike Plaintiffs' motion as untimely and not in conformity with Rule 11.Following the hearing on October 21, 2025, the Court took the parties' respective motions under advisement. Subsequently,on November 4, 2025, Schuelke filed a pleading withdrawing all Counterclaims asserted in Schuelke's Amended Answer andCounterclaims filed August 7, 2025, and requesting that the Court rule that Plaintiffs' motion for Rule 11 sanctions is moot“insofar as it pertains to the withdrawn pleadings and decline to impose any sanctions relating thereto.”II. Legal StandardsA. Motion to dismiss and/or for judgment on the pleadingsA complaint may be dismissed for its “failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.” Minn. R. Civ. P. 12.02(e).When deciding a Rule 12.02(e) motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, the Court must “accept the facts alleged in thecomplaint as true and construe all reasonable inferences in favor of the non-moving party.” Walsh v. U.S. Bank, 815 N.W.2d598, 606 (Minn. 2014).Minnesota is a notice pleading state. Id. at 604-05. As such, Minnesota “does not require absolute specificity in pleading, butrather requires only information sufficient to notify the opposing party of the claim against it.” Id. at 605. While a plaintiff must
Viken v. Schuelke, 2026 WL 968103 (2026) WESTLAW   © 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.4provide more than “labels and conclusions” to support its claim for relief, a claim is adequately alleged “if it is possible onany evidence which might be produced, consistent with the pleader's theory, to grant the relief demanded.” Sterry v. MinnesotaDepartment of Corrections, 8 N.W.2d 224, 235 (Minn. 2024)(quoting Walsh,851 N.W.2d at 603); Bahr v. Capella Univ., 788N.W.2d 76, 80 (Minn. 2010). The Minnesota Supreme Court has reaffirmed “the notice-pleading standard [it] articulated inWalsh.” Halva v. Minnesota State Colleges and Universities, 953 N.W.2d 496, 502 (Minn. 2021).On a motion to dismiss, the Court may consider documents that are attached to the Complaint. Hardin City. Sav. Bank v. Housing& Redevelopment Auth. of City of Brainerd, 821 N.W.2d 184, 192 (Minn. 2012) (citing Minn. R. Civ. P. 10.03 and commentingthat documents could be considered because they were specifically incorporated by reference in the complaint and Rule 10allows consideration of exhibits to a pleading). The Court may also consider documents that are referenced in the Complaintbut not attached to it. N. States Power Co. v. Metropolitan Council, 684 N.W.2d 485, 490-91 (Minn. 2004); see also Greer v.Professional Fiduciary, Inc., 792 N.W.2d 120, 126-27 (Minn. Ct. App. 2011) (a court may consider documents that are embracedby or relied upon in the Complaint). The document(s) referenced in the Complaint, however, must also be “central to the claimsalleged.” Brown v. State, 617 N.W.2d 421, 424 (Minn. Ct. App. 2000).*4 After the pleadings are closed, Minn. R. Civ. P. 12.03 allows a party to move for judgment on the pleadings. Courts reviewa motion for judgment on the pleadings to determine whether a complaint sets forth a legally sufficient claim for relief. SecurityBank & Trust Company v. Larkin, Hoffman, Daly & Lindgren, Ltd., 916 N.W.2d 491, 495 (Minn. 2018).A motion under Minn. R. Civ. P. 12.03 resembles a motion to dismiss for failure to state claim pursuant to Minn. R. Civ. P.12.02(e). In a motion for judgment on the pleadings, the Court must consider only the pleadings, interpreted in the light mostfavorable to the non-moving party. See Stephenson v. Plastics Corp. of America, 150 N.W.2d 668, 671 (Minn. 1967). The Courtconsiders “only the facts alleged in the complaint, accepting those facts as true and drawing all reasonable inferences in favorof the nonmoving party.” Security Bank & Trust Company, 916 N.W.2d at 495 (internal quotations and citations omitted).To survive a motion for judgment on the pleadings, a plaintiff must state facts that, if proven, would prove a sufficient claimand support the relief sought. Midwest Pipe Insulation, Inc. v. MD Mech, Inc., 771 N.W.2d 28, 31 (Minn. 2009). A motion forjudgment on the pleadings should only be granted if the pleadings create no issues of fact. Bank of America, N.A. v. Kent, 2013WL 3968643 at * 2 (Minn. Ct. App. August 5, 2013) (“When the answer denies material allegations in the complaint or materialquestions of fact exist, judgment on the pleadings should not be granted.”) (citing Chilson v. Travelers Ins. Co., 230 N.W. 118,119 (Minn. 1930) and In re Trusts Created by Hormel, 543 N.W.2d 668, 671 (Minn. Ct. App. 1996)).B. Amending pleadingsThe district court has “wide discretion” when deciding whether to permit an amendment to pleadings and will only be reversedfor a clear abuse of discretion. Voicestream Minneapolis, Inc. v. RPC Properties, Inc., 743 N.W.2d 267 (Minn. 2008). “A partymay amend a pleading once as a matter of course at any time before a responsive pleading is served or, if the pleading