Yaroshevsky v. Karlin (Eastern District of N.Y. (E.D. N.Y) Feb. 23, 2026)

Case details
Full caption
EVGENY YAROSHEVSKY v. BENJAMIN W. KARLIN
Country
United States
Jurisdiction
Federal
Court
Eastern District of New York (E.D. N.Y)
Decided
Feb. 23, 2026
Disposition
Motion Granted
EVGENY YAROSHEVSKY, Plaintiff, v. BENJAMIN W. KARLIN,..., Slip Copy (2026) © 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.12026 WL 522624Only the Westlaw citation is currently available.United States District Court, E.D. New York.EVGENY YAROSHEVSKY, Plaintiff,v.BENJAMIN W. KARLIN, SANDRA KARLIN,WINNIE WOODCLIFF PARK, LLC, WOODCLIFFPARK COTTAGES, LLC, Defendants.25-CV-2747 (DG) (SDE)|Filed 02/23/2026Attorneys and Law FirmsEugeny Yaroshevsky, Forest Hill, NY, Pro Se.Kim Allison Smith, Amanda Star Frazer, Anthony C. Pasca,Esseks, Hefter, Angel, Di Talia & Pasca, LLP, Riverhead, NY,for Defendants.REPORT & RECOMMENDATIONSETH D. EICHENHOLTZ United States Magistrate JudgeEastern District of New York*1 Pro se Plaintiff Evgeny Yaroshevsky brings claimsagainst Defendants Benjamin W. Karlin, Sandra Karlin,Winnie Woodcliff Park, LLC, and Woodcliff Park Cottages,LLC (collectively, “Defendants”), in connection with aproperty dispute. Presently before the Court, on referral fromthe Honorable Diane Gujarati, United States District Judge,are Defendants’ motions to dismiss Plaintiff's Complaintpursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) and (6);and, separately, to impose sanctions on Plaintiff pursuant toFederal Rule of Civil Procedure 11. As part of his response toDefendants’ Rule 11 motion, Plaintiff seeks leave to amendhis Complaint to partially address the concerns raised in thatmotion.For the reasons set forth below, the undersigned respectfullyrecommends that the Court deny Plaintiff leave to amendhis Complaint; grant Defendants’ motion for sanctions,including the sanction of dismissal of Plaintiff's Complaintwith prejudice; and, even if the Court declines to dismiss theComplaint as a sanction, grant Defendants’ motion to dismissthe Complaint.FACTUAL & PROCEDURAL BACKGROUNDThis action is the latest in a years-long landlord/tenant disputebetween the parties. The facts described below are based onPlaintiff's allegations in the Complaint and, where noted, thehundreds of pages of briefing and exhibits submitted by theparties to this action.I. Underlying Landlord/Tenant DisputeWoodcliff Park is a seasonal beachfront community ofcottages on the North Shore of Long Island, New York ownedby Winnie Woodcliff Park, LLC and managed by WoodcliffPark Cottages, LLC.1 Plaintiff and his wife have owned acottage in the Woodcliff Park community for around 30 years.(See Complaint (“Compl.”), Dkt. No. 1, 14.) Both partiesagree that Plaintiff occupied the property pursuant to a yearlylease agreement.2 (See id.; Declaration of Kim A. Smith insupport of Motion to Dismiss, (“Smith Decl.”) Dkt. No. 38-1, 21.)Although there have been multiple disputes between Plaintiffand Defendants since at least 2003, the Complaint centers ona dispute arising in 2022. (See Compl. ¶¶ 179, 325; SmithDecl. ¶¶ 8, 26–27.) Among other things, Defendants claimPlaintiff failed to return a signed lease agreement for the2022 season and occupied the property during that seasonwithout paying rent. (Id. 27.) Plaintiff also describes aseries of confrontations with Defendants and other tenants atWoodcliff Park. (See Compl. ¶¶ 120, 122, 131–133, 138, 169;see also Smith Decl. 33–34.)*2 As a result of these events, Defendants withdrew theiroffer to Plaintiff for a 2022 lease, informed Plaintiff that heand his wife were unlawful holdover tenants, and served themwith a 90-day notice terminating their tenancy. (Smith Decl. 37.) Plaintiff did not vacate the premises, and on December23, 2022, Defendants commenced a summary proceeding inthe Town of Riverhead Justice Court to remove him from theproperty. (Id. 38.)II. State Court Litigation & SettlementAfter fierce litigation, the parties agreed to settle the JusticeCourt proceeding in October 2023. (Smith Decl. ¶¶ 39–51;see also Stipulation of Settlement, (“Settlement”), Dkt. No.38-12.) Under the settlement terms, Plaintiff agreed to vacate
EVGENY YAROSHEVSKY, Plaintiff, v. BENJAMIN W. KARLIN,..., Slip Copy (2026) © 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.2the property no later than October 15, 2023. (Settlement § 1.)In exchange, Defendants agreed to purchase Plaintiff's cottagefor fair market value as determined through an appraisal. (Id.§ 2, § 3a–d.) Both parties also agreed to a general release ofall claims they may have had against one another. The releaselanguage applicable to Plaintiff read as follows:“EVGENY YAROSHEVSKY and YELENAYAROSHEVKY, their principals, members, heirs,executors, administrators, successors, and assigns,as RELEASORS, release and discharge WINNIEWOODCLIFF PARK, LLC, as RELEASEE, theRELEASEE, RELEASEE'S principals, members, heirs,executors, administrators, successors, and assigns, from allactions, causes of action, suits, debts, dues, sums of money,accounts, reckonings, bonds, bills, specialties, covenants,contracts, controversies, agreements, promises, variances,trespasses, damages, judgments, extents, executions,claims, and demands whatsoever, in law, admiralty orequity, which against the RELEASEE and each of them, theRELEASORS, the RELEASORS’ successors and assignsever had, now have or hereafter can, shall or may, have for,upon, or by reason of any matter, cause or thing whatsoeverfrom the beginning of the world until the Effective Date,including any and all claims that were made or which couldhave been made in the summary proceeding in the Town ofRiverhead Justice Court captioned Winnie Woodcliff Park,LLC. v. Yaroshevsky, Docket No. 22-LT-120894.”(Id. § 7(a) (the “Release”).) The Release also ensured that theJustice Court “retain[ed] jurisdiction to enforce and to resolveany disputes under this stipulation.” (Id. § 5.) The partiesexecuted the stipulation on October 10, 2023. (Id. p. 6.)But the settlement stalled in part because, along with othercontinued disputes, the parties failed to agree on an appraiserand, thus, fair market value for Plaintiff's cottage. (SeeCompl. 