Xiong v. Wofford (Jan. 22, 2026)

Case details
Full caption
THAT XIONG v. MINGA WOFFORD
Country
United States
Jurisdiction
Federal
Decided
Jan. 22, 2026
Majority
Chi Soo Kim (J.) (unanimous Court)
THAT XIONG, Petitioner, v. MINGA WOFFORD, Respondent., Slip Copy (2026) © 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.12026 WL 177739Only the Westlaw citation is currently available.United States District Court, E.D. California.THAT XIONG, Petitioner,v.MINGA WOFFORD, Respondent.No. 1:25-cv-2004 CSK|Filed 01/22/2026Editor's Note: This decision contains discussion of citationreferences that are incorrect or do not actually exist. Theseinvalid citations appeared in the original court opinion andhave been preserved as written since they are part of theofficial record. Any links to these invalid citations have beenremoved.Attorneys and Law FirmsRobert Gary Cummings, Law Offices of Robert G.Cummings, Redwood City, CA, for Petitioner.DOJ-United States Attorney's Office, for Respondent.ORDERCHI SOO KIM UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGEI. INTRODUCTION*1 Petitioner That Xiong filed a petition for writ ofhabeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241, challenginghis detention.1 As an infant, petitioner entered the UnitedStates on September 13, 1989 as a refugee from Thailand.On April 3, 1992, petitioner's status was adjusted to LawfulPermanent Resident. In May 2008, petitioner was convictedin Sacramento County Superior Court of discharging afirearm at an occupied vehicle and attempted murder aftera jury trial, and sentenced to 15 years to life imprisonment.On May 21, 2020, petitioner was ordered removed from theUnited States to Thailand. On July 10, 2020, petitioner wasreleased on an Order of Supervision pending his removal.On December 8, 2025, the Department of Homeland Security(“DHS”) received a Laotian Travel Document for petitioner.On December 18, 2025, DHS revoked petitioner's Order ofSupervision. On December 19, 2025, DHS detained petitionerto effectuate his removal. In the petition, petitioner challengeshis detention and the order for his removal.Pending before the Court is petitioner's motion for atemporary restraining order, which has been converted toa motion for preliminary injunction, seeking petitioner'simmediate release, an order requiring respondents to producetravel documents, and an order setting an expedited briefingschedule on the merits. (ECF No. 2.)II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND2In the petition, petitioner states that he was born in Thailandbut has never been recognized as a citizen of Thailand orany other country. (ECF No. 1 at 8.) Petitioner claims thathe is “effectively stateless” which has repeatedly obstructedremoval efforts. (Id.) In the opposition, respondents assertthat petitioner is a citizen and national of Laos and arefugee of Thailand who entered the United States onSeptember 13, 1989 when petitioner was four months old.(ECF No. 11 at 2.) The government's documents identifyThailand as petitioner's place of birth; both Laos and Thailandas petitioner's country of nationality and citizenship; andThailand as petitioner's country of last residence.3 (Exh.1, ECF No. 11-4 at 2-3 (Refugee Registration identifiesLaos as country of nationality); Exh. 2, ECF No. 11-4at 5 (Record of Lawful Permanent Residence identifiesLaos as country of citizenship); ECF No. 11-4 at 21, 23(12/19/2025 I-213 Form Record of Deportable/ InadmissibleAlien identifies both Laos and Thailand as petitioner's countryof citizenship and nationality); Exh. 5, ECF No. 11-4 at 16(5/5/2020 Notice to Appear identifies petitioner as a nativeand citizen of Thailand); Exh. 12, ECF No. 11-4 at 41-42(5/5/2020 I-213 Form Record of Deportable/ InadmissibleAlien identifies Thailand as petitioner's country of citizenshipand nationality).)*2 On April 3, 1992, when petitioner was almost three yearsold, his status was adjusted to Lawful Permanent Resident.(ECF No. 11-4 at 5.)On May 8, 2008, petitioner was convicted in SacramentoCounty Superior Court for discharging a firearm at anoccupied vehicle and attempted murder, and on December12, 2008, petitioner was sentenced to 15 years to lifeimprisonment. (Id. at 12-13, 16, 57-58.) On May 5, 2020,DHS issued petitioner a Notice to Appear in removalproceedings pursuant to Immigration and Nationality Act(“INA”) § 240, 8 U.S.C. § 1229a, due to petitioner's state court