is one towhich no responsive pleading is permitted and the action has not been placed upon the trial calendar, the party may so amend itno later than 21 days after it is served.” Minn. R. Civ. P. 15.01. Otherwise “a party may only amend a pleading by leave of thecourt or by written consent of the adverse party; and leave shall be freely given when justice so requires.” Id. “The district courtshould liberally grant motions to amend when justice requires and doing so will not result in prejudice to the adverse party.”Smith v. Woodwind Homes, Inc., 605 N.W.2d 418, 424 (Minn. Ct. App. 2000).The party that opposes the amendment has the burden of establishing prejudice. McDonald v. Stonebraker, 255 N.W.2d 827,830 (Minn. 1977). Generally, if prejudice is not established, the court should permit the amendment. LaSalle Cartage Co., Inc.v. Johnson Bros. Wholesale Liquor Co., 255 N.W.2d 233, 239 (Minn. 1974). However, leave to amend a pleading should notbe granted by a court when the amendment is futile because it would serve no useful purpose. U.S. Bank Nat'l Ass'n. v. RBPRealty, LLC, 888 N.W.2d 669, 705 (Minn. Ct. App. 2016).
Viken v. Schuelke, 2026 WL 968103 (2026) WESTLAW   © 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.5C. Rule 11 sanctions*5 “By presenting to the court... a pleading, written motion, or other document, an attorney or self-represented litigant iscertifying that to the best of the person's knowledge, information, and belief, formed after an inquiry reasonable under thecircumstances:•** (omitting text)(b) the claims, defenses, and other legal contentions therein are warranted by existing law or by a nonfrivolous argument forthe extension, modification, or reversal of existing law or the establishment of new law[.]”Minn. R. Civ. P. 11.02(b).“If warranted, the court may award to the party prevailing on the motion the reasonable expenses and attorney fees incurred inpresenting or opposing the motion.” Minn. R. Civ. P. 11.03(a).“When imposing sanctions, the court shall describe the conduct determined to constitute a violation of this rule and explain thebasis for the sanction imposed.” Minn. R. Civ. P. 11.03(c).III. Defendant Schuelke's motion to dismissDefendant Schuelke purportedly filed a motion to dismiss, arguing that Plaintiffs' lack of standing is a jurisdictional defect tothe lawsuit. Any party claiming lack of jurisdiction may move to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12.02. SeeMinn. R. Civ. P. 12.02(a)-(b) (listing defenses of lack of subject-matter jurisdiction and lack of personal jurisdiction). However, as a threshold matter, amotion to dismiss on grounds of lack of jurisdiction should be brought prior to serving a responsive pleading. Id. (“A motionmaking any of these defenses shall be made before pleading if a further pleading is permitted.”) Schuelke's motion is thusprocedurally inappropriate because Schuelke served an Answer on July 16, 2025, well prior to bringing the motion to dismisson September 9, 2025. In fact, all parties (including Schuelke) had served an Answer prior to the filing of Schuelke's motion todismiss. Accordingly, Schuelke's motion is not truly a Rule 12 motion to dismiss. The question becomes how the Court shouldinterpret Schuelke's motion.Because all parties had served an Answer, the Court finds it appropriate to treat Schuelke's motion as a motion for judgmenton the pleadings.2SeeMinn. R. Civ. P. 12.03 (“After the pleadings are closed but within such time as not to delay the trial, anyparty may move for judgment on the pleadings.”)There are at least three reasons why the Court finds it appropriate to deny Schuelke's motion to dismiss.First, the allegations of the Complaint sufficiently establish that Plaintiffs have standing to bring the lawsuit. On a motion forjudgment on the pleadings, the Court must accept the factual allegations as true. Taking the allegations in the Complaint as true,the Court accepts the following allegations in the ensuing paragraph as true for purposes of this motion:Plaintiffs own the property by virtue of a warranty deed they recorded in Hennepin County. Plaintiffs entered into a contract fordeed with Zachary Norman, and he abandoned the property; Plaintiffs did not consent for Norman to assign, sell or transfer hisinterest in the property. Schuelke has no ownership interest in the property, and she lacked a title interest to convey an allegedone-half interest in the property to Sculpin. Despite Schuelke lacking a title interest in the property, the quitclaim deed fromSchuelke to Sculpin was recorded in the Hennepin County Recorder's Office and remains on title.*6 “Under Minnesota law, ‘[s]tanding is acquired in two ways: either the plaintiff has suffered some ‘injury-in-fact,”’ Gillette,883 N.W.2d at 783 (alteration in original) (quotation omitted), defined as ‘a concrete and particularized invasion of a legally
