Weaver v. Shasta Servs. (2025)

Case details
Full caption
John Weaver v. Shasta Services
Country
United States
Jurisdiction
Federal
Decided
2025
Disposition
Dismissed
JOHN WEAVER, Plaintiff, v. SHASTA SERVICES, LLC, Defendant,, Slip Copy (2025) © 2025 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.12025 WL 2977874Only the Westlaw citation is currently available.United States District Court, W.D. Pennsylvania.JOHN WEAVER, Plaintiff,v.SHASTA SERVICES, LLC, Defendant,2:25-CV-00910-MJH|10/22/2025MEMORANDUM OPINION*1 On July 4, 2025, Plaintiff, John Weaver filed a Complaintagainst Defendant, Shasta Services LLC, alleging claimsfor discrimination, retaliation, and hostile work environmentunder the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967(“ADEA”), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (“TitleVII”), and the Pennsylvania Human Relations Act (“PHRA”).(ECF No. 1). On August 18, 2025, Defendant filed a Motionto Dismiss and accompanying brief. (ECF Nos. 10 & 11).On September 8, 2025, Plaintiff filed his Brief in Opposition.(ECF Nos. 12 & 13).1 On September 15, 2025, Defendantfiled its Reply. (ECF No. 14). For the following reasons,Defendant's Motion to Dismiss will be granted in part anddenied in part.I. Statement of FactsPlaintiff, John Weaver began working as Plant Managerat Shasta Services, LLC (“Shasta”) on or around January1, 2024. (ECF No. 1, at 9). Plaintiff alleges thatduring his time working at Shasta, various employees madecomments about his age. Allison Cunningham, HumanResource Manager, questioned whether Plaintiff's age on hisonboarding documents were correct, because “the date listedwould put him over the age of seventy.” (Id. 10). Plaintiffalleges that Mark Snyder, Operations Manager at Shasta,told Plaintiff that he should retire, because Plaintiff was oneof the oldest employees at Shasta “if [Shasta] want to getrid of [Plaintiff] they'll find a reason.” (Id. 11). On June1, 2024, Shasta's Maintenance Manager suggested that theyhave a “mock audit” on July 17, 2024, to prepare for anactual Maintenance audit that was forthcoming. (Id. 13).Plaintiff alleges that, on July 17, 2024, the actual Maintenanceaudit was performed. (Id. 15). At the audit, safety violationsrelated to Lock Out/Tag Out (LO/TO) procedures were notbeing performed by Grinder Operators on grinding machines.(Id.). On that same day, Shaun Mienke, Senior Vice Presidentof TMS International2 , terminated Plaintiff, attributing thetermination to Plaintiff's failure to implement the LO/TOprocedures. (Id. 20). Plaintiff alleges that his terminationwas actually because of his age. (Id. 21). In support ofthis contention, Plaintiff alleges that employees younger thanplaintiff also did not comply with the LO/TO proceduresin 2023, but were not terminated or disciplined. (Id. 22). Further, Plaintiff alleges that, just a day after he wasterminated, Shasta decided the LO/TO services were notneeded on the grinding machines. (Id. 21).*2 On January 10, 2025, Plaintiff filed a Charge ofDiscrimination with the EEOC against Shasta. (ECF No.10-1). The Charge alleged as follows:I began working as a Plant Manager for the Respondent atits Aliquippa, PA location in January of 2024. During myemployment I did not receive any disciplinary actions orperformance reviews. On or about July 17, 2024[,] I wasdischarged from employment.The Respondent stated I was discharged due to lock out/tagout procedures not being followed.I believe the Respondent discharged me because of my age,71, in violation of the Age Discrimination in EmploymentAct (ADEA). At least two (2) other individuals muchyounger than me knew of and were responsible for theissues which resulted in my discharge prior to my beinghired and during my employment but, they were notdisciplined or discharged. Their names are Mark Whalenand Shawn Mienke.(Id.).II. Relevant Legal StandardWhen reviewing a motion to dismiss pursuant to FederalRule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), the court must “accept allfactual allegations as true, construe the complaint in the lightmost favorable to the plaintiff, and determine whether, underany reasonable reading of the complaint, the plaintiff may beentitled to relief.” Eid v. Thompson, 740 F.3d 118, 122 (3dCir. 2014) (quoting Phillips v. Cty. of Allegheny, 515 F.3d224, 233 (3d Cir. 2008)). “To survive a motion to dismiss, acomplaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted astrue, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’ ”
