have the authority to make hiring and firing decisions and take other personnel actions. See, e.g., Rankin, 483 U.S. at 388-92, 107 S.Ct. 2891 (applying balancing approach to claim against constable for firing deputy constable); Pickering, 391 U.S. at 568-73, 88 S.Ct. 1731 (applying the balancing approach to claim against a School Board that dismissed a teacher); Jantzen v. Hawkins, 188 F.3d at 1247, 1256-58 (10th Cir.1999) (applying balancing approach to claim against a sheriff who fired a deputy); Prager v. LaFaver, 180 F.3d 1185, 1191 (10th Cir.) (applying the balancing approach to claim against Secretary of a state Department of Revenue who fired a senior tax attorney), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 120 S.Ct. 405, 145 L.Ed.2d 315 (1999). Although courts have occasionally applied the Pickering approach outside the employment setting, those decisions have typically involved some kind of contractual relationship between the plaintiff and the defendant. See, e.g, Umbehr, 518 U.S. at 673-86, 116 S.Ct. 2342 (applying the Pickering balancing to First Amendment claim by an independent contractor); Copsey v. Swearingen 36 F.3d 1336, 1343-45 (5th Cir.1994) (applying Pickering to the termination of a vendor’s license); Davis v. West Community Hosp., 755 F.2d 455, 461-62 (5th Cir.1985) (applying Pickering to hospital’s termination of surgeon’s staff privileges).
As the plurality explained in Waters v. Churchill, it is the government’s powers and responsibilities as an employer that warrant restrictions on speech that would not be justified in other contexts:
The government’s interest in achieving its goals as effectively and efficiently as possible is elevated from a relatively subordinate interest when it acts as a sovereign to a significant one when it acts as employer. The government cannot restrict the speech of the public at large just in the name of efficiency. But where the government is employing someone for the very purpose of effectively achieving its goals, such restrictions may well be appropriate.
Waters, 511 U.S. at 675, 114 S.Ct. 1878 (emphasis added). Similarly, when the government acts as a contractor, “its interests as a public service provider, including its interest in being free from intensive judicial supervision of its daily management functions, are potentially implicated.” Umbehr, 518 U.S. at 678, 116 S.Ct. 2342.
In this case, although Mr. Henry wanted the coordinator of the District Attorney’s drug task force to work closely with ONBDD agents, the ONBDD did not employ the coordinator. The authority to reestablish the task force, to seek funding for it, to hire Mr. Worrell and then to rescind that offer of employment belonged to Mr. Henry, not the ONBDD defendants. The evidence submitted by the ONBDD defendants indicates that they, like Mr. Henry, were concerned about providing effective law enforcement. However, the functioning of the drug task force was Mr. Henry’s responsibility.
In instances in which a public employee alleges that an official outside the employing agency has engaged in retaliatory con-' duct, there are serious risks in applying the Pickering approach to define the scope of the employee’s First Amendment rights. Our decision in Flanagan, 890 F.2d at 1566-67, suggests one such risk. There, we referred to the Supreme Court’s rejection of “a heckler’s veto” in First Amendment cases. Id. We concluded that a police department could not justify disciplinary action against the plaintiff police officers simply because some members of the public found the officers’ speech offensive and, therefore, might not cooperate with the police department in the future. See id.
Applying Pickering to public officials outside the employing agency and not parties to a contract with the plaintiff would raise the possibility of an analogous kind of veto — -a veto over personnel or contractual decisions. In particular, acting with retaliatory intent, a third party upon whose cooperation the employer depended could refuse to cooperate with the employ