Viken v. Schuelke, 2026 WL 968103 (2026) WESTLAW   © 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.6protected interest,’ Webb Golden Valley, LLC v. State, 865 N.W.2d 689, 693 (Minn. 2015) (quotation omitted), ‘or the plaintiff isthe beneficiary of some legislative enactment granting standing,’ Gillette, 883 N.W.2d at 783-84 (quotation omitted).” Laymonv. Minnesota Premier Properties, LLC, 903 N.W.2d 6, 13 (Minn. Ct. App. 2017).3Taking Plaintiffs' allegations from the pleadings to be true, and construing all inferences in their favor, Plaintiffs have allegedsufficiently that they were injured in fact and/or have standing. Plaintiffs have sufficiently alleged an injury in fact becausethey own the property, yet a person who allegedly has no ownership interest (Schuelke) has deeded a one-half interest in theproperty to Sculpin, a third party. The quitclaim deed conveyed by Schuelke to Sculpin remains on title and, assuming it hasno validity because Schuelke had no title interest to convey, the deed operates as a cloud on title on the property. AlthoughLaymon involved the specific issue of whether a personal representative had standing to bring a quiet title action on behalf of adecedent, the Court of Appeals held that the simple allegations that certain conveyances in question clouded title were sufficientto confer standing. Id. at 14. Laymon held:Appellants indisputably executed and recorded conveyances that Mary Laymon alleges cloud title to the subject property, inwhich Mary Laymon further alleges that ‘[the estate] has an interest... free and clear of the interests of all [appellants].’ Weconclude that those allegations are sufficient to confer standing here. See Schiff v. Griffin, 639 N.W.2d 56, 60 (Minn. App. 2002)(stating that “a determination of standing must not be based on the substantive merits or prospective success of a claim”); cf Inre Appeal of Selection Process for Position of Electrician, 674 N.W.2d 242, 247 (Minn. App. 2004) (stating that “[s]tanding isa low hurdle because [one] need only allege” its basis), review denied (Minn. Apr. 20, 2004).Laymon, 903 N.W.2d at 14 (emphasis added).Based on the allegations in the Complaint, Plaintiffs' ownership interest in the property has been impacted by Schuelke's actions,and they have been sufficiently injured for purposes of standing. As co-owners of the property who are directly impacted byan allegedly invalid quitclaim deed that purported to convey a one-half interest in the property to a third party, Plaintiffs hasbeen injured and have standing to bring a quiet title action. Id.; see also In re Appeal of Selection Process for Position ofElectrician, 674 N.W.2d at 247 (“Essentially, a potential litigant must allege injury in fact, or otherwise have a sufficient stakein the outcome, to have a court decide the merits of a dispute.”) Schuelke's argument that Plaintiffs, as owners of the propertyin question, do not have a stake in the outcome of this quiet title dispute is rejected by this Court.Second, there are issues of fact which make granting judgment on the pleadings inappropriate. Even assuming Schuelke werecorrect that failure to serve the contract for deed vendee with a notice of cancellation precluded a quiet title action (the Court,however, makes no such finding that Schuelke is correct) there appears to be an issue of fact regarding whether Norman wasserved. See Pl. Mem. at 8 (“In discovery, Schuelke and her counsel were provided with the above information and produceddocumentation of the cancellation of the Contract for Deed, including evidence that they personally served Norman with theNotice of Termination.”) Even if Schuelke's legal theory correct (which is not at all clear), the existence of a fact disputeregarding service makes judgment on the pleadings inappropriate. Kent, 2013 WL 3968643 at * 2.*7 Third, Schuelke has not convinced the Court that her legal argument is sound and/or controlling. In essence, Schuelkeargues that Plaintiffs' claims are barred because they sued Schuelke allegedly prior to terminating the contract for deed andproperly serving Norman with notice.4 Schuelke argues: “Plaintiffs' failure to satisfy these prerequisites eliminates their standingto pursue quiet title, slander of title, ejectment, and declaratory judgment claims.” (Schuelke Mem. at 11).The Court is not persuaded by Schuelke's argument that a contract for deed vendor lacks standing to pursue a quiet title actionunless and until the vendor has terminated the contract for deed. Schuelke's main argument is that a quiet title action cannotcommence prior to termination of the contract for deed. Schuelke argues: “Recent legal authority confirms that ‘vendors undera contract for deed generally lack standing to bring title-based lawsuits before properly terminating the contract for deed incompliance with Minn. Stat. § 559.21.”’ (Schuelke Motion at 18). However, Schuelke does not cite what “authority” supportsthat proposition in the motion. Schuelke also argues, in the Memorandum of Law, that “Professional legal analysis confirms:‘vendors under a contract for deed generally lack standing to bring title-based lawsuits before properly terminating the contract
