Wells Fargo Bank v. Dean (Feb. 24, 2026)

Case details
Full caption
Wells Fargo Bank v. Frances W. Dean
Country
United States
Jurisdiction
Federal
Decided
Feb. 24, 2026
Disposition
Dismissed
Majority
Of United States (J.) (unanimous Court)
WELLS FARGO BANK, N.A., as Trustee for the Carrington..., Slip Copy (2026) © 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.12026 WL 555590Only the Westlaw citation is currently available.United States District Court, E.D. Texas, Sherman Division.WELLS FARGO BANK, N.A., as Trustee for theCarrington Mortgage Loan Trust, Series 2007-FRE1, Asset-Backed Pass-Through Certificatesv.FRANCES W. DEANNO. 4:25-CV-00263-ALM-BD|Filed 02/24/2026Editor's Note: This decision contains discussion of citationreferences that are incorrect or do not actually exist. Theseinvalid citations appeared in the original court opinion andhave been preserved as written since they are part of theofficial record. Any links to these invalid citations have beenremoved.Attorneys and Law FirmsMichael Foster Hord Jr., Eric Craig Mettenbrink, Hirsch &Westheimer, P.C., Houston, TX, for Wells Fargo Bank, N.A.Frances W. Dean, Allen, TX, Pro Se.ORDER AND REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONOF UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGEBill Davis United States Magistrate Judge*1 Defendant Frances W. Dean filed a motion for atemporary injunction, Dkt. 21, and a second, nearly identicalmotion for a temporary injunction, Dkt. 23; see Dkts. 24(response), 25 (reply). The court will recommend that thesecond motion, Dkt. 23, be denied, and it will dismiss thefirst motion, Dkt. 21, as moot. It will also warn Dean abouther apparent use of generative artificial intelligence to preparecourt filings.FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUNDWells Fargo Bank, N.A., sued Dean, alleging that it is themortgagee and beneficiary of a deed of trust to a propertysecuring Dean's debt. Dkt. 1 at 3. According to the complaint,Dean has been in default on her loan since 2010. Id. The bankseeks to foreclose on the deed of trust. Id. at 4.Dean filed a motion for a “temporary injunction” seekingto enjoin the bank from entering her property; changing herlocks; harassing, intimidating, or communicating with herregarding possession of the property; or acting to disturb herpossession of the property other than through litigation. Dkt.21 at 4. Before the bank could respond, she filed a second,nearly identical motion for the same relief. Dkt. 23.According to the motion, Dean resides at the property subjectto the deed of trust. Id. at 2. She says that someone working fora third-party company and purporting to act on behalf of “themortgage company” came to the property, claimed that theproperty “was ‘foreclosed’ ” and changed the locks. Id. Localpolice responded and told that person that “this was a civilmatter requiring a formal eviction.” Id. Three months later,another group associated with the same third-party companyappeared at the property. Id. Dean threatened them with a gun,ordering them to leave. Id. Dean argues that an injunction isnecessary to eliminate “[t]he threat of repeated intrusion byindividuals with whom a violent police incident has alreadyoccurred,” creating “an immediate danger to [her] physicalsafety and right to peaceful enjoyment of her homestead.” Id.at 3.In its response, the bank explains that the people whoappeared at the property were its agents and states that theywere attempting to inspect, winterize, and secure the property,which they believed was vacant. Dkt. 24 at 4–5. It argues thatthe deed of trust permits it to enter and inspect the propertywith prior notice and reasonable cause. Id. at 5. It sent agentsto do so because Dean had not responded to inquiries aboutthe state of the property. Id. at 5. According to the bank, allDean needs to do is communicate with it to avoid a need forfurther inspections. Id. at 8.In her reply, Dean asserts for the first time that, on a thirdinstance, between the two already described, the bank's agent“attempted to enter the [p]roperty.” Dkt. 25 at 3.INJUNCTIVE-RELIEF STANDARDFederal Rule of Civil Procedure 65 permits the court toenter a preliminary injunction or temporary restraining order