THAT XIONG, Petitioner, v. MINGA WOFFORD, Respondent., Slip Copy (2026) © 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.2criminal conviction. (Id. at 16-17.) On May 5, 2020, U.S.Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”) conducted aconsensual telephone interview with petitioner, who reportedbeing a national/citizen of Thailand who entered the UnitedStates at San Francisco, California in 1989 with his family asa young child. (Id. at 42.) Petitioner reported that his parentsare naturalized citizens of the United States. (Id.) Becausepetitioner was over the age of 18 when his parents becamenaturalized United States citizens, petitioner was unable toderive citizenship through his parents. (Id.) On or about May6, 2020, DHS conducted a custody determination, providednotice to petitioner, and took petitioner into custody. (Id. at25; Villagran Decl., 12.) Petitioner requested review of thecustody determination by an immigration judge. (Id.) On May21, 2020, an Immigration Judge ordered petitioner removedfrom the United States to Thailand. (Id. at 27-28.) Petitionerwaived the right to appeal the removal order. (Id. at 28.)On July 10, 2020, petitioner was released from detentionon an Order of Supervision with various conditions becausepetitioner was not deported or removed “during the periodprescribed by law.” (Id. at 30-34; ECF No. 11-1 at 13-20.)On December 8, 2025, the government received a LaotianTravel Document for petitioner. (ECF No. 11-4 at 36;Villagran Decl. 15 (ECF No. 11-3).) On December 18, 2025,DHS issued a warrant for petitioner's removal. (ECF No. 11-4at 38.) On December 19, 2025, DHS issued petitioner a Noticeof Imminent Removal Pursuant to 8 C.F.R. § 241.4(g)(4)where “ICE is in possession of a travel document to affectyour removal and expects this to occur in January 2026.” (Id.at 45-46.) On this same date, petitioner was detained andprovided with a Notice of Revocation of Release, whichexplained that petitioner's supervised release was revokedbased on changed circumstances in his case. (Id. at 48-49.)On December 19, 2025, ICE held an informal interview withpetitioner, as required by 8 C.F.R. § 241.13(i).4 (ECF No. 19at 2; ECF No. 19-1 at 2.)*3 On January 6, 2026, a Notice of Removal was issuedadvising petitioner that ICE intends to remove petitioner toLaos, which petitioner refused to sign. (ECF No. 11-4 at 61;ECF No. 11 at 7.) Respondents assert that petitioner would notsign the written notice form and would not discuss whether hefeared removal to Laos. (ECF No. 11 at 7.) Respondents statethat petitioner still has time to provide a statement or claimregarding fear of deportation to Laos. (Id.) In its oppositionfiled on January 6, 2026, respondents indicated that theywould submit a status report to advise the Court whetherpetitioner provided any statement or claim regarding fear ofdeportation to Laos. (Id.) On January 13, 2026, respondentsfiled their status report that as of January 12, 2026, there is norecord that petitioner or petitioner's counsel has expressed afear of petitioner's removal to Laos. (ECF No. 17.)III. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND ANDCONVERSION TO MOTION FOR PRELIMINARYINJUNCTIONOn December 26, 2025, petitioner filed a petitionfor writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2241,challenging petitioner's detention and seeking an ordergranting the petition for writ of habeas corpus, orderingpetitioner's immediate release or supervised release, orderinga stay of removal, directing respondents to produceall travel documents and embassy communications andenjoining petitioner's re-detention absent materially changedcircumstances. (ECF No. 1 at 6.) Petitioner simultaneouslyfiled a motion for a temporary restraining order seeking therelief sought in the petition. (ECF No. 2 at 5.)On December 26, 2025, the district court issued a briefingschedule on the motion for temporary restraining order. (ECFNo. 