Viken v. Schuelke, 2026 WL 968103 (2026) WESTLAW   © 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.7for deed in compliance with Minn. Stat. § 559.21.”’ (Schuelke Mem. at 4, 13). Again, Schuelke does not cite to a case forthat proposition.Before the unsupported proposition, Schuelke argues: “Vendors cannot pursue title-based claims while vendee rights remainin effect. Miller v. Snedeker, 257 Minn. 204, 209 (1960) (contract for deed vendors must follow statutory procedures beforeasserted superior title rights).” (Schuelke Mem. at 3). The Court read Miller (and the pinpoint cite at page 209) and could notlocate any such holding. Miller upheld a trial court's ruling on the sufficiency of the evidence that a contract for deed vendeewas not entitled to rescission of the purchase agreement and not entitled to refund of the earnest money payment. Id. at 220-21.Although there is some brief discussion of Minn. Stat. § 559.21, Miller merely reiterates that a contract for deed vendor is notlimited to the remedy of statutory cancellation in the event of a breach of contract. Id. at 219. Miller holds “This statute is of noaid to the plaintiff.” Id. at 220. Miller simply does not stand for the broad proposition that is advanced by Schuelke.Later in her Memorandum, Schuelke points to a case, Lambert v. Bongard, 648 N.W.2d 712 (Minn. Ct. App. 2002), which sheargues supports that “vendors must establish clear termination before pursuing ejectment.” (Schuelke Mem. at 4). This Courthas reviewed Lambert and did not locate any ruling or holding that relates to Schuelke's standing argument; Lambert is not acase about standing at all, and it does not hold that a vendor must “establish clear termination.” Lambert instead held that therewere genuine issues of material fact regarding whether the vendees defaulted on the contract for deed, and it also held that thestatute of limitations in Minn. Stat. § 541.05 did not apply to a statutory cancellation of contract for deed. Id. at 715.*8 Schuelke also argues that Plaintiffs did not comply with statutory procedures to terminate the contract for deed prior toserving this quiet title lawsuit, and as such, Plaintiffs lack standing. Schuelke argues that there is no proof of service uponNorman of the termination notice; according to Schuelke, this is “fatal” to Plaintiffs' attempt at terminating the contract fordeed. Schuelke argues that “Minnesota courts strictly enforce service requirements: ‘failure to properly serve required partiesinvalidates the termination of the contract for deed and, consequently, the vendor's standing to bring title-based lawsuits.’ Engav. Felland, 264 Minn. 67, 117 N.W.2d 787 (1962).” (Schuelke Mem. at 6). However, Schuelke does not provide a pinpointpage cite for the aforementioned quote, and the Court read Enga and was not able to locate the quote. Furthermore, Enga is anunlawful detainer case and did not involve standing to bring a quiet title lawsuit. The Supreme Court reversed the trial court,holding that prior to bringing an unlawful detainer claim against the defendant, “service of the notice of termination upon [bothpurchasers named in the contract for deed], as well as upon defendant as the occupant,... was a prerequisite to plaintiffs action inunlawful detainer.” Id. at 71. Although Enga touched tangentially on the importance of establishing in that case that the contractfor deed vendees had been served notice of termination of the contract for deed, the reason for that was because the SupremeCourt was concerned that there was insufficient proof that the vendees' interests had been completely divested; in other words,in that case, service upon the occupant defendant alone was not sufficient. Id. There was no holding in Enga, however, nearlyas broad as asserted by Schuelke in the purported quote, which does not even appear in Enga.Finally, the Court recently (on January 7, 2026) heard oral argument on Plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment. During oralargument, Schuelke conceded summary judgment in favor of Plaintiffs on all of Plaintiffs' claims against Schuelke other than theslander of title claim. Schuelke made no mention of lack of standing during oral argument. Oddly, Schuelke's counsel assertedthat (excepting the slander of title claim) Schuelke had not contested Plaintiffs' claims. This was an astounding concession givenSchuelke's prior motion to dismiss. Schuelke's concession at oral argument may be reasonably interpreted as a waiver of herprior motion to dismiss, and this is yet another reason to deny Schuelke's motion to dismiss.For all of the foregoing reasons explained above, Plaintiffs have standing to bring this quiet title action and Schuelke's motionto dismiss will be denied.IV. Plaintiffs' motion to strikePlaintiffs have brought a motion to strike Schuelke's Amended Answer and Counterclaims. When Schuelke served her Answer,there was no responsive pleading permitted for Plaintiffs or any other party; Schuelke's Answer did not contain any cross-claims