216; Smith Decl. 55.) Plaintiff further alleges thesettlement agreement was fraudulent and unenforceable forother reasons. (See Compl. ¶¶ 216–217.)Plaintiff did not vacate the property. (Smith Decl. 61.)In March 2024, Defendants applied to the Justice Court fora Judgment of Possession and Warrant Eviction, claimingPlaintiff had breached the settlement agreement. (Id. ¶¶ 62–63.) The Justice Court entered judgment in Defendants’ favor,and Plaintiff appealed. (Id. ¶¶ 76–79.) That appeal remainspending. (Id. 86.) During the pendency of that appeal,Plaintiff also sought three stays of that judgment in both theJustice Court and the Appellate Term—two of which weredenied and one of which remains pending. (Id. ¶¶ 87–101.)III. Plaintiff Seeks Relief in Federal CourtOn May 16, 2025, Plaintiff initiated this action by filinghis Complaint. Totaling over 374 pages, the Complaintalleges 14 causes of action. (See Compl. p. 1) Among otherclaims, Plaintiff asserts Defendants’ actions to evict himfrom the Property constitute fraud, tax evasion, intentionalinfliction of emotional distress, public nuisance, deprivationof constitutional rights, and conspiracy under the RacketeerInfluenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (“RICO”). (See id.)Plaintiff also sought a preliminary injunction. (See Compl. §XI; Order to Show Cause for Temporary Restraining Order,Dkt. No. 5.)IV. Plaintiff's Complaint and Motions Contain False orMisleading Citations Resulting in Multiple WarningsAbout Sanctions*3 Shortly after filing the Complaint, Plaintiff also movedto disqualify Defendants’ counsel. (Motion to DisqualifyCounsel, Dkt. No. 14.) The Court referred that motionto the then-assigned Magistrate Judge, Peggy Kuo. (OrderReferring Motion dated June 6, 2025.)Defendants’ opposition to Plaintiff's motion to disqualifyalleged that Plaintiff used false or misleading citationsthroughout his lengthy Complaint and other filings. (SeeDefendants’ Opposition to Motion to Disqualify, Dkt. No.15-10, pp. 4–6.) Plaintiff countered that these assertions were“reckless and untrue,” and said his authorities were legitimate.(Plaintiff's Reply in Support of Motion to Disqualify, Dkt. No.16, ¶¶ 2–3.)In her opinion denying Plaintiff's motion, Magistrate JudgeKuo noted that she could not locate one of Plaintiff's citedcases and found that two quotations attributed to another casecould not be found in the relevant opinion. (Order, Dkt. No.20, p.7 n.2.) Without “speculat[ing] as to how Plaintiff cameto include [these] erroneous quotations in his motion papers,”she cautioned Plaintiff that “even though he is proceedingpro se, he must still comply strictly with the requirements ofrepresentations made to a court pursuant to Federal Rule ofCivil Procedure 11(b)” and warned him that failure to do somay result in sanctions. (Id.) This was the first warning givento Plaintiff about sanctions for this conduct.
EVGENY YAROSHEVSKY, Plaintiff, v. BENJAMIN W. KARLIN,..., Slip Copy (2026) © 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.3The second warning about sanctions would come shortlythereafter, based on false citations in an entirely separatefiling. On June 13, 2025, the day after Magistrate Judge Kuoissued her Order, Plaintiff's motion for injunctive relief wasargued before Judge Gujarati. The Court denied Plaintiff'smotion to the extent it sought a temporary restraining order forfailure to establish such a remedy was appropriate. (Transcriptof June 13, 2025 Hearing (“June 13 Tr.”), Dkt. No. 50-12, at22:17–23:1.) The Court also denied Plaintiff's motion to theextent it sought a preliminary injunction, noting at the timethat Plaintiff's filings had relied at least in part on nonexistentcitations. (Id. at 23:2–7.).During argument, Judge Gujarati warned Plaintiff, “[e]venthough you are proceeding pro se, you must take care tocomply with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, includingRule 11(b), which relates to representations to the Court.” (Id.at 6:2–9.) Plaintiff expressly denied using generative artificialintelligence (“AI”) to draft his papers and said he had foundcases on Google, other search engines, and legal websites.(See id. at 6:16–22.) Judge Gujarati credited Plaintiff'sexplanation and said she assumed Plaintiff did not know hewas using unreliable sources. (See id. at 6:23–7:7.) Plaintiff“promis[ed] to be more meticulous” in the future. (Id. at 7:5–7.)At the conclusion of the conference, Judge Gujarati set abriefing schedule for Defendants’ motion to dismiss andtold Plaintiff he could renew his motion for injunctive reliefwith proper supporting documentation. (Minute Entry datedJune 13, 2025.) He did so on July 17, 2025. (See Plaintiff'sSupplemental Declaration in Support of Renewed Order toShow Cause, Dkt. No. 22.)V. Plaintiff Persists in Filing Documents with False orMisleading CitationsPlaintiff made additional filings after this conference, andDefendants again asserted that Plaintiff's filings containedadditional nonexistent or misleading citations. (See, e.g.,Letter, Dkt. No. 32.) On August 5, 2025, Judge Gujarati helda conference and heard argument on the alleged fake citationscontained in Plaintiff's filings. (Minute Entry dated Aug. 5,2025.) That hearing resulted in Plaintiff's third warning fromthe Court about his conduct and the potential for sanctions.*4 During the in-person conference, Judge Gujarati said shehad “real concerns” about Plaintiff's “very troubling conduct”and warned that he needed to take the issue “extremelyseriously.” (Transcript of Aug. 25, 2025 Conference, (“Aug.25 Tr.”), Dkt. No. 50-19, at 2:19–4:2.) The Court askedPlaintiff multiple times if he would like to withdraw hisComplaint without prejudice, remove any incorrect citations,and refile his claims in a new complaint that invitation.