Young v. Young (June 8, 2026)

Case details
Full caption
A25-0906 In the Marriage of: Kimberly Ann Young v. Charles Wayne Young, Jr
Country
United States
Jurisdiction
Federal
Decided
June 8, 2026
Disposition
Affirmed
Majority
Nonprecedential Opinion Bratvold (J.) (unanimous Court)
This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c). STATE OF MINNESOTA IN COURT OF APPEALS A25-0906 In the Marriage of: Kimberly Ann Young, petitioner, Respondent, vs. Charles Wayne Young, Jr., Appellant. Filed June 8, 2026 Affirmed Bratvold, Judge Hennepin County District Court File No. 27-FA-22-6120 Kimberly Ann Young, Minneapolis, Minnesota (pro se respondent) Charles Wayne Young, Jr., St. Cloud, Minnesota (pro se appellant) Considered and decided by Bratvold, Presiding Judge; Worke, Judge; and Ross, Judge. NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION BRATVOLD, Judge In this appeal from a post-dissolution order modifying a judgment and decree, appellant father argues that the district court clearly erred in its factual findings. Father also contends that the district court abused its discretion by (1) failing to decide two of father’s motions; (2) deciding issues when it lacked jurisdiction to do so; (3) modifying child
2 support; (4) ordering father to reimburse respondent mother for their children’s expenses; and (5) vacating a parenting-time “right of first refusal” set out in the dissolution judgment and decree. Finally, father argues that the district court judge should not preside over further proceedings between these parties based on the appearance of bias. We affirm. FACTS Appellant Charles Wayne Young Jr. (father) and respondent Kimberly Ann Young (mother) were married in 2012. Their two minor children were born in 2013 and 2014. In March 2023, the district court dissolved the marriage in a stipulated judgment and decree (decree). The decree provided that the parties shared joint legal and joint physical custody of the children and equal parenting time. Under the decree, father was to receive the marital home in Minneapolis and the children would attend Minneapolis Public Schools. This is the second of two appeals following entry of the decree. This opinion summarizes the relevant facts here based, in part, on facts set out in Young v. Young, which affirmed the district court’s decision. No. A24-1922, 2025 WL 3200038, at *1 (Minn. App. Nov. 17, 2025) (Young I). After the parties separated, father began a romantic relationship with a new partner and purchased a home in St. Cloud into which he moved with his romantic partner. Id. In May 2024, mother moved to modify parenting time, in part based on the travel distance and time between father’s home and the children’s school. Id. Father opposed mother’s motion and separately moved to amend the parenting-time schedule. Id. The parties waived an evidentiary hearing “and asked the district court to rely upon the parties’ affidavits in reaching its decision.” Id.
3 In October 2024, the district court filed an order modifying parenting time (October 2024 order). The district court first determined that the statutory best-interests factors supported a parenting-time schedule that minimized travel between St. Cloud and Minneapolis on school days. Accordingly, it ordered that, during the school year, father had parenting time “every other weekend from Friday after school until Sunday evening” as well as “any non-holiday, non-school days, Spring Break, and MEA Break.” Father, who worked in St. Paul, also had parenting time in the Twin Cities metropolitan area on Wednesdays and Thursdays after school until 7:00 p.m. During summer breaks, the children would alternate weeks with each parent until the week before school began, which was designated as mother’s parenting time “so that the children may prepare for school.” The October 2024 order also provided for “reasonable telephone contact” and video calls between the children and the off-duty parent while in the care of the on-duty parent (reasonable communication provision). In November 2024, father was self-represented and moved, in essence, for an order to show cause why mother should not be held in contempt, alleging that mother refused to allow the children to communicate with father by telephone and video call. On December 2, mother responded and included cross-motions, asking the district court to (1) deny father’s contempt motion, (2) modify the reasonable communication provision in the October 2024 order, (3) “incorporate the parties’ previous agreement regarding the holiday parenting-time schedule into the” October 2024 order, (4) rule on mother’s May 2024 motion in which she asked father to pay $1,232.32 in expenses for the children,