WELLS FARGO BANK, N.A., as Trustee for the Carrington..., Slip Copy (2026) © 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.2(“TRO”). There are four prerequisites to obtaining such relief.The movant must demonstrate*2 (1) a substantial likelihood ofsuccess on the merits; (2) a substantialthreat that the movant will sufferirreparable injury if the injunctionis denied; (3) that the threatenedinjury outweighs any damage that theinjunction might cause the defendant;and (4) that the injunction will notdisserve the public interest.Affiliated Pro. Home Health Care Agency v. Shalala, 164 F.3d282, 285 (5th Cir. 1999); see Clark v. Prichard, 812 F.2d991, 993 (5th Cir. 1987) (noting that the standards for TROsand preliminary injunctions are the same). A party seekinginjunctive relief must “unequivocally show the need for itsissuance,” Valley v. Rapides Parish Sch. Bd., 118 F.3d 1047,1050 (5th Cir. 1997), by introducing sufficient evidence tojustify the granting of a preliminary injunction or TRO, PCITransp. Inc. v. Fort Worth & W. R.R. Co., 418 F.3d 535, 546(5th Cir. 2005). The movant must prove each of the fourelements before injunctive relief can be granted. See Miss.Power & Light Co. v. United Gas Pipe Line Co., 760 F.2d618, 621 (5th Cir. 1985). The decision to grant or deny aninjunction lies within the court's discretion. Id.DISCUSSIONI. Lack of Entitlement to an InjunctionDean does not specify whether she is seeking a preliminaryinjunction or a TRO. But she has not shown an entitlementto either.Dean argues that she has established an imminent risk ofirreparable harm because there is an ongoing risk that thebank, through its agents, will lock her out of the propertyagain and that another violent incident will occur. Dkt. 23at 3. In some cases, repeated trespasses to land will warrantinjunctive relief if they are “continuous such that stopping[them] would require a multiplicity of suits.” Texas v. DHS,123 F.4th 186, 212 (5th Cir. 2024). But a trespass to land isordinarily compensable by damages. Stevenson v. E.I. DuPontDe Nemours & Co., 327 F.3d 400, 408 (5th Cir. 2003). Thattype of injury is not irreparable. Deerfield Med. Ctr. v. City ofDeerfield Beach, 661 F.2d 328, 338 (5th Cir. Unit B 1981).Dean alleges only one trespass and one instance in which thebank's agents “came to the property.” Dkt. 23 at 2; see UnitedStates v. Prince, 868 F.2d 1379, 1386 (5th Cir. 1989) (refusingto consider facts raised for the first time in reply). A singleincident is far from a continuous trespass that would requirea multiplicity of suits to remedy. The bank also explainedthat, because Dean failed to respond to its correspondence,it believed that the property was abandoned. Dkt. 24 at 5. Itstates that it would have no need to send agents to the propertyagain if she responds to its cor-respondence. Id. at 8.To the extent that Dean is in danger of violence, it appearsthat is of her own doing. Her motion asserts only that two ormore people “came to the property”—not that they broke in,threatened her, or attempted to use force of any kind—and thatshe responded by threatening them with a gun. Dkt. 23 at 2.Dean could presumably avoid the risk of violence in the futureby refraining from threatening others with a deadly weapon.In short, Dean has failed to show that she is at immediaterisk of irreparable harm and is therefore not entitled toinjunctive relief. The court need not consider the otherelements necessary to secure injunctive relief. See Mungia v.Judson ISD, No. SA-09-cv-395-XR, 2009 WL 3431397, at *2(W.D. Tex. Oct. 19, 2009).II. Dean's Reliance on Nonexistent Citations*3 Dean cites several cases, or purported cases, in hermotion and reply. Two of them—American ResidentialServices of Texas, LP v. Jimenez, 446 S.W.3d 649, 652–53(Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2014), and Holub v. FDIC,159 B.R. 782, 789 (S.D. Tex. 1993)—do not exist. Others donot stand for the cited proposition. City of Austin v. HoustonLighting & Power Co., 844 S.W.2d 773 (Tex. App.