(See id. at 4:19–20; 8:2–10:7; 12:23–13:5; 14:9–11; 16:24–17:2; 19:23–20:5.) Plaintiff declined to do so but acceptedthe Court's corresponding invitation to withdraw his renewedmotion for injunctive relief because it also relied on fakecitations. (See id. at 12:23–13:20.) After again explainingthe potential consequences of proceeding on a Complaintwith incorrect authority, the Court told Plaintiff “[it] hadoffered [him] an opportunity, [he was] not interested in theopportunity to correct [his] mistakes, and so [he was] goingto be stuck with the consequences of that decision.” (Id.at 19:23–20:1.) The Court also warned Plaintiff that ifthere were any fake citations in his forthcoming briefing inopposition to Defendants’ motion to dismiss, he could besanctioned. (See id. at 16:1–5.)After Plaintiff failed to revise his filings, Defendantsreviewed Plaintiff's briefing and identified at least five casesthat did not exist and thirteen instances in which the languagePlaintiff quoted did not appear in the case. (See Declaration ofAmanda Star Frazer, (“Frazer Decl.”), Dkt. No. 50-1, 40.) Inresponse, Plaintiff said his papers contained “at most, good-faith mislabeling or citation variations traceable to open-access databases.” (Declaration of Plaintiff in Opposition toMotion to Dismiss, (“Pl's. MTD Opp.”), Dkt. No. 39, 14.)The parties’ fully briefed motion to dismiss was filed onAugust 11, 2025.VI. Defendants Provide Plaintiff with Notice of anAnticipated Motion for Sanctions and Plaintiff Fails toCorrect the False and Misleading CitationsDespite the multiple warnings from the Court and continuedmention by Defendants that Plaintiff continued to rely on falseor misleading sanctions, Plaintiff failed to take any steps tocorrect or withdraw any of his filings at any time.On December 4, 2025, Defendants served Plaintiff with acomplete copy of a proposed motion for sanctions pursuant toRule 11. (Letter, Dkt. No. 49-1, p. 1; see also Memorandumin Support of Defendants’ Motion for Sanctions, (“Defs.’Sanctions Mot.”), Dkt. No. 50-31.) In the proposed motion,Defendants argued that Plaintiff should be sanctioned for hispersistent use of fake and misleading citations. (See Defs.’Sanctions Mot. pp. 14 –24.) They further argued that Plaintiffshould be sanctioned for bringing claims barred by theRelease, and for fabricating facts to support his arguments that
EVGENY YAROSHEVSKY, Plaintiff, v. BENJAMIN W. KARLIN,..., Slip Copy (2026) © 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.4the Justice Court and Defendants’ counsel acted fraudulently.(See id.) The motion sought dismissal of Plaintiff's complaintand striking of his filings, as well as costs and attorneys’fees Defendants incurred in opposing Plaintiff's arguments.(See id. p. 25.) Defendants warned Plaintiff that if he didnot withdraw his Complaint with prejudice by December 26,2025, Defendants would move for sanctions. (Id.) Despite thethree prior warnings from the Court, and the benefit of the safeharbor period before Defendants could file their motion forsanctions, Plaintiff did not correct the prior filings in responseto the notice of the motion, nor did he respond to Defendantsat all.On December 29, 2025, after Plaintiff failed to take correctiveaction during the safe harbor period, Defendants filed a letterseeking leave to file their motion for sanctions, which wasreferred to the undersigned. (Order dated Dec. 30, 2025.)VII. During Argument on the Motion for Sanctions,Plaintiff Makes Material Misrepresentations to theCourtAfter this matter was referred to the undersigned, the Courtscheduled a hearing on the motion for January 7, 2026. (Id.)The purpose of the hearing was to discuss with Plaintiff theserious consequences associated with the conduct describedby Defendants and to see if there was any opportunity toresolve the matter short of a decision to sanction Plaintiff.*5 During the hearing, the undersigned echoed previouswarnings about “the seriousness of the allegations containedin the motion and the seriousness of the potentialconsequences and sanctions [he was] facing in thiscase.” (Transcript of Jan. 7, 2026 Hearing, (“Jan. 7 Tr.”), Dkt.No. 51, at 2:20–22.) To ensure there was no misunderstandingabout Defendants’ allegations, the Court asked Defendantsto explain their argument that Plaintiff's Complaint shouldbe dismissed for relying on inappropriate citations. (See id.at 2:15–3:23.) The undersigned also explained plainly thatthe issue of fake and misleading citations was “most critical”because it could be a basis to dismiss Plaintiff's Complaintentirely. (Id. at 5:18–21.)In response to Defendants’ arguments, Plaintiff explainedthat he had used and relied on publicly available sources,including Google Scholar, Court Listener, and Justia Lawfor legal research. (See id. at 6: 11–9:10.) The undersignedasked Plaintiff multiple times if Plaintiff had checked everycitation in his papers to determine it was accurate, andPlaintiff affirmed he had done so each time. (See id. at 9:15–11:15.) Ultimately, the undersigned and Plaintiff then had thefollowing exchange:“THE COURT: So with all of that said, I will again confirmwith you is your representation to this Court that you'vechecked each and every citation in your papers filed withthe Court, including the ones in the Rule 11 motion cited bydefendant's counsel, and you've verified that they all existand stand for the proposition for which you cite them?PLAINTIFF: Yeah. Verified since the last hearing(indiscernible), so verified those citations and (inaudible).Yes.”(Id. at 13:18–14:2.)After the undersigned suggested that he would take a shortbreak from the hearing to personally verify whether thecitations were accurate, Plaintiff began to back away from hisprior representations. Without yet acknowledging some of hiscitations were false or misleading, Plaintiff instead argued hehad not had an opportunity to correct any inaccurate citationsbecause no one had ordered him to do so. (See id. at 16:2–18:17.) The undersigned rejected this argument. (See id. at19:12–20.)Only then—after at least five prior declarations to the contraryduring the conference and numerous representations over theprior seven months to other judges and counsel—did Plaintifffinally acknowledge that “[s]ome of [the citations], yeah,definitely were not good and correct.” (Id. at 19:20–21.)Plaintiff also suggested he wanted the opportunity to amendhis complaint to correct any false or misleading citationscontained in the complaint. (See id. at 20:16 –21:6.) Theundersigned expressed concern that Plaintiff had not yet doneso, given that these issues were first identified seven monthsprior, but made clear it would not rule on any motion withoutgiving Plaintiff an opportunity to respond in writing. (See id.at 21:6–24:7.)Plaintiff then also admitted that, despite his priorrepresentation to Judge Gujarati to the contrary, he had usedAI software, including Gemini, the AI feature built in theGoogle Chrome browser, to obtain at least some citationson some legal issues. (See id. at 58:4–6.) When asked if hehad verified any of the case law provided to him by GoogleGemini before filing his Complaint, Plaintiff admitted that hehad not. (See id. at 58:19–59:3.)