4 (5) modify child support starting December 1, 2024, and (6) order the parties to participate in mediation. On December 9, 2024, father appealed the October 2024 order. In district court, father separately replied and responded to mother’s December 2 cross-motions, opposing mother’s motions and seeking to restore his parenting time to 45.1% or higher “because [his] time was reduced . . . without an evidentiary hearing.” The parties appeared for a hearing on December 16, 2024, and the district court ordered the parties to mediate. Later that month, the district court amended its October 2024 order, stating that its intention was to “correct clerical errors.” The December 2024 order clarified the holiday parenting-time schedule and the reasonable communication provision. On the same day, the district court denied father’s motion to hold mother in contempt. On January 15, 2025, mother’s attorney contacted the district court and asked it to “waive the mediation requirement . . . and schedule a motion in this matter” because father “refused to schedule mediation.” That same day, father opposed waiving mediation and asked the district court to reprimand mother’s attorney “for pursuing unnecessary litigation” and to restore his parenting time to 50%. On January 21, 2025, father filed a motion objecting to the hearing that mother scheduled for February 26, 2025, arguing that the district court lacked jurisdiction during the pending appeal, among other things. Father’s motion also asked the district court to “require [mother] to comply with all procedural mediation and negotiation rules before filing further motions” and asked the district court judge to recuse “due to a pattern of
5 procedural irregularities.” On February 4, 2025, father moved for a stay pending the appeal, asking the district court to grant “a stay of all further parenting-time modifications,” cancel the February hearing, and “require [mother] to comply” with court rules. The district court did not cancel the February 2025 hearing, and father filed several more motions before the hearing.1 At the hearing, the district court stated that it would strike father’s “most recent filings that were untimely.” The district court also stated that it was not conducting an evidentiary hearing and noted that it had ordered mediation, but father “did not participate.” Father responded that he “never refused” mediation. Father also stated that he would “pay child support based on the child support calculator,” but the parties needed “to figure out what that percentage of overnights is.” Father did not specify a number of overnights. The district court filed an order addressing the motions heard at the February hearing (May 2025 order). The district court granted father’s request in part and stayed mother’s motion to modify parenting time, stating that the district court “does not currently have jurisdiction over those issues” because the parenting-time issue decided in the October 2024 order was on appeal. But the district court also determined that some issues were not covered by the October 2024 order and ruled on those issues. For example, the district court modified child support retroactive to January 1, 2025, ordered father to reimburse mother $3,010.19 in expenses for the children, and vacated the parenting-time 1 This opinion does not describe father’s motions filed after February 4 and before the February 2025 hearing because father’s primary brief does not raise them as issues on appeal.
6 “right of first refusal” from the decree. The district court also calculated child support using a child-support guidelines worksheet. The district court denied requested relief that was “not granted, stayed, or otherwise denied.” Father now appeals the May 2025 order. DECISION Father and mother are self-represented on appeal. Self-represented parties are “accorded some leeway in attempting to comply with court rules,” but they are “still not relieved of the burden of, at least, adequately communicating to the court what it is [they want] accomplished and by whom.” Carpenter v. Woodvale, Inc., 400 N.W.2d 727, 729 (Minn. 1987). “Although some accommodations may be made for pro se litigants, this court has repeatedly emphasized that pro se litigants are generally held to the same standards as attorneys and must comply with court rules.” Fitzgerald v. Fitzgerald, 629 N.W.2d 115, 119 (Minn. App. 2001). Our review of father’s brief shows that it contains many citations to caselaw that either do not exist—sometimes referred to as “hallucinations”—or do not support his legal argument. And father’s brief inaccurately quotes statutes and the record. Our review also leads us to believe that father may have used generative artificial intelligence (AI) to write his brief. While AI can be a helpful tool and we do not suggest that court rules prohibit its use, we emphasize that hallucinated caselaw is not valid authority and that all parties should be mindful of the importance of accuracy in their submissions. Finally, as discussed below, father fails to cite authority that supports his position and to articulate an argument in support of some issues. This results in forfeiture, and the
