Wilt v. Dep't of the Navy, No. 6:24-cv-213-JDK-KNM (2025)

Case details
Full caption
Wilt v. Department of the Navy
Country
United States
Jurisdiction
Federal
Decided
2025
Disposition
Dismissed
Majority
Recommendation Of The (J.) (unanimous Court)
Wilt v. Department of the Navy, Slip Copy (2025) © 2025 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.12025 WL 1276250Only the Westlaw citation is currently available.United States District Court, E.D. Texas, Tyler Division.Miranda WILT, Plaintiff,v.DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY, and DefenseFinance and Accounting Service, Defendants.Case No. 6:24-cv-213-JDK-KNM|Signed May 2, 2025Attorneys and Law FirmsMiranda Wilt, Tyler, TX, Pro Se.Aimee Michelle Cooper, DOJ-United States Attorney'sOffice, Plano, TX, Whitney Tharpe, DOJ-United StatesAttorney's Office, Tyler, TX, for Defendants.ORDER ADOPTING REPORT ANDRECOMMENDATION OF THE UNITEDSTATES MAGISTRATE JUDGEJEREMY D. KERNODLE, UNITED STATES DISTRICTJUDGE*1 Plaintiff Miranda Wilt, proceeding pro se, originallysued Defendant the Department of the Navy (“Navy”) in the7th Judicial District Court of Smith County, Texas. DocketNo. 1. In a separate lawsuit, Plaintiff also sued Defendantthe Defense Finance and Accounting Service (“DFAS”) inthe 241st Judicial District Court of Smith County, Texas.See Docket Nos. 1–3, Wilt v. Def. Fin. & Acct. Serv., No.6:24-cv-00266-JDK-KNM (E.D. Tex. July 25, 2024). BothDefendants then removed each case to federal court. Id. TheCourt granted Defendants’ motions to consolidate the twocases. Docket No. 9; Docket No. 8, Wilt v. Def. Fin. & Acct.Serv., No. 6:24-cv-00266-JDK-KNM (E.D. Tex. Sept. 23,2024). Defendants then filed a motion to dismiss pursuantto Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6).Docket No. 23.On April 9, 2025, Judge Love issued a Report andRecommendation recommending that Defendants’ motion begranted. Docket No. 33. Plaintiff timely filed objections to theReport. Docket No. 34.I.Where a party timely objects to the Report andRecommendation, the Court reviews the objected-to findingsand conclusions of the Magistrate Judge de novo. 28U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). In conducting a de novo review, theCourt examines the entire record and makes an independentassessment under the law. Douglass v. United Servs. Auto.Ass'n, 79 F.3d 1415, 1430 (5th Cir. 1996) (en banc),superseded on other grounds by statute, 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) (extending the time to file objections from ten to fourteendays).In her objections, Plaintiff (1) argues she has raised afact issue on her failure to exhaust her administrativeremedies; (2) contests the report's classification as someof Plaintiff's allegations as “fraud” or “deceit”; (3) arguesthe court erroneously applied the Tucker Act, 28 U.S.C. §1491; (4) contends that the Court should reject the report'srecommended dismissal of Plaintiff's Title VII claim on“hyper-technical” grounds; and (5) objects to the report'srecommended dismissal of several of her claims on groundsof no private right of action. Docket No. 34.A.Plaintiff did not exhaust her administrative remedies underthe Federal Tort Claims Act (“FTCA”). First and foremost,Plaintiff's response and sur-reply is bereft of any argumentthat her factual allegations create a disputed issue of facton exhaustion. Nor did her amended complaint provide anyallegations that she satisfied the exhaustion requirement. SeeAdes v. United States, 2020 WL 8832502, at *3 (E.D. Tex.Dec. 16, 2020), report and recommendation adopted, 2021WL 345911 (E.D. Tex. Feb. 2, 2021) (“[P]resentment of anadministrative claim ... must be pleaded ... by the FTCAclaimant.”). Instead, Plaintiff argues that the Court shouldrecognize a futility exception to the FTCA's exhaustionrequirement. Docket Nos. 29; 31. The Court will not. See, e.g.,In re Complaint of Ingram Barge Co., 351 F. App'x 842, 843(5th Cir. 2009) (per curiam) (“[T]he FTCA does not admit afutility exception to its exhaustion requirement ....”).*2 Plaintiff argues she adequately raises a fact issue onexhaustion because she contacted both Defendants regarding(1) misdirected funds meant for her and her children; (2) the