EVGENY YAROSHEVSKY, Plaintiff, v. BENJAMIN W. KARLIN,..., Slip Copy (2026) © 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.5The undersigned reiterated the “potentially extremely seriousconsequences” that Plaintiff faced and then heard argumenton Defendants’ other arguments for sanctions or dismissal,including that Plaintiff's claims were precluded by the releaseexecuted to resolve the Justice Court proceeding, and thatPlaintiff failed to state a civil RICO claim with sufficientspecificity. (See id. at 24:11–12; 24:13–57:25.)*6 The hearing was briefly adjourned to review Plaintiff'scitations, which confirmed that some citations did not existand some did not stand for the propositions asserted. (Seeid. at 65:8–16.) The undersigned then permitted Plaintiffan opportunity to decide how he wanted to proceed. Theundersigned reiterated some of the possibilities discussedduring the hearing: Plaintiff could seek to withdrawhis Complaint; seek the opportunity to amend, with theunderstanding that amending might not fully resolve theconduct at issue and that he could still be subject to Rule 11sanctions; or move forward with his claims as they stood. (Seeid. at 69:5–70:20.) The undersigned also reiterated its seriousconcerns with granting leave to amend given the belatednature of the request and directed Plaintiff to confer withDefendants before requesting leave to withdraw or amend hiscomplaint. (See id. at 72:4–16.) Plaintiff acknowledged thathe understood these directions. (See id. at 72:17–18.) Theundersigned also made clear that a request to amend at thisstage would likely not address the concerns raised in the Rule11 motion. (See id. at 72:7–8.) Plaintiff was ordered to filehis opposition to Defendants’ motion for sanctions or a statusletter detailing how he intended to proceed by January 14,2026. (Order dated Jan. 7, 2026.)VIII. Plaintiff Seeks Leave to AmendOn January 13, 2026, seven months after Plaintiff wasfirst warned about false and misleading citations in hisComplaint, Plaintiff filed a letter requesting leave to amendhis Complaint. (Plaintiff's Motion to Amend, (“Pl's. Mot.to Amend”), Dkt. No. 52.) Invoking his pro se status, andcompletely ignoring his prior misrepresentations, Plaintiffargued that any citation errors were unintentional and “arosefrom inadvertence and from the practical challenges ofproceeding pro se in a procedurally and factually complexmatter.” (Id. p. 1.) On the same day, Plaintiff also filed hisopposition to Defendants’ motion for sanctions. (Oppositionto Motion for Sanctions, Dkt. No. 53.)On January 16, 2026, Defendants filed an opposition to therequest to amend the complaint, in which they argued thatPlaintiff's request to amend should be denied for futility,undue delay, and prejudice pursuant to Federal Rule ofCivil Procedure 15(a). (See Letter in Opposition to Plaintiff'sRequest for Leave to Amend Complaint, Dkt. No. 55.)On January 21, 2026, Defendants filed a reply in supportof their motion for sanctions. (Reply, Dkt. No. 57.) There,Defendants asserted Plaintiff used fabricated authorities in hisopposition to their motion for sanctions and identified eachinstance where the case cited by Plaintiff allegedly did notinclude the quoted material or did not accurately describe thecase's holding. (See id. pp. 1–4.)After the motion was fully briefed, the undersigned enteredan order to ensure Plaintiff clearly understood the postureof the case. In that Order, the undersigned “reiterate[d] itsprior Orders and expectations and [gave] Plaintiff one finalchance to decide how to proceed.” (Order dated Jan. 21,2026).3 On January 23, 2026, Plaintiff confirmed that “[a]ftercareful review of the Court's clarifications and expectations,”he wanted to proceed with his request to amend. (Letter, Dkt.No. 58, p. 1.)DISCUSSIONAlthough Defendants initially sought dismissal under Rule12(b)(6) and 12(b)(1), because Defendants’ subsequentmotion for sanctions also seeks dismissal with prejudice,the undersigned addresses that motion first. As part of theconsideration into whether sanctions are appropriate, theundersigned addresses Plaintiff's request for leave to amendthe complaint.I. Defendants’ Motion for SanctionsDefendants argue Plaintiff should be sanctioned (i) forusing false and nonexistent legal authority in his paperssubmitted to the Court; (ii) for fabricating facts to supporthis claims regarding Defendants’ alleged RICO conspiracyand the theories of wrongdoing by Defendants’ counseland the Justice Court; and (iii) for bringing a frivolousComplaint barred by the Release. (See Defs.’ SanctionsMot.) Defendants assert sanctions should include dismissal ofthe Complaint with prejudice and striking Plaintiff's filingsfrom the record. (Id. p. 25.) The undersigned recommendsthe Court grant Defendants’ motion for Rule 11 sanctions,which should include dismissal of Plaintiff's Complaint withprejudice.
EVGENY YAROSHEVSKY, Plaintiff, v. BENJAMIN W. KARLIN,..., Slip Copy (2026) © 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.6A. Standard for Sanctions Under Rule 11*7 “ ‘The central purpose of Rule 11 is to deterbaseless filings in district court and thus ... streamlinethe administration and procedure of the federal courts.’ ”Kumaran v. Northland Energy Trading, LLC, 762 F. Supp.3d 322, 336 (S.D.N.Y. 2025) (quoting Cooter & Gell v.Hartmarx Corp., 496 U.S. 384, 393 (1990)). To accomplishthat purpose, the Rule requires any party filing papers infederal court to certify those papers are “not being presentedfor an improper purpose, such as to harass, cause unnecessarydelay, or needlessly increase the cost of litigation,” and thatthe arguments within are “warranted by existing law” or“nonfrivolous.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(b).If, “after notice and a reasonable opportunity to respond,”a court determines Rule 11 has been violated, the courtmay impose an appropriate sanction on “any attorney, lawfirm, or party.” Id. at (c)(1). The Rule also allows a courtto award reasonable expenses, including attorneys’ fees, tothe prevailing party on the motion for sanctions. Id. at (c)(2). A district court has broad discretion in determiningwhether to impose any sanction for a Rule 11 violation.See, e.g., Perez v. Posse Comitatus, 373 F.3d 321, 325 (2dCir. 2004). In exercising that discretion, “a district courtis obligated to exercise caution and restraint.” KingvisionPay-Per-View Ltd. v. Ramierez, 05-CV-2778, 2005 WL1785113, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. July 28, 2005); see also Galin v.Hamada, 283 F. Supp. 3d 189, 201 (S.D.N.Y. 2017) (“Rule11 sanctions are reserved for extraordinary circumstances”)(internal quotation marks and citation omitted), aff'd, 753F. App'x 3 (2d Cir. 2018). “[B]ecause the purpose ofimposing Rule 11 sanctions is deterrence, a court shouldimpose the least severe sanctions necessary to achieve thatgoal.” Schottenstein v. Schottenstein, 04-CV-5851, 