Viken v. Schuelke, 2026 WL 968103 (2026) WESTLAW   © 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.8or counterclaims. Accordingly, Schuelke had 21 days to serve an amended Answer. Minn. R. Civ. P. 15.01. On the twenty-second(22nd) day, Schuelke filed and served an Amended Answer and Counterclaims that contained nine counterclaims. Schuelke didnot obtain Plaintiffs' consent in advance, nor did Schuelke request leave from the Court to serve/file an amended Answer.Although it is theoretically possible that the Court may have granted Schuelke leave to amend her Answer if leave had beensought, it is not known what the Court would have done since no motion for leave was ever filed. In any event, it was not properfor Schuelke to simply file and serve an Amended Answer without first either obtaining consent from Plaintiffs or leave fromthe Court. Given the lack of consent from Plaintiffs, the proper course of action in this case would have been for Schuelke to filea motion with the Court seeking leave to amend her Answer. For reasons that are unclear, Schuelke did not do this. Schuelkewithdrew all of the counterclaims in a pleading filed November 4, 2025; this pleading did not address the minor changes to theAnswer and two additional affirmative defenses which appear in the Amended Answer.Schuelke's Amended Answer is not permitted without first obtaining consent from Plaintiffs or leave of the Court. Schuelkedid not attempt either. Accordingly, the Amended Answer and Counterclaims is an improper pleading, and as such, Plaintiffs'motion to strike will be granted.V. Plaintiffs' motion for Rule 11 sanctionsPlaintiffs have moved for Rule 11 sanctions against both Schuelke and Schuelke's legal counsel. Plaintiffs argue that becauseSchuelke refused to seek leave to amend the pleadings to assert the nine additional counterclaims, and simply asserted them,Plaintiffs were forced to respond to counterclaims which lacked merit. Plaintiffs argue that Schuelke served onerous discoveryon Plaintiffs, including many Requests for Admissions. Plaintiffs analyze, in great detail, each and every counterclaim andargue that each one lacks merit. Defendant Schuelke, in her motion pleadings, initially argued that Plaintiffs misunderstoodRule 15.01, and later argued that Schuelke had voluntarily dismissed all of the counterclaims but one. Schuelke also argued thatPlaintiffs' motion was untimely and that Plaintiffs sought Rule 11 sanctions prior to the expiration of the “safe harbor” period.*9 This Court finds that Plaintiffs were correct in their interpretation that because there was no responsive pleading permittedto Schuelke's initial Answer, Schuelke had only 21 days to serve/file an amended Answer; otherwise, Schuelke needed torequest leave from the Court or obtain consent from Plaintiffs. Schuelke served/filed her Amended Answer containing ninecounterclaims one day following the expiration of the 21-day period; this was improper and Schuelke should instead haveobtained consent from Plaintiffs or sought leave from the Court. Schuelke did neither.On August 20, 2025, Plaintiffs counsel served Schuelke's counsel, Luke Bellville, with a Rule 11 “safe harbor” letter. (MaglioDecl., Ex. C, filed 9/30/25). The expiration of the 21-day “safe harbor” period would have been September 10, 2025. Minn. R.Civ. P. 11.03(a)(l). On September 30, 2025, Plaintiffs filed a motion seeking to strike Defendant Schuelke's Amended Answerand Counterclaims and seeking Rule 11 sanctions against Schuelke and her attorney, Bellville. On October 9, 2025, DefendantSchuelke filed a Notice of Motion and Motion seeking to strike Plaintiffs' motion for Rule 11 sanctions as untimely and, amongother things, for allegedly failing to comply with Rule 11's “safe harbor” provisions.As a threshold matter, the Court finds that Plaintiffs' motion for Rule 11 sanctions was not untimely. A motion for Rule 11sanctions is a nondispositive motion, as regardless of how it is decided, it would not dispose of the non-moving party's claims.As such, Plaintiffs were required to file and serve the Notice of Motion and Motion and all accompanying pleadings twenty-one(21) days prior to the hearing; Plaintiffs did so on September 30, 2025, twenty-one (21) days prior to the hearing held on October21, 2025. Furthermore, Plaintiffs did not file/serve the motion for Rule 11 sanctions until forty-one (41) days had passed fromthe date Plaintiffs served the letter upon Bellville informing him that Plaintiffs intended to seek Rule 11 sanctions; in doing so,Plaintiffs waited the required twenty-one (21) days following service of the letter and, given Schuelke and Bellville's failure tocure the alleged defects, were entitled to seek sanctions from the Court. Minn. R. Civ. P. 11.03(a).