—Dallas1992, writ denied), was decided by a different court than shesays it was. And she failed to note that Glade v. Dietert, 286S.W.2d 955 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 1956), was reversed bythe Supreme Court of Texas, Glade v. Dietert, 295 S.W.2d 642(Tex. 1956).The court suspects that those errors stem from the useof generative artificial intelligence. See Margie Alsbrook,Untangling Unreliable Citations, 37 Geo. J. L. Ethics 415,446–47 (2024). That has become a regrettably commonproblem, wasting party and court resources alike. E.g., Wilt v.Whitehouse Police Dep't, No. 6:25-cv-00117-JCB-JDL, 2025
WELLS FARGO BANK, N.A., as Trustee for the Carrington..., Slip Copy (2026) © 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.3WL 2795828, at *2 (E.D. Tex. July 16, 2025), report andrecommendation adopted, 2025 WL 2778463 (E.D. Tex. Sept.26, 2025); Boggess v. Chamness, No. 6:25-cv-64-JDK-JDL,2025 WL 978992, at *1 (E.D. Tex. Apr. 1, 2025); Gauthierv. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., No. 1:23-cv-281, 2024 WL4882651, at *1 (E.D. Tex. Nov. 25, 2024).By signing and filing documents with the court, parties certifythat their legal contentions are warranted by existing law. Fed.R. Civ. P. 11(b)(2). False citations contradict that certificationand are tantamount to dishonesty. That Dean is pro se inno way relieves her of responsibility for the accuracy andquality of the documents she submits to the court. Loc. R.CV-11(g). The court relies on the honesty and accuracy ofparties' briefing. Citing nonexistent cases undermines theintegrity of the judiciary and the court's trust in litigants. It isunacceptable.If Dean files another document that contains hallucinatedor otherwise nonexistent citations, she will be subject tosanctions. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(c); Pete v. Facebook DataBreach a/k/a/ Meta Platforms, Inc., No. 1:25-cv-00245-MAC, 2025 WL 2979701, at *3 n.5 (E.D. Tex. Oct. 22, 2025);Lukose v. Bank of Am. N.A., No. 4:25-cv-00293-JDK-JDL,2025 WL 2946090, at *5 n.2 (E.D. Tex. June 2, 2025), reportand recommendation adopted, No. 4:25-cv-293-JDK-JDL,2025 WL 2506281 (E.D. Tex. Sept. 2, 2025).CONCLUSIONIt is ORDERED that Dean's first motion for a temporaryinjunction, Dkt. 21, is DISMISSED AS MOOT.It is RECOMMENDED that Dean's second motion for atemporary injunction, Dkt. 23, be DENIED.* * *Within 14 days after service of this report, any partymay serve and file written objections to the findings andrecommendations of the magistrate judge. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1).A party is entitled to a de novo review by the district courtof the findings and conclusions contained in this reportonly if specific objections are made. Id. § 636(b)(1). Failureto timely file written objections to any proposed findings,conclusions, and recommendations contained in this reportwill bar an aggrieved party from appellate review of thosefactual findings and legal conclusions accepted by the districtcourt, except on grounds of plain error, provided that the partyhas been served with notice that such consequences will resultfrom a failure to object. Id.; Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140, 155(1985); Douglass v. United Servs. Auto Ass'n, 79 F.3d 1415,1417 (5th Cir. 1996) (en banc), superseded by statute on othergrounds; 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) (extending the time to fileobjections from 10 to 14 days).*4 So ORDERED and SIGNED this 24th day of February,2026.All CitationsSlip Copy, 2026 WL 555590End of Document© 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.
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