2005 WL912017, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 18, 2005) (citing Fed. R. Civ.P. 11(c)(2)). A court generally considers the following factorswhen deciding whether to impose Rule 11 sanctions:“(1) [w]hether the improper conduct was willful, ornegligent; (2) whether it was part of a pattern or activity,or an isolated event; (3) whether it infected the entirepleading, or only one particular count or defense; (4)whether the person has engaged in similar conduct in otherlitigation; (5) what effect it had on the litigation processin time or expense; (6) whether the responsible person istrained in the law; (7) what amount, given the financialresources of the responsible person, is needed to deter thatperson from repetition in the same case.”Ratner v. Robinson, 13-CV-6278, 2015 WL 6965077, at *18–19 (E.D.N.Y. Nov. 10, 2015) (quoting Vasile v. Dean WitterReynolds Inc., 20 F. Supp. 2d 465, 506 (E.D.N.Y. 1998), aff'd,205 F.3d 1327 (2d Cir. 2000)); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 11Advisory Committee's Note to 1993 Amendment.Rule 11 also includes two threshold procedural requirementsto “safeguard due process rights.” Baffa v. Donaldson, Lufkin& Jenrette Sec. Corp., 222 F.3d 52, 58 (2d Cir. 2000).First, a motion for sanctions must “be made separately fromany other motion and ... describe the specific conduct thatallegedly violates Rule 11(b).” Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(c)(2).Second, the Rule's “safe harbor provision,” requires a partyseeking sanctions to serve their motion on the opposing partyat least 21 days before filing it in court to allow the opposingparty the opportunity to withdraw or correct the challengedrepresentation. Id. A motion that fails to comply with theserequirements must be denied. See, e.g., Bryant v. Britt, 420F.3d 161, 163 n.2 (2d Cir. 2005).B. Application of Rule 11 to Pro Se Litigants*8 The Second Circuit has repeatedly instructed that prose litigants are deserving of “special solicitude” and must beheld to less stringent standards than lawyers. Triestman v. Fed.Bureau of Prisons, 470 F.3d 471, 475 (2d Cir. 2006) (quotingRuotolo v. IRS, 28 F.3d 6, 8 (2d Cir. 1994)). Nevertheless, prose litigants are “not exempt ... from compliance with relevantrules of procedural and substantive law,” Triestman, 470 F.3dat 477, and “[i]t is well-settled that Rule 11 applies to pro selitigants.” Mantis Transp. v. Kenner, 45 F. Supp. 3d 229, 253(E.D.N.Y. 2014); see also Ekeoma v. City of New York, 23-CV-946, 2025 WL 2952562, at *3 (E.D.N.Y. Oct. 8, 2025).Although district courts may consider a plaintiff's pro se statusin determining whether to impose sanctions, see Maduakolamv. Columbia Univ., 866 F.2d 53, 56 (2d Cir. 1989),“[t]he factthat a litigant appears pro se does not shield him from Rule 11sanctions because one acting pro se has no license to harassothers, clog the judicial machinery with meritless litigation,and abuse already overloaded court dockets.” Malley v. N.Y.City Bd. of Educ., 207 F. Supp. 2d 256, 259 (S.D.N.Y. 2002);see also Lipin v. Hunt, 573 F. Supp. 2d 836, 845 (S.D.N.Y.2008) (“[A] court's authority to enjoin vexatious litigationextends equally over pro se litigants and those representedby counsel, and a court's special solicitude towards pro selitigants does not extend to the willful, obstinate refusal toplay by the basic rules of the system upon whose very powerthe plaintiff is calling to vindicate his rights.”).
EVGENY YAROSHEVSKY, Plaintiff, v. BENJAMIN W. KARLIN,..., Slip Copy (2026) © 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.7Still, courts do not impose sanctions on a pro se litigantlightly. “[W]here a pro se litigant is alleged to have runafoul of Rule 11, courts generally apply a more lenientstandard.” Sachs v. Matano, 15-CV-6049, 2016 WL 4179792,at *7 (E.D.N.Y. July 15, 2016), report and recommendationadopted, 2016 WL 4186708 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 4, 2016).Under this more lenient standard, “Rule 11’s application [is]determined on a sliding scale according to the litigant's levelof sophistication.” Horton v. Trans World Airlines Corp., 169F.R.D. 11, at *16 (E.D.N.Y. 1996). Sanctions may be moreappropriate when a pro se litigant has legal experience orhas been previously warned of possible sanctions. See, e.g.,Colida v. Nokia Inc., 07-CV-8056, 2008 WL 4517188, at*12 (S.D.N.Y. May 6, 2008) (imposition of sanctions waswarranted against pro se plaintiff in part because “plaintiffhad been previously warned about the possibility of Rule11 sanctions”); Fariello v. Campbell, 860 F. Supp. 54, 71(E.D.N.Y.1994) (awarding sanctions where pro se plaintiffwas previously warned that sanctions may be imposed if hefiled another action); Baasch v. Reyer, 827 F. Supp. 940, 944(E.D.N.Y. 1993) (imposing sanctions when pro se plaintiffhad “shown some competence in finding and understandingthe law,” the court had explained to plaintiff why his claimshad failed and made him “fully aware of the legal and factualrequirements of his claims,” and had also warned plaintiffabout possible sanctions, and plaintiff had nonetheless filed amotion for a new trial).C. Sanctions Are Appropriate Under theCircumstances Presented HereThe undersigned finds Defendants met Rule 11’s proceduralsafeguards, and that, even considering the special solicitudedue a pro se litigant, Plaintiff's persistent and unrepentantuse of false and misleading citations, along with the materialmisrepresentations he made to three judges about his conduct,warrants sanctions, which should include dismissal of hisclaims with prejudice.1. Defendants Met Rule 11’s Procedural RequirementsThe undersigned first considers whether Defendants met thesafe harbor notice requirement of Rule 11 and concludesthat they have. As previously discussed, Defendants serveda copy of their motion on Plaintiff 21 days before movingfor sanctions.4 See supra pp. 7–8. The undersigned findsthis provided Plaintiff with the requisite notice to correct thealleged misconduct prior to Defendants seeking sanctions.But Plaintiff wholly failed to do so. Instead, he persisted in hismisconduct by invoking nonexistent and inaccurate authorityin his opposition to Defendants’ motion for sanctions. Seesupra p. 11.2. Plaintiff's Use of False andMisleading Citations Is Sanctionable*9 Not only is Plaintiff's Complaint rife with citations tononexistent cases, but he has continued to rely on citationsto nonexistent authority in almost every filing—including hismost recent filing opposing Defendants’ motion for sanctions.See supra p. 11. In that opposition, Defendants identify eightcases that do not stand for the cited proposition or do notinclude the purported quotation. (See Reply in Support ofDefendants’ Motion for Sanctions, Dkt. No. 57, pp. 1–4.)Defendants also identify at least seven cases cited in Plaintiff'sComplaint and five cases cited in Plaintiff's opposition toDefendants’ motion to dismiss that do not exist at all. (SeeFrazer Decl. ¶¶ 5–13; Declaration of Kim A. Smith in Supportof Defendants’ Motion for Sanctions, (“Sanctions Decl.”),Dkt. No. 50-1, 40.) Defendants also identify multiple othercases that do not stand for the proposition cited in Plaintiff'sfilings. (See, e.g., Letter, Dk. No. 32, p. 1; Sanctions Decl.