7 issue “will not be considered on appeal unless prejudicial error is obvious on mere inspection.” Schoepke v. Alexander Smith & Sons Carpet Co., 187 N.W.2d 133, 135 (Minn. 1971). We reorganize the arguments in father’s brief into six issues and discuss each in turn. I. The district court did not refuse to consider two of father’s motions. Alternatively, any error in failing to expressly address the motions was harmless. Father contends that the district court erred by refusing to consider three motions based on its incorrect conclusion that the motions were untimely. Father specifically argues that the district court did not consider the motions he filed on January 21, January 31, and February 4. The record does not show that father filed a motion on January 31. As a result, we address only the January 21 and February 4 motions.2 At the February hearing that preceded the May 2025 order, the district court stated that it would “strike” father’s most recent filings as untimely. A district court may ignore untimely submissions if there is no justification for their lateness. See Axford v. Axford, 402 N.W.2d 143, 145 (Minn. App. 1987) (concluding that the district court acted within its discretion by ignoring appellant’s post-hearing submissions that were filed without motion or explanation). 2 It is true that father filed motions after February 4 and before the February 2025 hearing, but on appeal, father does not appear to challenge the district court’s alleged failure to consider these other motions. Father argues in his reply brief that his February 14 filing was timely. We seldom reach issues raised for the first time in a reply brief. Emerson v. Sch. Bd. of Indep. Sch. Dist. 199, 809 N.W.2d 679, 687 (Minn. 2012). Thus, we do not consider father’s motions filed after February 4 and before the February 2025 hearing.
8 First, we consider the record involving the January 21 and February 4 motions. Second, we consider whether father was prejudiced in the district court’s failure to expressly address some issues in its May 2025 order. A. January 21 and February 4 Motions We conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion in its handling of the January 21 and February 4 motions for several reasons. First, the district court did not state that it considered the motions filed on January 21 and February 4 to be untimely. Based on our review, it appears that the district court’s timeliness comment did not relate to the January 21 or the February 4 motion, because it was made immediately after mother’s attorney challenged father’s motions dated February 20 and 26. Second, father claims that his January 21 and February 4 motions addressed issues discussed at the February 2025 hearing, specifically that they discussed child support or the children’s expenses. Our review of the January 21 and February 4 motions does not support father’s position; neither child support nor the children’s expenses were covered in the motions he filed on those dates. Third, the district court expressly considered some arguments that father raised in the January 21 and February 4 motions: for example, the district court granted father’s motion to stay parenting-time issues pending appeal of the October 2024 order. Fourth, the district court expressly denied any “relief not granted, stayed, or otherwise denied.” Thus, even if the district court erred by failing to explicitly discuss some of the issues father raised in his January 21 and February 4 motions, reversal is not required for the reason argued by father.
9 B. Harmless Error On appeal, father identifies three requests for relief raised in the January 21 and February 4 motions that were denied but not explicitly discussed in the May 2025 order. The three requests asked the district court to (1) cancel the February 2025 hearing; (2) require mother “to comply with all procedural mediation and negotiation rules before filing further motions”; and (3) recuse “due to a pattern of procedural irregularities” that “have created an appearance of bias and undermined confidence in the fairness” of the proceedings. We conclude as to each of these three requests that father fails to establish prejudice. Before obtaining relief on appeal, father has the burden to demonstrate that any error was prejudicial. Midway Ctr. Assocs. v. Midway Ctr., Inc., 237 N.W.2d 76, 78 (Minn. 1975) (citing Loth v. Loth, 35 N.W.2d 542, 546 (Minn. 1949)). We do not grant relief on appeal for any error that does not affect father’s substantial rights. Minn. R. Civ. P. 61 (requiring harmless error to be ignored); see also Goldman v. Greenwood, 748 N.W.2d 279, 285 (Minn. 2008) (applying rule 61 in a family-law appeal). With the prejudice requirement in mind, we turn to each request. First, as to the request to cancel the February 2025 hearing, father argued to the district court that it lacked jurisdiction, an issue we address below. Second, as to father’s request that the district court order mother to comply with the rules, father does not contend on appeal that mother violated the rules or that he was prejudiced by mother’s violation of the rules. See Schoepke, 187 N.W.2d at 135 (explaining that appellate courts consider improperly argued issues to be forfeited).