Viken v. Schuelke, 2026 WL 968103 (2026) WESTLAW   © 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.9Turning to the merits of Plaintiffs' motion, the Court has reviewed the court file, including the nine counterclaims asserted inSchuelke's Amended Answer, and the parties' arguments. The Court is troubled that Schuelke's attorney maintained that theapproach of simply filing the Amended Answer was proper, and that Plaintiffs misunderstood Rule 15.01. Plaintiffs did notmisunderstand Rule 15.01, and Bellville should have withdrawn the Amended Answer and sought a motion with this Court forleave to amend Schuelke's Answer. It was not proper to initiate discovery on the counterclaims when leave to assert them hadnot been obtained. The Court recognizes that Plaintiffs may have incurred costs associated with responding to the discoverypropounded by Schuelke. The Court is also concerned regarding the nature of the counterclaims brought by Schuelke. In CountVII, Schuelke attempted to bring a claim alleging a violation of a statute, yet the statute in question does not provide a privatecause of action. Similarly, in Count IX, Schuelke attempted to bring an action for “contempt of court” when there is no privatecause of action for that particular situation (even if the allegations are true). The Court is also concerned that Count VI, intentionalinfliction of emotional distress, was pled in a case which predominantly involves a dispute over title to real property.*10 Despite the Court's concerns regarding Schuelke's Amended Answer and Counterclaims, Defendant Schuelke attempted towithdraw all but one counterclaim within the 21-day “safe harbor” timeline. On September 9, 2025, twenty (20) days followingPlaintiffs' service of the letter notifying Schuelke and Bellville regarding Plaintiffs' intent to seek Rule 11 sanctions, DefendantSchuelke filed a pleading which stated that: “Pursuant to Minnesota Rule 41.01(a)(1), Defendant voluntarily dismisses thefollowing counts from her Amended Answer with Counterclaims without prejudice:” and then proceeded to list all counterclaimsexcept Counterclaim No. IV.5 (Def. Schuelke Motion to Dismiss at 4-5). Then, on November 4, 2025, Defendant Schuelke fileda Notice of Withdrawal of Counterclaims in which Schuelke stated that “she voluntarily withdraws all counterclaims asserted inher Amended Answer and Counterclaims filed on 8/7/2025, including Count V (“Interference with Statutory Rights.”). (Noticeof Withdrawal filed 11/4/25).It is clear to this Court that as of September 9, 2025, Schuelke was attempting to dismiss - or have the Court dismiss - allcounterclaims except Count V (Interference with Statutory Rights). By November 4, 2025, Schuelke attempted to dismiss -or have the Court dismiss - allcounterclaims. Although the analysis is a bit convoluted because the Amended Answer is not,technically, a proper pleading, Rule 41.01(a) applies to Counterclaims. SeeMinn. R. Civ. P. 41.03 (“The provisions of Rules41.01 and 41.02 apply to the dismissal of any counterclaim, cross-claim, or third-party claim.”) Because Plaintiffs had not filedan Answer (to the counterclaims) or a motion for summary judgment, Schuelke was entitled to file a Notice of Dismissal ofthe counterclaims. Minn. R. Civ. P. 41.01(a); Minn. R. Civ. P. 41.03. Although as a technical matter, Schuelke did not file aNotice of Dismissal, the Court liberally construes the two filings made by Schuelke (on September 9, 2025 and November4, 2025) described above as tantamount to a Notice of Dismissal. Although the technical “form” of the pleading(s) may nothave been correct, it was evident that Schuelke was informing all involved that she was withdrawing all of her counterclaims.Because Schuelke attempted to withdraw eight of the nine counterclaims within the “safe harbor” period, and because Schuelkeattempted to withdraw the ninth counterclaim two weeks following the hearing, the Court exercises its discretion not to awardRule 11 sanctions against Schuelke and/or her attorney, Bellville. In any event, the Court has stricken Schuelke's AmendedAnswer and Counterclaims, so Schuelke's counterclaims are effectively dismissed.VI. Rule 11 concerns raised sua sponte by this CourtAlthough the Court has denied Plaintiffs' motion for Rule 11 sanctions, the Court may, on its own volition (sua sponte) raiseRule 11 concerns. Rule 11.03 states that “On its own initiative, the court may enter an order describing the specific conductthat appears to violate Rule 11.02 and directing an attorney, law firm, or party to show cause why it has not violated Rule 11.02with respect thereto.” Minn. R. Civ. P. 11.03(a)(2).The Court is very troubled by two aspects of the Motion to Dismiss (Index No. 44) and Memorandum of Law (Index No. 45)filed on September 9, 2025 by Schuelke's legal counsel, Luke Bellville. First, as explained in detail above, the primary legalargument made lacked proper legal support. To reiterate, the argument made was that a contract for deed vendor lacks standingto bring a quiet title action without first terminating the contract for deed. This argument was not made meekly; Bellville'sMotion and Memorandum contained bold statements touting the argument. As an example, the Memorandum proclaimed:
