Villavicencio v. Mingo, No. 2:25-cv-0993 (Oct. 7, 2025)

Case details
Full caption
Jose Villavicencio v. Judge Stephanie Mingo
Country
United States
Jurisdiction
Federal
Decided
Oct. 7, 2025
Disposition
Motion Granted
© 2025 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.JOSE VILLAVICENCIO, Plaintiff, v. JUDGE STEPHANIEMINGO, Defendant.United States District Court, S.D. Ohio, Eastern Division, EASTERN DIVISION. | October 7, 2025 |Slip Copy | 2025 WL 2837645Document Detailsstandard Citation:JOSE VILLAVICENCIO, Plaintiff, v. JUDGE STEPHANIE MINGO,Defendant., No. 2:25-CV-0993, 2025 WL 2837645 (S.D. Ohio Oct. 7,2025)All Citations:Slip Copy, 2025 WL 2837645Search DetailsSearch Query:adv: (openai "artificial intelligence" chatgpt "google gemini" "westlawcocounsel" "large language model") (hallucinat! fake fictitious spuriousnonexistent "non-existent" "made up" imagined /p (gpt ai "artificialintelligence" chatgpt chaton perplexity openai copilot "google gemini""google bard" grok "mata v. avianca" claude llm llms)) (hallucinat! fakefictitious spurious nonexistent "non-existent" "made up" imagined) +3(precedent case "legal authority" "legal case") & DATE(aft 1/1/2023)Jurisdiction:OhioDelivery DetailsDate:October 9, 2025 at 3:18 AMDelivered By: Client ID:NOCLIENTIDOutlineORDER ANDREPORT ANDRECOMMENDATION(p.1)All Citations (p.3)
JOSE VILLAVICENCIO, Plaintiff, v. JUDGE STEPHANIE MINGO,..., Slip Copy (2025) © 2025 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.12025 WL 2837645Only the Westlaw citation is currently available.United States District Court,S.D. Ohio, Eastern Division,EASTERN DIVISION.JOSE VILLAVICENCIO, Plaintiff,v.JUDGE STEPHANIEMINGO, Defendant.Case No. 2:25-cv-0993|Filed: 10/07/2025Chief Judge Sarah D. MorrisonORDER AND REPORT ANDRECOMMENDATIONELIZABETH A. PRESTON DEAVERS UNITEDSTATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE*1 Plaintiff Jose Villavicencio, an Ohio residentproceeding without the assistance of counsel, hasrequested leave to proceed in forma pauperis with thisaction. (ECF No. 1.) The Motion is GRANTED. Alljudicial officers who render services in this action shalldo so as if the costs had been prepaid. 28 U.S.C. §1915(a). It is ORDERED that Plaintiff be allowedto prosecute his action without prepayment of fees orcosts.This matter is also before the Court for an initialscreen of Plaintiff's Complaint (Compl., ECF No. 1-1)under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2) and 1915A to identifycognizable claims and to recommend dismissal ofPlaintiff's Complaint, or any portion of it, which isfrivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim upon whichrelief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief froma defendant who is immune from such relief. 28U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2), 1915A. For the reasons below,the Undersigned RECOMMENDS that the CourtDISMISS without prejudice Plaintiff's Complaint.(ECF No. 1-1.)I. STANDARD OF REVIEWCongress enacted 28 U.S.C. § 1915, the federal informa pauperis statute, seeking to “lower judicialaccess barriers to the indigent.” Denton v. Hernandez,504 U.S. 25, 31 (1992). In doing so, however,“Congress recognized that ‘a litigant whose filing feesand court costs are assumed by the public, unlike apaying litigant, lacks an economic incentive to refrainfrom filing frivolous, malicious, or repetitive lawsuits.’” Id. at 31 (quoting Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S.319, 324 (1989)). To address this concern, Congressincluded subsection (e)1 as part of the statute, whichprovides in pertinent part:(2) Notwithstanding any filing fee, or any portionthereof, that may have been paid, the court shalldismiss the case at any time if the court determinesthat--* * *(B) the action or appeal--(i) is frivolous or malicious;(ii) fails to state a claim on which relief may begranted; or ....28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i) & (ii); Denton, 504U.S. at 31. Thus, Section 1915(e) requires sua spontedismissal of an action upon the Court's determinationthat the action is frivolous or malicious, or upondetermination that the action fails to state a claim uponwhich relief may be granted.“A complaint may be dismissed as frivolous whenthe plaintiff cannot make any claim with a rationalor arguable basis in fact or law.” Brown v. Kruse,No. 1:15-CV-526, 2015 WL 5907557, at *1 (S.D.Ohio Aug. 24, 2015) (citing Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 328–29), report and recommendation adopted, No. 1:15-CV-526, 2015 WL 5836009 (S.D. Ohio Oct. 7, 2015).“An action has no arguable legal basis when the ...plaintiff claims a violation of a legal interest whichclearly does not exist. An action has no arguable factualbasis when the allegations are delusional or rise tothe level of the irrational or wholly incredible.” Id.(citations and quotations omitted). The Court doesnot need to accept as true factual allegations that arefantastical or delusional. Id. (citations and quotationsomitted).