JOHN WEAVER, Plaintiff, v. SHASTA SERVICES, LLC, Defendant,, Slip Copy (2025) © 2025 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.2Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl.Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)).The Supreme Court clarified that this plausibility standardshould not be conflated with a higher probability standard.Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. “A claim has facial plausibilitywhen the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows thecourt to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant isliable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678(citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556); see also Thompson v.Real Estate Mortg. Network, 748 F.3d 142, 147 (3d Cir.2014). “Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause ofaction, supported by mere conclusory statements, do notsuffice.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. “Factual allegations of acomplaint must be enough to raise a right to relief abovethe speculative level.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. A pleadingparty need not establish the elements of a prima facie caseat this stage; the party must only “put forth allegations that‘raise a reasonable expectation that discovery will revealevidence of the necessary element[s].’ ” Fowler v. UPMCShadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 213 (3d Cir. 2009) (quoting Graff v.Subbiah Cardiology Assocs., Ltd., 2008 WL 2312671 (W.D.Pa. 2008)); see also Connelly v. Lane Constr. Corp., 809 F.3d780, 790 (3d Cir. 2016).Nonetheless, a court need not credit bald assertions,unwarranted inferences, or legal conclusions cast in the formof factual averments. Morse v. Lower Merion Sch. Dist., 132F.3d 902, 906 n.8 (3d Cir. 1997). The primary question indeciding a motion to dismiss is not whether the plaintiff willultimately prevail; but rather, whether he or she is entitled tooffer evidence to establish the facts alleged in the complaint.Maio v. Aetna, 221 F.3d 472, 482 (3d Cir. 2000).The purposeof a motion to dismiss is to “streamline[ ] litigation bydispensing with needless discovery and factfinding.” Neitzkev. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 326-27 (1989).III. Discussion*3 The Title VII and ADEA claims brought by Plaintiff allrequire an exhaustion of any required administrative remediesbefore bringing a claim for judicial relief. See Mandel v. M& Q Packaging Corp., 706 F.3d 157, 163 (3d Cir. 2013)(Title VII); see also Seredinski v. Clifton Precision Prods. Co.,Div., of Litton Sys., 776 F.2d 56, 63 (3d Cir. 1985) (ADEA).To properly exhaust the required administrative remedies, aplaintiff must file a charge of discrimination with the EEOCand receive a right to sue letter. Mandel, 706 F. 3d at 163.Such filing serves to “define the scope of the [EEOC]’sinvestigation and to notify the defendant of the chargesagainst it.” Barzanty v. Verizon PA, Inc., 361 F.App'x 411,415 (3d Cir. 2010). The charge of discrimination allows “theEEOC the opportunity to settle disputes through conference,conciliation, and persuasion, avoiding unnecessary action incourt.” Antol v. Perry, 82 F.3d 1291, 1296 (3d Cir. 1996).“The parameters of the civil action in the district courtare defined by the scope of the EEOC investigation whichcan be reasonably expected to grow out of the charge ofdiscrimination.” Atkinson v. LaFayette Coll., 460 F.3d 447,453 (3d Cir. 2006); see also Simko v. U.S. Steel Corp.,992 F.3d 198, 207 (3d Cir. 2021) (“The relevant test fordetermining whether a later claim needs to be exhausteddespite the filing of a previous charge is a two-prongedinquiry into whether the acts alleged in the subsequent suit arefairly within the scope of [1] the prior EEOC complaint, or[2] the investigation arising therefrom.”) (internal quotationsomitted).Defendant argues that Plaintiff's hostile work environment,retaliation, and ADEA discrimination claims must bedismissed, because Plaintiff failed to exhaust hisadministrative remedies as to these claims. (ECF No. 11).Specifically, Defendant argues that Plaintiff's claims withinhis complaint do not fit within the scope of his prior EEOCCharge. (Id.). Plaintiff argues that all his claims are fairlywithin the scope of his EEOC Charge or any investigation thatwould have followed from the Charge. (ECF No. 12).A. Age Discrimination ClaimsPlaintiff brings age discrimination claims against Defendantunder the ADEA and PHRA. (ECF No. 1, at ¶¶ 28-53).Defendant argues that Plaintiff has not exhausted hisadministrative remedies as to these claims. (ECF No. 11, at9-10). Plaintiff argues that his age discrimination claims areproperly within the scope of his EEOC Charge. (ECF No. 12,at 6-12).To establish a prima facie case of age discrimination, aplaintiff must prove: (1) he is a member of the protectedclass, i.e., he is at least 40 years old; (2) he is qualifiedfor the position in question; (3) he suffered an adverseemployment action; and (4) the circumstances surroundingthe adverse action “could give rise to an inference ofintentional discrimination.” Burton v. Teleflex Inc., 707 F.3d417, 426 (3d Cir. 2013).In his EEOC Charge, Plaintiff stated:
JOHN WEAVER, Plaintiff, v. SHASTA SERVICES, LLC, Defendant,, Slip Copy (2025) © 2025 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.3I believe the Respondent dischargedme because of my age, 71, inviolation of the Age Discriminationin Employment Act (ADEA). Atleast two (2) other individuals muchyounger than me knew of and wereresponsible for the issues whichresulted in my discharge prior tomy being hired and during myemployment but, they were notdisciplined or discharged. Their namesare Mark Whalen and Shawn Mienke.(ECF No. 10-1). Although Plaintiff's EEOC Charge is notspecific, it is clear from the contents of the EEOC Chargethat Plaintiff intended to bring a discrimination claim againstDefendant under the ADEA. The administrative remedyexhaustion requirement does not mandate that a Plaintiffinclude every detail of the alleged wrongs against them tosatisfy the requirement, just enough that the Defendant isnotified of the charges against it. Plaintiff's Charge clearlyputs the Defendant on notice of an ADEA discriminationclaim. As such, Plaintiff has properly exhausted hisadministrative remedies as to his age discrimination claimsagainst Defendant. Defendant's Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff'sage discrimination claims under the ADEA and PHRA, atCount I of the Complaint, will be denied.B. Hostile Work Environment Claims*4 Plaintiff brings a hostile work environment claim againstDefendant under the ADEA, Title VII, and the PHRA. (ECFNo. 1, at ¶¶ 66-67). Defendant argues that Plaintiff's hostilework environment claim is not within the scope of Plaintiff'sEEOC Charge. (ECF No. 11, at 6-8).Plaintiff's EEOC Charge contains no allegations relatedto a hostile work environment claim such that Defendantwould have been put on notice of such violations, northat the EEOC would have investigated further into anyhostile work environment claims. As such, Plaintiff hasfailed to exhaust his administrative remedies as to his hostilework environment claims. Defendant's Motion to DismissPlaintiff's hostile work environment claims, at Count III of theComplaint, will be granted.C. Retaliation ClaimsPlaintiff brings a claim for retaliation against Defendantunder an unspecified statute. (ECF No. 1, at ¶¶ 68-75).Defendant argues that the scope of Plaintiff's EEOC Chargedoes not encompass any retaliation claim. (ECF No. 11, at8-9). Defendant further argues that Plaintiff's complaint doesnot plead facts sufficient to allege a retaliation claim. (Id.).Plaintiff argues that his retaliation claim is within the scopeof this EEOC Charge. (ECF No. 12).Plaintiff's EEOC Charge does not contain any allegations ofretaliation or any facts that would cause a reasonable readerof the EEOC Charge to be put on notice of such a claim orbe compelled to investigate any sort of retaliatory actions. Assuch, Plaintiff failed to exhaust his administrative remediesas to his retaliation claims. Defendant's Motion to DismissPlaintiff's retaliation claims, at Count IV of the Complaint,will be granted.D. Count II: Wrongful TerminationPlaintiff brings a claim for wrongful termination againstDefendant. Defendant argues that Plaintiff's wrongfultermination claim is preempted by the ADEA, Title VII,and the PHRA. (ECF No. 11, at 11). Plaintiff argues thathis wrongful termination claim is in the alternative to hisstatutory discrimination claims. (ECF No. 12, at 7).Editor's Note: Tabular or graphical material not displayableat this time.All CitationsSlip Copy, 2025 WL 2977874Footnotes1Plaintiff refiled his Brief in Opposition, at ECF No. 13, with an appended exhibit indicating that two casecitations within the original filing “do not adequately address the issues cited in my brief.” It is clear to the
JOHN WEAVER, Plaintiff, v. SHASTA SERVICES, LLC, Defendant,, Slip Copy (2025) © 2025 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.4Court that the case citations at issue, within the original Brief in Opposition, were “hallucinations” createdby Artificial Intelligence.2The Complaint does not make clear TMS International's relationship to Shasta, but from the facts allegedwithin the Complaint it seems that TMS International is Shasta's parent company.End of Document© 2025 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.
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