Viken v. Schuelke, 2026 WL 968103 (2026) WESTLAW   © 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.10“Professional legal analysis confirms: ‘vendors under a contract for deed generally lack standing to bring title-based lawsuitsbefore properly terminating the contract for deed in compliance with Minn. Stat. § 559.21.”’ (Schuelke Mem. at 4). TheMemorandum continued later: “Minnesota law is clear: vendors cannot pursue title-based claims before properly terminatingcontracts for deed ....” Id. at 11. The first sign of trouble was that there was no case cited by Bellville which immediatelyfollowed these bold pronouncements. Further trouble lay ahead, however, when certain cases were cited in support of Schuelke'sargument. These cases included Miller v. Snedeker, 257 Minn. 204, 209 (1960) (Schuelke Mem. at 3), Lambert v. Bongard, 648N.W.2d 712, 717 (Minn. Ct. App. 2002) (Schuelke Mem. at 4) and Enga v. Felland, 264 Minn. 67 (1962) (Schuelke Mem. at6-7). The Court read these cases, and they do not support the primary argument (that contract for deed vendors lack standingto pursue a quiet title action if they have not terminated the contract for deed); the cases are not about standing, nor do theyinvolve contract for deed vendors who have brought quiet title actions. The cases do not hold that contract for deed vendorslack standing to pursue a quiet title action if they have not terminated a contract for deed. Despite the factual dissimilarity ofthese cases to the instant case, there was no argument made to try to explain how the cited cases applied to the instant case.It is likely that is because there is no good-faith argument that could be made that the cases cited by Bellville could be readand/or interpreted to support the propositions he advanced in the Motion and Memorandum. In sum, it is highly problematicthat the primary argument made by Bellville not only lacks legal support, but that the cases cited in support of the argumentdo not, in good-faith, support the argument made.*11 As a corollary to the primary argument, Bellville also argued that a failure to properly serve notice of cancellation of acontract for deed also results in lack of standing to pursue a quiet title action. (Schuelke Mem. at 6). In making this corollaryargument, there was another very serious problem with Bellville's conduct: the quotations which appear in the Memorandumdo not appear in the cases cited and/or are not attributed to a case. Plaintiffs set forth an explicit chart making this argument(P1. Mem. at 2-3, filed on 10/20/25). The Court asked Bellville at the hearing whether, when the Court read the cases, the Courtwould find the quotations in Bellville's brief. Bellville replied to the effect that this was “early morning litigation 101,” thathe had relied upon “Lexis Assist,” and “we should be OK.” Bellville added that if there was language that was “off-point”he apologized.When the Court read the cases cited and looked for certain quotations attributed to them in Bellville's Memorandum of Law,the Court could not find all of the quoted language. The following quotations from Bellville's Memorandum do not appear inthe case which is cited as the source of the quoted language:1. “failure to properly serve required parties invalidates the termination of the contract for deed and, consequently, the vendor'sstanding to bring title-based lawsuits.” Enga v. Felland, 264 Minn. 67, 117 N.W.2d 787 (1962). (Schuelke Mem. at 6).2. Enga v. Felland, 264 Minn. 67, 71 (1962) (service requirements are “prerequisite to pursuing an action”) (Schuelke Mem.at 7).63. Ahlstrand v. McPherson, 285 Minn. 398, 402 (1969) (vendors who failed to serve notice “did not comply with statutoryrequirements for cancellation”). (Schuelke Mem. at 6).Relatedly, none of the cases cited by Bellville contain this quotation, which appears at page 4 of the Memorandum and at page18 of the Motion:4. “vendors under a contract for deed generally lack standing to bring title-based lawsuits before properly terminating thecontract for deed in compliance with Minn. Stat. § 559.21.” (Schuelke Mem. at 4; Schuelke Motion at 18).Courts rely on attorneys to advance legal arguments that have support in the law; in other words, it is fundamental that whenattorneys make an argument, they must cite controlling authority to support the argument. At a minimum, attorneys mustcite persuasive authority and explain why persuasive authority is sufficient. However, if authority is lacking altogether, it is