JOSE VILLAVICENCIO, Plaintiff, v. JUDGE STEPHANIE MINGO,..., Slip Copy (2025) © 2025 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.2*2 To properly state a claim upon which relief maybe granted, a plaintiff must satisfy the basic federalpleading requirements set forth in Federal Rule of CivilProcedure 8(a). See also Hill v. Lappin, 630 F.3d 468,470–71 (6th Cir. 2010) (applying Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) standards to review under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915A and1915(e)(2)(B)(ii)). Under Rule 8(a)(2), a complaintmust contain a “short and plain statement of the claimshowing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R.Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Thus, Rule 8(a) “imposes legal andfactual demands on the authors of complaints.” 16630Southfield Ltd., P'Ship v. Flagstar Bank, F.S.B., 727F.3d 502, 503 (6th Cir. 2013) (emphasis in original).Although this pleading standard does not require “‘detailed factual allegations,’ ... [a] pleading that offers‘labels and conclusions’ or ‘a formulaic recitation ofthe elements of a cause of action,’ ” is insufficient.Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quotingBell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544,555 (2007)). A complaint will not “suffice if ittenders ‘naked assertion[s]’ devoid of ‘further factualenhancement.’ ” Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at557). The Court holds pro se complaints “ ‘to lessstringent standards than formal pleadings drafted bylawyers.’ ” Garrett v. Belmont Cnty. Sheriff's Dep't.,No. 08-3978, 2010 WL 1252923, at *2 (6th Cir. April1, 2010) (quoting Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520(1972)). This lenient treatment, however, has limits:“ ‘courts should not have to guess at the nature ofthe claim asserted.’ ” Frengler v. Gen. Motors, 482 F.App'x 975, 976–77 (6th Cir. 2012) (quoting Wells v.Brown, 891 F.2d 591, 594 (6th Cir. 1989)).In addition, when it is evident from the face of thecomplaint that a court lacks federal jurisdiction, thecourt may dismiss an action for lack of subject-matterjurisdiction under both 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) andFederal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(h)(3). Williamsv. Cincy Urban Apts., No. 1:10-cv-153, 2010 WL883846, at *2 n.1 (S.D. Ohio Mar. 9, 2010) (citingCarlock v. Williams, 182 F.3d 916, 1999 WL 454880,at *2 (6th Cir. June 22, 1999) (table)).II. ANALYSISThe Undersigned concludes that this Court is withoutjurisdiction over Plaintiff's claims and thereforerecommends that the Court dismiss Plaintiff's action.Plaintiff filed a document captioned “Complaint for aWrit of Mandamus.” (Compl. at PageID 4.) Plaintiffseeks the following relief:A. Issue a writ of mandamus compellingDefendant (the Franklin County EnvironmentalCourt) to render a final written determinationof the environmental penalty owed by the LLCwithin ten (10) days of issuance of the writ;B. Order the Court to apply the $1,000-per-property maximum as articulated in Ullmannv. Columbus (or the correct amount after a fact-finding hearing), and to enter that amount onthe record;C. Declare that Defendant's failure to determinethe penalty does not stay the pending appeal ofthe receivership sale; the two matters are distinctand must be resolved independently[.]***(Compl. at PageID 8 (as in original).)1 Plaintiff allegesthat “the Court,” presumably the Franklin CountyEnvironmental Court, failed to rule on his motionwithin 30 days. (Id. at PageID 7.) Plaintiff furthercontends that “receiver's counsel ... presented a penaltyestimate of $1,000,000.” (Id. at PageID 5 (emphasisomitted and cleaned up).)*3 It appears Plaintiff seeks an order compellingthe state court to follow state law. Plaintiff claimsthis Court has “original jurisdiction over a mandamusaction under 28 U.S.C. § 1362 (All Writs Act).” (Id. atPageID 5.) Plaintiff also asserts that the “All Writs Act,28 U.S.C. § 136 (2)” “permits a federal district court toissue a writ of mandamus to compel the performance ofa clear legal duty.” (Id. at PageID 6.) The Undersignednotes that 28 U.S.C. § 1362 and 28 U.S.C. § 136(2) are not statutes that provide authority for a writof mandamus and construes Plaintiff's request as onepursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1651.Most simply, the Court cannot grant Plaintiff'srequested relief because under Federal Rule of CivilProcedure 81(b), the writ of mandamus has beenabolished. “Relief previously available through [writsof mandamus] may be obtained by appropriate actionor motion under these rules.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 81(b).“[U]nder 28 U.S.C. § 1651 (All Writs Statute) federal