¶¶ 40, 52). The Court has confirmed Defendants’ findingsthrough its own review of Plaintiff's citations.These errors are only exacerbated by Plaintiff's use ofgenerative AI as a drafting tool, without sufficient efforttaken to verify the accuracy of the draft product. Seesupra p. 10. That kind of conduct, whether undertaken bycounsel or a pro se litigant, creates a heavy and undueburden on opposing litigants and the courts to determinethe accuracy and merit of easily generated, voluminous, yetpotentially error-filled, filings. That is why, after warningsand opportunities to correct, the persistent presentation ofnonexistent legal authority or misrepresenting the importof legal authority resulting from a lack of effort to verifythe content of AI-generated drafts is sanctionable. See,e.g., Ramirez v. Humala, 24-CV-242, 2025 WL 1384161,at *1 (E.D.N.Y. May 13, 2025) (listing cases addressingAI-generated citations and finding “the Second Circuit, aswell as district courts across the country, have found thesubmission of nonexistent case citations in filings to thecourt to constitute sanctionable conduct under Rule 11(b)(2).”); Ferris v. Amazon.com Services, LLC, 24-CV-304, 2025WL 1122235, at *2 (N.D. Miss. Apr. 16, 2025) (imposingsanctions against pro se plaintiff who continued to submit
EVGENY YAROSHEVSKY, Plaintiff, v. BENJAMIN W. KARLIN,..., Slip Copy (2026) © 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.8false citations generated by AI after being put on notice bydefendant, and ordering plaintiff to pay defendant's costs).Here, Plaintiff's failure to verify and correct his filings has,for months, distracted from adjudicating Plaintiff's claimson their merits. Instead, the Court and Defendants’ counselhave been forced to spend significant time and resources todetermine whether the authorities cited in Plaintiff's error-filled filings actually support his arguments. Making mattersworse, Plaintiff has misrepresented his conduct on multipleoccasions, arguing as recently as oral argument on the motionfor sanctions that he had verified his citations when heactually had not. See supra pp. 9–10. Given the severityof Plaintiff's conduct, the undersigned finds sanctions areappropriate even under the more lenient standard applicable toPlaintiff as a pro se litigant. See, e.g., Williams v. Off. of ChildSupport, 21-CV-8235, 2023 WL 2396354, at *5 (S.D.N.Y.Mar. 3, 2023) (imposing sanctions when pro se plaintiffcaused defense counsel and court “to incur substantial time indisposing of the case” by willfully filing claims plaintiff knewwere false), report and recommendation adopted, 2023 WL3967791 (S.D.N.Y. June 13, 2023); Shepherd v. Annucci, 921F.3d 89, 97–98 (2d Cir. 2019) (affirming sanction of dismissalwhen pro se plaintiff acted in bad faith, even when lessersanctions were not considered).a. Plaintiff's Belated Request to AmendDoes Not Sufficiently Address HisMisconduct and Should Be DeniedDespite failing to do so for months, Plaintiff now requests anopportunity to amend his Complaint to address the concernsraised in the Rule 11 motion. See supra pp. 9–11. Theundersigned notes that such an amendment would not fullyresolve the conduct at issue in Defendants’ Rule 11 motion,which extends beyond citations in Plaintiff's Complaint tocitations in other documents and misrepresentations aboutopposing counsel. See supra pp. 10–11. Nor would itaddress Plaintiff's persistent misrepresentations to the Court.However, even if it would, the undersigned respectfullyrecommends Plaintiff's request for leave to amend be denied.*10 Under Rule 15(a)(1), a party may amend a pleadingwithout seeking permission from the Court once within 21days of serving it, or 21 days after a responsive pleading orRule 12 motion is served. Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(1). Otherwise,a party may only amend its pleading after obtaining writtenconsent from the opposing party or with leave of court. Id.at (a)(2). Rule 15(a) provides that leave to amend “shall befreely given when justice so requires.” But the district courthas broad discretion whether to grant or deny leave to amend.See, e.g., Zahra v. Town of Southold, 48 F.3d 674, 685 (2d Cir.1995).“Generally, leave to amend should be freely given, anda pro se litigant in particular should be afforded everyreasonable opportunity to demonstrate that he has a validclaim.” Nielsen v. Rabin, 746 F.3d 58, 62 (2d Cir. 2014)(internal quotation marks and citation omitted). But leave toamend may still be denied, even to a pro se plaintiff, with“good reason, ... including futility, bad faith, undue delay, orundue prejudice to the opposing party.” Zappin v. Cooper,23-165, 2024 WL 3084015, at *3 (2d Cir. June 21, 2024)(quoting TechnoMarine SA v. Giftports, Inc., 758 F.3d 493,505 (2d Cir. 2014)).Here, Plaintiff had numerous opportunities over the pastseven months to amend his Complaint and address his falseand misleading citations. These opportunities include but arenot limited to when Judge Gujarati discussed the deficienciesin his Complaint at the August 5, 2025 conference; afterDefendants filed their motion to dismiss; after Defendantssent their safe harbor letter notifying him of their intentionto seek sanctions; after Defendants filed their motion forsanctions; and finally, after the January 7 conference beforethe undersigned. See supra pp. 4–11. By rejecting theseopportunities, Plaintiff has allowed this case to go down apath of intense and lengthy motion practice that could havebeen avoided had he amended when these issues were firstbrought to his attention. Considering that this prejudice todefendants is one of the most important considerations inreviewing a motion to amend, the undersigned finds thatfailure for months to seek leave to amend his Complaint in theface of persistent warnings, resulting in Defendants having tofile multiple motions, is precisely the kind of bad faith andundue delay that warrant denial of leave. See Lipin v. Nat'lUnion Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh, Pa., 202 F. Supp. 2d 126,140 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) (imposing sanctions on pro se plaintiff“forced” defendants to litigate meritless claims).Even if the Court were inclined to grant leave to amend, theundersigned respectfully recommends that the Court sanctionPlaintiff for his persistent misrepresentations to the Court andhis inexplicable delay in seeking to correct his Complaint.Thus, the undersigned also recommends that the Court denyPlaintiff's request to amend his Complaint as an alternative tosanctions.