10 Third, as to father’s request for the district court judge to recuse herself, a party may request that a judge voluntarily disqualify themselves before the party files a notice of removal. See State v. Finch, 865 N.W.2d 696, 702 (Minn. 2015) (analyzing recusal request in criminal proceedings). Because the district court judge did not recuse herself, father could have filed a notice of removal, but he did not do so. Even if we assume that father’s motion amounted to a notice of removal, father failed to make a sufficient showing to require the district court judge’s disqualification. Removal of a judge in a civil matter is governed by Minnesota Rule of Civil Procedure 63.03, which states in part that a “judge or judicial officer who has presided at a motion or any other proceeding. . . may not be removed except upon an affirmative showing that the judge or judicial officer is disqualified under the Code of Judicial Conduct.” (Emphasis added.) A judge need not recuse unless the judge’s “impartiality might reasonably be questioned.” See Minn. Code Jud. Conduct Rule 2.11(A). Here, the district court judge had presided over many hearings involving father and mother, so father was required to affirmatively show that the judge was disqualified. Father’s January 21 motion stated that the district court judge should recuse herself based on “a pattern of procedural irregularities” and asserted that the district court had reduced his parenting time “from 50% to 36% without an evidentiary hearing.” We are not persuaded. First, prior adverse rulings, on their own, do not sufficiently show bias. Hannon v. State, 752 N.W.2d 518, 522 (Minn. 2008); Olson v. Olson, 392 N.W.2d 338, 341 (Minn. App. 1986) (family-law appeal). Second, father argues that some of the judge’s comments at the February 2025 hearing demonstrate bias, but the
11 record shows the challenged comments related to this case and do not have even the appearance of bias. Third, father argued in his January 21 motion that a procedural irregularity occurred when the October 2024 order reduced in his parenting time without an evidentiary hearing. But this court considered and rejected this identical argument in Young I, concluding that father waived an evidentiary hearing and failed to make an affirmative showing of disqualification. 2025 WL 3200038, at *1-6. Because father failed to make an affirmative showing that the district court judge was disqualified, we conclude that the district court’s failure to explicitly discuss father’s request for removal of the judge was harmless error. In short, the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying father’s January 21 and February 4 motions for the reasons already stated. We also conclude that any error in the district court’s failure to expressly discuss three requests for relief in these motions was harmless. See Reid v. Strodtman, 631 N.W.2d 414, 419-20 (Minn. App. 2001) (concluding that, where the district court erred by concluding that a motion had no basis but the moving party would not have been entitled to relief, the district court’s error was harmless).3 3 Father also argues that he was denied due process because he believes that the district court issued the May 2025 order without reviewing his written arguments. Similarly, father argues that the district court denied him due process when it ordered, during the February 2025 hearing, that father produce tax documents, pay stubs, and health insurance documentation “by 4:30 p.m. that same day.” The court of appeals reviews de novo the procedural due process afforded a party. Plocher v. Comm’r of Pub. Safety, 681 N.W.2d 698, 702 (Minn. App. 2004). “[D]ue process of law requires notice and an opportunity to be heard.” Szarzynski v. Szarzynski, 732 N.W.2d 285, 296 (Minn. App. 2007). Based on our review of the record surrounding the January 21 and February 4 motions and the February 2025 hearing, father had notice and an opportunity to be heard on these issues.