Wilt v. Department of the Navy, Slip Copy (2025) © 2025 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.2improper storage and destruction of her personal property;and (3) securing her rights as a dependent spouse under theNavy's policies. Docket No. 34 at 3. But these facts do notallude to any FTCA claim filed with either Defendant. Thesefacts also fail to allege any request for monetary damages orstate a sum certain Plaintiff sought to recover from the UnitedStates. See id.; see also Cook v. U.S. Dep't of Labor, 978 F.2d164, 166 (5th Cir. 1992) (finding a FTCA claimant fails toexhaust administrative remedies where he does not presentthe appropriate agency notice of a value on the claimant'sclaim).Plaintiff's first objection is overruled.B.The Report's analysis of the FTCA's intentional tort exceptionis correct. Plaintiff objects that the Report mis-characterizedher “negligence” claims as “fraud” and “deceit.” DocketNo. 34 at 3. To the extent Plaintiff alleges only claims fornegligence, rather than intentional torts for fraud, deceit,or misrepresentation, such claims are barred because of herfailure to exhaust administrative remedies. See supra I.A(explaining Plaintiff's negligence claims are barred for failureto exhaust remedies under the FTCA). And to the extentPlaintiff asserts claims arising from Defendants’ allegedmisrepresentation, deceit, or interference with contractualrights, the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over suchclaims. Baker v. McHugh, 672 F. App'x 357, 362 (5thCir. 2016) (“[T]he United States has not waived sovereignimmunity for claims arising out of ... misrepresentation ...[or] deceit.”); see also Tanner v. Crossroads Row Grp., 2024WL 1340589, at *6 (E.D. Tex. Mar. 12, 2024), report andrecommendation adopted, 2024 WL 1340066 (E.D. Tex.Mar. 28, 2024) (“[T]he court does not have jurisdictionover Plaintiff's claims against the Government for breach offiduciary duty ....”).Plaintiff's second objection is overruled.C.The Report's application of the Tucker Act was appropriate.Plaintiff believes that the Report erroneously suggested thatsome of Plaintiff's claims could only be brought in the FederalCourt of Claims. Docket No. 34. Plaintiff explains that she isnot bringing a “traditional breach of contract action,” but a“deprivation of statutory entitlements and benefits wrongfullywithheld or misdirected.” Id. at 4. Plaintiff also argues that,because she requests relief in the form of (1) correction ofbenefit mis-allocations; (2) confirmation of her dependentrights; and (3) restitution, the Court of Claims does notmaintain exclusive jurisdiction. Id. at 4–5.As a preliminary matter, Plaintiff's amended complaint doesnot request “correction of benefit misallocations”; it requests“judicial determination of the rights, duties, and obligationsof the parties” and $6,000,000 in monetary damages. DocketNo. 15 at 21. The Court will not consider relief that Plaintiffraises for the first time in her objections.Broadly requesting declaratory relief, moreover, does notdivest the Court of Claims of its exclusive jurisdictionover this matter. “Where the real effort of [Plaintiff] is toobtain money from the federal government, the exclusivejurisdiction of the Claims Court cannot be evaded or avoidedby framing a district court complaint to appear to seekonly injunctive, mandatory or declaratory relief againstgovernment officials or the government itself.” Amoco Prod.Co. v. Hodel, 815 F.2d 352, 361 (5th Cir. 1987) (cleaned up);see also Muller v. United States, 2024 WL 3448015, at *1(S.D. Tex. July 17, 2024) (“District courts are required to‘pierce’ the pleadings so that artful pleading does not undercutthe jurisdiction of the Claims Court (that is, Congress’[s]intent in enacting the Tucker Act).” (cleaned up)).*3 The essence of Plaintiff's amended complaint seeksmonetary damages.1 And the declaratory relief Plaintiffseeks produces no significant “prospective effect orconsiderable value”—if any—apart from the Court'sdetermination that Defendants owe Plaintiff money. SeeAmoco, 815 F.2d at 363. Thus, the Federal Court of Claimsmaintains exclusive jurisdiction over Plaintiff's contractualclaims.Plaintiff's third objection is overruled.D.The Report's dismissal of Plaintiff's Title VII claim wasproper. Plaintiff argues that the Report's recommendeddismissal of her Title VII claim was erroneous because itwas based on a “technicality.” Docket No. 34 at 5. Congresspartially waived the United States's sovereign immunity forcivil employment discrimination claims by federal employees
Wilt v. Department of the Navy, Slip Copy (2025) © 2025 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.3brought against the “head of the department.” 