Viken v. Schuelke, 2026 WL 968103 (2026) WESTLAW   © 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.11incumbent on the attorneys to inform the Court that there is no authority, but that there is another good reason to make theargument.In this case, Bellville made a legal argument - and he made it boldly - that is simply not supported with controlling or persuasiveauthority. The argument is that a contract for deed vendor that does not first terminate the contract for deed lacks standing tobring a quiet title action. The cases cited in support of the argument did not support the proposition. Furthermore, in multipleinstances Bellville made the argument and cited no case in support of the argument. In advancing an argument without adequatecontrolling and/or persuasive authority, Bellville appears to have violated Rule 11.02(b) because the argument is not “warrantedby existing law or by a nonfrivolous argument for the extension, modification, or reversal of existing law or the establishmentof new law[.]”Furthermore, Bellville made a corollary argument that failure of a contract for deed vendor to serve notice of cancellation resultsin lack of standing to pursue a quiet title action. In doing so, Bellville not only cited a case, but attributed a quote to the caseas follows: “failure to properly serve required parties invalidates the termination of the contract for deed and, consequently, thevendor's standing to bring title-based lawsuits.” Enga v. Felland, 264 Minn. 67, 117 N.W.2d 787 (1962). (Schuelke Mem. at 6).The quote does not appear in Enga, and Enga does not support the proposition argued. As shown above, there are two otherquotes which Bellville attributed to cases which do not appear in those cases. In attributing quotations to cases on three separateoccasions in Schuelke's Memorandum when those quotations do not appear in the cases, it appears that Bellville has violatedRule 11.02(b) because the nonexistent quotations do not constitute “legal contentions... warranted by existing law....”*12 Accordingly, having described the specific conduct which appears to violate Rule 11.02, this Court will issue an Orderdirecting attorney Luke Bellville to show cause why he has not violated Rule 11.02 with respect thereto.VII. ConclusionThis is the first in a series of Orders necessary to resolve the parties' pending motions. The record reveals that this case isprocedurally complex. Through this Order, the Court attempts to bring some clarity to some of the procedural complexitieswhich have arisen during the litigation of this case. The Court will deny Schuelke's motion to dismiss for lack of standing forvarious reasons, but primarily because based on the allegations in the Complaint, Plaintiffs have sufficiently alleged injury-in-fact given they own the property in question and have alleged a cloud in the title. Defendants Schuelke's Amended Answerand Counterclaims will be stricken because Schuelke did not obtain consent from Plaintiffs or leave of Court prior to filingand serving the Amended Answer. Plaintiffs' motion for Rule 11 sanctions against Schuelke and Bellville will be deniedbecause Schuelke attempted to withdraw nearly all of the asserted nine counterclaims during the “safe harbor” period, and thensubsequently attempted to withdraw all of them after the hearing on October 21, 2025; although the pleading by Schuelke wasnot technically proper, her attempts at withdrawal were effectively tantamount to an intended Notice of Dismissal. However,the Court has raised, on its own volition, apparent conduct by Bellville as described in this Order which appears to violate Rule11, and as such, Bellville will be ordered to show cause why Rule 11 sanctions should not be imposed.N.P.Footnotes1To date, Defendants Sculpin and Lake Area have not filed an Answer. However, according to Plaintiffs, Defendants Sculpin and LakeArea served their Answer on January 16, 2025.2According to Plaintiffs, Defendants Sculpin and Lake Area served their Answer on January 16, 2025.3The full citation of Gillette is In re Gillette Children's Specialty Healthcare, 883 N.W.2d 778, 784 (Minn. 2016).
Viken v. Schuelke, 2026 WL 968103 (2026) WESTLAW   © 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.124Schuelke argued that “Minnesota law is clear: vendors cannot pursue title-based claims before properly terminating contracts fordeed, and termination requires strict compliance with service requirements.” (Schuelke Mem. at 11, 56). There is no case cited tosupport that proposition.5However, the only counterclaim not named was Count V, Interference with Statutory Rights. The Court interprets the record thatSchuelke inadvertently labeled the “Quantum Meruit and Unjust Enrichment” counterclaim as “Count V” when in reality, it wasCount IV.6The actual quote is: “Absent competent proof that both purchasers named in the Volks' contract completely divested themselves ofany interest in that contract, service of the notice of termination upon them, as well as upon defendant as the occupant, was requiredby the statute and was a prerequisite to plaintiffs action in unlawful detainer.” Id. at 71.End of Document© 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.
ProvenanceKnow exactly where this document came from.Members see the sourcing behind every authority on DocPost — so you can check the record yourself and cite with confidence.Request access