12 II. The district court had jurisdiction over the issues decided in the December 2024 and May 2025 orders. Father argues that the district court lacked jurisdiction at the time it entered the December 2024 and May 2025 orders because the issues decided were pending in this court on appeal. Mother argues that the district court correctly identified and limited its orders to issues that were not on appeal. We review jurisdictional issues de novo. Rubey v. Vannett, 714 N.W.2d 417, 421 (Minn. 2006). “[T]he filing of a timely and proper appeal suspends the trial court’s authority to make any order that affects the order or judgment appealed from, although the trial court retains jurisdiction as to matters independent of, supplemental to, or collateral to the order or judgment appealed from.” Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 108.01, subd. 2. In other words, the district court retains authority to address ancillary or collateral matters while an appeal is pending. In Perry v. Perry, this court discussed a district court’s jurisdiction to issue orders in a family-law matter while an appeal was pending. 749 N.W.2d 399, 402-04 (Minn. App. 2008). We concluded that a district court may rule on a motion to modify a child-support order, even when that order is on appeal, as long as the modification order would not “necessarily affect the previous child-support order.” Id. at 402-03 (quotation omitted). We explained that “an order does not necessarily affect the order on appeal if it involves a new set of facts and does not require the district court to consider the merits of the issue on appeal.” Id. at 403.
13 Perry recognized that a district court has jurisdiction over issues that are “supplemental and collateral to the issue on appeal” but may exercise its “discretion to stay or defer its decision” until after the court of appeals issues its decision on the pending appeal. Id. at 401. And “in the family-law context, the district court’s authority to act should be construed in a way that permits the courts to respond to changing circumstances and protect the best interests of the children.” Id. at 403. Father argues that, under Perry, the district court lacked jurisdiction over the issues it decided in the May 2025 order. We disagree. Father appealed the May 2025 order in June 2025. In November 2025, this court filed Young I and affirmed the October 2024 order modifying parenting time. 2025 WL 3200038, at *1, *6. In doing so, we concluded that the district court did not abuse its discretion by modifying the parenting-time schedule and rejected father’s argument that the district court demonstrated bias. Id. at *2-6. At the time the district court filed the May 2025 order, this court had not yet filed Young I. In the May 2025 order, the district court considered its jurisdiction given the pending appeal of the October 2024 order. The district court determined that “[c]hild support, expense reimbursement, vacating the right of first refusal, adding therapy dispute resolution language and attorney’s fees were not subject to the October 2024 Order.”4 4 In the May 2025 order, the district court also determined that it did not “currently have jurisdiction over” mother’s motion to modify the “three-weekend rule” because it “would effectively be modifying the October 2024 Order currently on appeal.” The three-weekend rule is described below in note 7. The district court erred by concluding that it lacked jurisdiction over mother’s motion to modify the three-weekend rule because the request was based on a new set of facts or circumstances that had changed since the October 2024 order. See Perry, 749 N.W.2d at 403. That said, because neither party contends that the
14 Thus, the May 2025 order decided only issues that were “independent of, supplemental to, or collateral to” the October 2024 order on appeal. Minn. R. App. P. 108.01, subd. 2. Similarly, the December 2024 order decided matters collateral to the October 2024 order because it (1) added a holiday schedule, which was inadvertently not included in the October 2024 order, and (2) clarified the reasonable communication provision in the decree in response to motions by both parties. Neither of the issues decided in the December 2024 order necessarily affected an issue decided in the October 2024 order.5 Thus, the district court acted within its jurisdiction in resolving the issues set out in the December 2024 and May 2025 orders. After this appeal was submitted for a decision, father filed with this court as “supplemental authority” a district court order filed April 24, 2026, in which the district court amended parenting-time provisions in the December 2024 order. Father’s correspondence to the court stated that the district court lacked jurisdiction to issue the April 2026 order. district court erred in staying mother’s motion to modify the three-weekend rule or that staying the motion prejudiced a party, we conclude that any error was harmless. 5 Father argues that the district court’s December 2024 order inserted a new holiday parenting-time schedule that was not merely clerical and that this court agreed with his characterization in Young I. Father is incorrect. In Young I, we observed that, before the October 2024 order, mother “proposed a holiday schedule that alternated placement between most holidays” and that father “proposed a similar alternating holiday schedule.” 2025 WL 3200038, at *1. We did not analyze whether that schedule collaterally changed the parenting-time schedule. Based on our review of the record, the addition of the holiday parenting-time schedule in the December 2024 order did not alter the overall parenting time of either party, and thus we reject father’s argument.