EVGENY YAROSHEVSKY, Plaintiff, v. BENJAMIN W. KARLIN,..., Slip Copy (2026) © 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.9b. The Relevant Factors Supportan Imposition of SanctionsThe relevant factors also weigh in favor of imposing sanctionsin this case. As detailed supra, Plaintiff's conduct exceedsnegligence or an innocent error by a pro se litigant. Evenassuming he did not know the cases cited in his Complaintwere wrong at first, when those issues were brought to hisattention by opposing counsel and three different judges, hedenied any inaccuracies existed and accused Defendants oflying. See supra pp. 5–7, 9. He also continued to use falseor misleading citations in filings. See supra pp. 7, 11. Inthe end, Plaintiff ultimately admitted he knew his authoritieswere false despite insisting otherwise for many months. Seesupra pp. 8–10. Notwithstanding that knowledge, he failedto correct them—despite being asked by defense counsel andmultiple federal judges on at least six occasions to do so. Seesupra pp. 4–12. Such overt misrepresentations are willful andwarrant serious sanctions. Crum v. Dodrill, 562 F. Supp. 2d366, 382–83 (N.D.N.Y. 2008) (collecting cases and imposingsanction of dismissal against pro se incarcerated plaintiff formaking material misrepresentation in complaint).*11 But most importantly, this Court's clear and consistentwarnings made Plaintiff fully aware of the possibility ofsanctions. Over a period of more than nine months, theCourt explained to Plaintiff his obligations under Rule 11and warned him many times of the potential consequencesof his conduct. See supra pp. 5–10. Despite those warnings,Plaintiff continued to file multiple papers with inaccurate ornonexistent citations—even though he now admits he knewthey were incorrect. See supra pp. 7, 10. He also affirmativelyand repeatedly denied that he was using nonexistent citations,as recently as the argument about the instant motion. Seesupra pp. 4–6, 9–11. Even if given the benefit of thedoubt as a pro se litigant, Plaintiff responded by, at best,denying there was an issue, but also arguably making materialrepresentations to Judge Gujarati and the undersigned. Seesupra pp. 5, 9. Such dogged determination to use reckless oroutright false arguments to the Court despite clear warningsweighs in favor of sanctions.5 See Khudai v. Akamai Techs.,20-CV-3686, 2023 WL 7174616, at *5–6 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 1,2023) (imposing sanctions on pro se litigant who continuedto make unsubstantiated statements about defendant and itsattorneys for nearly a year), report and recommendationadopted, 2024 WL 2046052 (S.D.N.Y. May 8, 2024)3. Sanctions Should Include Dismissal with PrejudiceHaving found Plaintiff's conduct is sanctionable, theundersigned now determines what sanctions should beimposed. Under these circumstances, the undersigned findssanctions less than dismissal with prejudice would not deterPlaintiff from ongoing misconduct in this case. Plaintiff isunrepentant and has demonstrated that he will persist inmisconduct despite this Court's warnings. See supra pp 4–12. Such persistence in making misleading representationswarrants dismissal with prejudice.6 See, e.g., Saxena v.Martinez-Hernandez, 22-CV-2126, 2025 WL 1194003, at *2(D. Nev. Apr. 23, 2025) (“[plaintiff's] use of AI generatedcases—and his subsequent refusal to accept responsibility fordoing so—is just another example of [his] abusive litigationtactics, and further explains why the court issued case-terminating sanctions”); O'Brien v. Flick, 2025 WL 242924,at *5 (S.D. Fla. Jan. 10, 2025) (imposing sanction of dismissalagainst plaintiff who filed papers citing to nonexistent casesand unpersuasively represented to the court that the citationswere “the result of an inadvertent mix-up”).4. Shifting of Fees Related to Defendants’ Rule11 Motion Is an Additional Appropriate SanctionBecause defense counsel spent a significant amount of timeevaluating and verifying Plaintiff's citations and authoritiesas a result of his refusal to admit and correct the citations,the undersigned recommends that the Court grant Defendantsleave to file a formal fee application to recover feesrelated to the Rule 11 Motion. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(c)(4). The undersigned also recommends Plaintiff be affordedthe opportunity to oppose the amount sought, including byaddressing his ability to pay such a sanction. To the extentPlaintiff makes such an argument, he must support it withappropriate evidence. And to the extent Plaintiff cites legalauthority in response to the fee application, he must check allcitations in that filing and include an exhibit with copies ofall citations to electronic copies of authority.*12 In other cases, courts have also imposed monetarysanctions against parties who used incorrect citations inbriefs, including when the inaccuracies are a result of using AIsoftware. See, e.g., Mata v. Avianca, Inc., 678 F. Supp. 3d 443,466–67 (S.D.N.Y. 2023) (imposing $5,000 monetary penaltyon two lawyers for submitting citations to fake opinions).Here, although the conduct is sufficiently egregious to
EVGENY YAROSHEVSKY, Plaintiff, v. BENJAMIN W. KARLIN,..., Slip Copy (2026) © 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.10warrant such sanctions, given Plaintiff's pro se status, as wellas the likelihood that holding Plaintiff responsible for the feesand costs associated with Defendants’ motion to dismiss willconstitute a substantial financial sanction in and of itself, theundersigned finds a separate monetary sanction inappropriateand recommends against the Court issuing one.II. Defendants’ Motion to DismissDefendants separately move to dismiss the Complaint onseveral other grounds, each of which have some degreeof merit. (See Defendant's Motion to Dismiss, Dkt. No38-33.) Given the recommendation to dismiss this matteras a sanction, the undersigned does not address each ofthese grounds. However, the undersigned notes that, even ifthe Court were to decide against dismissing the Complaintas a sanction, one of the grounds in Defendants’ motionindependently and plainly requires dismissal of Plaintiff'sComplaint: that the claims are barred by a release Plaintiffsigned as part of a prior settlement agreement. (See id. pp. 26–30.)Plaintiff attaches the release at issue to the Complaint. (SeeCompl., Ex. 26 p. 3.) It is thus incorporated by reference andmay be considered at the motion to dismiss stage. See, e.g.,Chambers v. Time Warner, Inc., 282 F.3d 147, 152–53 (2dCir. 2002). The Court may also take judicial notice of theRelease. See, e.g., In re Nine W. LBO Sec. Litig., 505 F. Supp.3d 292, 302 n.3 (S.D.N.Y. 2020) (“Settlement agreementsare documents of which a court may take judicial notice inorder to determine whether future claims are barred by aprevious settlement.”) (quoting Deylii v. Novartis Pharms.Corp., 13-CV-6699, 2014 WL 2757470, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. June16, 2014)).The undersigned finds that the language of the Releaseunambiguously releases all past and future claims againstDefendants. See supra p. 3. Its terms also appear to encompassall predicate acts in Plaintiff's alleged RICO scheme and,thus, would require dismissal of the complaint. See id; seealso, e.g., Johnson v. City of N.Y., 23-CV-3018, 2024 WL3520445, at *5–6 (S.D.N.Y. July 23, 