6.) The district court ordered that respondents shall nottransfer petitioner out of this District. (Id.) The district courtordered respondents’ response to the temporary restrainingorder due within five court days and petitioner's reply, ifany, due within three court days of the filing of respondents’opposition. (Id.)The parties consented to the jurisdiction of a United StatesMagistrate Judge, and on December 29, 2025, this casewas reassigned to the undersigned. (ECF No. 9.) That sameday, this Court ordered that the district judge's briefingschedule remained in place; ordered respondents to includewith their opposition all portions of petitioner's A-Fileand other supporting documents referenced in or relatedto respondents’ opposition, including copies of all ordersof release, documents related to any relevant violations ofrelease, and all detention orders; and ordered the parties toinform the Court whether they were amenable to convertingthe motion for a temporary restraining order into a motion fora preliminary injunction. (ECF No. 10.)On January 6, 2026, respondents filed an opposition andsubmitted documents. (ECF No. 11.) In the opposition,respondents state that they do not oppose converting themotion for a temporary restraining order to a motion for apreliminary injunction. (Id. at 1 n.2.) On January 7, 2026,petitioner filed a reply. (ECF No. 12.) On January 12, 2026,
THAT XIONG, Petitioner, v. MINGA WOFFORD, Respondent., Slip Copy (2026) © 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.3petitioner filed a notice confirming that he was also amenableto converting the motion for temporary restraining order toa motion for preliminary injunction without further briefing.(ECF No. 16.) Because the standard for issuing a temporaryrestraining order and preliminary injunction is the same, seeStuhlbarg Int'l Sales Co. v. John D. Bush & Co., 240 F.3d832, 839 n.7 (9th Cir. 2001), respondents had notice andthe opportunity to respond in opposition, and all parties areamenable to converting the motion, petitioner's motion fora temporary restraining order is converted to a motion forpreliminary injunction without further briefing. (See ECFNos. 11, 16.)A hearing was held on January 13, 2026.5 (ECF Nos. 13, 18.)IV. LEGAL STANDARDS*4 Injunctive relief is “an extraordinary remedy that mayonly be awarded upon a clear showing that the plaintiffis entitled to such relief.” Winter v. Natural Res. Def.Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 22 (2008) (citation omitted). Thestandard governing the issuing of a temporary restrainingorder is “substantially identical” to the standard for issuinga preliminary injunction. Stuhlbarg Int'l Sales Co. v. John D.Brush & Co., 240 F.3d 832, 839 n.7 (9th Cir. 2001). To obtaineither form of injunctive relief, the moving party must show:(1) a likelihood of success on the merits; (2) a likelihoodof irreparable harm to the moving party in the absence ofpreliminary relief; (3) the balance of equities tips in favorof the moving party; and (4) an injunction is in the publicinterest. Winter, 555 U.S. at 20.V. DISCUSSIONIn his petition, petitioner brings three claims: (1) “unlawfulprolonged detention” where petitioner alleges that his“detention exceeds the presumptively reasonable period” inviolation of the Fifth Amendment and Zadvydas v. Davis,533 U.S. 678 (2001) (ECF No. 1 at 4-5, ¶¶ 29-31); (2)violation of procedural due process based on ICE's refusalto disclose travel documents or provide an opportunity tochallenge removal (ECF No. 1 at 5, 32); and (3) “unlawfulremoval absent judicial review” (ECF No. 1 at 5, ¶¶ 33-34).In his motion, petitioner requests that the Court prohibitrespondents from removing petitioner from the United States;order petitioner's immediate release under supervision; orderrespondents to produce travel documents and embassycommunications; and set an expedited briefing schedule.