quent to that payment, Walker’s assistance was terminated without written notice and without informing him of his right to appeal.6 (T28, 88).
Plaintiff Silagy applied for township general assistance on at least three occasions in 1974. She was denied assistance but was never informed of the reasons supporting the rejection of her application nor informed of her right to appeal (T57-80).7
II.
In Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 90 5. Ct. 1011, 25 L.Ed.2d 287 (1970), the Supreme Court held that procedural due process requires that welfare recipients must be provided with adequate notice and an evidentiary hearing before benefits may be discontinued. 397 U.S. at 260-68, 90 S.Ct. at 1016, 25 L.Ed.2d at 295. In Goldberg, the plaintiffs alleged that certain New York State and New York City officials, who administered federal and state welfare programs, had terminated or were about to terminate assistance without prior notice and a hearing. 397 U.S. at 255-56, 90 S.Ct. at 1012, 25 L.Ed.2d at 289. In discussing the constitutional rights of welfare recipients, the Court noted:
“. . termination of aid pending resolution of a controversy over eligibility may deprive an eligible recipient of the very means by which to live while he waits. Since he lacks independent resources, his situation becomes immediately desperate. His need to concentrate upon finding the means for daily subsistence, in turn, adversely affects his ability to seek redress from the welfare bureaucracy.” 397 U.S. at 264, 90 S.Ct. at 1018, 25 L.Ed.2d at 297.
The Court further reasoned that:
“ ‘The fundamental requisite of due process of law is the opportunity to be heard.’ . . . The hearing must be ‘at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner.’ ... In the present context these principles require that a recipient have timely and adequate notice detailing the reasons for a proposed termination, and an effective opportunity to defend by confronting any adverse witnesses and by presenting his own arguments and evidence orally.” 397 U.S. at 267-68, 90 S.Ct. at 1020, 25 L.Ed.2d at 299.
The Goldberg requirements have been applied in numerous cases similar to the one now before the court. In Mothers’ & Children’s Rights Organization v. Sterrett, 467 F.2d 797, 798 (7th Cir. 1972), this Court affirmed a permanent injunction, restraining Indiana’s Administrator of Public Welfare and Welfare Board members from terminating or reducing Public Assistance Benefits unless the recipients were given a prior hearing.
Similarly, in Brooks v. Center Township, 485 F.2d 383 (7th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 911, 94 S.Ct. 1455, 39 L.Ed.2d 496 (1974), the plaintiff began receiving rent and food assistance from the defendants in February 1969 pursuant to the Indiana “poor relief” statute. Ind.Code § 12—2—1—1 et seq. (1973). In May 1970, his rent and in February 1971 his food benefits were terminated without prior notice or hearing or notice of his right to an administrative appeal. Citing Goldberg, the Court held the termination to be unconstitutional for failure to provide a pretermination hearing, an opportunity for plaintiff to be heard and notice of the reasons for termination. 485 F.2d 385, 386. Accord Freitag v. Carter, 489 F.2d 1377, 1383-84 (7th Cir. 1973). The Court specifically dispelled the notion that any lesser due process standards applied to state as opposed to federal programs:
6
Roughton testified at the hearing on the preliminary injunction that Walker was terminated because Roughton never received a statement from Walker’s doctor confirming that he was still disabled from a work injury (T28).
7
Roughton testified that Silagy was denied general assistance in July 1974 because he and his staff could not understand her application and because she received assistance elsewhere. On a subsequent occasion when Sila-gy visited Roughton’s office she was not given assistance. Roughton testified that she did not ask for assistance and that she had $80 in her pocket (T29-33).