42 U.S.C. §2000e-16(c). Plaintiff admits she has not done so.Plaintiff's fourth objection is overruled.E.Lastly, Plaintiff objects to the Report's recommendationsregarding her claims under the Family Violence Preventionand Services Act, 42 U.S.C. § 10402; the Inspector GeneralAct of 1978; and 10 U.S.C. § 1059. Docket No. 34 at 6.Although somewhat unclear, Plaintiff appears to argue thatthe Court has jurisdiction over these statutory claims becauseher constitutional rights were violated, supporting a Bivensclaim.” Id. Plaintiff also argues that even if some of thesestatutes lack a private right of action, the AdministrativeProcedure Act (“APA”) authorizes review.This is the first time Plaintiff has alleged or argued thatshe asserts constitutional claims under the Fifth Amendmentor that the APA somehow confers jurisdiction over thesestatutory claims. Because the Court is bound by Plaintiff'sallegations within her amended complaint, the Court deniesPlaintiff's request to assert for the first time in her objectionseither a Bivens claim or that the APA confers jurisdiction overthese statutory claims. The Court, moreover, agrees with othercourts that two of these statutes, § 10402 and the InspectorGeneral Act of 1978, do not create private rights of action.See, e.g., Thompson v. State of Wash., 2005 WL 2045886, at*2 (W.D. Wash. Aug. 25, 2005) (finding “the Family ViolencePrevention Services Act contains no private right of action”);Brown v. Ulmer, 2022 WL 226878, at *1 (D.D.C. Jan. 21,2022) (holding the Inspector General Act of 1978 does notcreate a private right of action).Plaintiff's fifth objection is overruled.F.For portions of the Report Plaintiff did not clearly object to,the Court reviews such portions for clear error. United Statesv. Wilson, 864 F.2d 1219, 1221 (5th Cir. 1989) (holding that,if no objections to a Magistrate Judge's Report are filed, thestandard of review is “clearly erroneous, abuse of discretionand contrary to law”). Having reviewed the unobjected-toportions of the Report, the Court is satisfied that it containsno clear error.II.*4 The Court also finds it necessary to address two casescited by Plaintiff in her objections. Plaintiff argues thatSanchez v. United States, 803 F. Supp. 1066 (N.D. Tex.1992), held that “systemic negligence in military or agencyadministration may be redressed under [the] FTCA.” DocketNo. 34 at 4. Plaintiff also cites Wilkerson v. University of N.Tex., 878 F.2d 276, 279 (5th Cir. 1989), which purportedly“permits substitution of the correct party [in a Title VII action]where the original complaint placed the agency on notice.” Id.at 5. Neither of these cases exist,2 and appear to have beengenerated by artificial intelligence (“AI”).Plaintiff's citation to hallucinatory cases likely generated viaAI violates this Court's Local Rule CV-11(g), which makesclear that “generative artificial intelligence tools may producefactual and legal inaccuracies and reminds attorneys that theymust verify the information that they submit to the court.”Gauthier v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 2024 WL 4882651,at *2 (E.D. Tex. Nov. 25, 2024). Just like an attorney, a pro selitigant remains bound by the Court's rules and the standardsarticulated under Rule 11. See L.R. CV-11(g). Plaintiff'sfalse statement of law in her objections is sanctionable andprovides no basis to cure her jurisdictional defects for eitherher negligence, breach of fiduciary duty, or Title VII claims.The Court cautions Plaintiff that fabricated citations will notbe tolerated.III.Having conducted a de novo review of the record in this caseand the Magistrate Judge's Report, the Court has determinedthat the Report of the Magistrate Judge is correct, andPlaintiff's objections are without merit. Accordingly, theCourt hereby ADOPTS the Report of the Magistrate Judge(Docket No. 33) as the opinion of the Court. Defendant'smotion to dismiss Plaintiff's claims (Docket No. 23) isGRANTED. Plaintiff's claims are DISMISSED withoutprejudice for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. See Voisin'sOyster House, Inc. v. Guidry, 799 F.2d 183, 188–89 (5th Cir.1986).So ORDERED and SIGNED this 2nd day of May, 2025.
Wilt v. Department of the Navy, Slip Copy (2025) © 2025 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.4All CitationsSlip Copy, 2025 WL 1276250Footnotes1As the Report correctly observes, Plaintiff cannot invoke this Court's jurisdiction in twisting her allegationsof contractual—or “statutory”—entitlement of benefits into claims of “negligence” or “fraud.” See supra I.A(dismissing Plaintiff's negligence claims for failure to exhaust FTCA remedies); I.B (dismissing Plaintiff'sclaims for fraud, misrepresentation, and breach of fiduciary duty under the FTCA's intentional tort exception).2A search for 803 F. Supp. 1066 yields Libisch v. Black & Decker Corp., a sexual discrimination case from theDistrict of Maryland. The Court could not locate a 1992 Northern District of Texas case with the title: Sanchezv. United States. Similarly, a search for 878 F.2d 276 yields Poynor v. U.S. Parole Comm'n, a habeas casefrom the Ninth Circuit. The Court likewise could not locate a 1989 Fifth Circuit case with the title: Wilkersonv. University of North Texas.End of Document© 2025 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.
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