(ECF No. 2 at 5.)A. Proper RespondentIn the opposition, respondents move to strike and dismissall improperly named respondents. (ECF No. 11 at 1 n.1.) Respondents state that the proper respondent is thefacility administrator at the Mesa Verde ICE ProcessingCenter, where petitioner is detained. (Id.) “[L]ongstandingpractice confirms that in habeas challenges to present physicalconfinement—‘core challenges’—the default rule is that theproper respondent is the warden of the facility where theprisoner is being held ....” Rumsfeld v. Padilla, 542 U.S. 426,435 (2004). The Ninth Circuit has “affirm[ed] the applicationof the immediate custodian and district of confinementrules to core habeas petitions filed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §2241, including those filed by immigrant detainees.” Doe v.Garland, 109 F.4th 1188, 1199 (9th Cir. 2024). Petitioner fileda reply, but did not respond to the government's request, whichis interpreted as a non-objection. The government's requestis granted. The Court dismisses all respondents but MingaWofford, Warden of the Mesa Verde ICE Processing Center.B. Likelihood of Success on the MeritsIn his petition and motion, petitioner argues that ICE hasfailed to produce travel documents for petitioner despitepetitioner's request, failed to identify the receiving country,and failed to offer a timeline for removal. (ECF No.1 at 1, 3; ECF No. 2 at 4, 7, 9.) Petitioner arguesthat his detention violates Zadvydas and that detention ispresumptively unconstitutional after six months. (ECF No. 1at 4, ¶¶ 29-30; ECF No. 2 at 5, 8-9.)With the government's opposition, respondent providedthe travel document issued for petitioner from Laos(ECF No. 11-4 at 36); a December 19, 2025 Noticeof Imminent Removal Pursuant to 8 C.F.R. 241.4(g)(4)informing petitioner that “ICE is in possession of a traveldocument to affect your removal and expects this to occurin January 2026” (id. at 45-46); a December 19, 2025Notice of Revocation of Release, which explained thatpetitioner's supervised release was revoked based on changedcircumstances in his case (id. at 48-49); and a January 6,2026 Notice of Removal that identified Laos as the receivingcountry (id. at 61). In petitioner's reply, petitioner fails toaddress any of these issues. (See ECF No. 12.)*5 The Court concludes that petitioner is not likely tosucceed on the merits. Most of petitioner's arguments andclaims are moot given that the government provided the
THAT XIONG, Petitioner, v. MINGA WOFFORD, Respondent., Slip Copy (2026) © 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.4requested travel document, identified the receiving country,and identified the timeline for removal. The Court turns topetitioner's remaining arguments.Petitioner is not likely to succeed on his first claim andargument that his detention violates Zadvydas becauseit “exceeds the presumptively reasonable period” of sixmonths.6 (See ECF No. 1 at 4, 29; ECF No. 2 at 8-9.)Petitioner presents no evidence that he has been detainedmore than six months, and fails to respond to the government'sdocumentation submitted with its opposition that establishesthe following. Petitioner was initially detained on or aboutMay 6, 2020, and released two months later on July 10, 2020.(ECF No. 11-1 at 13-20; ECF No. 11-4 at 25, 30-34; VillagranDecl., ¶¶ 12, 14.) Petitioner was re-detained on December 19,2025, and filed his habeas petition and motion one week lateron December 26, 2025. (ECF No. 11-1 at 59-60; VillagranDecl., 17.) As of January 13, 2026 when the hearing washeld, petitioner has been detained in total, including his initial2020 detention, for approximately three months (89 calendardays).Petitioner's second claim for procedural due process is basedon the alleged failure to “provide an opportunity to challengeremoval.”7 (ECF No. 1 at 5, 32.) Petitioner argues that thegovernment violated due process because petitioner's releasewas revoked “without neutral review or consideration of lessrestrictive alternatives.” (ECF No. 12 at 4.) Petitioner is notlikely to succeed on his second claim.Pursuant to 8 C.F.R. § 241.13(i)(2), the government mayrevoke the release of a noncitizen subject to a final order ofremoval who has been released under an order of supervisionif the government determines that “there is a significantlikelihood that the alien may be removed in the reasonablyforeseeable future” due