15 We do not consider the April 24, 2026 order for several reasons, including (1) it is outside the record on appeal because it was filed after the May 2025 order, Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 110.01 (stating that the record for an appeal is limited to the documents and exhibits that were before the district court and any transcript of proceedings); see In re Nelson, 495 N.W.2d 200, 202, 204 (Minn. 1993) (ruling the court of appeals should not have considered a letter sent to district court after the ruling at issue on appeal), and (2) it was filed in April 2026, nearly a year after the May 2025 order, so it is not relevant to this appeal. Father is wrong in asserting that the pendency of an appeal automatically precludes the district court from altering the ruling at issue in the appeal. See Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 108.01 (addressing a district court’s ability to act pending appeal); Perry, 749 N.W.2d at 401-03 (same). Previously, both in this appeal and in father’s prior appeal, we cited rule 108.01 and Perry for the idea that the pendency of an appeal does not preclude a district court from acting in the case while the appeal is pending. Young v. Young, No. A24-1922 (Minn. App. Mar. 10, 2025) (order). Despite already having cited these authorities to father twice to reject precisely the argument father makes to us now, we must now—for at least the third time—reject father’s argument that the pendency of an appeal precludes the district court from altering the ruling at issue in the appeal. III. The district court did not abuse its discretion by modifying child support. Father argues that the district court clearly erred in calculating the number of overnights that the children spend with him per year based on the parenting-time schedule and contends that, as a result, the district court miscalculated father’s responsibility for
16 child support. Mother argues that (1) the parties follow a parenting-time schedule that does not establish a specific number of overnights and (2) father forfeited any challenge to child support based on the number of overnights because he did not raise that issue in district court. Modification of child support is governed by Minnesota Statutes section 518A.39 (2024). Section 518A.39, subdivision 2, allows a district court to modify child support upon a showing of a substantial change in circumstances that rendered the existing award unreasonable and unfair. A district court has “broad discretion in ordering modifications to child support orders.” Putz v. Putz, 645 N.W.2d 343, 347 (Minn. 2002). Appellate courts review a district court’s order regarding child support for an abuse of discretion. Id. “A district court abuses its discretion by making findings unsupported by the evidence or improperly applying the law, or delivering a decision that is against logic and the facts on record.” Woolsey v. Woolsey, 975 N.W.2d 502, 506 (Minn. 2022) (quoting Bender v. Bernhard, 971 N.W.2d 257, 262 (Minn. 2022)). We review findings of fact for clear error and the evidence in a light favorable to the findings. In re Civ. Commitment of Kenney, 963 N.W.2d 214, 221 (Minn. 2021). Father maintains that he has 119 overnights each year, while the district court found he has 102 overnights each year. Relatedly, father argues that the district court abused its discretion by effectively modifying his parenting time to 102 overnights and by disregarding mother’s part-time income. We are not convinced by either of father’s arguments, First, father incorrectly assumes that the district court’s calculation of 102 overnights modified the parenting-time
17 schedule. The district court did not modify parenting time in the May 2025 order, and we reject father’s contrary view. In the May 2025 order, the district court stated that the October 2024 order modified parenting time, the children were living primarily with mother, and this was a change in circumstances that rendered the existing child-support award unreasonable and unfair. Father does not challenge this reasoning. The district court therefore based its May 2025 child-support determination on its October 2024 order modifying parenting time. While the October 2024 order established a parenting-time schedule, that schedule does not set out a fixed number of overnights. Second, while father is correct about some aspects of his argument, he reaches a faulty conclusion. Father is correct in stating that the district court found in the May 2025 order that, under the current parenting-time schedule, father “has 102 overnights per year and mother has 263 overnights per year.” Applying parental income for determining child support (PICS) percentages, the district court determined that mother is responsible for 34% of the children’s uninsured medical and dental expenses and father is responsible for 66% of those expenses. Similarly, the district court determined that father’s net child-support obligation is $1125 per month. Preliminarily, in considering this issue, we reject mother’s argument that father forfeited appellate review of the child-support determination based on the number of overnights. We understand father’s response to be that he believed that the parties would negotiate the percentage of overnights each parent would have while in mediation and thus he had no reason to suggest a specific number of overnights. Therefore, we will address father’s challenge to the child-support decision. See Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 103.04 (stating
