state law’ to prevent the injuries [to appellant] in violation of the cruel and unusual punishments provisions of the Eighth via the Equal Protection and Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution -•?»
appellant suffered certain damages.
The district court, in granting the motion to dismiss, gave two alternative grounds for its decision; that the complaint did not allege intentional conduct by the defendants, and second, that the conduct complained of did not violate any federally secured rights. The court held that at most the allegations made out an “unintentional common law tort.”
Since Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 81 S.Ct. 473, 5 L.Ed.2d 492 (1961), some courts, like the district court in the instant case, have held that unintentional conduct does not state a claim under section 1983. See United States ex rel. Gittlemacker v. Pennsylvania, 281 F.Supp. 175 (E.D.Pa.1968); Kent v. Prosse, 265 F.Supp. 673 (W.D.Pa.), aff’d, 385 F.2d 406 (3rd Cir. 1967). Another court has indicated that negligent conduct in the appropriate circumstances may support a claim under section 1983. See Huey v. Barloga, 277 F.Supp. 864 (N.D.Ill.1967). A close reading of the relevant portion of the Monroe opinion, set out here in the margin,1 indicates that the Court was merely rejecting the proposition that “specific intent” to violate constitutional rights was required. The “natural consequences” test formulated by Mr. Justice Douglas apparently leaves open the question of the degree of culpability required by section 1983. It may be that negligent conduct, in the appropriate circumstances, will support an action under section 1983. See Huey v. Barloga, swpra. Mere negligent failure to act, standing alone, however, would seem insufficient.
In order to be actionable under section 1983, however, we believe that more than an isolated incident of negligent failure to protect must be alleged. The federal courts have stated on numerous occasions that absent unusual circumstances they will not intervene in the internal administration of state prison systems. See, e. g., Stiltner v. Rhay, 371 F.2d 420 (9th Cir. 1967); United States ex rel. Lee v. Illinois, 343 F.2d 120 (7th Cir. 1965); Snow v. Gladden, 338 F.2d 999 (9th Cir. 1964). In Jordan v. Fitzharris, 257 F.Supp. 674 (N.D.Cal.1966), the federal court did intervene in the administration of the California prison system. There the action, brought under section 1983, involved serious circumstances existing in the state prison for which the remedy of section 1983 was designed. No such circumstances are present here. No allegations of direct prison guard beating are made such as those found in Wiltsie v. California Department of Corrections, 406 F.2d 515 (9th Cir. 1968).
In addition to an allegation of the requisite degree of culpability, plaintiffs in section 1983 actions must show a violation of federally secured rights. Here appellant has alleged that his rights to equal protection of the laws and freedom from cruel and unusual punishment have been violated by state prison officials. While Monroe v. Pape, supra, eliminated the necessity of alleging specific intent to discriminate, compare Hoffman v.
1
“In the Screws case [Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. 91, 65 S.Ct. 1031, 89 L.Ed. 1495 (1945)] we dealt with a statute that imposed criminal penalties for acts ‘wilfully’ done. We construed that word in its setting to mean the doing of an act with ‘a specific intent to deprive a person of a federal right’ [citation omitted]. We do not think that gloss should be placed on § 1979 [designation of section 1983 under the Revised Statutes] which we have here. The word ‘wilfully’ does not appear in § 1979. Moreover, § 1979 provides a civil remedy, while in the Screws case we dealt with a criminal law challenged on the ground of vagueness. Section 1979 should be read against the background of tort liability that makes a man responsible for the natural consequences of his actions.” 365 U.S. at 187, 81 S.Ct. at 484.