to changed circumstances. This caseis different from cases like Vuong v. Becerra, 2025 WL3707172, at *3-4 (E.D. Cal. Dec. 22, 2025), where districtcourts have found that the government failed to follow its ownregulations to revoke release under 8 C.F.R. § 241.13, or caseslike Vu v. Noem, 2025 WL 3114341, at *5-7 (E.D. Cal. Nov.6, 2025), where the government did not meet their burdento show a significant likelihood that the noncitizen may beremoved in the reasonably foreseeable future.Here, the government followed its regulations and there isa significant likelihood that petitioner may be removed inthe reasonably foreseeable future where a Laotian TravelDocument was recently issued for petitioner. Petitioner wassubject to a final removal order. (ECF No. 11-4 at 27-28.)After the government received a Laotian Travel Documentfor petitioner, DHS issued a warrant for petitioner's removaland re-detained petitioner on December 19, 2025 after issuinga Notice of Imminent Removal, which informed petitionerthat “ICE is in possession of a travel document to affect yourremoval and expects this to occur in January 2026” (ECFNo. 11-4 at 45-46), and issued a Notice of Revocation ofRelease, which explained that petitioner's supervised releasewas revoked based on changed circumstances in his case(id. at 48-49). ICE promptly held an informal interviewwith petitioner on December 19, 2025, as required by 8C.F.R. § 241.13(i)(3). (ECF No. 19 & 19-1.) Petitioner wasprovided with the opportunity to respond to the reasons forthe revocation, to show no significant likelihood of removal inthe reasonably foreseeable future, and to provide a statementor claim regarding fear of deportation to Laos. See 8 C.F.R.§ 241.13(i)(3). In his reply, petitioner does not indicate thathe claims fear of being removed to Laos or that he hasinitiated any process to claim such a fear. (See ECF No.12.) In addition, as of January 12, 2026, there is no recordthat petitioner or petitioner's counsel has expressed a fear ofpetitioner's removal to Laos. (ECF No. 17.)*6 Petitioner's third claim for “unlawful removal absentjudicial review” appears to actually be a ground for relief, nota habeas claim, as petitioner requests that the Court enjoin hisremoval to preserve habeas review. (See ECF No. 1 at 5, ¶¶33-34.) This district court has already ordered respondents notto transfer petitioner out of this district, preserving this districtcourt's jurisdiction over this habeas petition. (ECF No. 6.)Having concluded that the petitioner is not likely to succeedon his claims, the Court declines to reach the parties’ otherarguments.8C. Other Preliminary Injunction FactorsBecause the first preliminary injunction factor “is a thresholdinquiry and is the most important factor,” a “court neednot consider the other factors” if a movant fails to show alikelihood of success on the merits. Baird v. Bonta, 81 F.4th1036, 1040 (9th Cir. 2023) (internal quotation marks andcitations omitted). Therefore, the Court declines to reach theremaining preliminary injunction factors because the Courtfinds that petitioner is not likely to succeed on the merits.VI. CONCLUSION AND ORDERSAccordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that:
THAT XIONG, Petitioner, v. MINGA WOFFORD, Respondent., Slip Copy (2026) © 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.51. The government's request to dismiss all improperlynamed respondents is GRANTED, and respondentsMoises Becerra, Kristi Noem, and Pamela Bondi aredismissed. The Clerk of the Court is directed to amendcourt records to reflect that Minga Wofford, Warden ofthe Mesa Verde ICE Enforcement Processing Center, isthe only respondent.2. Petitioner's motion for preliminary injunction isDENIED.3. Petitioner has requested an expedited schedule. By 9:00a.m. on January 26, 2026, the parties are ordered tosubmit a Joint Status Report as to whether the caseshould proceed to addressing the habeas petition on themerits. If either party indicates that the case shouldproceed to the merits, by 5:00 p.m. on January 30,2026, petitioner is ORDERED TO SHOW CAUSEwhy this Court should not convert this preliminaryinjunction order into