18 that appellate courts may “reverse, affirm or modify the judgment or order appealed from or take any other action as the interest of justice may require”). We also recognize that applying the October 2024 parenting-time schedule theoretically results in father having 119 overnights, more than the 102 overnights found in the May 2025 order. But this schedule also results in several weekends when father would have the children three weekends in a row, triggering what the decree referred to as the “three-weekend rule,” which requires the parties to make adjustments so that neither parent has more than two consecutive weekends with the children.6 Thus, based on the three-weekend rule in the decree, the children will spend fewer than 119 overnights at father’s home. Still, father argues that the three-weekend rule does not apply to weekends that are not holidays and thus the district court erred because it “expressly . . . declined to modify or apply” the three-weekend rule when determining child support.7 Father misapprehends the district court’s ruling; because the district court declined to modify the rule, it had to apply it. But even assuming that father is correct that the three-weekend rule applies only 6 The decree included the “three-weekend rule,” which was not modified in the October 2024 or May 2025 orders, and described it as providing: “In the event the holiday schedule and parenting-time schedule would result in one parent having parenting time three (3) weekends in a row, the parties will work together to adjust the schedule so one parent only has two (2) weekends in a row.” 7 Father also argues that Young I recognized he had 36% of overnights, which is “final” and therefore governs the calculation of child support. This argument lacks merit. In describing the October 2024 order, this court in Young I stated that the “parties agree that the new parenting-time schedule results in father having 36% of overnights, a reduction from the equal overnight schedule” in the decree. 2025 WL 3200038, at *1. This is a mere summary of the record and is not a determination of parenting time.
19 to weekends that are holidays and therefore the district court erred when it applied the rule to non-holiday weekends, the effect of 119 versus 102 overnights on child support is de minimis and thus harmless error. See Hesse v. Hesse, 778 N.W.2d 98, 105 (Minn. App. 2009) (citing Wibbens v. Wibbens, 379 N.W.2d 225, 227 (Minn. App. 1985) (stating that de minimis error in setting child support is not grounds for remand)). Finally, father argues that the district court did not consider all sources of mother’s income and refers to her part-time job. The district court determined that mother’s gross income was $4,593 per month. Mother’s pay stubs from her full-time job add up to less than that amount. Mother acknowledged at the hearing that she worked part time. Thus, the record supports the district court’s finding of mother’s income, and we discern no error. We therefore conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion or rely on clearly erroneous findings in modifying child support based on the October 2024 order. IV. Father forfeited review of the district court’s decision to strike the parenting-time right of first refusal. Father argues that the district court erred when it eliminated the parenting-time “right of first refusal” without “required statutory findings, without applying best-interest standards, and despite [father’s] express demand for an evidentiary hearing.” The right of first refusal refers to a provision in the decree requiring that the on-duty parent offer the off-duty parent the opportunity to provide childcare before utilizing third-party childcare when the on-duty parent cannot be present during their scheduled parenting time. Mother responds that she and father asked the district court to strike the right of first refusal. Indeed, in a responsive motion filed on June 14, 2024, father asked the district