2024); (finding generalrelease barred pro se plaintiff's civil rights claims that arosebefore execution of the release); Gallo v. Inter-Con Sec. Sys.Inc., 20-CV-4879, 2021 WL 3913539, at *5–8 (S.D.N.Y.Sept. 1, 2021) (dismissing pro se plaintiff's discriminationclaims against former employer when plaintiff had previouslyentered into settlement agreement releasing those claims);Dechberry v. N.Y. City Fire Dep't, 124 F. Supp. 3d 131, 141–43 (E.D.N.Y. 2015) (broad terms of general release warranteddismissal of pro se plaintiff's employment discriminationclaims); Interpharm v. Wells Fargo Bank, Nat'l Ass'n, 655F.3d 136, 142 (2d Cir. 2011); (“Under New York law ... avalid release constitutes a complete bar to an action on aclaim which is the subject of the release.”) (internal citation& quotation omitted).In his opposition to the motion to dismiss, Plaintiff initiallyargued that the Release is not so broad as to encompasshis claims, and that it is undermined by fraud, coercion,lack of consideration, and material breach. (See Pl's. MTDOpp.; Pl's. Mot. to Amend.) However, during the January 7,2026 conference, Plaintiff conceded that all his claims wouldbe covered by the Release. (See Jan. 7 Tr. at 30:22–31:5.)Plaintiff instead argues that he is not bound by the Releasebecause he was never paid the settlement amount requiredunder the agreement. (See Pl's. Mot. to Amend pp. 2–3; Jan.7 Tr. at 27:15–29:3.)*13 The undersigned finds Plaintiff's argument unavailing.Plaintiff cannot unilaterally declare the release void and bringa RICO claim in federal court. Under the parties’ settlementagreement, the state court retains jurisdiction to enforce thespecific terms of that agreement. See supra p. 3. If, asPlaintiff alleges, Defendants breached the terms of the parties’agreement, Plaintiff's remedy is to seek enforcement in thestate court with jurisdiction over the agreement. See, e.g.,Town of Huntington v. Am. Mfrs. Mut. Ins. Co., 267 F.R.D.449, 453 (E.D.N.Y. 2010) (granting motion to dismiss claimsalleging breach of agreement to settle state court constructionlitigation because, inter alia, state court retained jurisdictionover agreement and it was an accessible forum to continuedispute); Thanning v. Nassau Cnty. Med. Examiners Off., 187F.R.D. 69, 71 (E.D.N.Y. 1999) (“[D]isputes arising out ofthe alleged breach of the settlement agreement amount tobreach of contract claims that are properly decided in a stateforum.”); Scelsa v. City Univ. of N.Y., 76 F.3d 37, 40–41(2d Cir. 1996) (“[E]nforcement of a settlement agreement isfor the state courts.”). Therefore, Plaintiff's claims are barredby the release from the prior settlement agreement, and theundersigned recommends they be dismissed with prejudice onthat basis.CONCLUSIONFor the reasons set forth above, the undersigned recommendsthat the Court grant Defendants’ motion for sanctions,including dismissing Plaintiff's Complaint with prejudice,
EVGENY YAROSHEVSKY, Plaintiff, v. BENJAMIN W. KARLIN,..., Slip Copy (2026) © 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.11or, alternatively, granting Defendants’ motion to dismissand dismissing Plaintiff's Complaint with prejudice. Theundersigned also recommends that, should it grant the motionfor sanctions, the Court also grant Defendants leave to filea formal application to recover fees related to that motion,which Plaintiff may oppose under the terms described herein.OBJECTIONSAny objections to this Report and Recommendation mustbe filed within 14 days after service of this Report andRecommendation. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed. R. Civ.P. 72(b)(2); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(a) & (d) (addressingcomputation of days). Any requests for an extension of timefor filing objections must be directed to Judge Gujarati.Failure to file objections within this period designating theparticular issues to be reviewed waives the right to appealthe district court's order. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b); Fed. R. Civ.P. 72(b)(2); see also Wagner & Wagner, LLP v. Atkinson,Haskins, Nellis, Brittingham, Gladd & Carwile, P.C., 596F.3d 84, 92 (2d Cir. 2010) (“[A] party [forfeits] appellatereview of a decision in a magistrate judge's Report andRecommendation if the party fails to file timely objectionsdesignating the particular issue.”); Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S.140 (1985) (finding Federal Magistrates Act does not forbidcourt of appeals from adopting rule conditioning appealfrom district court's judgment that adopts magistrate judge'srecommendation upon filing of objections to magistratejudge's report identifying those issues on which further reviewis desired).SO ORDERED.All CitationsSlip Copy, 2026 WL 522624Footnotes1Benjamin Karlin is the sole member of Winnie Woodcliff Park, LLC and Woodcliff Park Cottages, LLC. (SmithDecl. 7; Compl. 9.) Mr. Karlin's wife, Sandra Karlin, is named as a Defendant but holds no position inWinnie Woodcliff Park, LLC, nor Woodcliff Park Cottages, LLC, nor any other entity related to Woodcliff Park.(Smith Decl. 7.)2Winnie Woodcliff Park, LLC rents parcels of the Woodcliff Park property to tenants, who lease their land butown the cottages and structures that sit on the land. (See Compl. 27; Smith Decl. 7.)3That Order clarified Plaintiff's obligation to follow all directions and orders from the Court—even those givenorally as opposed to in writing. (Id.) It also explained that the Court had indeed directed Plaintiff to conferwith Defendants before seeking leave to amend, and that the Court had not found Plaintiff should have anopportunity to amend given the concerns addressed at the January 7 conference. (Id.)4Plaintiff's argument that there is overlap between Defendants’ motion to dismiss and motion for sanctionsis irrelevant. (See Plaintiff's Opposition to Motion for Sanctions, Dkt. No. 53-1 22.) Both motions may bebrought simultaneously so long as a Rule 11 motion is filed “separately,” as occurred here. See Fed. R. Civ. P.11(c)(2); see also JGIAP RH 160 LLC v. CRI Holding Corp., 21-CV-02489, 2023 WL 5979125 (E.D.N.Y. Aug.16, 2023) (addressing Rule 11 motion and Rule 12(b)(6) when both were made separately in compliance withsafe harbor provision) report and recommendation adopted, 2023 WL 6307320 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 28, 2023).5Although not required to grant Defendants’ motion, such subjective bad faith renders sanctions even moreappropriate in this case. Cf. In re Pennie & Edmonds LLP, 323 F.3d 86 (2d Cir. 2003) (comparing objectivereasonableness standard for imposing Rule 11 sanctions pursuant to motion brought by opposing counselto subjective bad faith standard for district court's inherent authority to impose sanctions sua sponte).
EVGENY YAROSHEVSKY, Plaintiff, v. BENJAMIN W. KARLIN,..., Slip Copy (2026) © 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.126While the undersigned is mindful that dispositive sanctions are disfavored in the Second Circuit, Weller v.Ichan School of Medicine at Mt. Sinai, 23-CV-4775, 2025 WL 3537854, at *8 (E.D.N.Y Dec. 10, 2025) (internalcitations omitted), the facts here present one of those unique circumstances where a dispositive sanctionshould be considered.End of Document© 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.
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