a final order on the merits ofpetitioner's habeas petition. Thereafter, respondent mayfile a response within seven (7) days of the filingof petitioner's Order to Show Cause response, andpetitioner may file an optional reply within three (3) daysof the filing of respondent's response.Dated: January 21, 2026All CitationsSlip Copy, 2026 WL 177739Footnotes1Petitioner is represented by counsel and paid the filing fee. The parties consented to the jurisdiction of aUnited States Magistrate Judge pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c)(1). (ECF No. 9.)2The factual background comes from the unverified habeas petition, documents submitted by Respondents,and the sworn declaration of Paul Villagran, DHS Deportation Officer. (See ECF Nos. 1, 11-1, 11-3, 11-4,17, 19.)3At the hearing, the Court inquired into this discrepancy and concluded that this dispute need not be resolvedto address the preliminary injunction motion.4At the hearing, the Court ordered the government to submit a Supplemental Status Report to address whetheran informal interview of petitioner was conducted where the citation in the government's opposition wasincorrect. (See ECF No. 18; ECF No. 11 at 3.) Respondents filed their Supplemental Status Report correctingthe record and submitted an “Alien Informal Interview Upon Revocation of Order of Supervision Under 8C.F.R. § 241.4(l); 8 C.F.R. § 241.3(i)” document dated December 19, 2025. (ECF No. 19; ECF No. 19-1 at2.) Petitioner was provided an opportunity to respond to the government's supplemental filing, but did notfile a response. (See Docket.)5In the January 9, 2026 minute order scheduling the hearing (ECF No. 13), the Court instructed petitioner'scounsel to be prepared to address at the hearing whether his motion can be converted into a motion forpreliminary injunction without additional briefing and to address legal authority cited in petitioner's briefing,including two cases cited in petitioner's reply that appeared to be hallucinations: “Phan v. Barr, No. 1:19-cv-01451, 2019 WL 7758773 (E.D. Cal. Dec. 20, 2019); Flores v. Barr, No. 1:20-cv-00491, 2020 WL 1939565(E.D. Cal. Apr. 22, 2020).” (See ECF No. 12 at 2, 3, and 4.) This minute order also informed petitioner of therequirements under Local Rule 181 for Certified Students. (ECF No. 13.) Petitioner addressed all three issuesin a notice filed on January 12, 2026, admitting error for the citations, apologizing, and submitting citationsfor two different cases: “Hoac v. Becerra, No. 2:25-cv-01740-DC-JDP, 2025 WL 1993771 (E.D. Cal. July 16,2025); Phan v. Becerra, No. 2:25-cv-01757-DC-JDP, 2025 WL 1993735 (E.D. Cal. July 16, 2025).” (ECF No.16.) The Court has confirmed that these are citations for actual cases that are relevant to the issues raised
THAT XIONG, Petitioner, v. MINGA WOFFORD, Respondent., Slip Copy (2026) © 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.6in petitioner's brief. At the January 13, 2026 hearing, the Court addressed the hallucinated citations andordered petitioner's counsel to order the transcript for the hearing, provide the transcript to the law studenton petitioner's filings and to any staff who assists petitioner's counsel, require the law student and any staff toread the hearing transcript, and provide written confirmation of the completion of this order. (See ECF No. 18.)6The Court declines to reach the legal argument regarding whether Zadvydas applies where the underlyingfactual basis for the argument is not present.7The portion of this claim based on ICE's refusal to disclose travel documents is moot. (See ECF No. 1 at5, 32.)8In its opposition, the government raises an argument regarding judicial review of a Convention Against Torture(“CAT”) claim and procedures for CAT claims. (See ECF No. 11 at 7, 8.) The government confirmed at thehearing that there is no CAT claim at issue. The Court also declines to reach the government's jurisdictionarguments regarding the government's removal order or execution of the final removal order. (See ECF No.11 at 3-4, 7-8.)End of Document© 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.
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