20 court to strike the right of first refusal. During district court proceedings, father never suggested that he opposed striking the right of first refusal in the decree. Therefore, father forfeited any claim that the district court erred by striking the right of first refusal, and we do not consider the issue further. V. The district court did not abuse its discretion by ordering father to reimburse mother for the children’s expenses. Father attacks the district court’s decision to order him to reimburse mother $3,010.19 for the children’s expenses on two grounds. First, he argues that the district court found that he refused to mediate and relied on that refusal to award mother the children’s expenses. The record does not support father’s claim. Before the February 2025 hearing, mother filed a letter describing her efforts to mediate issues and stating that father “refused” to schedule mediation. During the February 2025 hearing, the district court admonished father, stating it had ordered the parties “to go to mediation” and that father “did not participate in it.” Father responded that he did not refuse to go to mediation. The district court did not find that father “refused” mediation, nor did it refer to father’s refusal to mediate in the May 2025 order. Nothing in the record supports father’s claim that father’s refusal to mediate affected the district court’s decision to order father to pay the children’s expenses. Second, father argues that the district court abused its discretion by ordering him to reimburse mother for the children’s expenses without making related factual findings. He specifically argues, among other things, that the expenses sought “overlapped expenses previously addressed in prior motions.” Mother responds that father “did not provide any
21 counter or rebuttal to [her] request for unreimbursed expenses” and thus father forfeited this issue. In the May 2025 order, the district court observed that the decree requires the parties to “share equally in all of the cost and expenses of all agreed upon extra-curricular and school related activities/expenses.” Mother sought reimbursement from father of $3,010.19 in the children’s expenses. The district court found that mother substantiated that amount in “a detailed spreadsheet outlining the expenses for gymnastics, cheerleading, haircuts, therapy, co-pays for medical expenses, school supplies, and sport-related gear.” The spreadsheet also credited father for other reimbursements he had already made to mother. The district court found that father did “not address, or deny, his failure to reimburse mother,” and therefore it “consider[ed] mother’s request unopposed.” We agree with mother that father has forfeited this issue by failing to challenge mother’s request for reimbursement in district court. See Thiele v. Stich, 425 N.W.2d 580, 582 (Minn. 1988) (stating that appellate courts generally do not consider issues not raised or decided during district court proceedings). Because father did not challenge mother’s reimbursement request during district court proceedings, we do not consider this issue further. VI. The record does not demonstrate that the district court judge was biased against father. Father asks this court to “reassign” this matter to another district court judge. Father concedes that he “does not allege personal or intentional bias” by the district court judge. But father asserts that the district court judge “issued at least one administrative ruling” in
22 the “same subject matter area in which” father works. Father contends that this creates the appearance of bias and that, therefore, any further proceedings on remand must be assigned to a different judge. Father also argues that repeated errors establish judicial bias. Because he provides no authority in support of this argument, we do not consider this argument. See Schoepke, 187 N.W.2d at 135. We presume that “a judge has discharged her duties properly.” Hannon, 752 N.W.2d at 522. “In reviewing claims of judicial bias, [appellate courts] have considered whether the trial judge considered arguments and motions made by both sides, ruled in favor of a complaining [party] on any issue, and took actions to minimize prejudice to the [party].” Id. As discussed above, adverse rulings alone do not demonstrate judicial bias. Id. Rather, bias must be established based on the record as a whole. Id. We conclude that father speculates that the district court judge appeared to be biased because she issued at least one ruling in the “same subject matter area” in which father works. Father provides no argument or evidence that such a ruling indicates bias—he does not identify the ruling or litigation, state whether the case involved him or his employer, or specify whether the judge ruled favorably or adversely. See Schoepke, 187 N.W.2d at 135. Father therefore does not overcome the presumption that the district court judge discharged her duties properly. See Hannon, 752 N.W.2d at 522. Because father offers only speculation to support his argument that the district court judge’s prior ruling in an unrelated matter creates the appearance of bias, the claim fails. Affirmed.
ProvenanceKnow exactly where this document came from.Members see the sourcing behind every authority on DocPost — so you can check the record yourself and cite with confidence.Request access