JOSE VILLAVICENCIO, Plaintiff, v. JUDGE STEPHANIE MINGO,..., Slip Copy (2025) © 2025 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.3courts may issue all writs necessary or appropriate inaid of their respective jurisdictions, including writs inthe nature of mandamus.” Skaggs v. Jefferson Cir. Ct.,No. 3:18-CV-P149, 2018 WL 2187723, at *1 (W.D.Ky. May 11, 2018) (citing Haggard v. Tennessee, 421F.2d 1384, 1385 (6th Cir. 1970)). However, “[i]t issettled that a federal court has no general jurisdictionto issue writs of mandamus where that is the only reliefsought.” Id. (citing Haggard, at 1386).That is the case here—Plaintiff seeks only mandamusrelief. “In the absence of special statutory authority[a federal court] can issue writs of mandamus onlyas ancillary to and in aid of jurisdiction otherwisevested in it.” Id. To the extent Plaintiff seeks reliefpursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1361, his Complaint muststill be dismissed. 28 U.S.C. § 1361 gives the districtcourts “original jurisdiction of any action in the natureof mandamus to compel an officer or employee ofthe United States or any agency thereof to performa duty owed to the plaintiff.” 28 U.S.C. § 1361(emphasis added). Plaintiff, however, asks this Courtto compel Judge Mingo and/or Franklin CountyEnvironmental Court to perform acts. These are notofficers, employees, or agencies of the United States.Accordingly, Plaintiff's action is subject to dismissalfor lack of subject matter jurisdiction.As a final matter, the Undersigned notes that Plaintiffcites to “Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. (1983)” forthe proposition that “[t]he United States SupremeCourt has held that a federal district court mayissue mandamus to compel a state court officer toperform a non-discretionary duty required by statelaw.” (Compl. at PageID 5 (emphasis in original).)This is patently false. Several of Plaintiff's state-law citations are also incorrect or do not exist. TheUndersigned CAUTIONS Plaintiff that “[s]anctionsmay be imposed for submitting false and nonexistentlegal authority to the Court.” Lothamer Tax Resol.,Inc. v. Kimmel, No. 1:25-CV-579, 2025 WL 2490380,at *14 (W.D. Mich. Aug. 29, 2025) (quotation andcitation omitted).The Undersigned finds that this Court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction. Accordingly, the UndersignedRECOMMENDS that the Court DISMISS withoutprejudice Plaintiff's claims.III. CONCLUSIONFor the reasons explained above, it isRECOMMENDED that Plaintiff's Complaint (ECFNo. 1-1) be DISMISSED without prejudice inits entirety pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) forlack of subject-matter jurisdiction. It is FURTHERRECOMMENDED that the Court certify pursuant to28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3) that for the foregoing reasonsan appeal of any Order adopting this Report andRecommendation would not be taken in good faithand therefore deny Plaintiff leave to appeal in formapauperis. See McGore v. Wrigglesworth, 114 F.3d 601(6th Cir. 1997).PROCEDURE ON OBJECTIONS*4 If any party seeks review by the DistrictJudge of this Report and Recommendation, thatparty may, within 14 DAYS, file and serve onall parties any objections to the Report andRecommendation, specifically designating this Reportand Recommendation, and the part in question, as wellas the basis for objection. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed.R. Civ. P. 72(b). Responses to objections must be filedwithin 14 DAYS after being served with a copy. Fed.R. Civ. P. 72(b).The parties are specifically advised that the failure toobject to the Report and Recommendation will result ina waiver of the right to de novo review of by the DistrictJudge and waiver of the right to appeal the judgmentof the District Court. Even when timely objectionsare filed, appellate review of issues not raised inthose objections is waived. Robert v. Tesson, 507 F.3d981, 994 (6th Cir. 2007) (“[A] general objection toa magistrate judge's report, which fails to specify theissues of contention, does not suffice to preserve anissue for appeal ....” (citation omitted)).IT IS SO ORDERED.All CitationsSlip Copy, 2025 WL 2837645
JOSE VILLAVICENCIO, Plaintiff, v. JUDGE STEPHANIE MINGO,..., Slip Copy (2025) © 2025 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.4Footnotes1Formerly 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d).1Plaintiff also identifies Judge Mingo as “Defendant.” (Compl. at PageID 5.) As the Undersigned finds thatthis Court is without jurisdiction, the Undersigned will not address this issue.End of Document© 2025 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S.Government Works.
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